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ABSTRACT
The thesis critically and empirically examines the development of manufacturing in 
Zimbabwe, through a case study of the metal engineering sector, following the introduction 
of the structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1990/91. Original field research of 
manufacturing firms and supporting organisations was conducted in Zimbabwe during 1995 
and 1996.
A theoretical framework is applied using concepts of institutional legacy and path 
dependency. This provides an alternative approach to use of neo-classically based analytical 
frameworks. It is concluded that orthodox economic approaches are inadequate as a basis 
for improving the prospects for successful industrial development, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. There is a need to improve the understanding of a country’s changing social 
relations, in their historical context. This includes analysing patterns of agency within and 
between institutions and the individuals that comprise them. In part this can be accomplished 
by examining class and power relations and conflicts.
Zimbabwe's structural adjustment programme was not followed by industrial rejuvenation 
and expansion. Firm performance varied in ways that cannot be explained using 
conventional economic approaches. Overall, there has been: a lack of technological and 
organisational improvements and industrial investment; a decline in real wages and industrial 
employment; and, a lack of skills improvement across firms and supporting organisations.
Zimbabwean industrial development suffers from a dislocation of interest between those 
owning most of the productive industrial capital and those formulating policies that affect 
industry. The capitalist class is fragmented between historically established white capitalists, 
and emergent indigenous or black interests. Explanations are offered for the observed 
weaknesses of supporting institutions, including government ministries, training 
organisations and workers’ and employers' organisations.
The findings make a strong case that without better data collection from firms and an 
improved understanding of historical contexts and constraints, policy shifts to promote 
industrial development will not have the desired results. Even though the research collects 
a better data set than previously available, it is difficult to draw the types of definite 
conclusions and recommendations presented by most commentators on the same questions.
2
This thesis is dedicated to my dear partner in all of life’s 
adventures, Andrea and my daughter Hannah, who had the 
grace to wait until the thesis was submitted before appearing 
in the world, and thus was named.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research could not have been completed without the considerable direction, support and 
encouragement I received from my supervisor, John Sender, as well as Ben Fine and many 
other members of the staff and research student body at the Economics Department of SO AS.
I received valuable financial support throughout the thesis from the Economic and Social 
Research Council, as well as fieldwork support from the Central Research Fund, University 
of London.
A number of fellow researchers have read various portions of the thesis and given me their 
valuable comments. They include Padraig Carmody, David Dickinson, Jane Goudge, Simon 
Roberts and Scott Taylor,
I also have to thank the very generous support I received from countless individuals and 
organisations while in Zimbabwe during 1995 and 1996. Most prominent among them were 
Clever Mumbengegwi, Rob Davies and the rest of the staff at the Department of Economics, 
University of Zimbabwe, who allowed me to adopt them as my institutional home during my 
field work. I received special assistance from Edwin Muchapondwa who was particularly 
helpful. Outside of the Economics Department, I received much encouragement and support 
from Peter Hall, Godfrey Kanyenze, Charles Mbohwa, Joe Muzulu, Peter Robinson and 
Edmore Tobaiwa.
I owe much to the many many survey respondents who gave up their valuable time to answer 
my numerous questions. Many from the surveyed firms and other organisations, must remain 
anonymous. Others are recorded in Appendix 3.7.
A number of people assisted in the production of the thesis document itself. My thanks go 
to Bernice and James McNeil and Caroline Sheath. My wife, Andrea, gave me valuable 
editorial and emotional support, despite despairing that I would ever finish.
Finally, I have to note that despite the support and assistance of many others, the thesis 
remains entirely my own work.
4
CHAPTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................... 2
DEDICATION..................................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................4
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....................................................................................................5
INDEX OF TABLES......................................................................................................... 13
INDEX OF FIGURES....................................................................................................... 15
ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................... 17
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND........................................................................................ 18
1.2 THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION
OF THE THESIS.......................................................................................20
1.3 OVERVIEW .............................................................................................. 21
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE................................................................................ 22
2. ANALYSES OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE CONTEXT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
2.1 INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC POLICY SHIFTS ..................................24
2.1.1 Evolution of Policy Framework.................................................... 24
2.1.2 Analysing Industry in Africa under
Structural Adjustment ..........................................................   27
5
2.1.3 ‘ Capacity Building’ and the Importance
of Political Economy.....................................................................33
2.2 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACHING
THE MILLENNIUM.................................................................................38
2.2.1 The Role of Trans-National Corporations
and Globalization...........................................................................40
2.2.2 East Asian Lessons: the State of the Debate ............................... 43
2.2.3 Human Development and Industrial Development..................... 47
2.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................49
2.3.1 Agency, Linkages and Structure: the Importance
of Class...........................................................................................49
2.3.2 Path Dependency, Institutional Legacies and New
Institutional Economics  .....................................................50
2.4 EMPIRICAL GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH........................................54
2.5 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 56
3. M ETH O D O LO G Y
3.1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................... 57
3.2 DATA GATHERING  ..............................................................................57
3.2.1 Engineering Sector Census (“the ES Census”) ............................58
3.2.1.1 Firm Identification.............................................................59
3.2.1.2 The ES Census Questionnaire.......................................... 61
3.2.1.3 Pre-testing and Dissemination of the
Questionnaire.........................................................62
3.2.1.4 The Responses...................................................................65
3.2.1.5 Processing the Census D a ta .............................................. 67
3.2.1.6 Selection of the Case Study F irm s.................................... 67
3.2.2 Detailed Firm Case Studies.......................................................... 69
3.2.2.1 General Data .....................................................................72
3.2.2.2 Production Process Data ...................................................76
3.2.2.3 Employee Survey...............................................................79
3.2.3 Non-Firm Institutional Survey...................................................... 83
6
3.3 ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS....................................................... 87
3.3.1 Engineering Sector (ES) Census Analysis...................................87
3.3.1.1 Factor and Cluster Analysis...............................................88
3.3.1.2 Sectoral Analysis . .............................................................89
3.3.2 Case Studies................................................................................. 91
3.3.3 Institutional Analysis................................................................... 92
3.4 CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................92
4. THE HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE: 1965 - 1990
4.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................93
4.2 MANUFACTURING SECTOR PERFORMANCE:
1965- 1990 .............................................................................................  93
4.3 POLICY DETERMINANTS....................................................................102
4.3.1 The UDI Period ......................................................................... 103
4.3.2 Post-Independence..................................................................... 106
4.3.3 Investment  ....................................................................... 112
4.3.4 Setting the Scene for Policy Shifts............................................. 116
4.4 PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITIVENESS................. 118
4.5 TREATMENT OF WORKERS................................................................123
4.5.1 Wages and Employment Conditions......................................... 123
4.5.2 Labour Relations: the Impact of Organised
Labour ......................................................................................... 130
4.6 TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS ..............................................................134
4.6.1 Skills and Innovation..................................................................134
4.6.2 T raining......................................................................................137
4.6.3 Management Issues and Techniques ......................................... 139
4.7 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 140
5. THE ESAP YEARS
5.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 142
7
5.2 OVERVIEW.OF ANALYSES TO DATE OF INDUSTRY
UNDER ESAP......................................................................................... 142
5.2.1 Orthodox Interpretations ............................................................143
5.2.2 Critical Views ............................................................................143
5.3 OUTLINE OF THE ESAP PROGRAMME ............................................144
5.4 POST-ESAP ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE........................................147
5.4.1 Macro and Sectoral Performance................................................147
5.4.2 Investment..................................................................................151
5.4.3 Exports........................................................................................152
5.4.4 Productivity................................................................................156
5.5 TREATMENT OF WORKERS................................................................157
5.5.1 W ages..........................................................................................157
5.5.2 Employment................................................................................158
5.6 SKILLS .................................................................................................... 160
5.7 CONCLUSION: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF E SA P............................162
PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE ENGINEERING 
SECTOR
6.1 INTRODUCTION  .............................................................................. 166
6.2 SECTORAL OVERVIEW...................................................................... 167
6.2.1 Firm Size ....................................................................................168
6.2.2 Firm Age ....................................................................................169
6.2.3 Trade Orientation.......................................  171
6.2.4 Ownership  .......................................................................... 171
6.2.5 Cluster Differentiation................................................................ 172
6.3 THE CASE STUDY FIRMS: STRATEGY AND
INVESTMENT ....................................................................................... 173
6.3.1 Characteristics of the Case Study Firms ..................................174
6.3.2 Changes in the Domestic Marketplace........................................ 177
6.3.2.1 Market Structure .............................................................177
6.3.2.2 Competitiveness Factors .................................................179
6.3.3 Strategic Shifts.............................................................................. 180
6.3.3.1 Responses to Changes in Domestic
Trading Conditions .............................................180
6.3.3.2 Shifts to Greater Export Orientation .............................. 187
6.3.4 Investment Implications and Impediments ................................. 189
6.3.5 Outcomes, Problems and Constraints ..........................................190
6.3.5.1 Strategic Outcomes .........................................................191
6.3.5.2 Strategy Implementation:Problems and Constraints . . .  192
6.4 ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION....................................................192
6.4.1 Changing the Organisation of Production................................... 193
6.4.1.1 What has been Changed?.................................................193
6.4.1.2 The Changes in D e ta il.....................................................195
6.4.1.3 Sources of Information and A dvice................................ 200
6.4.1.4 Problems Encountered.................................................... 200
6.4.2 The Impact of Organisational Change on Performance...............201
6.5 SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITAL INNOVATION ...............204
6.5.1 Technical Characteristics and Change.........................................205
6.5.1.1 Technology in U se ...........................................................206
6.5.1.2 Technological Change since E S A P ................................ 208
6.5.1.3 Maintenance and Trouble-Shooting
Capabilities .........................................................211
6.5.2 Case Study Firm Skills Portfolios............................................... 213
6.5.2.1 Employment Structure.....................................................213
6.5.2.2 Relative Levels of Experience........................................ 215
6.5.3 Educational and Experience Backgrounds of
W orkers.......................................................................................216
6.5.3.1 Schooling and Post-School
Vocational Training............................................ 217
6.5.3.2 Previous Work Experience ............................................ 219
6.5.3.3 Recruitment Preferences ................................................ 219
6.5.4 Training and Skills Development ............................................... 220
6.5.4.1 Firm’s Approaches to Training ...................................... 220
6.5.4.2 Training Experiences........................................   222
9
6.5.4.3 Skills Learned .................................................................223
6.5.4.4 Training and Skills Changes .......................................... 225
6.6 TREATMENT OF WORKERS................................................................226
6.6.1 Earnings: Influences and Impact ............................................... 228
6.6.1.1 Employment.....................................................................229
6.6.1.2 W ages...............................................................................230
6.6.1.3 Other Earnings Related Influences ................................ 234
6.6.1.4 Other Income Earning Activities.................................... 237
6.6.2 Non-Financial Performance Motivators..................................... 237
6.6.2.1 Health and L eave.............................................................238
6.6.2.2 Recognition, Rewards and Celebrations ........................ 239
6.6.3 Respect and Trust....................................................................... 240
6.6.3.1 Matters of Respect...........................................................240
6.6.3.2 T rust.................................................................................242
6.6.4 Workers’ Collective Representation ......................................... 243
6.7 CONCLUSIONS: PUTTING THE FIRMS TOGETHER....................... 246
6.7.1 Changes in Firm Behaviour....................................................... 248
6.7.2 Performance Outcomes ...........................................   249
6.7.3 Explanations of the Differences   ............................................. 250
7. THE DYNAMICS OF NON-FIRM INSTITUTIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................... 253
7.2 THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY FRAMEWORK IN
THE 1990s...............................................................................................255
7.2.1 Documented industrial Policy Prior to ESAP ........................... 255
7.2.2 Industrial Policy Implications of E SA P..................................... 256
7.2.3 Post-ESAP Industrial Policy Development............................... 257
7.2.4 Assessing the Industrial Policy Process..................................... 260
7.3 POST-ESAP CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT ......................    260
7.3.1 Government................................................................................261
10
7.3.2 Quasi-Government Affiliates...................................   264
7.3.3 Business Organisations ..............................................................267
7.3.4 Science and Technology Organisation....................................... 268
7.3.5 Collaborative Consultative Initiatives....................................... 270
7.4 SKILLS DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS -
CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS................................................ 273
7.4.1 The Changing Structure of Higher Technical
Education and Skills Development............................................ 273
7.4.2 Manpower Development: Control, Consultation
and Funding.................................................................................274
7.4.3 Manpower Development - Administration ................................ 278
7.4.4 Educational and Training Organisations -
Case S tudy ...................................................................................282
7.5 UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS’ ORGANISATIONS -
CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS................................................ 286
7.5.1 Introduction......................................................   286
7.5.2 Labour Relations: The Evolving Institutional
Framework...................................................................................286
7.5.3 The Evolution of National Collective
Bargaining in the 1990s.............................................................. 291
7.5.4 Negotiating the Treatment of Workers in the
Engineering Industry.................................................................... 292
7.5.5 The Engineering Industry in the National
Context.........................................................................................299
7.6 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................302
8. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION.......................    304
8.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK........................................................... 305
8.2.1 The Orthodox Underpinning of “Structural
Adjustment” .................................................................................305
11
8.2.2 Path Dependency and Institutional
Legacies.......................................................................................306
8.3 ASSEMBLING A COMPOSITE EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS .............................................................................................308
8.3.1 Institutional Legacies and Other Characteristics........................ 308
8.3.2 Overall Assessment of Industrial Development
Under ESAP.................................................................................315
8.3.3 Political Economy and Social Relations .................................... 317
8.4 FUTURE PROSPECTS AND POLICY OPTIONS .............................. 318
8.4.1 “Globalisation” and Asian Lessons............................................ 319
8.4.2 Developing Homegrown Approaches ........................................ 320
8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH.........................................................................324
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................................325
APPENDICES
3.1 Engineering Sector Questionnaire........................................................................345
3.2 Case Study: General Survey Questionnaire.......................................................... 347
3.3 Case Study: Production Survey Questionnaire ....................................................358
3.4 Case Study: Employee Survey Questionnaire.......................   367
3.5 List of Organisations Surveyed ............................................................................ 371
3.6 Organisational Survey Questionnaire ...............................   373
3.7 List of Those Interviewed .................................................................................... 376
4.1 Use of Zimbabwe Data ...........................     378
6.1 Case Study Firm Performance D ata  ........................................................ 381
7.1 A Case of Institutional Intertia: the foundry training centre ................................386
12
INDEX OF TABLES
TABLES PAGE
CHAPTER 3
Table 3.1 Frequency by Size of Original Census Sample and
Responses...................................................................................................65
CHAPTER 4
Table 4.1 Manufacturing Sector Average Annual Growth Rates, 1966-90 .............  95
Table 4.2 Government Share of GDP and Employment 1968-1990 ....................... I l l
Table 4.3 Percentage Distribution of Units, Employment and Net
Output by size, 1970 and 1988 ...............................................................  122
Table 4.4 Profit and Wage Shares of Manufacturing................................................126
Table 4.5 Technical Training: Student Enrolments..................................................138
CHAPTER 5
Table 5.1 Relative Production Changes in Manufacturing Sectors: 1990-96 .........  148
Table 5.2 Relative Changes in Manufacturing Sector Exports: 1991-95 ...............  152
Table 5.3 Manufacturing Sector Exports/Gross Output: 1986-93 .........................  153
Table 5.4 Apprenticeship Completed in Selected Years: 1980-95 .........................  161
Table 5.5 Summary Enrolments of all Technical Colleges: 1990s.............  161
CHAPTER 6
Table 6.1 Average Firm Performance by Size Group ........................................... 169
Table 6.2 Average Firm Performance by Age Group ..............................................170
Table 6.3 Typology of Metal Engineering Firms: 1991-1995 ...............................  171
Table 6.4 Case Study Firms: General Characteristics..............................................176
Table 6.5 Distribution of Firms Across the Engineering Sector ............................. 177
Table 6.6 Summary of Shifts in Firm Strategy ........................................................181
Table 6.7 Case Study Firms - Strategic Changes 1991-96 .....................................  182
Table 6.8 Case Study Firms - Organisational Changes 1991-96 ...........................  194
Table 6.9 Engineering Sector - % Firms Organisational Changes 1991-96 .........  194
13
198
202
207
209
212
214
215
217
219
221
223
224
231
233
236
239
241
242
245
Case Study Firms - Team W ork.............................................
Organisational Change and Productivity Outcomes ............
Firm Machinery Characteristics.............................................
Case Study Firms - Technological Changes 1991-96 ..........
Firm Maintenance Characteristics.........................................
Skills Breakdown of Firms’ Workforce.................................
Length of Service in Firm .....................................................
Average Educational Attainment of Workers ......................
Work and Unemployment Experience...................................
Workers’ Perceptions of Firm Training.................................
Workers’ Participation In-House Training.............................
Quality of Instruction/Skills Learned.....................................
Annual Change in Average Real Consumption Wages: 1990s
Average Total Monthly Earnings: 1996 .................................
Hours Worked and Overtime Earned 1996 ..........................
Days Off and Other Health Matters (per worker) - 1996 . . . .
Treatment with Respect.........................................................
Trust Indicators .......... ..........................................................
Union and Workers Committee Membership - 1996 .......... ..
14
. 94
. 96
. 96
. 97
. 98
. 98
100
102
114
124
125
125
128
128
130
147
149
150
150
151
154
156
157
158
158
159
INDEX OF FIGURES
Manufacturing Value A dded ..............................
Manufacturing Volume Production Index..........
Productive Sector Shares of GDP ......................
Investment D etails..............................................
Engineering as % of Manufacturing Value Added
Engineering Value Added by Subsector ............
Manufactured Exports and Im ports....................
Manufactured Metal/Engineering Exports..........
Government Investment as % G D P....................
Real Wages per Employee..................................
Engineering Subsectors: Real Wages ................
Wages as % of Value Added per Worker ..........
Manufacturing Employment ..............................
Minimum/Actual Wage Differences..................
Value Added per Employee................................
Manufacturing Value A dded ..............................
Manufacturing Volume Production Index..........
Productive Sector Shares of GDP ......................
Engineering Value Added by Subsector ............
Investment as % Value Added............................
Manufactured Metal/Engineering Exports..........
Value Added per Employee................................
Real Wages per Employee..................................
Engineering Subsectors: Real Wages ................
Wages as % of Value Added per Worker ..........
Manufacturing Employment ..............................
15
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAG Affirmative Action Group
ACC Advanced Capitalist Countries
ACCOR Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia
ARnI Association of Rhodesian Industries
BTC Bulawayo Technical College
CAD Computer-aided Design
CAM Computer-aided Manufacturing
CIP Census of Industrial Production
CNC Computer numerically controlled
CPI Consumer Price Index
cso Central Statistical Office
CZI Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries
DRC Domestic Resource Cost
DUP Directly Unproductive Profit-seeking Activity
EEAZ Engineering Employers' Association of Zimbabwe
EMCOZ Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe
ERS Export Retention Scheme
ES Engineering Sector
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTDC Foundry Training and Development Centre
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoZ Government of Zimbabwe
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDE Human Development Enterprise
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HND Higher National Diploma
HRDP Human Resources Development Plan
IBDC Indigenous Business Development Centre
IDC Industrial Development Corporation
IFI International Financial Institution
ILO International Labour Organisation
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification
ISO International Standards Organisation
KPS Kawasaki Production System
LRA Labour Relations Act, Act No. 16, 1985
LRT Labour Relations Tribunal
LTPS Long Term Perspective Study
MHE Ministry of Higher Education
MLI Medium to Large Industries
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoL Ministry of Labour
MSI Micro to Small Industries
MVA Manufacturing Value Added
NAMACO National Manpower Advisoiy Council
16
NC National Certificate
ND National Diploma
NEC National Employment Council for the Engineering and Iron and Steel Industry
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council (South Africa)
NEWU National Engineering Workers' Union
NIC Newly Industrialised Country
NIE New Institutional Economics
NIESR National Institute of Economic and Social Research (UK)
NMT New Management Techniques
NPE Neoclassical Political Economy
OGIL Open General Import Licenses
R&D Research and Development
RMSM Revised Minimum Standards Model
RPED Regional Programme on Economic Development
SAZ Standards Association of Zimbabwe
SEDCO Small Enterprises Development Corporation
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SIRDC Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre
SME Small to Medium Enterprise
SOAS School of Oriental and African Studies
TFP Total Factor Productivity
TNC Trans-National Corporation
TNDP Transitional National Development Plan
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID United States Agency for International Development
uz University of Zimbabwe
VTC Vocational Training Centre
WSAB Wages and Salaries Advisory Board
ZABO Zimbabwe Association of Business Organisations
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDB Zimbabwe Development Bank
ZECF Zimbabwe Economic Consultative Forum
ZIC Zimbabwe Investment Centre
ZIE Zimbabwe Institution of Engineers
ZIF Zimbabwe Institute of Foundrymen
ZIMDEF Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund
ZISCO Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation
ZNCC Zimbabwe National Chambers of Commerce
17
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The underlying question which prompted the research recorded in this thesis concerns the 
practical possibilities for the development of a viable manufacturing sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Since independence, manufacturing success has been limited in most of these 
countries. The experience of the implementation of World Bank and IMF-inspired structural 
adjustment programmes across the sub-continent during the 1980s has raised fears of a lack 
of continuing industrial deepening (Riddell, 1993) and, even, de-industrialisation 
(Mkandawire, 1991, Stein, 1992, Lall, 1992). Few signs of dynamic new industrial 
investment or growth have appeared since then.
The development of manufacturing industry has long been regarded as synonymous with 
economic development.1 Industrial development is still seen by many as "the critical agent 
of the structural transformation that marks the transition from a primitive, low productivity, 
low income state to one that is dynamic, sustained and diversified" (Lall, 1992:105). Yet, 
typically, manufacturing has been given minimal attention in structural adjustment 
programmes (Riddell, 1993:217); these programmes have either focussed on primary 
commodity production or have reflected the notion of sectoral targeting.
Zimbabwe, the most industrialised nation in sub-Saharan Africa to have implemented one 
of these programmes, saw its manufacturing sector lose 5 percent of its share of GDP 
between 1990 and 1995 (see Chapter 5). It provides an excellent case study, therefore, of the 
consequences of structural adjustment and the prospects for future industrial development.
In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, the performance of the engineering sector has been a key 
indicator of the increasing depth of industrial development. The engineering sector has 
backward and forward linkages to most other sectors of the economy, producing capital and
1 See, for example, Young, 1928, and Kaldor, 1966, who both emphasised manufacturing as an engine 
of growth, with manufacturing more susceptible than other sectors, such as mining and agriculture, to 
extensive division of labour as markets grow (see also Argyrous, 1996).
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intermediate goods, as well as consumer goods. It forms the focus of the research.
Before proceeding to a detailed examination of any specifics pertaining to Zimbabwe, some 
general observations are appropriate. Structural adjustment policies typically emphasise 
moving to a market price-based incentive system. Following any devaluation, export prices 
should become more attractive relative to domestic market prices, and prices of domestically 
produced tradeables should become more attractive relative to competing imports. Domestic 
production should shift towards tradeables and to more allocatively efficient, labour-intensive 
industries, firms and products, with lower domestic resource costs. The potential problems 
with this expected outcome include: difficulties undertaking new investment due to high real 
interest rates and other financial sector impediments; the removal of quantitative trade 
restrictions and reductions in tariffs opening domestic production to imports, which out- 
compete local products on many criteria, including price (where the imported goods are 
produced in lower cost/lower margin environments); structural difficulties in entering export 
markets for the first time; and a range of problems in taking advantage of new opportunities 
due to a lack of technological capabilities.2
If firms behaved according to the pattern implied by orthodox economic assumptions, they 
would react to changes in prices; alter their firm strategy in terms of product mix and 
production techniques; and, follow this through with changes in firm behaviour. Orthodox 
economics rarely enters the black box' of the firm, however, to explain in detail how these 
changes might occur and how decisions to change firm strategy and behaviour are made. 
New institutional economics attempts this to a greater extent (see Chapter 2). It too has its 
limitations, however.
This thesis examines in some detail what firms in Zimbabwe actually did, in the face of 
changes in economic policy. It attempts to uncover the variety of actually experienced 
change processes at the firm level. The actions of firms were not only influenced by crude 
economic incentives, but also by other institutions involved in the processes of production 
and exchange. These included other firms; non-firm organisations attempting to support and 
assist industrial firms; and, other less visible institutions of influence, including the legal
2
See the critical review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for and against structural 
adjustment type policy packages in Chapter 2.
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framework and business norms.
The thesis examines a small number of Zimbabwean engineering firms, in order to 
understand how industry has developed under the economic policy shifts known as structural 
adjustment.
While the thesis focuses on the period of the first phase of Zimbabwe’s Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) during 1990-96, there are occasions where more recent 
events throw light on the earlier period.
1.2 THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS
The central question, about how paths of industrial development are affected by certain types 
of economic policy change, can be divided into a number of sub-questions. Each of these is 
examined in the thesis. They are:
i. What have been the main determinants of the pattern of industrial development in 
Zimbabwe, from UDI onwards? How successful was it prior to the introduction of 
the various liberalisation and other policies, collectively known as ESAP, in 1990?
ii. Why have some manufacturing firms achieved better results than others, on a variety 
of performance criteria, during that period? What are, and have been, the main 
influences on the behaviour and performance of Zimbabwean industrial firms?
iii. How has the institutional framework surrounding and underpinning industry in 
Zimbabwe been contributing to and/or detracting from industrial development?
iv. What are the prospects for industrial deepening in Zimbabwe and how can deepening 
be encouraged?
The core thesis is that these questions can only begin to be answered once it has been 
recognised that the orthodox approach to solving the problems of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa through structural adjustment programmes is fundamentally flawed. Such
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programmes cannot promote viable industrial sectors, which are essential to guarantee more 
dynamic economies. The orthodox approach cannot take into account many of the key 
constraints and influences that shape the way that development actually occurs. This failure 
arises because of the methodological limitations of the economic theory employed by the 
Washington based institutions.
This research is unique in its empirical application of an institutional approach based on the 
use of institutional legacies and path dependence as tools of analysis to better understand the 
dynamics of policy formulation, implementation and the responses of economic agents. 
Original primary data were collected from a census of the engineering sector, case studies of 
ten manufacturing firms and interviews with representatives of non-firm organisations 
supporting industrial development in Zimbabwe, during a nine month period in 1995-96. The 
data were analysed using a combination of institutional tools, while taking into account 
agency, linkages and structure in a dynamic way to improve the understanding of 
development processes and constraints.
1.3 OVERVIEW
The thesis concludes that orthodox economic approaches are at best partially useful in 
understanding processes of industrial change. Such approaches are inadequate as a basis for 
improving the prospects for successful industrial development, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The thesis offers a critical alternative to new institutional economics, drawing on literature 
from an older institutional perspective and examples of empirical analysis in economic 
history. Theoretically, it is found that there is a need to improve the understanding of a 
country’s changing social relations, in their historical context . This includes analysing 
patterns of agency within and between institutions and the individuals that comprise them. 
In part this can be accomplished by examining class and power relations and conflicts.
Applying this approach to Zimbabwe reveals that the structural adjustment programme has 
not been followed by industrial rejuvenation and expansion. Neither has de-industrialisation
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occurred in all sectors. Instead, firm performance has varied in ways that cannot be explained 
using conventional economic approaches. Overall, there has been: a lack of industrial 
investment and technological improvement; poorly understood and implemented efforts to 
adopt imported organisational improvements; a decline in real wages and industrial 
employment; and, a lack of major efforts to improve skills and human resource capabilities 
across firms and supporting organisations.
Zimbabwean industrial development suffers from a dislocation of interest between those 
owning most of the productive industrial capital and those formulating policies that affect 
industry. The capitalist class is fragmented between historically established white capitalists, 
and emergent indigenous or black interests. These are in conflict, which negatively affects 
the ability of industrial capitalists to lobby effectively for their interests. Various 
explanations are offered for the observed weaknesses of supporting institutions, including 
government ministries, training organisations and workers’ and employers’ organisations.
The findings make a strong case that without better firm data collection and an improved 
understanding of historical contexts and constraints, policy shifts to promote industrial 
development will not have the desired results. Even though the research collects a better data 
set than previously available, it is difficult to draw the types of definite conclusions and 
recommendations presented by most commentators on the same questions.
1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The second critically assesses the literature on a 
number of areas related to the core subject. These include various interpretations of 
industrial development and economic policy shifts, with particular reference to African 
countries under structural adjustment. The chapter also looks at the possibilities for industrial 
development at the end of the twentieth century, with a particular focus on lessons from East 
Asia. This is followed by a search for an appropriate theoretical framework, which 
encompasses examination of agency, linkages and structure, as well as the use of path 
dependency and institutional legacy as critiques of new institutional economics.
The third chapter outlines the methodology applied in conducting the fieldwork data
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collection.
The following two chapters present a historical perspective on the evolution of industrial 
development in Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 covers the period from UDI in 1965 to the launch of 
ESAP in 1990. Apart from a broad overview of industrial development, several areas are 
highlighted, which provide the basis for the analysis of institutional legacies in later chapters. 
These include: policy determinants; production efficiency and competitiveness; the treatment 
of workers; and, the development of skills and technology. Chapter 5 examines and 
interprets data on the changing fortunes of industrial development during ESAP, following 
1990. The chapter also briefly appraises other interpretations of that period.
Chapters 6 and 7 present and analyse the original empirical content of the thesis. The first 
of these examines the changing behaviour of firms in the 1990s, both from the Engineering 
Sector (ES) Census of the engineering sector as a whole, as well as from the much more 
detailed analysis of data collected from case study firms. The second assesses the changing 
behaviour, functions and roles of a number of the most important non-firm organisations in 
or related to the engineering sector.
In Chapter 8, the conclusions of the thesis are presented. Various strands which are explored 
in the earlier chapters are drawn together in this chapter to present a unified analysis of the 
patterns of industrial change in Zimbabwe during the 1990s. Some suggestions concerning 
the prospects for future industrial development are presented alongside various policy options 
to improve those prospects. Finally, several areas are recommended where further research 
could add value to Zimbabwe's efforts to improve the development of its manufacturing 
sector.
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2. ANALYSES OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Since the independence of many developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, there have 
been various perspectives on how best to encourage their industrialisation. More recently, 
there has been a limited amount of research that aims to analyse the consequences for 
industrial development of structural adjustment programmes. This research contributes to 
this analysis. Debates on industrial development have also been shaped by the experiences 
of the late-industrialisers in East Asia, as well as by studies of the impact of trans-national 
corporations and globalisation on industrialisation prospects. This chapter will review this 
literature.
The approach of the thesis is primarily empirical (see Chapter 3), but it is important to spell 
out the theoretical underpinnings of the approach being taken. The aim is to apply an 
institutional approach to the subject, which takes into account agency, linkage and structure. 
The importance of using the tools of political economy to improve understanding of 
institutional dynamics is highlighted throughout. Concepts of path dependency and of 
institutional legacies are developed as the fundamental theoretical tools for the research. A 
number of empirical studies have attempted to use similar approaches, or examine similar 
questions. These provided the inspiration for this thesis and are reviewed in the last section 
of this chapter.
2.1 INDUSTRY AND ECONOMIC POLICY SHIFTS
2.1.1 Evolution of Policy Frameworks
Structuralist approaches to policy-making were adopted by many developing countries during 
the 1960s. Governments, often newly independent, saw the need to make up for various 
structural deficiencies associated with their 'underdevelopment'. The prevailing wisdom was 
that without doing this, developing nations would be condemned to a marginal life on the 
periphery of an economic system dominated by advanced capitalist countries (ACCs). The 
potential for catching up with the ACCs was limited without the industrial development 
required to counter the impact of continuously deteriorating terms of trade for their primary
24
commodity exports (Mytelka, 1989). Structuralism was associated with policies of import 
substitution, which required government regulation of exchange (prices, wages, exchange 
rates, imports etc.) to create a protected environment for the emerging manufacturing sector.
During the 1970s, a groundswell of opinion started to build, which was critical of public 
intervention, especially in the form of protection, in support of industrialisation.1 It was 
argued that interventionist policies had caused more problems than they solved. The 'market', 
notwithstanding various imperfections it might still have had in developing countries, was 
seen to have fewer serious failures than those brought about by the economically wasteful or 
directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUPs) of rent-seeking elites dominating 
national state and power structures.2 Consequently, in the 1980s, with the onset of the debt 
crisis, IFI-led policy packages were promulgated throughout the developing world. Demand 
reduction (stabilisation) policies were to redress short-term macro-economic imbalances. 
Economies were to be restructured on the supply side, over several years, through structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs).
Apart from reductions in public expenditure, SAPs were typically a package of liberalisation 
measures aimed at moving various 'factor' and product markets (for inputs and outputs, 
labour and finance) away from inefficient outcomes. Inefficiencies were seen as resulting 
principally from price distortions maintained by inefficient state interventions. In their 
earliest and simplest formulation, the programmes were designed to get prices right, giving 
incentives to economic agents to participate more efficiently in the various markets. SAPs 
usually included measures to downsize most organisations in the public sector. 
Government's role in directing the economy was to be limited to creating an enabling 
environment for private economic agents to maximise their utility functions.
The measures were predicated on the belief that autonomous economic agents acting to 
maximise their own utility in efficiently operating (where prices reflect scarcities) and 
unfettered markets (without unnecessary government interventions) would also maximise
1 This grew out o f studies by Balassa in the 1960s, which found that faster export growth was negatively 
associated with higher levels of protection (see Balassa (1965) and reference to his work in Edwards 
(1997)).
2 On rent-seeking see Krueger, (1974), on DUPs see Bhagwati, (1982) and see critique in Section 2.1.3 
below.
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social utility (Lall, 1995). The emphasis was on ensuring that the process of exchange works 
effectively. Production choices flowed in a deterministic way from incentives created in the 
market. This belief was based on a raft of restrictive assumptions, the challenging of which 
forms the basis of many of the critiques of the approach.
Serious criticism was also provoked as a result of SAPs’ failure to improve the plight of most 
of the economies in which they were implemented, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Some 
of the principle problematic features were the failure to increase productive investment, 
alleviate poverty and provide more productive employment for the majority of the 
implementing country's population. Initially, the response to these criticisms was to broaden 
the scope of the programmes with the addition of infrastructure, education and training 
components. More recently, components were tacked on to SAPs to reduce the negative 
social effects (White, 1996:790-1). Influenced by the experience ofthe East Asian countries, 
more emphasis was placed on the need to have effective research and policy-making 
organisations within government. Capacity building programmes were being promoted 
alongside or as part of SAPs, at the same time as civil services were being cut as part of fiscal 
discipline (Ravenhill, 1993). Overall, however, there was no fundamental re-think away 
from neo-classical economic orthodoxy as the foundation of the most appropriate approach 
to economic policy making. The underlying belief is still one centered on the need to get 
markets working as effectively as possible. More and more subsidiary policy initiatives are 
added to SAPs to deal with the inherent contradictions and consequent problems that, 
unsurprisingly, arise in trying to make that happen.
Many assessments of structural adjustment have been made during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
World Bank has undertaken a number of cross-country evaluations of its lending experience. 
Two of the most recent are Adjustment in Africa (1994) and Structural and Sectoral 
Adjustment: World Bank Experience 1980-92 (Jayarajah and Branson, 1995). Their general 
analysis is reflected in that on the industrial impact, reviewed below.
Critiques of the impact of SAPs have been provided in many papers and books over the past 
decade and a half. Many of these are covered in literature reviews by van der Geest (1994), 
and White (1996). Various problems with SAPs are highlighted, as well as problems in 
assessing their impact. The latter include difficulties with projecting the past in before-and-
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after analyses, problems in constructing convincing counterfactuals, and difficulties in 
attributing causality to the changes that do happen in the face of a lack of a convincing 
theoretical base (White, 1996:792). The theoretical problems at a macro level are tackled 
critically by Tarp (1993), who indicates the limitations of the implicit constructs used in the 
World Bank's Revised Minimum Standards Model (RMSM) ,3 For example, in the model, 
growth is driven by investment, which is driven by savings. The SAPs finance is to fill the 
savings gap. The critical problems are assumptions of constant technology, explanatory 
variables omitted, and behavioural models which are far too simplistic.
Mosley, Subasat and Weeks (1995) point out that the regressions which form the basis of the 
conclusions reached m Adjustment in Africa are problematic to replicate from the same data 
and subject to significant variation if similar, but different data are used. Lall (1995:2023-26) 
conducts a similar exercise using alternative data and produces much less certain and 
significant results than the World Bank. Even when he does find that the growth of 
manufacturing value added (MVA) is higher in policy-improving countries, he suggests that 
this merely reflects differences in macro-management, but says nothing about causality. 
These critiques, often themselves poorly founded theoretically, have yet to be taken seriously 
by the IFIs, which remain stubbornly committed to the essentials of elements their orthodox 
approaches, despite the efforts of the Japanese (Wade, 1996).
At present, therefore, we are at a watershed between the growing realisation that the approach 
adopted for the last decade and a half has failed to produce the anticipated results and the 
adoption of an alternative approach. This thesis aims to contribute to the search for an 
improved understanding of what is required to encourage industrial development in sub- 
Saharan Africa in general and in Zimbabwe, in particular,
2.1.2 Analysing Industry in Africa under Structural Adjustment
Views o f the World Bank
Several examinations of industrial performance under structural adjustment have been made
3 For an insight into the lack of consistency between the IMF short-run (Polak) model and World Bank’s 
long-run RMSM model, see Fine (1994).
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during the 1990s. The World Bank's multi-country studies cited above include reviews of 
impact. Within the Bank's framework, trade policy reforms are perceived to be the main 
instigator of improvements in the manufacturing sector. Typically, this view has led to the 
adoption of a combination of measures to liberalise access to imports (improving access to 
foreign exchange, eliminating non-tariff barriers and reducing tariff barriers), and to 
restructure incentives to promote exports, including through devaluation (see World Bank, 
(1994) Chapter 3). These have been complemented by the removals of price and other 
controls on goods, labour and finance, as well as anti-monopoly measures in some countries. 
In practice, however, it is only rarely that "adjustment programmes remove barriers to entry, 
exit, or expansion" (Jayarajah and Branson, op: cit: 188), or directly tackle other structural 
constraints at the sectoral level.
The Bank's findings tie improvement in industrial and manufacturing growth to the adoption 
of improved macroeconomic policies (World Bank, 1994:149-152). Jayarajah and Branson 
(op: cit) identify negative impacts on industry of declines in the provision of public 
infrastructure and the negative impact on investment of high real interest rates. However, "a 
period of slowdown or even reversal of sectoral growth may be perfectly consistent with 
increased efficiency of resource use in the industrial sector" (ibid.: 191). Most successful 
adjusters were found to have better implemented their policy shifts. De-industrialisation is 
rejected on the basis of evidence of "much activity particularly among smaller enterprises not 
included in official statistics" (World Bank, 1994:149).
Relatively dynamic performance, as well as higher tendencies to invest, to export and to 
employ higher skills, of newer enterprises, are cited in Adjustment in Africa as cause for 
optimism about industry's prospects. Yet, it is certainly not evident that many small 
enterprises are either sustainable firms, or capable of growing beyond their small size. New 
enterprises will only be able to enter competitive markets if they have some advantage over 
the existing participants. The former grow quickly during their start up phase, as they expand 
to fill the market space their advantage offers. Over time, these advantages erode as existing 
firms react to the new entrant, or as other newer and yet more dynamic firms enter. What is 
of greater importance, therefore, is the performance of the more mature firms, which continue 
to employ the great bulk of the industrial workforce. Neither of the recent Bank documents 
provides conclusive evidence concerning the impact of the reforms on such firms. Indeed,
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more generally "serious research on the impact of structural adjustment on industry is scarce. 
This applies in particular to impact studies of medium and large-scale industries" (de Valk, 
1994:235). Jayarajah and Branson suggest that to discover definitively why some countries 
have fared better than others requires detailed study of individual cases (ibid.: 195).
The World Bank launched the Regional Programme on Enterprise Development (RPED) in 
the early 1990s. It has carried out firm level surveys in several African countries. These 
surveyed panels of firms over three consecutive years examining many aspects of firms' 
behaviour and performance. A number of cross country reports have been produced to date 
(including Biggs, Shah and Srivastra (1995), Biggs and Srivastra (1996), and Biggs and 
Raturi (1997)), as well as a number of country-specific analyses, including several on 
Zimbabwe (see Chapter 4 below). The implications of firm level studies are mostly 
commented on in the comparative sections in the firm level analysis assessed in Chapter 5.
The RPED results have been reported on subsequent to Adjustment in Africa. Biggs, et. al. 
find that "there is considerable heterogeneity in the average technical efficiency of firms" 
(ibid: 1995:61). Some firms appear to be highly efficient, while average efficiencies tend to 
be significantly lower than comparators from Asia and Latin America. Efficiency is 
improved by developing production and investment capabilities through learning 
mechanisms, although in most cases these are very weak. There is also considerable 
evidence of downsizing among larger firms (especially in two of the four countries reported 
on), which the authors find “troublesome” (Biggs and Srivastava, 1996:45). It is suggested 
that "it is becoming clear that microeconomic factors are critically important in conditioning 
the speed and response to policy reform." (Biggs and Raturi, 1997:2). Through the use of 
econometric estimates of orthodox production functions, technological capabilities of 
workers and managers are identified as being major determinants of firm level productivity. 
This analysis identifies such determinants as important, however, so that the data can fit the 
regression. The focus then shifts to how to improve these capabilities. It is implied that the 
overall policy framework is satisfactory, although cautious support is given to infant industry 
arguments (ibid.:33). Most recommendations are aimed at individual industries and firms.
Most of the detailed research is useful for comparison with the data collected for this thesis, 
and is reviewed below. Most of the published comparators from the RPED research to date
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are based on the first round of surveys only and, apart from size changes, provide a static 
picture. Very little information has been published on changed practices under SAP reforms.
Critical Perspectives
A comprehensive review of critical literature is provided by de Valk (1994). Typically, 
critics suggest inadequate attention is paid to structural weaknesses which are the root of the 
problems of industrialisation in Africa (Lall, 1992, Stein, 1992). Riddell explains the 
industrial growth seen from the mid-1960s to 1980 in several case study African countries, 
as resulting principally from growth in domestic demand (1990c:33-35). SAPs with their 
downward pressures on real wages, and moves to higher prices in deregulated goods and 
capital markets, directly depress domestic demand and therefore domestic manufacturing.
The most pessimistic critics suggest SAP policies ’’are likely to de-industrialize, forcing 
countries into a problematic reliance on resources and agricultural exports" (Stein, 1992:86). 
Interest costs of foreign loans, and foreign inputs costs escalate considerably with 
devaluation. Domestic financing costs escalate with financial liberalisation. Cuts in publicly 
funded infrastructure expenditure inhibit export-oriented manufacturing. With moves to an 
uncontrolled foreign exchange market, competitive consumer goods are often imported, 
instead of now more expensive capital and intermediate goods. (ibid.:88-9). These imports 
put pressure on domestic producers to cut costs to compete, rather than taking advantage of 
cheaper equipment to invest in improving their productive efficiency.
The Bank agrees some firms and sectors are likely to be losers, as resources are reallocated 
(see above). White asks when is this efficient and when is it de-industrialisation (1996:798). 
Regardless of problems over the definition of'de-industrialisation', this is a difficult question 
to answer. Implicit in the concept is the notion that some African countries had achieved a 
certain level of industrialisation, which is doubtful. Even in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
substantial proportions of the officially recorded manufacturing sectors are processing 
industries immediately downstream from primary production.4 Put more subtly, SAPs 
"have had little success, except for the greater utilisation of capacity permitted by newly
4 See Fine and Rustomjee (1996) for discussion of “manufacturing” definitions in the context of South 
Africa.
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available foreign exchange. While important in the short-run, greater utilisation of capacity 
cannot be a source of sustained growth in total factor productivity" (Pack, 1993:4). Nor is 
a positive output response necessarily a sign of improved efficiency (White, 1996:799). 
While the macro-stability pursued through adjustment policies may well be necessary, further 
industrialisation requires additional investment in productive activities.
The lack of industrial investment is one of the greatest problems that has beset many 
countries going through structural adjustment. For Mkandawire "too few skilled wealthy 
entrepreneurs exist to rationalise denationalised parastatals or exploit incentives to 
manufacture tradeable goods. Unable to use the state ... African economies await, in the 
absence of indigenous capital, the arrival of foreign investors who remain skeptical about 
export-oriented industrialisation in Africa" (1991:147). The implication of this view is that 
accumulation remains problematic in many African countries. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly 
the case that accumulation is taking place in some sectors of the economy and that, in most 
African countries, financial institutions can recycle savings. The questions are whether 
sufficient funds can be generated for new productive investment and, if so, why that 
investment is not taking place.
Many critics have reverted to the implicit structuralist beliefs that markets could assist in 
solving many of the problems, if only their structural weaknesses and imperfections could 
be corrected. Otherwise, government failures are again replaced by market ones (Lall, 
1995:2022). Unfortunately, in sighting their criticism, there is a temptation to set up the 
World Bank as something of a monolithic strawman. The portrayal of the implications of 
the orthodox assumptions can thus be rather crass (for example, see ibid.:2020-21). 
Nonetheless, the criticism of the partial nature of the neo-classical orthodoxy underpinning 
SAPs is not misplaced. Changing price incentives at best may only be part of a solution. 
Attention is also required purposefully to develop capabilities and institutions (Lall, 1993), 
in order to create a national system of innovation (Freeman, 1987). Such an approach 
implicitly calls for a more gradual and longer term approach to the development of policies 
for industrial development, and "institutional change as a pre-requisite for strengthening 
innovative activities" (Andersen and Lundvall, 1988:12).
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Higher levels of technological capabilities are required to improve the productivity of new 
investment (Lall, 1992, 1993 and 1995, and Enos, 1991).5 In sub-Saharan Africa, these 
capabilities have been inhibited from developing by the inadequate development of 
managerial, technical and entrepreneurial skills. The latter are complementary capabilities 
to the technological ones. Without them and without a range of supporting organisations, it 
can be exceedingly difficult to enter into activities with more complex technologies. While 
the highlighting of technological capabilities themselves does not move us away from an 
extension of orthodoxy (Biggs, et. al., 1995), critics emphasise that liberalisation alone is 
fundamentally ill-equipped to address skills shortages and technological deficiencies (Lall, 
1995:2027-28).
Many varied institutions are required to support the development of firm level capabilities 
in such areas as export development, industrial standards and training, and technology (Lall, 
1992:121). Typically these have also not developed, partly as a result of the scarcity of skills. 
Supporting organisations are poorly managed and funded. They are not well linked with the 
firms they are intended to support. Many of the SAP changes contribute to these weaknesses. 
For example, cutting education and health programmes negatively impacts the volume and 
efficiency of their delivery,6 and, thus, the development of human capabilities required to 
boost productivity.
Many critics also agree that given the variety of structure and experience between different 
countries, the best way of improving our understanding of the relationship between SAPs and 
industrial development is through more detailed individual case studies (Lall, 1995:2024). 
This is part of the rationale for the focus on Zimbabwe in this thesis.
Drawing from the East Asian examples (see below), many critics have identified the need for 
the formulation and implementation of effective industrial strategies (de Valk, 1994:236 and 
Lall, 1995:2027). This implicitly requires a more active role for public institutions, which
5 While the development of technology is a major contributor to industrial development, this is not a 
principle focus of attention here, as it has played a relatively small role in Zimbabwe's recent industrial 
experience (see Chapter 6).
6 See indicators for health and education changes in Zimbabwe in the 1990s (World Bank, 1996a) 
revealing that there was a sharper decline in the delivery of health services than in education delivery.
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implies "the launching pad of any reform must be improvement in government capabilities 
themselves" (de Valk, loc. cit.).
Shortcomings
In any review of literature on industrial development under adjustment in Africa, a number 
of deficiencies or unresolved areas become apparent. There is near universal agreement that 
SAPs have not been as successful in boosting an industrial supply response as was initially 
hoped, although the extent of their shortcomings varies significantly depending on the 
perspective of the commentator. There is scope for more detailed case study work at the 
level of the individual country and individual firms to establish more precisely what exactly 
has been happening, particularly to pre-existing medium and larger enterprises.
Overall, the literature raises some serious questions about whether the changes in relative 
prices can achieve very much at all. As Amsden (1997) has pointed out, the recent 
preoccupations of most development economists with trade and fiscal policies has led to very 
little focus being given to micro-economic questions of production. Much greater attention 
has to be paid to the institutional framework supporting industry. What is missing from most 
of the above analyses, is a sense of why the economic agents that are formulating and 
implementing policies should decide to act in ways that are most supportive of industrial 
development, and to develop institutions and their capacities accordingly. Further 
discussions relating to this are covered within political economy literature.
2.1.3 'Capacity Building' and the Importance of Political Economy
One of the unresolved contradictions within the debates around SAPs concerns the role of 
the implementing agencies. For government to implement policy change well, even within 
the neo-classical view, access to good data about what is happening in the economy is 
essential. Government organisations need to be able to utilise the data to improve the 
predictability of the environment for private economic agents, enabling them to make rational 
choices. Government needs to be able to make and implement effective policies. 
Furthermore, implementation needs to be monitored and corrective action taken, if policy 
outcomes are not in accordance with expectations (or aspirations).
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It is certainly not clear a priori that, for a government which has demonstrated low or 
declining capacity in the past, cutting its budget and the size of its public service is the best 
way of improving its capacity. For example, to privatise state assets efficiently, without huge 
subsidies to the potential purchaser, requires the government to rationalise existing 
operations. If it can achieve this, it is not clear why it should not be able to run the 
organisation efficiently over time. This requires a careful examination of the details of the 
institutional capacity to formulate and implement policy.
The emphasis on issues of capacity is related to questions of why government organisations 
should be efficient or not; what might be the motives of those running them; what interests 
they might represent in their broader society (see above); and, how all of this might affect a 
government's ability to develop and implement economic policies. The orthodox approach 
underpinning SAPs has suffered from the lack of a convincing theory of the nature of the 
state and its role in and relations with society. Consequently, despite an emphasis on 
developing better policies, as well as institutions within public and private spheres, within 
orthodoxy (and for many of its critics), there are no clear proposals as to how this is to be 
done, by whom and why this should be more effective than past efforts.
The structuralist critiques have also added little to our understanding of the dynamics of the 
state. At their best, they are good at identifying what the government should be doing better 
in order to develop institutions with more effective capabilities, as well as what those 
institutions should be doing. It is suggested that capabilities cannot be built quickly, and 
considering the low level of capability in most sub-Saharan African countries at present, few 
answers are provided as to how to move from the current situation to a better one. For Lall 
the answer is that for the short term it may be better to allow the market to play a greater role 
(1992:126). There is evidence from South Korea, however, to suggest that it is possible to 
develop public capacity relatively rapidly, through leaming-by-doing (Chang, 1994).
Furthermore, structuralist approaches do not address the issue of what might encourage 
policymakers in trying to implement policies and practices aimed at improving the prospects 
for industrialisation. A strong assumption of benevolent political leadership is frequently 
made. Without addressing the political forces that might lie behind and influence the 
orientation of that leadership, such an approach begs the key questions.
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The political economy o f Adjustment and policy change
New or neoclassical political economy (NPE) arose partly as a result of a desire within 
orthodoxy to expose the reasons why active economic involvement by government is often 
apparently associated with poor economic management; why policy shifts are hard to achieve 
and are not implemented fully; and, why even once implemented, they may be subject to 
reversal. All of these have happened in sub-Saharan African countries implementing SAPs.
NPE has populated the state with the same type of rational, self-seeking, atomistic, utility- 
maximising individuals,7 that populate neoclassical economics (for example, see Srinivasan, 
quoted in Meier (199 la: 5)). The state is seen as a tool of exploitation for the benefit of the 
dominant groups within it (Findlay, 1991). Consequently, it is important to have its influence 
on economic life kept to a minimum to limit opportunities for rent-seeking by these groups 
and for engaging in DUPs, such as lobbying government officials and policy makers to give 
favours. DUPs are seen to be activities which waste resources in pushing redistribution, 
rather than in productive income generation. As noted above, such theories underpinned 
attempts by the IFIs to reduce the role of the state in conjunction with the implementation of 
most SAPs.
There are a number of problems with NPE.8 These include its static character. In most 
variants, there is no theory to account for changes in the influence of dominant groups and 
power and, therefore, changes of policy orientation from within the government. Thus, as 
with the structuralist views noted above, there is "no logically apparent means of moving 
from bad to better (apart from) the exogenous introduction of wise statesmen or technocrats 
who are above petty political rationality" (Grindle, 1991:58). The shortcomings in this regard 
include the omission of patterns of accumulation in a particular setting, which would give an 
economic dynamic to the purely political issues around challenges to and transfers of power 
(Chang, 1994:21). NPE also tends to omit consideration of'institutional variation', which 
influences and restricts a variety of ways in which social groups are able to influence those 
in government (Haggard, quoted in Meier, 1991b:272-3).
n
In new political economy, what is maximised may be presented as power or votes. Effectively this is
the equivalent of utility, as it also gives access to resources.
See Chang, 1994 for an excellent typology and critical overview.
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Rent seeking need not be socially wasteful. Rent seeking in some form will occur as long 
as governments exist and implement policies (Rodrik, 1993:20). For capitalists, the 
opportunity to gain short-term monopoly rents is one of the main drivers of Schumpeterian 
innovation. Moreover, an important way for capitalists to communicate their needs is to 
lobby government. There is a difference between rent-seeking, and rent-finding, however. 
The former can assist in developing more appropriate and supportive policies to meet 
industries needs, while the latter, when it takes the form of gaining long term and unchecked 
monopoly power, can be destructive.
Bureaucrats may not be purely self-seeking either. Depending partially on locally established 
norms and the history of local public institutions, they may exhibit public spiritedness and 
organisational loyalty. Equally, this cannot be assumed. Political principals may need to 
provide benefits to individuals and groups throughout the political hierarchy, which would 
mean that bureaucrats' interests might well be compromised (Grindle, 1991). Removing the 
rational self-interest assumption reduces the deterministic nature of the NPE analysis and 
opens it up to the possibility of great variation in the explanations of political economy 
outcomes. This again calls for a much more specific analysis of particular institutions and 
circumstances to improve any understanding of policy decision making.
These contrasting perspectives were part of the debates, concerning the relative merits of 
state regulation versus market regulation of the economy, which flourished through the 1980s 
and early 1990s (see for example, Evans et. al. (1985), and Colclough and Manor (eds.), 
(1991)).
After 1989, with the publication of the Long Term Perspective Study (LTPS), (World Bank 
1989), issues of governance were raised for the first time (Callaghy, 1993:477). Initially the 
major concerns were building policy formulating capacity at the same time as diminishing 
opportunities for corruption. These soon translated into concerns about improving the 
prospects for both political and economic liberalisation. This is of less relevance to 
Zimbabwe, which has not experienced any form of significant political liberalisation.
Nonetheless, there is nothing deterministic about the relationship between the political 
system, democratic or other, and the types of inter-linkage and patterns of agency between
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those in government at the political and executive levels and the rest of society. The lack of 
improvement in adjustment programmes following so-called democratic transitions in a 
number of African countries in the early to mid-1990s has disappointed the IFIs and their 
backers (see Williamson and Haggard (1994), Gordon(1996) and Bienen and Herbst( 1996)). 
This has led to further interest in the relative effectiveness of relevant institutions (including 
those of government and markets). Whether a regime is democratic or not, for effective 
policy making, there appear to be requirements for institutional effectiveness as outlined 
above. Yet, noting that the capacity of institutions may not be dependent on the type of 
political regime does not provide an answer to the question of how governments can be made 
to work more effectively to promote industrial development.
One approach has been to examine how government organisations can at the same time 
improve their effectiveness and be more responsive to the needs of their social partners in 
industrial development. Evans (1992) developed the concept of "embedded autonomy" to 
explain why the East Asian "developmental states" were able to be successful. According 
to this view, those making policy in government were kept distanced from rent-seekers, in 
order to maintain their autonomy, and yet were close enough to their broad society to be able 
to respond to its needs in a timely fashion. This concept is based on a contradictory mix of 
bureaucratic insulation and intense immersion in surrounding social structures (for a 
summary of critiques, see Fine and Rustomjee (1996:58-63)). This view separates the state 
from the class interests represented through it and even suggests that "class structure must 
be seen, at least in part, as the product of the state action" (Evans, 1992:179). Yet, this begs 
the question of how those dominating state institutions develop their interests, which leads 
back to an examination of the relationships between the evolution of class forces and state 
institutions (which are explained in more detail below).
More recently, much effort has been placed on improving the analytical account of the state 
and the nature of its relationship to society and economic development (see Fine and 
Stoneman (1996) and Fine and Rustomjee (1996)). In its best formulations, this has moved 
beyond the state: market dichotomy. It is the dynamics of the relationship between those 
active in the market and the individuals and organisations in government, that differentiates 
one setting from another and that will influence economic prospects. This is explored further 
in the theoretical section below.
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Shortcomings
Most critics of NPE do not provide an explanation of the diverse motivations of different 
economic agents, individually, or collectively. They assume that, not only are there publicly 
motivated political leaders and bureaucrats (see above),9 but that these individuals can 
establish a position of dominance within the public institutions in order to introduce their 
proposed policy changes. It is further assumed that there can be sufficient separation of the 
government (or these benevolent individuals within it) from parasitic elements within wider 
society, to successfully carry out its programmes. The empirically driven need to combine 
this autonomy with social embeddedness shows up the emptiness of such analysis, unless its 
foundations in an analysis of class relations and conflict is taken seriously.
To some extent Chang (1994) gets close to moving beyond this, when he mentions the need 
to examine patterns of accumulation. Yet, while he does not mention the need to examine 
shifts in class and power relations, investigating such shifts might provide a more satisfactory 
understanding of agency (see below).
There is a need to clarify the dynamic relationships between institutional behaviour and 
change. This can only be done effectively, if at the same time the influences of the prevailing 
patterns of agency within the relevant institutions and social structures are ascertained. 
Without this, the exercise becomes little more than a descriptive process, examining various 
institutional structures. • It would lack any possible pragmatic prescriptive power. The 
following theoretical section includes a further investigation of these matters.
2.2 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT APPROACHING THE MILLENIUM
This section addresses the question of what is considered possible for industrialisation in an 
international context. Much has been made in the literature of the difficulties of trying to 
industrialise at the end of the twentieth century. In the so-called “age of globalisation” and
9 See Grabowski, for example, who ascribes the pursuit of post-independence import substitution policies 
to "coalitions o f individuals who held highly idealistic views of their responsibilities to their fellow 
citizens" (1994:420).
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high speed travel and communications with few barriers to trade, most market opportunities 
have been used up by large TNCs based in the ACCs and the late industrialisers. These firms 
have built up significant competitive advantages, which become effective barriers to entry 
to firms from less developed nations trying to compete. Yet, as can be seen below, there are 
others who disagree about the extent of globalisation and its potential impact, suggesting that 
there is still considerable scope for domestic policymaking to have an influence (see Weiss, 
1997).
Similarly, many look to the examples of late industrialisation elsewhere, especially in Asia, 
and suggest that the reasons that it worked there provide lessons from which to apply learned 
wisdom to Africa. Others dismiss any potential relevance, suggesting that the conditions 
which pertained to support industrial development in East and South-East Asia were very 
particular, in terms of initial conditions, time and place.
Both debates are briefly examined, in order to assess the prospects for their relevance to, and 
implications for, industrial development in Zimbabwe. This is of particular relevance in two 
ways. Stoneman suggested, during the late 1980s, Zimbabwe was growing rapidly with a 
viable domestically controlled alternative to structural adjustment type policies (1992:107). 
He characterised that policy framework as "a more democratic and less single-minded version 
of the NIC model" (1995:7). If this was so, it makes the experience of the 1990s all the more 
unfortunate, but may offer some directions for the future. Secondly, the resolution of the 
matters raised in these debates is likely to have a veiy strong role in delimiting the options 
that Zimbabwe and its government might consider for the future.
Much emphasis has been placed on the important contribution skills development can play 
in industrial development.10 Yet, there has been considerable disagreement about the reative 
effectiveness of various institutional frameworks for skills development. Attention is paid 
to the role of skills and other aspects of human development in the development of industrial 
enterprises. These become the focus of much more detailed attention in the firm and 
organisational case studies presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
10 See for example Middleton, et. al. (1993), Chapter 2.
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2.2.1 The Role of Trans-National Corporations and Globalisation
Most of Zimbabwe's older and larger industrial firms were either established by foreign- 
based firms, or by capitalists from other countries, mostly the United Kingdom and South 
Africa (Clarke, 1980). As a result, international capitalists have played a dominant role in 
shaping the pattern of Zimbabwe's industrial development. Those firms established by 
resident foreigners cannot be regarded as the same as TNCs. Essentially they function as 
local firms. Such capitalists may, however, be less inclined to reinvest their surplus in the 
host country. A concern arises therefore about the relative merits of different patterns of 
relationship between foreign and local firms in promoting industrial development.
Trans National Corporations
Much of the structuralist literature on the role of TNCs in the 1960s and 1970s emphasised 
problems caused by their exploitative nature, as they transferred national wealth by stealth.11 
Research on transfer pricing, inappropriate levels of capital intensity, a lack of technology 
transfer and training, the supplanting of local opportunities for accumulation (Fine, 1997:42), 
and remittance of profits led to hesitation in encouraging new foreign direct investment 
(FDI).12
In the 1980s, as part of the spread of economic orthodoxy through structural adjustment 
programmes, and with a decline in domestic saving, the emphasis moved to looking to 
international capitalists and TNCs in particular, as possible sources of capital (both financial 
and human) and modem managerial and technical input.13 Capital inflows from this source 
were seen as essential to take over and rehabilitate nationalised firms, as well as to provide 
new investment, employment creation and foreign exchange generation. It has been noted 
that many NICs developed with limited direct involvement by established TNCs (Nayyar,
11 See Helleiner (1989) and Rasiah (1995) Chapter 2, for an excellent overview of literature on 
transnational corporations, or foreign manufacturing capital. Hirschman (1977) was a structuralist 
writer who emphasized the more positive benefits of foreign capital.
12 This was clearly seen in post-independence Zimbabwe (see Herbst (1990) and Chapter 4 below).
13 See Rasiah (1995:9-12) for an exposition of the neoclassical arguments in favour of the spread of 
foreign manufacturing firms.
40
1978). Consequently, there has been a lack of consensus on the pros and cons of TNCs and 
local capitalists in promoting industrial development.
Classical Marxists have emphasised positive impacts on host countries, including the 
reduction of dependent ties to the advanced countries (Warren, 1973 and 1980), and the 
introduction and cheapening of technology (Emmanuel, 1982). Unlike neoclassical 
proponents, they suggest, however, that the ability to gain from such advantages is dependent 
on the particular political economy of the host country and the local government's ability to 
extract advantages from the foreign firms. Such writers have been, however, unable to 
indicate how states could benefit from TNCs, without destroying infant local firms.14
The relative merits of and relations between TNCs and local capitalists have been examined 
by Jenkins (1987 and 1990). He found that TNCs tend: to concentrate in the more capital- 
intensive and advertising-intensive branches of industry; to import more (from their sister 
firms); and, to pay higher wages. Yet, apart from these static differences, nothing is 
deterministic about the relationships between TNCs and local firms, or their respective 
performances. The presence of TNCs has lead to attempts by domestic firms to respond to 
their competition by adopting similar production techniques and emulating other behavioural 
characteristics. Local technological upgrading has also occurred where TNCs sub-contract 
elements of their production, requiring higher standards from their local suppliers (Rasiah, 
1995:26). These factors may have helped prepare those firms to compete internationally 
themselves.
For Rasiah, it is the superior productive capacity and access to market outlets which enable 
TNCs to play a positive role in industrialisation (1995:40).
Globalisation
The concept of globalisation is associated with reducing international barriers to capital 
movements; increasingly flexible production technologies, which could relocate production 
more easily; industries becoming increasingly concentrated internationally as globally
14 See Rasiah (1995:36-40) for a more detailed exposition of these views.
41
competitive corporations develop stronger competitive advantages and consequent barriers 
to entry; and, increasing competition between national governments for attention by TNCs 
(United Nations, 1992). As a result, a prevailing view developed in the early 1990s, that 
individual national governments were becoming increasingly powerless to discipline 
international capitalists. Accordingly, public policy should limit itself to investing in training 
and infrastructure to provide a more enabling environment in order to attract international 
capitalists.
Thus, orthodoxy emphasises the difficulties of creating new viable and internationally 
competitive enterprises locally and, hence, the importance of encouraging FDI by TNCs as 
the core route to industrial development. It also suggests, in a curious echo of dependency 
theory, that individual governments should not try to discipline TNCs too much, or countries 
will not attract new TNCs and may lose those they already have.
Recently an increasing groundswell of skepticism and doubt about the respective merits, 
validity and inevitability of globalisation has begun to appear (see for example, Hirst (1996), 
Rodrik (1997), Fine (1997), Pauly and Reich (1997) and Weiss (1997)). Such critics argue 
that the commitment of most TNCs is still to their national bases, as evidenced by the 
location of their research and development and strategic planning functions, as well as by 
where they turn when they need political backing. Furthermore, most manufacturing activity 
still takes place within the ACCs (Hirst, 1996:33). Pauly and Reich suggest that "the 
institutional and ideological legacies of distinctive national histories continue significantly 
to shape the core operations of multinational firms" (1997:3). This certainly does not imply 
TNCs are beyond the boundaries of being open to guidance and disciplining by national 
public institutions, in order to utilise them more effectively to support national development 
efforts. How this might be done will vary from place to place and industry to industry, 
depending on various institutional characteristics.
Internationalisation - rather than globalisation - presents opportunities for institutionally 
strong states to reap advantages from being able to push their firms and industries, and 
"assuming a dominant role in coalitions of states, transnational institutions, and private sector 
groups" (Weiss, 1997:24). Thus, extracting advantages from FDI will depend on the local 
institutional framework and the political economy of the local relationship between those in
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government and local and international capitalists. Fine suggests "only a case study approach 
can unravel the complex net effects of inward investment" (1997:44).
Much of the literature seems to overlook the differences between host countries dealing with 
TNCs with existing investments and those countries’ efforts to attract new FDI, It may prove 
to be substantially easier to exercise discipline over existing "sunk" investments than over 
firms considering new investment in a number of alternative locations. The latter can 
persuade potential hosts to effectively bid against each other to attract them. In Zimbabwe, 
with a preponderance of long-standing investment by TNCs, this difference becomes 
important (see Chapters 4 and 5).
2.2.2 East Asian Lessons: the State of the Debate
The development paths of the East Asian countries have not been homogenous. The North 
eastern countries, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have grown distinctly more quickly since 
the early 1960s, than the South Eastern countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia 
(Chang, 1997). Nonetheless, the latter group have also experienced more rapid growth and 
industrialisation extent than most other countries during the past four decades. The particular 
characteristics of those paths vary significantly from country to country. Nonetheless, for 
over a decade, analysts have been trying to characterise more generally what has made 
several countries in the Asian region so comparatively successful (see for example, 
Scalapino, Sato and Wanandi (eds.) (1985), World Bank (1993), Chang (1994), Rodrik
(1995)). There have been efforts recently to extract lessons for Africa from the Asian 
experiences (see, for example, Robinson and Tambuntertchai (1993), Brautigam (1994) and 
Stein (ed.) (1995)).
There are many possible lessons from East Asia concerning late industrialisation. This work 
attempts to encapsulate the major areas of the debate, which are relevant for the examination 
of the Zimbabwe experience. The lessons emerge from the policies and strategies 
themselves. They also arise in terms of the political economy frameworks which enabled 
those policies to be developed and implemented successfully. Each of these is examined in 
turn.
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Strategies and Policies
Much of the literature encounters a difficulty in defining what is meant by “industrial policy”. 
For the World Bank (1993), it means the use of policy instruments selectively across 
industries. This implies that trade policy when applicable to all goods is not industrial policy, 
but if selectively applied it is. The World Bank's approach has been identified as inherently 
problematic and contradictory by a number of authors (see Amsden (1994), Lall (1994), Stein 
(1995a) and Wade (1996)). It seems to make more sense to embrace all types of policies 
affecting the manufacturing sector, whether selectively focussed within manufacturing or not.
Chang (1997) gives an up-to-date overview of the evolution of the analyses of the major 
factors which are used to explain the success of the NICs. It is now accepted by substantial 
numbers of authors from a variety of perspectives that there were significant government 
interventions which assisted in propelling the pace of industrial development in many Asian 
countries above that in other regions. Among what is usually known as trade policy, these 
included a combination of infant industry protection with export promotion at an early stage. 
The latter was conducted through a wide variety of support mechanisms, including subsidies, 
finance, information, and quality control. The export dimension was important to circumvent 
constraints on capturing economies of scope and scale in domestic markets of limited size, 
and to generate sources of foreign exchange. The latter would finance imports of technology 
to continue catching up to international best practice.
On the industrial policy side, Chang (1997) identifies some areas of particular importance in 
addition to the familiar state-sponsored development of infrastructure, education, and 
research and development, as well as the recognition of key industries to target for 
development. These include the control of luxury consumption in the early stages of 
development, the regulation of entry and capacity, as well as other more direct promotional 
measures to assist in the capture of scale economies domestically, while firms are learning 
to become competitive exporters. The control of levels of competition was a particularly 
important way of increasing scale and productive efficiency at the cost of reduced allocative 
efficiency. Chang suggests the latter costs are a small fraction of the opportunity costs 
forgone if scale economies are not achieved (ibid.:21).
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Rodrik (1995) makes a convincing argument that the critical factor in enhancing growth in 
South Korea and Taiwan was the sharply increased levels of investment in the early 1960s. 
This was more important than the growth of exports. Exports accounted for a relatively low 
percentage of GDP in that period, and thus could have been responsible for only a small 
fraction of overall growth until the mid-1970s (ibid.:68). Similarly productivity spillovers 
from exports could also only have been responsible for a small proportion of growth. While 
Rodrik falls into the trap of accounting for the good performance as a result of positive initial 
conditions (see below), he does indicate the importance of government's role in creating the 
investment boom.
There is no space here to debate the relative merits of export-led versus investment-led 
development. Both strategies have a role to play. The Zimbabwe case study examines what 
happened to both exports and investment since 1965 to understand better where some of 
Zimbabwe’s problems may lie. In both cases, there is also the need for effective institutions 
to lead and implement the adopted policies.
Institutions and Political Economy
There is an implicit and unjustified bias in orthodox views. The latter portray the 
development of efficient government institutions as inherently more complex and 
problematic than the development of efficient market institutions. Yet, the best empirical 
research on East Asia contradicts such views. A number of authors have highlighted the 
advantages of: “getting the prices wrong”, to create opportunities for accumulation, in order 
to provide incentives and resources for investment; coordinating investment across industries 
in order to maximise the benefits of potential linkages (see below); and promoting various 
sectors in turn, as other parts of the world achieve greater competitiveness in those areas 
already established (see Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Akyuz and Gore (1996) and Chang 
(1994 and 1997)). However, a number of other countries (especially in Latin America) tried 
to use similar policies with a notable lack of success. Thus, while in principle copying 
policies may not be too complex, in practice adopting other countries’ policy frameworks and 
implementing their policies is more so.
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The Asian success in implementation appears to have been a combination of the dynamic 
capacity of the public organisations themselves, as well as facets of the way that government 
organisations were integrated into wider society.15 The lessons need to be extracted at two 
levels, therefore. These include accounting for organisational successes, and examining the 
political economy of particular countries. The former requires attention to organisational 
capacity, professionalism, and motivation of those people staffing the public sector (see, for 
example, Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995) and Slater and Jackson (1996)). The public sector 
also has to place a high priority on economic performance (Rodrik, 1995:91).
Political economy arguments include the need to identify patterns of agency in economic 
management. The problems with arguments ascribing success to state autonomy have been 
noted above. Yet, little of the critical literature moves beyond this. For example, Stein 
(1995a) pays little attention to the reasons favouring a dynamic approach to development in 
the NIEs, so that state-administered policies could be developed and implemented. Rodrik 
stresses the importance of the relatively low inequality of income and wealth (ibid.:92). 
Although this helps explain the difficulty of monopolisation of the state structures by 
particular class, Rodrik still reverts to autonomy to explain the insulation of policy 
implementers from pressure groups. He does, however, highlight the separation of the 
political leaders from the bureaucrats, which enabled the former to monitor and supervise the 
latter and ensure they did not choke off entrepreneurial initiative by "sticking too closely to 
the letter of the law" (loc. cit.). Yet again, he encounters the problem that the supervision had 
to be on the basis of lobbying from the business community, but does not fully explain why 
this was able to promote efficient interventions, rather than inefficient ones. Thus, there 
appears to be room for further analysis of what determined the development of the particular 
political economies in the NICs and what enabled those countries to develop efficient and 
effective institutions to support and implement their industrial policies successfully.
Many more orthodox arguments have been made about the more favourable initial conditions 
in Asia, in terms of well educated and competent bureaucrats in East Asia, and the implicit 
difficulties in replicating those conditions (World Bank, 1993,6). The conditions had been 
developed themselves, however, by earlier governments. At the end of World War 2, the 
NICs were not nearly as distinctively endowed as they were 15 years later (Chang, 1997).
1S These exhibited considerable variety (Whitley, 1992)
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Development of the NICs institutions was not as unique as is sometimes portrayed. The 
development of institutional capacity was pushed through relatively quickly (Chang, 1994). 
Arguments against the possibility of a similar development happening in some African 
nations, therefore, are less solid than they first appear. From the perspective taken in this 
thesis, it is impossible to address the questions of institutional reliability or adaptability 
without a more detailed examination of particular national institutional frameworks and 
histories. This is attempted in the analysis below.
Finally, relatively little attention is paid in the above literature to the relations between either 
government or business and organised labour in the Asian countries. Emphasis was given 
to keeping real wage increases below productivity increases and repressive policies were 
implemented towards organised labour (Brautigam, 1994:125). However, there was strong 
emphasis on improving the social wage by controlling prices of wage goods, and through the 
provision of social goods (Stein, 1995b: 11). Overtime, wages have "risen relatively quickly 
in response to and in order to induce productivity increases" (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996:35). 
Again, as with the other policies, there was considerable variety over time and across 
countries. Productivity improvement was based on both technology improvement and on 
increasing skills, to improve technological capabilities. Government organisations typically 
played a major role in promoting both of these.
2.2.3 Human Development and Industrial Development
The term “Human Development” has been coined by Standing to encompass an integrated 
system of labour practices which are compatible with firms' dynamic efficiency and 
profitability (Standing, 1995, Standing et. al., 1996). This embraces skills, social equity, 
economic equity and democracy. Human Development Enterprise (HDE) indices can be 
constructed to reflect a firm’s relative behaviour on these various criteria. To date limited 
information supports the view that firms with higher HDE scores have higher labour 
productivity, employment and higher unionisation (Standing, 1995:24-26).
The most basic components of the HDE are that firms should provide good opportunities for 
skills acquisition. The magnitude of skills development is not a guarantee of quality, 
however, or of who is being trained (Smith, 1995). Nonetheless, a range of research has 
demonstrated positive linkages between higher levels of skills and those of most important
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ingredients of industrial development, namely productivity and technological change.16 
Shackleton (1992) points out the difficulty of international comparative research and 
variations in training requirements across industries, which mean that more training is not 
always better. The negative impact of structural adjustment on training needs has also been 
postulated (Lucas, 1994). But as with the HDE analysis, few writers have yet attempted to 
examine these issues empirically.
It is not just the level and quality, but also the type of skill which is important. Lazonick has 
advanced the concept of the 'skill base', as the "foundation on which people engage in 
collective and cumulative - or organisational - learning" (1997:1). It is argued that Japan's 
international success relative to the United States resulted from its investment in broader and 
deeper skill bases. This, like the HDE index, is in turn related to issues of corporate 
governance and organisational integration. Lazonick provides preliminary historical 
evidence to demonstrate that it was the separation of the responsibility for technological 
development from shopfloor workers in the US and its integration with shopfloor work 
practices in Japan that contributed to the superiority of the Japanese in many industries.
/
Institutional aspects of skills development are also important. The more common constraints 
experienced by training organisations internationally include: inadequate financing; weak 
information links with employers; organisational fragmentation; overly rigid curricula; and 
weak management with limited autonomy (Middleton et. al, 1993:194-201). Publicly 
supported training can perpetuate itself, by creating institutions that then have to justify their 
role and depend on funding allocations for skills development. They lobby for increased 
funding allocations, by emphasising the gains available from increased skills development 
(Shackleton, 1992:77-79). There are also free rider problems associated with publicly 
supported programmes. Private provision only may lead to a lack of necessary programmes, 
however, due to collective action problems. Due to information constraints, quality problems 
may still arise with privately run programmes.
A number of theoretical issues arise in this analysis. These include for example the need to 
separate standard distrust of state organisations by private interests, from other more country- 
specific institutional characteristics. These are explored in the next section.
16 See for example, Daly, Hitchens and Wagner (1985), Steedman and Wagner (1987), Prais (ed.) (1990), 
Haskel and Martin (1993) (examining the impact of skill shortages), and Wood (1995).
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2.3 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Neoclassical analysis is predicated on the activities, preferences and expectations of the 
individual, rational, self-interested, utility-maximising economic agent. Such axioms give 
rise to many difficulties, particularly because they abstract from social relations, time and 
place. Any one of these might constrain, or influence the behaviour of individual economic 
agents, so that the assumptions widely applied by followers of orthodoxy are not tenable.
Structuralist analysis in its purer forms is based on the actions of and events occurring in a 
society, industry, or organisation as a whole. Often the motivating factors that propel these 
structures to action is absent, implied (the assumed benevolence of government wanting to 
develop its society), or ignored.
In contrast to these perspectives, this thesis uses as its theoretical foundation the proposition 
that social evolution results from a dynamic, non-deterministic, dialectical interaction of 
individuals and collective social structures, including firms, classes and other institutions.
2.3.1 Agency, Linkages and Structure: the Importance of Class
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) use the debates on South Korean industrialisation to demonstrate 
the concepts of linkage and agency. The former is a structural feature (albeit dynamic - 
ibid.:30) that indicates association between different activities, events or sectors (derived 
from Hirschman (1977)). By itself, however, without taking agency into account there is no 
opportunity of understanding causality, or the reasons that linkages do or do not appear. 
Within orthodox economics, agency comes from the atomistic individual. In structuralist 
analyses, agency (which is difficult to observe) comes from the structures being linked to one 
another. In a dialectical view, agency needs to take into account that impulses for change can 
come at different times from individuals and from social forces, structures or linkages. The 
use of class satisfies this latter criterion. Tracing the evolution of class assists in 
understanding the motivation of individuals and groups representative of class interests 
within the state and society (for example, trade unions or business associations).
Fine and Rustomjee argue that it is impossible to see the state constructed independently of 
the prevailing class structure, which conclusively dispels the myth of the state's autonomy. 
As such, external forces are instrumental through the state in alliance with particular class 
interests (ibid.:47). While there may be institutional constraints on individual actions
temporarily, the class which has, or gains, access to power will be able to change them and 
therefore the characteristics of the state. Gramsci suggested that the limits of the possible 
social actions are constrained by and constituted within the prevailing social structures, but 
those structures "can themselves be transformed by collective action" (Gill, 1991:55). 
Dominant classes can, through the state, also actively reshape class composition in order to 
entrench their position further. This process may be inhibited by institutional circumstances 
(see below).
Direct observation of the empirical assessment of social change and change in class forces 
is complex. The state is not a single entity, but is composed of both politicians and 
bureaucrats, who exist in many different institutions and organisations. It is unlikely that 
classes will be represented through each of these in the same way. This gives rise to conflicts 
and rivalries within the state. Similarly markets also comprise a range of institutions: in 
goods markets, for example, there are organisations that buy and sell; those that provide 
information on quality and prices; and, those that represent producers’ and consumers’ 
interests.
In order to make an assessment of social changes and their implications for economic 
outcomes, it is necessary to examine concrete events and situations in a particular society. 
One way of doing this, which is adopted here, is to analyse changes in the principal 
institutions that comprise social structures and relations.17 This has the advantage of leading 
us directly to potentially pragmatic recommendations to promote industrial development.
2.3.2 Path Dependency, Institutional Legacies and New Institutional Economics
One of the fundamental precepts of a critical institutional approach is that markets and their 
constituent institutions do not evolve naturally (see Polanyi (1944) for an early expression 
of this idea and more recently, Hodgson (1988)).18 They require adequate definitions of 
property rights, a reliable legal system and the recognition of established codes of business 
practice. This opens a potential role for government to influence the development of 
industrial organisation and other modem market-related organisations. "[Bjusiness
17 See Chandler (1990), Lazonick (1991) and see Dugger and Sherman (1994) for a comparison of 
Marxism and radical institutionalism.
18 Hodgson describes as Panglossian the assumption that everything that exists naturally is good 
(1993:197).
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organisations, not individuals play the central role in the production and distribution side of 
the market. Understanding how the state can promote different industrial structures to 
encourage more rapid growth and innovation would seem to be an important part of the 
strategy for Africa's future." (Stein, 1995b:5-6) In Asia, industrialisation was facilitated 
through a variety of government-led initiatives (ibid.: 14-18). Markets develop, thus, as a 
result of the resolution of conflicts in the determination of economic policies and of 
government's capabilities to limit or control stagnant forces and enhance technologically 
dynamic ones.
The call for a prominent role for government to assist in promoting more effective markets, 
does not necessarily move us away from a neoclassical perspective, however. Writers from 
a New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspective certainly acknowledge the importance of 
the institutional frameworks for markets (North, 1990). It is the World Bank, after all, which 
has been leading calls for public sector capacity building, alongside SAPs, in the 1990s. In 
a curious example of ideological slippage, neoclassical theorists identify a role for public 
regulatory authorities to ensure that excessive market power is restrained. Surely, if effective 
markets were naturally occurring, this would not be required. The need for competition and 
regulatory policy suggests that the tendency towards increased concentration is actually 
natural - hence the possible need for it to be restrained. What distinguishes NIE, however, 
is the prime role attributed to prices (Stein, 1994).
A critical examination of institutions leads to factors other than those related to prices and 
markets emerging as important. For example, one of the key Asian success factors at the 
micro level was the development of organisations that were "able to encourage loyalty and 
trust" (Stein, 1995b: 17). In Korea and Japan, for example, this was done through the 
development of large interlocking conglomerates (for an African example, see Brautigam 
(1997)). Trust and loyalty are also important within the firm. Firms with stronger trust and 
loyalty relationships encourage workers to be less self-seeking and opportunistic, which can 
improve the chances of the firm's success (Hodgson, 1988:211).
Within the broad neoclassical fold, the focus on institutional factors/transactions costs in NIE 
provides an extra set of tools in analysing policy issues. The only difference from a purer 
neoclassical position is that rational individual behaviour takes place against a background 
of institutions with transactions costs. Rational individuals are still assumed to want to 
minimise those costs (see, for example, Matthews (1986)). There have been a number of
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efforts to increase the complexity of NIB.19 Yet, one of the inherent problems for 
practitioners of NIE is the difficulty of empirically validating the concepts (see Coase, 1993). 
In attempting to operationalise transactions costs (see Williamson, 1993), imputation and 
ascription of assumed costs has to be made, which may or may not approach the true costs 
of undertaking a particular transaction.
This thesis does not aim to make a profound critique of NIE, although it does use an 
alternative institutional analysis, based on fundamentally different premises than NIE. Many 
critiques of NIE approaches are already available. These include, for example, in relation to 
development, Stein (1994) and Harriss, Hunter and Lewis (eds.), (1995); in relation to 
business organisation, and in particular focussed on Williamson’s work, Lazonick (1991); 
highlighting the implications of Williamson's neglect of social relations, Granovetter (1985), 
and, for a collection on various aspects of transactions cost economics, Pitelis (ed.), (1993). 
However, few critical approaches have been applied to the use of empirical evidence by 
developing countries.20 This thesis attempts to start to address that gap.
One alternative to NIE is a structuralist approach. Hodgson, for example, sees that "the study 
of institutions offers a means of examining the basis of routinised action from the viewpoint 
of the system as a whole." (Hodgson, 1988:10).
In the dialectical approach taken in this thesis, there is neither emphasis on the primacy of 
the individual or of society. Giddens notes "The basic element in society is not the abstract 
individual, but the social individual, who is both constructive within and constructed through 
society" (1979:374/5). Such a dialectical approach sees institutions as social entities, having 
separate dynamics from those of the individuals which form them. Neither has initial 
primacy of existence or causality over the other. Institutions create recognised habits and 
routines, which guide and influence individual behaviour. For example, firms do this within 
durable organisational structures, embodying skills and experience with which to establish 
continuity, as the personnel within the firm changes (Hodgson, 1988:208). Yet, institutions 
are also subject to change according to the actions of those individual agents that comprise 
them. Revealing and understanding the dynamics of this dialectical process as it occurs
19 See Williamson (1985) for one of the classic works ofNIE and Hodgson (1988) and Lazonick (1991) 
for critical appraisals thereof.
20 Stein's useful article is a theoretical piece. Van Arkadie (1990) and Bangura (1994) are among those 
who have critically examined the disfunctionality of public institutions in developing countries. Both 
papers lack empirical specificity.
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within the manufacturing sector is the task of this research.
To accomplish this, detailed studies of particular institutions are required in order to 
understand how conflicts between institutions, classes and individuals are resolved. 
Economic policy-making and change does not take place in a vacuum, but in a particular 
historical setting. "[Historically rooted institutions ... frame the choices of individuals and 
structure the terms of which issues such as agency problems and contact problems are 
confronted" (Zysman, 1994:245). Relevant institutions range from norms of behaviour, 
which may influence the way that contracting takes place, to firms themselves, which 
develop routines in productive behaviour.
As a result of diverse histories, therefore, the pattern of social relationships in production and 
exchange varies from society to society. The latitude for making effective policies is 
therefore constrained and defined by the particular evolution of institutions in a particular 
society. Understanding the nature of these constraints allows us to assess the prospects for 
the possibilities for success of particular policy shifts.
Institutional histories shape the nature of society at all levels, from the macro to the 
individual firm or worker. Yet, there is nothing deterministic about the various institutional 
forms that evolve. For example, "[l]abour relations systems that embed powerful centralised 
national movements (Sweden) and systems that are part of a weak national labour movement 
(Japan) have supported rapid growth and productivity improvement" (ibid.:256). The social 
institutions of most interest are those which do not alter radically with each change in power. 
Zysman suggests that "while policy and corporate patterns are not immutable, they are deeply 
entrenched" (ibid.:259).
It is not clear in this approach, however, what it is about the institutional heritage that may 
constrain change in one situation and not in another. Of particular interest to this research 
is the question of what determines and maintains the established institutional habits and 
routines and, therefore, how they might be changed. Here this research returns to the above 
analysis of agency and linkages. While the identification of institutionally rooted path 
dependence is dynamic and assists us in understanding the prospects for, and some of the 
constraints on, factors around potential change, it cannot analytically address the question of 
change without bringing in agency. Accordingly, Zysman (1994) and Antonelli (1997) both 
look at how agents and structure (institutions) interact.
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Much of the path dependency literature has been used to derive improved methods for 
examining patterns of technological change and structural change at industry and firm levels 
(see Zysman and Antonelli). Antonelli, for example, extends the structure-conduct- 
performance approach to industrial organisation, with the addition of a recursive feature, 
where the conduct chosen on the basis of existing structures may feed back and change the 
structure itself (1997:652). This creates, for example, the possibilities of dynamic barriers 
to entry, but falls short of being a dialectical approach.
The path dependency concept provides a way of understanding dynamics, but has most often 
been used to improve understanding of change in the advanced countries, where markets and 
institutional patterns are already well established (if not immutable). Below this approach 
is used as part of the foundation for an empirical examination of industrial change in a less 
sophisticated institutional environment. In order to integrate the concept of path dependence 
with the particular focus on its institutional aspects and bringing in the use of agency to assist 
in understanding mechanisms of causation, the term “institutional legacies” is used to 
characterise the approach.21
2.4 EMPIRICAL GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH
In this final section, there is a brief review of some of the empirical literature which strongly 
influenced fieldwork undertaken for this thesis. The methodology derived from these studies 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Few case studies attempt to understand how patterns of industrial development change in 
response to changes in economic policy. Most of the studies cited in Section 2.1 above rely 
on aggregated data and lack the depth of insight to be gained from analysing the diversity of 
individual firm experiences. Many of the more detailed case studies tackle particular themes 
in firm performance. For example, a number of studies examine the development of 
technological capabilities under structural adjustment (for example, Biggs et. al. (1995), and 
Lall et. al. (1994) on Ghana). However, it is not clear that technological capabilities alone 
are fundamental to industrial development. Freeman (1987) suggests it is also necessary to 
look at the way in which resources are managed and organised.
21 Although this term has not been widely found in literature, a recent paper has highlighted its use in 
a different application (Hamann, 1997)
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Much empirically based literature over the past decade has discussed the advent of so-called 
“post-Fordism” and “lean production” or “flexible specialisation”.22 One of the problems 
with these concepts is that "they are overly flexible and insufficiently specialised" (Sayer, 
1989:666). Many critics suggest these authors have not identified significant shifts in 
capitalist development, but rather ways of intensifying work and putting extra pressure and 
stress on workers to perform (see Sayer (1989), Brenner and Glick (1991), Smith (1994) and 
Lloyd (1994)). While the latter sets of arguments appear to have a great deal of merit, what 
is not in dispute is that changes in organisational and management practices are continually 
taking place. Many recent studies, including those by Best (1990) and Schmitz (1990), 
highlight international changes towards increased production flexibility, greater 
democratisation, continuous incremental innovation, industrial districts and the development 
of a cooperative and participatory atmosphere within firms. These studies provide important 
guidance to the direction of empirical research in this thesis.
Most firm level studies undertaken by economists conduct econometric estimates of various 
types of production functions.23 This approach is rejected here on the grounds of 
methodological inadequacies; it is too open to assumptions determining outcomes and is 
incapable of addressing the issues of interest to this research. Typically, these studies are 
theoretically driven, and therefore assumptions about the outcomes drive the variables 
examined.
There are examples of firm level studies which do not approach their subjects this way. For 
example, Middleton, Ziderman and Adams (1993) provide a useful summary of research 
linking skills to productivity, although this is biased towards matters of vocational training.24
On other labour matters, there has been a variety of work conducted. More orthodox 
analyses of labour markets under adjustment are contained in Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar 
(1994). An approach much closer to that followed here is Standing, Sender and Weeks
(1996). More relevant studies in this field are referred to in the following chapters.
7 ? In addition to those mentioned above, see Piore and Sabel (1984) and Womack, Jones andRoos (1990) 
for some of the key works.
23 See, for example, much of the work coming out of the RPED surveys.
24 See also Wood (1995) and further discussion in chapters below.
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Another research tradition, in particular driven by economic history and other social sciences, 
is the case study approach (see Reid (1987), Chapter 3). This uses primary data collected in 
the field to generate and validate theories and drives the research process followed in this 
thesis.25
Given the theoretical importance of understanding institutional histories, several economic 
histories of industries and national industrial development prove particularly useful. Mass 
and Lazonick's work on the decline of the British cotton industry (1990) identified problems 
with changes in work and organisational practices in the context of path dependency or 
institutional legacies (or “rigidities” in their terminology). Other studies based on detailed 
data collection and attempts to understand patterns of agency include Fine (1990), Clarke 
(1994) and Shapiro (1994).
2.5 CONCLUSION
There have been deficiencies in the analytical treatment of industrial development in 
countries undergoing structural adjustment. Despite a wealth of critical analysis, the IFIs 
stubbornly adhere to orthodox economic frameworks. While these appear increasingly 
anachronistic, no alternative has been able to take their place. The research in this thesis is 
a small contribution to the formation of solidly based empirical research, that seeks to 
contribute to the dislodging of the status quo and to provide an indication of alternative 
directions for analysis,.
The literature survey has covered a number of related and relevant debates to search for 
appropriate ways of tackling the subject. This has drawn on debates about the importance 
of understanding the local political economy, as well as the lessons to be drawn from the 
spread of TNCs, globalization and the East Asian examples of late industrialisation.
In conducting this exercise, a theoretical framework has been selected, which makes use of 
concepts of institutional legacy and path dependency. This leads in the following chapters 
to the development of an analytical account of industrial development in Zimbabwe, which 
is set against a background analysis of historical and institutional change.
25 See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
56
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the methodology guiding the empirical work undertaken in the thesis. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first describes how and why the data was 
gathered, problems that were encountered and, where possible, how these were overcome. 
The second section lays the foundation for the data analysis used to produce the results 
presented in subsequent chapters.
3.2 DATA GATHERING
Data collection was split into three phases, although they were not strictly sequential. During 
the first, basic data were collected on firms in the metal engineering sector, and were used 
to identify and select firms for the detailed case study work in the second phase. In the 
second phase, managers and workers from the shortlisted firms were interviewed in order to 
collect more detailed data on a number of aspects relating to the firms' performance. The 
third phase saw the collection of data on non-firm institutions, which support, underpin or 
otherwise have influence on the activities of individual firms in the sector. Some of these 
institutions relate to the sector specifically and others more generally to manufacturing in 
Zimbabwe, but therefore also have an influence on, or are inflenced by the activities of the 
metal engineering sector.
The following sub-sections will deal with the data requirements for each phase; the design 
and formulation of the questionnaires; sampling issues and sources of data; and, the problems 
encountered in pre-testing and delivery of the questionnaires.
Most of the firm level studies cited in the literature survey include between 20 and 50 firms 
as case studies, although in many cases these studies cover several sub-sectors. Each of the 
studies tends to focus on a few fairly narrow aspects of the issues being addressed in this 
thesis.
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An attempt was made to build a comprehensive picture of institutional characteristics 
influencing the longer term performance of individual firms, as well as institutional features 
of the broader environment. It was considered appropriate to look in great detail at a small 
sample of firms. The approach was similar to that of Kaplinsky (with Posthuma -1994) and 
the economic history accounts of Brazil (Shapiro, 1994) and South Africa (Clarke, 1994), 
who deal in detail with six firms or fewer. For example, in analysing the impact of the 
adoption of new management techniques (NMTs) in Zimbabwe, Kaplinsky assessed the 
strengths and limitations of the process of adaptation through a case study of data from six 
firms. What such studies lose in statistical significance, they make up for in the holistic 
richness of detail and the convincing weight of well-founded explanation. As Cohen and 
Levin suggest:
"Many of the most credible empirical regularities have been established not 
by estimating and testing elaborate optimisation models with published data, 
but by the painstaking collection of original data, usually in the form of 
responses to relatively simple questions." (1989:1098)
3.2.1 Engineering Sector Census (’’the ES Census”)
The ES Census was driven by two major considerations. First, given the general dearth of 
reliable and up to date information at a sectoral level in Zimbabwe, it was felt necessary to 
develop the ability to draw some broad conclusions about what was happening in the 
engineering sector as a whole. Secondly, it was considered necessary to have a solid 
justification for selecting the particular firms chosen for the detailed case studies.
In the event, the ES Census also served the purpose of introducing the researcher to the case 
study firms. It was possible to establish research credibility by sending the firms a summary 
of research results from the first phase. This facilitated access to the case study firms for the 
more detailed and time-consuming involvement which was required of those firms. Only two 
firms objected to participating in the case study phase.
In selecting firms for the Ghana case study, Lall et. al. (1994) attempted to mix size classes, 
ownership forms (although considerable evidence suggests that these are not relevant to the 
technological issues1) and market performance categories (either import-substituting or
1 See Enos (1991: 113) and Lall et. al. (1994)
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exporting). In their effort to choose the more technologically interesting, they were drawn 
to the medium and larger sized firms (1994: 47).
With a strong interest in obtaining a good understanding of the development of industry in 
Zimbabwe, and an interest in the firms driving that development, a similar approach was 
followed in this research. Smaller firms, excluding micro-enterprises (of five employees or 
less), were also included in the initial selection exercise, as it was thought that some of these 
firms might exhibit considerable dynamism.
An initial postal survey (with telephone, fax and visit follow-up) was mailed to all the firms 
which were identified as part of the engineering manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe's main 
industrial centres of Bulawayo, Harare and the Midlands towns of Gweru and Kwekwe.2
3.2.1.1 Firm Identification
There was no immediately available source of information to identity firms operating in the 
engineering sector. Due to their legal confidentiality obligations3, the Central Statistical 
Office (CSO), which conducts an annual Census of Industrial Production (CIP), was unable 
to divulge information about the firms beyond the number of firms in each industrial (ISIC) 
category.
It was, therefore, necessary to undertake an extended search across a number of organisations 
involved in the sector, which afforded the researcher the chance to arrange an initial 
introduction to those organisations. The organisations included:
• the industry representative and lobbying association, the Confederation of Zimbabawean 
Industry (CZI)
• the commercial representative and lobbying organisation, the Zimbabwe National 
Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC)
The NEC lists (see below) and anecdotal evidence suggested that over 90% of the firms in the sector 
were in these locations.
3 The RPED survey used the CSO database in a very limited way. The CSO gave the researchers code
numbers for the firms and employment figures, which were then random sampled in a size stratified 
manner and only the names of the selected firms were revealed (Gunning (ed.), 1994:3). A similar 
method could not have been applied in this case.
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• the government's parastatal trade promotion institution, ZimTrade
• the Engineering Employers Association of Zimbabwe (EEAZ)
• the National Employment Council for the Engineering and Iron and Steel Industries
(NEC).
Each organisation provided listings of members, or directories. A number of financial 
institutions were also visited, but were prohibited from assisting because of confidentiality 
requirements. The Company Registrar was visited, but the records are manually maintained, 
with no sectoral categorisation. This was of no practical use.
The most comprehensive source of company names was the NEC. All registered firms in the 
sector are legally obliged to register with the NEC, which is responsible for mediating 
between workers and employers on matters relating to remuneration and other conditions of 
service, although this does not include human resource development. The NEC maintained 
records on the size of the firms by employment and whether the firm was manufacturing 
which made it possible to eliminate many micro firms.4 Due to capacity limitations, the NEC 
is not always able to ensure that new firms register with them immediately. Firms which 
have not registered with the NEC within a reasonable period have been prosecuted in the 
past.
Finally, those few firms which obviously appeared to be non-metal based, for example some 
electrical engineering manufacturers were excluded from the ES Census.
In total, some 650 company names and other basic contact details were assembled, covering 
metal engineering manufacturing enterprises with more than five employees in and around 
Harare,5 Bulawayo and the Midlands towns (Gweru and Kwekwe).
It was not possible to ensure that every firm in the sector was captured. Given that it was not 
intended to undertake a representative random sample, the exclusion of a few firms should 
not prejudice the validity of the research.
4 In many cases, however, it was not possible to tell from the NEC information whether firms were 
manufacturing or not and in some cases their size was not recorded either
5 This included the nearby Chitungwiza and Norton.
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3.2.1.2 The ES Census Questionnaire
The Census questionnaire asked a narrow range of questions to obtain a general picture of 
the companies in the population. Questions asked included: firm age; ownership; type of 
operation; levels of output and employment at present and in the recent past; products; recent 
efforts to change and improve products; percentage of output exported; degree of internal 
organisational segmentation; introduction and use of modem production technologies; basic 
skill characteristics of workforce; age of, and recent investment in, capital equipment; 
changes in management techniques; unionisation of workforce; existence of plant level 
workers’ committees. A copy of the questionnaire is attached as Appendix 3.1.
The aim of collecting the data was to provide a solid basis for the classification of the sector 
according to different typologies of firms. The typology could then be used as the basis for 
selecting a small number of firms for case studies. The data also facilitated a preliminary 
assessment of association between measures of firm performance or dynamism (namely 
growth in output and employment), and variations in skills, technology, management 
techniques and the treatment of workers.
It was decided to include one open-ended question about existing problems and constraints. 
This was added, both to give the respondents an oppotunity to vent their frustrations directly, 
as well as to provide an indicator, admittedly very crude, of the more important contemporary 
problems and constraints, as perceived by the owners and managers of firms.
Various published questionnaires and data lists were used to design the draft Census 
questionnaire, as well as the questionnaires used in the case studies (see below). These 
included:
• Wood's questionnaire, which was based on Daly et al. (1985) and was used in an analysis 
of skills and labour productivity in the South African engineering sector (Wood, 
1995:146-9)
• the World Bank's RPED questionnaires for Zimbabwe (Three annual waves: 1993-1995)
• the RPED questionnaire for the technology case study on Zimbabwe (Nov. 1993)
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• the Zimbabwe Government's Census of Production Questionnaire (1993 version)
• the draft ILO Enteiprise Flexibility Study (South Africa) Questionnaire6
• Muzulu and Kanyenze's (1993) questionnaires used to examine the impact of Zimbabwe's 
real exchange rate depreciation and macro-adjustment during the 1980s on manufacturing 
performance and workers respectively
• the employment experience section of Sender's (1993) questionnaire covering women 
farm workers in South Africa
Barr's (1994) questionnaire about entrepreneurial networks in Ghana.
The RPED questionnaire was of particular relevance, as it allowed the possibility of 
comparing the results of this research with the RPED's panels of performance and other firm 
data for the sector. The RPED survey for Zimbabwe collected data on just over 200 
manufacturing firms in the metal products, clothing and textiles (including leather and 
footwear), woodworking and furniture, and food processing sectors. Of these around 35 were 
in the metal products sector (Gunning and Mumbengewi (eds.), 1995:2-3).
Due to the undertakings of confidentiality given by the RPED researchers, there was no 
possibility of conscious overlap with the case study firms chosen as a result of the selection 
exercise above and those covered by the RPED.
A number of other questionnaires were examined and discarded. These included the World 
Bank's model approach (Stone, 1992) for its private sector assessment exercise. This was 
preoccupied with opinion-based questioning about 'the impact' of relative price changes and 
regulations on enterprise activity. The responses to such a questionnaire might be biased, for 
example, if respondents believed that their answers might lead to the changing of unpopular 
policies.
3.2.1.3 Pre-testing and Dissemination of the Questionnaire
Since electrical engineering firms were not included in the Census, three of these were used 
to pre-test the questionnaire. The sector is close enough to the target sector, so questions
6 See Standing et. al. (1996) for report
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which were comprehensible to such firms, were expected also to be understood by 
mechanical engineering firms. Firms of various sizes were approached, although all were 
privately owned and none were very large.
As a result of the pre-testing, a number of questions were reformulated. It was decided to add 
some questions in tabular form. Manufacturing sales had to be split from non-manufacturing 
sales, as some firms were responding to the changed economic environment by shifting their 
focus from manufacturing to agency or distribution activities.
Regarding capital equipment, two items of interest emerged: the range of ages of equipment 
in use; and also whether the firms had made new investments since the start of the structural 
adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1990/91.
There was confusion among the pre-test respondents as to the definition of the NEC. In one 
case it was viewed as the employers' association and in another as the union. It was decided 
to add a question about the name of the union/association to clarify this matter.
It was also decided to add a definition of manufacturing to the questionnaire. The sector 
embraces a wide field of activities, some of which, for example fabrication and 
refurbishment, may not be regarded as manufacturing. The distinction was briefly drawn 
between those activities which distinctly add value in production, including refurbishment, 
and those, like repair and maintenance, which do not (although they may maintain it).
The finalised questionnaire was sent out with a covering letter emphasising the potential 
benefits to the respondent of improved information becoming available on the sector (Reid, 
1987:7-8). Supporting letters were attached from the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zimbabwe, as well as from the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London (SO AS), attesting to the academic standing of the researcher. For CZI 
members, a letter of support from that organisation was also attached.
Efforts were made to identify those firms considered more dynamic and successful in the 
current economic environment. Individuals approached were from various sectoral 
organisations and the firms themselves. As a result, a few managing directors were
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approached, especially those recommended by those approached initially, as being among 
the more competent. Highlighted firms were targeted with greater vigour, in order to try to 
ensure that data on them would be captured.
This attempt to identify the most dynamic firms was not a great success. Only 16 firms were 
thus identified by more than one source. The reasons are revealing. The sector is very 
fragmented across the different sub-sectors, with the divisions appearing to follow the sectors 
served by the various metal sub-sectors, principally mining, agriculture, transport and 
construction. While there was some awareness of other firms within sub-sectors, little 
seemed to be known of firms which were not. The evident weakness of the representative 
associations backs up this view (see Chapter 7). Finally, there also seems to be considerable 
suspicion and distrust of outsiders, including competitors, government, the representative 
organisations, as well as researchers, among the firms in Zimbabwe. Owners and managers 
of the private companies especially seem determined to divulge as little information on their 
companies to others as possible.7 Nonetheless, a number of firms were identified as among 
the more dynamic ones.
Follow-up efforts were made directly with many of the larger firms and others recommended 
as being more dynamic. A follow-up letter was mailed to 72 of the larger firms about three 
weeks after the initial mail shot. Phoning and faxing proved difficult due to the inadequacies 
of the Zimbabwean telecommunications network. Visiting proved to be as productive in 
terms of time spent per company. In total, 115 companies were visited, including a number 
of those which had also been sent the second mail shot.
The visits also provided an opportunity to gain some further anecdotal and visual evidence 
of what was happening in the firms and to discuss the firms' problems and constraints in 
more detail. The visits did not, however, lead to a significantly higher response rate. Of the 
firms visited, only 19 firms responded.
7 Further discussion of the reasons for this behaviour and its implications are presented in Chapters 6 
and 7.
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3.2.1.4 The Responses
In total 145 completed responses to the ES Census questionnaire were received. Three firms 
responded twice and two responses were for groups of companies, which included responses 
for operating firms which were members of the groups. This left 140 usable responses. A 
further 43 responses indicated firms which were non-manufacturing or had closed down. 
Two firms indicated they were not in a position to respond due to confidentiality. Of the 16 
firms which had been identified as more dynamic, ten responded, six did not, while of the 
supposedly struggling firms, all six responded.
The firms which responded were predominantly the larger employers, as can be seen in Table 
3.1.
Table 3.1 - Frequency by Size of Original Census Sample and Responses
Size Class (no. of workers) <20 20-99 100-499 5:500
Original Sample1 23.7% 52.0% 19.5% 4.9%
Responses 18.7% 49.6% 26.6% 5.0%
size data was only available on 66% of the original sample firms; it is possible that there 
were many more at the lower size end, who had not registered their size with the NEC.
It is likely that repair and maintenance firms are concentrated at the smaller scale end of the 
sector. In addition, it is possible that fewer of those firms to which the forms did not apply 
(because they were not manufacturing) would have bothered to indicate this to be the case, 
so, the percentage of non-response from manufacturing firms is likely to be lower than from 
non-manufacturing ones.
A quick comparison with the number of firms in recent Census of Industrial Production 
(CIPs) reveals that in the engineering sectors (metals and metal products and transport 
equipment) for 1991 and 1993, 368 and 332 firms were recorded respectively.8 Thus, over 
40 percent of the firms 'officially* in the sector were captured in the ES Census. It is likely, 
however, that the CSO Census does not cover all manufacturing enterprises, especially the 
newer ones. For example, the CIPs do not include firms with less than 50 percent of the
8 The CSO puts a firm into a particular ISIC category if more than 50% o f its output falls into that 
category. There is no clear guideline for treatment of firms which have less than 50% of their output 
in any one category, but according to the CSO this is virtually unknown.
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value of their sales arising from manufacturing operations. 13 respondents (9.4 percent) fell 
into this category. Among the ten case study firms (see below), three provided incomplete 
or no records to the CSO (and only one of these was included in the CIP). Overall, therefore, 
it is considered that possibly a little over a third of the firms actually manufacturing 
responded to the ES Census questionnaire, with these firms employing over a third of the 
sectors' employees. This amounts to a relatively satisfactory result for a postal survey, since 
typical response rates are in the range of 10-30 percent.9
Out of the firms which provided good responses, 8 firms indicated that they were unable to 
provide sales figures due to confidentiality restrictions, and 19 others did not provide sales 
data for 1991 (including 13 firms which commenced operations within the past four years). 
Efforts to follow up, stressing the confidential nature of the research and the research ethics 
involved, with the 8 were to no avail. During the follow-up visits, many companies made 
the same observation as a partial explanation of their failure to respond to the questionnaire, 
but were apparently persuaded by the researcher that they had little to fear, due to the way the 
data would be used. For the most part this acceptance did not translate into subsequent 
responses. This behaviour is an important indicator of the nature of many firms in 
Zimbabwe, which display high levels of mistrust towards any outside interest (see Chapters 
6 and 7).
A comparison of the responses on union membership with records from NEWU revealed a 
significant over-reporting of the number of unionised employees. This was possibly as much 
a result of the confusion between the NEC and NEWU in the minds of managers, as of 
perceptions of higher than actual membership. It may also be accounted for by the fact that 
workers, who are no longer paying dues, still consider themselves to be and behave as union 
members (see details in Chapter 6).
9 See Wood (1995:99). It was also relatively positive given the volume o f research conducted in 
Zimbabwe. Many respondents, and others who chose not to respond, complained of receiving a large 
number of questionnaires, especially from local students in various disciplines, most o f which they 
ignore. Many are too voluminous or demanding in terms of the information required. It was also a 
positive response rate, given the apparent insularity o f many Zimbabwean business people.
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3.2.1.5 Processing the Census Data
In order to select the case study firms, a combination of factor analysis and cluster analysis 
was used. As expected, some of the pre-selected variables segmented the sector fairly 
clearly, while others did not. Factor analysis was used in order to select the variables which 
were best able to explain the greater proportion of the variation in the data. Cluster analysis 
techniques were then applied to deal with the various types of variables collected in the ES 
Census.
The techniques used in this analysis are briefly outlined in Section 3.2.1.1 below. The result 
was the segmentation of the data into seven discrete and fairly well-defined clusters of firms 
possessing overlapping but differentiated characteristics. The ES Census data are also used 
to characterise the engineering sector as a whole (see Chapter 6).
3.2.1.6 Selection of the Case Study Firms
A key objective of this research is both to understand what drives the performance of the 
sector as a whole, as well as to explain why some firms are more dynamic than others. Thus, 
it was decided to include among the case studies, the best performing and most dynamic 
firms, as well as those whose performance was less satisfactory. It is as important to 
understand why progress is not happening, as why it is.
Initially, it was considered desirable to include a failed firm among the case studies. In the 
event, despite the fairly frequent failure of engineering firms during the fieldwork period, it 
was not possible to do this at a level of sufficient detail,
The clusters were based on structural rather than performance features of the firms. Each 
cluster contained firms which had sales and employment growth that varied considerably (the 
main indicators of dynamism on which data were collected). One cluster (Cluster One) 
contained small firms, under 10 years old, with relatively high skills and mostly still in their 
initial rapid growth spurt. The other clusters all had broadly similar average growth rates. 
The firms varied more in terms of skills, technology, changes in product mix and 
organisation of production and degree of unionisation. In these categories, one cluster
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(Cluster Three) contained very stagnant, smaller to medium sized companies, with poorly 
developed skills and technology, which were doing little to change their products or product 
mix.
Various alternatives were considered in selecting the case study firms. Many of the firms 
reported anecdotally during the Census (see above), as being among the more successful in 
the present environment, fell into a single cluster (Cluster Five). However, three of the firms 
reported as being less than dynamic also appear in that cluster. It is more likely that Cluster 
Five contains many of the larger, longer established and consequently better known firms, 
rather than all of the most dynamic in the sector.
One alternative considered was to random sample the firms from within each cluster. With 
considerable behavioural diversity within each cluster, the firm thus selected might neither 
be very dynamic nor 'representative' of the cluster.
Another possibility was to select firms with similar products. Daly et. al. (1985), Mason and 
Wagner (1988) and Wood (1995) emphasise seeking out specific sub-sectors where there is 
the possibility of direct comparison between firms. Daly et. al. and Wood also focused their 
research on the manufacture of technologically less complex products, as efficiency issues 
could then be more visible to the non-engineer researcher. This approach was not possible, 
however. Given a fairly concentrated industrial structure, there were insufficient responses 
to the Census from firms in similar product categories that showed well differentiated 
performance characteristics. As a result, it was decided to limit the case study investigation 
to firms which were working principally with metal materials, so that at least there would be 
some commonality in the types of processes and skills likely to be used.
Another option would have been to select only firms involved in supplying the same 
economic sectors, as the reduced variety of sectoral linkages would limit another set of 
possible reasons for firm-level variation. This would have been possible across the clusters, 
as the clusters did not group together firms serving the same sectors.
However, given the desire to try and capture what was happening throughout the sector as 
a whole, it was decided to select dynamic firms which best captured the key features of each
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cluster, rather than attempting to ensure that all the firms served the same sector. So, for 
example, in the young and dynamic cluster, the selected firm and its alternate were those with 
very high growth rates for both manufacturing sales and employment, with high skill levels. 
It was decided to select the least 'dynamic' firm from the 'stagnant' Cluster Three, for a point 
of contrasting reference. It was further decided to exclude very small firms (less than 20 
employees), and those less than five years old, which had not been operating prior to the 
introduction of the changes in the economic policy framework.
The firms in each cluster did not easily capture all that cluster's defining characteristics 
(large, high skill, etc.) simultaneously, so an -unweighted average ranking system of the top 
three or four defining variables for each the cluster was used. In each case, a measure of 
growth was included as a selection characteristic. The firms with the highest average ranking 
on the key criteria were then examined for their suitability.
One firm was selected from each cluster, with an alternate. Both firms were to be 
approached, in case the preferred firm did not agree to continue to participate in the research.
3.2.2 Detailed Firm Case Studies
A letter of invitation to participate was sent to the selected firms and their alternates. The 
firms were then telephoned a week or two later to arrange the first appointment with the chief 
executive. Two of the firms, that would have been eligible for selection had they not been 
in the electrical, or other unsuitable sub-sectors, were chosen to pre-test the instances study 
questionnaires.
In a number of instances the firms initially identified in the cluster analysis could not be used. 
Two firms refused to participate, claiming that it would invade their privacy. One of these 
companies was majority owned by the Zimbabwe government. Another firm had only its 
administrative office in Harare, while its manufacturing operations were in a smaller centre, 
outside the selected sites for the research. One firm had closed its operations since the ES 
Census form was completed and yet another claimed to have ceased its manufacturing 
operations during the same period. In two clusters, one of which was the stagnant cluster, 
further letters had to be issued in order to obtain agreement from the firms concerned.
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In some clusters with larger firms, it was decided to examine two firms, making a total of 10 
case study firms. One of the originally selected firms had dropped its metal product 
operations some years before ES AP and was now only producing plastic products. This firm 
was retained for comparison purposes. In the other two clusters where two firms were 
included, this was, in part, to establish whether, given the crude nature of the clustering, there 
was as much variation between firms within each cluster, as between them.
The included firms delivered their output to the construction sector, the mining sector, or 
other manufacturing or service industries, either as intermediate or final products. None of 
the participating firms was specifically serving the agricultural sector or the motor industry, 
and only two firms were producing final consumption products. This probably reflected the 
relatively poor recent performance of the agricultural sector and the motor industry in 
Zimbabwe, as well as the depressed state of household consumption amongst most segments 
of the population (see Chapter 5).
While an effort was made to include a range of sizes of firms, most of the participating firms 
were medium sized (in the 20-99 employee grouping), which reflects the sectoral distribution 
(see Chapter 6). Only two firms had over 250 employees (both from the larger and older firm 
cluster). Other characteristics, such as ownership and location were mixed.
The racial origins of owners were not investigated in the ES Census, although calls for 
'indigenisation' and the interests behind those calls have important political influence in 
Zimbabwe (see subsequent chapters). It appears few indigenous (i.e. black-owned) private 
companies responded to the ES Census. Most of these were very small.10 None of them 
emerged as possible case studies from the cluster analysis. Given the above criteria for 
selecting firms, the inclusion of one of these firms would have been artificial.
The ten selected firms with their main products and cluster numbers in brackets are:
A. YOUNGO - steel fittings - (1)
B. SOLIDCO - metal products for health services - (2)
10 In a recent survey, only 7 out o f a sample o f 54 indigenous firms had more than 100 employees 
(Bradburd and Levy, 1995:3)
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C. STATICO - small metal signs (3)
D. SANDCO - specific line of components for mines and manufacturers (4)
E. RENEWCO-foundry (4)
F QUALCO - small components for the mining industry (5)
G. DELAYCO - heavy engineering and structural steel (5)
H. PLASTICO - plastic packaging (6)
J. PUSHCO - metal components for buildings (6)
K. MONOPCO - cables (7).
The rest of this section examines the rationale for the case study data requirements and the 
questions asked.
The data were divided into three groups. General firm performance data, as well as data on 
investment, products, strategy and organisational information were collected from the chief 
executive or owner. Productivity, production process and technical training data were sought 
from the production manager. Finally, 150 workers were interviewed regarding their 
personal circumstances, including their education, training, wages, and career history. 
Workers were also asked a number of motivational questions.
At a broad level, the survey aimed at understanding the circumstances under which decisions 
were made to undertake major new investments; to change production processes, product 
mixes, skills and technology in use; and, to revise organisational strategies. Collecting data 
on productivity, profitability and capacity utilisation, facilitates examination of the impact 
of strategic changes on such performance criteria. In addition, data were collected on a 
number of institutional factors of interest for the research, as specified below.
It was also intended to find out whether and why firms did not undertake strategic changes 
in response to changes in their business environment. This may include, for example, failing 
to take steps to improve worker productivity when faced with increasing labour costs, or not 
improving the product quality or updating the technology in use in response to changes by 
competitors. The assessment of such situations often has to be inductive, as the firms will 
not necessarily have made an assessment of potential changes and consciously taken a 
decision not to proceed. Furthermore, there is inherently a problem with the opinion based
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questions which have to be asked in tackling this matter directly. It is problematic to ask such 
a question in a way that will not prejudice or bias the response.
Overall, there was a strong emphasis on examining current performance and practices, 
against the background of changes the firms had implemented or experienced since the 
introduction of ESAP.
The data collected in the case study survey are analysed in Chapter 6. Detailed analysis of 
differences in the various categories of data collected is carried out across the firms and 
compared with the performance data.
3.2.2.1 General Data
In this section of the questionnaire, the data collected from the chief executive are discussed. 
The data include information on the firm at the strategic level, performance data and data on 
the structure of the firms, as well as their corporate policies on investment, planning and 
skills development (see copy of questionnaire in Appendix 3.2).
This initial draft of the questionnaire was too long to be fully dealt with in a single interview. 
It was decided during the pre-tests that the performance data would be best obtained by 
leaving a copy of a written questionnaire with the respondent.11 This could then be 
completed by the responsible person(s) in the firm. In the event, this was the least successful 
part of the case studies. Without the direct involvement of the researcher, the questionnaires 
were frequently mislaid, or their completion substantially delayed. With hindsight it might 
have been better to interview the responsible parties personally on a separate occasion. The 
concern about that option was that the information would not be readily accessible at the 
times the researcher visited and this would lead to inadequate completion of the forms.
This problem was mitigated to some extent in firms which were regularly submitting their 
CIP returns to the CSO. With the firms' written consent, the researcher was able to examine
11 Pre-tests were held with chief executives and production managers in two companies, as well as four 
workers in each company.
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their annual returns. In a number of instances, this was also problematic, as the figures 
submitted to the CSO were not always the same as those given to the researcher. One firm 
readily acknowledged that the figures sent to the CSO were artificially concocted to disguise 
the true situation at the company, given the doubts about the CSO's assurances of 
confidentiality. Furthermore, in many instances the CSO failed to elicit returns from 
companies and used proxy growth rates based on historical figures, perhaps over many 
successive years. Chapter 7 returns to the subject of the quality of data available on the 
sector and industry.
During the pre-tests it was decided not to tape the interviews. This was as a result of the 
prevailing environment of suspicion and mistrust. With a tape recorder on, it was feared that 
there would be hesitation on the part of the respondent, which might inhibit the frankness and 
depth of the responses. Some anecdotal off-the-cuff comments may have been lost as a 
result.
In most instances, interviews lasted between one and a half and two hours, depending on the 
extent of digression. The respondents were willing and ready to answer most questions 
asked. Overall, it is considered that the quality of the responses was good. There were 
problems with obtaining detailed and accurate responses to certain questions, where 
respondents were clearly guessing.12
Once the interviews with the production managers and workers were completed, brief 
profiles were developed of the companies' structure and where there might be critical points 
of interest, problem areas, or information deficits. In four of the most interesting and 
complex cases, a semi-structured interview was held with the chief executive to follow-up 
on particular issues.
PERFORMANCE DATA
This section was used to assess the relative dynamism and efficiency of the different firms
12 The difficulty of getting precise answers to questions leads one to suspect the quality and validity of 
some of the quantitative data collected during the RPED surveys. In those, performance data was 
expected immediately and the questionnaires were considerably longer than for this research (from 
verbal discussions with RPED enumerators).
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surveyed on the basis of well-established performance criteria. This provided a basis for 
relating other information to be collected to firm performance, as well as to facilitate 
comparison between the firms.
Of particular interest were profitability, value added, productivity and capacity utilisation. 
It was not expected, however, that all firms would readily provide access to information on 
profits, or productivity, so this was not directly requested. It was intended to collect 
sufficient data to make possible basic estimates of recent changes to these indicators. While 
this was done, there are serious concerns about the information on non-production costs and 
overheads. Thus, while net output figures (gross output less direct input costs) are probably 
fairly reliable, those requiring further deductions are not taken seriously in Chapter 6. 
Estimates of current capacity utilisation were less of a problem, but also seem highly suspect, 
in most cases being stated arbitrarily without the benefit of any statistics. There was no 
evidence that firms maintained historical records on capacity utilisation.
Crude estimates of profitability were constructed from the data provided on sales revenues, 
purchase costs and overheads. Their reliability is also highly questionable. Labour 
productivity estimates were calculated from information given about employment and output 
volumes, in part obtained from the production manager. The analysis of these figures is 
reported in Chapter 6.
With hindsight, the research would have benefited from more time to have reviewed the 
financial data in detail with firms' representatives.
In v e s t m e n t
In this section information was sought on the ownership structure of the company. Of key 
interest were data on any recent new or replacement investment.
The main problem was the lack of continuity in the information supplied by the firms. There 
were also differences between data supplied by the firms and those obtained from the CSO 
records.
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Pr o d u c t
The interest in products centres on analysing the timing of shifts in the firm's product mix. 
While it was intended to focus the analysis on how such changes in product mix were related 
to changes in the macro-economy, as well as to other changes within the firm, there was very 
little product innovation to assess (see Chapter 6).
Questions were also asked about changes in the degree of concentration in the local product 
markets. The product data also provided information on changes in the nature of competition 
in the firms' product markets. One objective of this section was to obtain information 
concerning non-price competition.
Em p l o y m e n t
Information was sought on the changing structure of employment, between permanent and 
non-permanent staff, between different skill levels and between various functions within the 
firm. Given the high frequency of retrenchment (redundancy) since ESAP, information was 
sought on the retrenchment experience of the company.
Re c r u it m e n t , T r a in in g  a n d  Skills  D e v e lo pm e n t
In this section of the survey, the objective was to obtain information on the skills policies of 
the firm. This included obtaining data on changes in firms' recruitment and training practices 
and policies. These changes link to others, including the introduction of new technologies 
and management techniques (see Section 3.1.2.2).
Co r p o r a t e  St r a t e g y
The main questions in this section covered changes in corporate strategy introduced since 
ESAP. The changes are examined to assess their impact on other areas of firm behaviour. 
Questions about the planning processes were used to assess the sophistication of the firms' 
management. This section's questions also stemmed from an interest in the degree to which 
the management style of the company could be described as consultative and participatory.
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This relates to issues of loyalty and trust within the firm.
O r g a n isa t io n  o f  Pr o d u c t io n
Closely related to the above are questions about the structure of the organisation and changes 
in the management techniques. The main questions concerned the introduction of changes 
in the organisation of production.
The managing directors were also asked about their linkages with other firms and 
organisations to try to establish how well integrated they were into the surrounding business 
environment. In the event, the data collected were difficult to use, given doubts about their 
reliability. In keeping with the isolated character of many firms, relatively little was revealed 
beyond the normal arms-length commercial arrangements.
3.2.2.2 Production Process Data
In this questionnaire (see Appendix 3.3), more detailed information on productivity, 
production process and technical aspects was sought from the production manager or 
equivalent. The interviews were held after the general questionnaire interview. The 
interviews took between one and two hours. In most cases the respondents were very willing 
to assist. The questionnaires were more oriented to production process than the general 
interviews, so questions were less awkward or less likely to arouse suspicion.
P r o d u c t iv it y
One of the key performance indicators used in this research is labour productivity. 
Measuring labour productivity can be attempted in both physical and monetary terms. Given 
that many case study firms are 'jobbing' type firms, it proved impossible to compare volume 
productivity (units per worker per day). Consequently, it was decided to adopt the value 
definition in calculations of productivity. Broad impressions of change (improved, worsened, 
unchanged) were also sought from the respondents in volume terms.
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Details of the firms' most recent efforts to improve productivity were also requested, with 
specific emphasis on the introduction of team working, and the perception of success or 
otherwise of such efforts. These data are juxtaposed with data on skills and training to assess 
the impact of different levels of skills, and changes in those skill levels on productivity (see 
Chapter 6).
P r o d u c t io n  T r a in in g
Detailed questions were asked about changes in the extent and type of training being 
undertaken by the firm. While there was some overlap with the general questionnaire, more 
detail was requested here.
This section also had check-type questions regarding the production manager's perceptions 
ofhis/her workers’ educational and skill endowments. Productivity or motivational problems 
could arise, if the production manager is consistently over-estimating or under-estimating the 
extent of literacy, numeracy and education among his/her staff.
In n o v a t io n
Questions in this section were designed to elicit responses concerning the originators of 
innovation and the types of technical change recently introduced in the firm. Supporting 
questions about the introduction of technical change were asked, similar to those asked about 
changes in the organisation of production in the general questionnaire.
The cost of the changes was investigated, but in many cases the production managers could 
not easily answer.
There was also a motivational aspect to this set of questions, including whether workers were 
given rewards for making suggestions; whether the suggestions had an impact on technical 
change; and, whether there were consequent changes in employment, skills required and/or 
tasks performed.
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M a c h in e r y
Questions were asked regarding the age and level of technology in use, as well as the 
experience of operating the machines, in terms of problems resulting in downtime. 
Information was also requested on the occupational level of the setters and operators and the 
training they are given.
Answers to these questions provide a linkage between technology, skills and training, 
through to productivity. With relatively limited use of newer technologies this section did 
not lead to findings of major importance. There were also problems in recognising which 
equipment fell within the definition of machinery.
M a in t e n a n c e
This section expanded on the experience of stoppages through breakdown to find out how 
they were dealt with. Changes in maintenance practices over time were sought. Maintenance 
capabilities are an important element of the firms' ’technological capabilities’ (see Section 6.5 
below).
M a n u f a c t u r in g  Pr o c ess
It was hoped to be able to make detailed comparisons of set-up times and physical outputs 
per worker and machine between firms producing similar products. In the event, due to the 
selection of firms in the case studies, this did not prove possible. Useful data were collected 
on defect rates and throughput times (although again these data were limited by the jobbing 
nature of many firms).
Tr o u b l e -S h o o t in g , Q u a l it y  a n d  Su p po r t  Ser v ic es
In order to follow-up on the technical capabilities of the firm, questions were asked about 
technical problems which had arisen over the previous few years, how they were solved and 
what type of external assistance was involved, if any. This also has an input into the 
organisational analysis, assessing the firms' interaction with external service organisations.
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This latter point was further investigated through the firms’ use of outside agencies to assist 
in adopting quality standards, as well as in other areas such as quality control, repair and 
maintenance, technical assistance, technical training and instrument calibration.
The issue of quality was highlighted, as many managers and others involved in the export 
promotion effort in Zimbabwe regard international product quality certification (ISO 9000, 
in particular) as being a pre-requisite to exporting internationally. Choosing, or not, to obtain 
these standards can be a complementary decision to other changes in strategy covered in the 
general questionnaire. This provides additional information about the way the firm sees its 
market potential.
3.2.2.3 Employee Survey
This section outlines the structure of and rationale for the questionnaire (see Appendix 3.4) 
addressed directly to a total of 150 workers across the ten firms.13 The percentage of 
workforce interviewed, ranging from 5% to 35%, was higher in the smaller firms. This was 
largely to ensure that a good sample of workers was surveyed in the smaller firms. Time and 
resource constraints meant that it was not possible to survey more workers in the larger firms. 
It was only possible to interview workers during their lunch breaks, except in two companies 
where three shifts were operating and workers could be interviewed as soon as their shift 
ended.
A representative sample of production workers was interviewed regarding their work 
histories, training and educational backgrounds, remuneration, unionisation and other 
characteristics (see below), which might have an impact on their productive capabilities and 
work effort.
The workers interviewed included unskilled, semi-skilled, artisans, and supervisors/foremen. 
As most of the sample firms employed very few technicians, these were not questioned. 
Limited information on the technical and educational background of engineers and 
production managers was obtained from senior management in some firms.
13 Ranging from 8 to 23 workers in any particular firm, roughly according to the size of the firm.
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A stratified random sample of workers was selected. Stratifications were made according to 
occupational level, and individual and divisional function. The ability to do this effectively 
varied according to the quality of employee record-keeping by the firms. Only the larger and 
more organised firms tended to have lists of employees divided according to grade, function 
and division. As almost all workers in the sector were male, an additional stratification on 
grounds of gender was deemed unnecessary. Only one woman was interviewed, and no 
others were seen in production positions during visits to the sample firms.14 In almost every 
firm, a member of the workers' committee was among those interviewed.
With an overall sample of 150 workers, there is a reasonable likelihood that statistical 
significance is obtainable on some indicators. The representativeness for the sector as a 
whole is compromised by the limited number of firms. Given that the selection process 
attempted to ensure that the firms were broadly representative of the sector as a whole, 
however, there should still be some more general validity. Greater problems emerge at the 
firm level. While correlations and other statistical comparisons can be made, the attainment 
of statistical significance at that level is rare.
The researcher was aware that there might have been problems in getting honest and useable 
responses from production workers, if it was believed that the researcher was too closely 
allied to management. Suspicions of a hidden agenda in asking the questions might have 
distorted the sincerity of the responses. For this reason, at each interview the researcher 
explained with considerable care the purpose of the research and its confidential nature; 
showed a letter from the National Engineering Workers Union (NEWU) supporting the 
research; and was accompanied by Zimbabwean enumerators, who were simultaneously 
interviewing several workers in the vernacular. Interviews were conducted in privacy, 
usually in the workers’ canteen or training room. No management personnel were present. 
A very low profile was kept when liaising with management during the earlier interviews, 
excluding factory tours.
14 This pattern varies considerably by sector in Zimbabwe. In the garment industry there are large 
numbers of women workers, although they tend to be in the lower skill occupations within that sector 
(Jirira, 1996).
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While consideration was given to conducting interviews off the factory premises, at workers * 
homes, or possibly in small groups at local social or community centres, time and practical 
constraints prohibited this.
The worker interviews took from 25 to 40 minutes each. In general, the workers answered 
the questionnaires willingly and were pleased to be asked about themselves. It appeared that 
this does not take place very often. For a limited number of questions, as outlined in the 
following subsections, there are doubts about the reliability of responses.
One of the main reasons for the detailed questions for individual workers was to improve the 
understanding of how skills differ across the full range of occupational levels within and 
between the firms. In the analysis, such differences are likely to form an important 
explanation of productivity levels and their differentials across firms.
Cu r r e n t  W o r k , W o r k  H ist o r y  a n d  Re m u n e r a t io n
Questions were asked about total years with the company, years and frequency of 
unemployment and reasons for leaving the previous job. Regrettably, the years since leaving 
school, or workers’ ages were not requested. Details of the present job title, status, whether 
work was shift based, whether team work had been introduced recently and how the 
workload (number of tasks per hour) had changed were requested. All this information helps 
to complement the information received from the management about firm dynamism and the 
changes which had taken place recently.
Workers were asked about their working hours; days on leave, off sick and for funerals. The 
latter two issues are important as there is an increasing incidence of HIV related illness and 
death affecting productivity in Zimbabwe. Wages and details of non-wage financial and non- 
financial allowances and benefits were also investigated. The data on working hours and 
wages provided input into calculations of productivity and other performance criteria.
One problem encountered here was that the grade of the person was not asked for. 
Estimating how close each worker's remuneration was to minimum agreed scales thus 
required careful judgement.
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Furthermore, there were a number of company credit schemes in operation. For instance, 
employees could obtain discounts on the purchase of groceries at a local store, and have the 
amounts deducted from their wages. This was not always picked up by the questions, and 
not all employees in companies operating such schemes took advantage of them. This sort 
of benefit may account for different percentages of gross against net wages.
Respondents were also asked about non-firm sources of income. This was to assess both 
how dependent they were on their wages and whether they were engaged in any rural 
activities to supplement income, or whether their other sources of income were also derived 
from urban activities. This is one question where the validity of the responses is very 
doubtful. Despite assurances of confidentiality, there was suspicion that management might 
still be able to gain some information from the results about specific individuals. This was 
a particular problem for those workers who were doing part-time jobs using tools ‘borrowed’ 
from the firm. There was, however, a reasonably positive response to the questions, as 
analysed in Chapter 6.
Ed u c a t io n  a n d  T r a in in g
Respondents were asked about their educational attainments and details about the technical 
subjects they had studied before coming into the firm, as well as training they had received 
since joining the firm and some details about training experiences. Questions were asked 
about new skills they had acquired recently. They were also asked if they had been denied 
any training which they had requested. These questions all served to complement and cross­
check the training information provided by management, as well as to form the basis for 
inter-firm comparisons of training practices and skill complements.
Regrettably, there was some imprecision in the questions asked. For example, if the 
respondent had not completed an in-company apprenticeship at the present firm, it was 
unclear whether an apprenticeship had been completed. As a result, there may be some 
downward bias in the level of educational attainment across the sample.
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M o t iv a t io n , T r u s t  a n d  Respe c t
Questions were asked about consultation with workers over plans for the company and the 
introduction of new technologies, as well as how workers learn about the companies plans. 
Questions about a number of sociological issues, such as whether they were offered chairs 
in managers’ offices, and shared toilets, were also asked to obtain a sense of the enforcement 
of hierarchy within the firms (which relates to respect and trust issues focussed on in 
Chapter 6).
Questions were asked about trade union and worker committee membership and whether the 
respondent had participated in any kind of industrial action in the company.
Finally, to allow the respondents a chance to air their grievances, there were open-ended 
questions about good things that had happened to them during their employment with the 
company, as well as what they would like to see improved. This last area was another where 
there seemed to be a degree of holding back from some respondents, while very few 
respondents had positive experiences to relate.
. 3.2.3 Non-Firm Institutional Survey
The literature survey provides a background to the reasons for examining non-firm 
institutions. In this subsection, the reasons for, and experience of, collecting information on 
these institutions are outlined.
Questions which arise include:
- Are the institutional changes complementing the policy shifts, or are they impeding 
them?
- What scope is there for institutions to change further in a manner that would be more 
supportive and encouraging of the further development of industry in Zimbabwe?
In order to have a systematic analytical approach to these questions, a common format was 
developed to assess the relevant institutions.
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It was originally intended to examine organisations, as well as less visible institutions, such 
as the legal framework, business norms and codes of practice. There were difficulties in 
identifying and contacting individuals to interview regarding the latter, and this examination 
proved to be beyond the time and physical resource capabilities of the researcher. 
Accordingly, although such institutions are considered to be of crucial importance, their 
empirical analysis features no further in this thesis.
The organisations surveyed included training organisations, both public and private 
(including vocational training colleges and universities); technology development 
organisations; employers’ associations and trade unions; and, the national organisation 
assisting firms to promote their exports (ZimTrade).15 In a few cases, the organisations have 
regulatory functions, especially some of the organs of government.
Among the institutional characteristics of interest to this study, are the organisations' histories 
and evolution. Zysman argues that the "character and function o f ... institutions are often 
evident only in their history... The progressive evolution of those structures defines evolving 
sets of constraints and incentives." (1994:245-6). For example, for many years staff within 
regulatory organisations were well versed in implementing a system of controls over the 
conduct of business. Changing their operational functions may not have immediately 
changed their behavioural patterns. These histories are analysed against the background of 
economic policy changes in Zimbabwe and other variations in economic circumstances (see 
Chapter 7). Of particular interest is an examination of whether the 'scaling back' of the 
government's role has been followed by the development of private commercially driven 
organisations providing similar or improved industrial support services.
The information sought concerned the dynamics of the relationships between the 
organisations and the sector(s) they served. This included whether they were reactive or 
proactive in carrying out their work and the skill and functional capabilities of the 
organisations. Examining linkages with users of their services, as well as with organisations 
providing complementary or competing services and other categories of social actors (civil 
servants, politicians, donors), helps in developing an outline of the organisational framework
15 The list o f organisations examined can be found in Appendix 3.5.
84
surrounding manufacturing. The problems in making use of the linkages effectively, in terms 
of communication and coordination with constituents and other organisations, are also 
assessed (see Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995: 454-55).
Standard structured surveys, with a mix of closed and open-ended questions were conducted 
in each organisation (see Appendix 3.6 for the survey instrument). There were few examples 
of questionnaires on which to draw as models for this part of the research.
In addition to the above topics, efforts were made to ascertain what social groups were most 
active and influential within each organisation. It was found difficult to obtain standardised 
answers to these questions, which often revealed more about the respondent than the 
objective situation. The analysis in Chapter 6 uses this and other information to develop an 
understanding of the paths of agency within the engineering sector and its organisations.
Analysis of how each organisation has changed or failed to change its strategies since the 
introduction of ESAP gives further insight into the dynamics of the organisations. The 
documentation of recent changes in strategy indicates how the organisation responded to or 
anticipated changes in the national economy, whether these resulted from shifts in the policy 
framework or other exogenous economic changes.
The rest of the standardised questionnaire focussed on assessing the capacity of the 
organisations to select and, then, to implement strategies. Tools were required for assessing 
the organisations’ effectiveness. These included examination of information management, 
problems that the organisations experienced in carrying out. their functions; staff 
qualifications and experience, and external evaluations of the organisation (if available).
In total 19 organisations were interviewed. The interviews took between one and a half and 
two and a half hours and were conducted in a cordial, if sometimes guarded manner. In 
general, the questionnaire interviews were immediately followed by a more open-ended, 
semi-structured interview covering a number of broader issues. For example, particular 
incidents covered in the literature were clarified, while possible explanations for past events 
from the different perspectives of individuals in different organisations were discussed. 
Given the dual purposes being served by the meetings, it was frequently necessary to
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continue the interview at a separate time. It was important, therefore, to ensure that there was 
not too much casual contact with the most senior people in these organisations at too early 
a stage, as this opened the possibility for them to become irritated at having to spend so much 
time with the researcher.
Some organisations were easier to study than others. The smaller and more autonomous 
organisations generally had current information more readily available and staff who were 
more keenly aware of the organisation's strategies and business. In some organisations, even 
organisational heads were not aware of the activities of their colleagues. Government organs 
were among the more difficult to assess effectively, especially in terms of the patterns of 
agency, linkages, and the capabilities of their staff. Some recent review documents of the 
work of the Ministries of Industry and Commerce and Higher Education have provided some 
information.16 The Public Service Commission was not responsive to direct approaches 
seeking to follow-up on these issues.17
The smaller and more tightly controlled organisations, for example, sectoral lobbying groups, 
tended to have more coherent, well focussed and commonly shared strategies, compared to 
larger and more diffuse organisations, without well developed management objectives and 
hierarchies, for example government ministries.
The fieldwork also included initial examination of less visible institutions, such as the legal 
framework, contracting and business norms, in the field research.18 Many recent changes to 
these institutions have taken place, such as delays in receiving payment for commercial 
transactions, related to high interest rates; and, difficulties in using the legal system as a 
mechanism for recourse. Such changes have affected the efficiency of firms in conducting 
their business. However, there was insufficient time in the fieldwork to pursue this line of 
research adequately. It remains a field for further research in the future.
16 See Ministry o f Higher Education (1994), Munetsi and Simango (1994), KPMG Peat Marwick (1995) 
and ILO (1995). There was a Commission o f Inquiry into the Public Service in 1989 (the report of 
which was not obtained).
17 After several unsuccessful attempts to arrange meetings through visits and by telephone, this was not 
pursued.
18 Increasing attention is being given to such institutional factors in empirical work - see for example, 
Deakin and Michie (1997) and other articles in the same edition of the Cambridge Journal o f  
Economics.
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Given a general concern to ensure that respondents were open and honest, assurances of 
confidentiality were given. Consequently, in the following chapters names and positions of 
respondents are seldom quoted. A list of many of those interviewed can be found in 
Appendix 3.7.
3.3 ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A great mass of data has been collected on firms, their workers and a number of non-firm 
organisations involved in the manufacturing industry. This section briefly previews the 
methods adopted to analyse the data.
3.3.1 Engineering Sector (ES) Census Analysis
The ES Census data was analysed for two purposes. The first was to gain an input into the 
selection of the firms for the case studies. This was conducted using a combination of cluster 
and factor analysis. Secondly, correlation and other basic statistical techniques were used to 
characterise the sector from the collected data (see Chapter 6).
The processing of the data was carried out using SPSS for Windows, version 6.0. This was 
carried out in a number of stages. The first stage was to enter and then clean the data, as far 
as possible. A number of firms were contacted to follow up on missing responses. New 
variables were created from the ES Census data. These included:
growth rates for sales and employment between 1991/92 and 1994/95
• an index of labour productivity levels and growth, calculated by dividing sales for the 
above years by employment in 1991 and 1995 respectively
• a combined firm skills index, including the number of apprentices, shadow valued at 25 % 
to reflect their four year training period, indicating that they are only fully skilled at the 
end of their apprenticeship, at which time about half leave their firms,19 and, graduate 
engineers weighted at twice the value of the technicians
19 The wastage rate was later confirmed at around half in the case study firms (see Chapter 6 below).
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a combined technology index, taking into account the use of more advanced machinery, 
the recent introduction of new technologies and the crude measure of the age of capital 
equipment (given a weighting significantly lower than the other components of the 
index).
The weightings of the last two indices can be adjusted, but are fairly robust. The data in the 
open-ended question contributed to the development of topic guides for interviews with the 
supporting organisations.
3.3.1.1 Factor and Cluster Analysis
The data from the ES Census were processed to group these data into clearly distinguishable 
clusters, in order to select firms for the detailed case studies.
In this research, there are variables where the value itself is important, sales, number of 
employees; ordinal variables, where higher values are ascribed to more valuable situations; 
nominal variables, where the outcome is ascribed a code, which has no inherently greater 
weight than another code; and, binary variables where the answer is of the “yes/no” variety. 
Combining these different types of variables requires careful attention to avoid mixing up the 
different types and giving value to nominal variables.
After comparing a large number of alternate clusterings, it became apparent that there was 
no clear basis on which to assess better' or 'worse' groupings. So, in order to identify which 
variables were likely to be the most important around which to perform the cluster analysis, 
in terms of explaining more or less of the variation in the data, factor analysis was used. Four 
factors, explaining 70% of the variation in the data, were generated using the following 10 
variables:
- growth in employment from 1991-1995
- the percentage of unionisation of the firm's workforce
- size by manufacturing sales in 1994/95
- age of the company
- percentage of exports
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- technology and skill indices (the technology index denoted by rank)
- whether the firms were improving the quality, production processes and marketing of 
their products (3 separate binary variables)
The first of the generated factors is dominated by firms with larger numbers of changes to 
the products and higher percentages of exports (or vice versa). This suggests that the most 
important factor distinguishing between the firms, is whether they are dynamic in changing 
their products and exporting. The second factor depends on younger firms with higher skills 
and lower unionisation; the third features firms with lower sales and higher unionisation, and 
the fourth draws on older firms with higher skills. The factor analysis is not interpreted any 
further, except to note that, as with the cluster analysis below, there is no place for 
performance dynamics or growth rates to distinguish between firms. The implication is that 
there is no clear association between firm structural factors and performance measures.
The "best" clustering, using SPSS's "K-means cluster analysis", involved seven clusters. This 
produced meaningful groups with reasonable degrees of similarity within them (see Section 
6 .1).
3.3.1.2 S ectoral Analysis
The ES Census data were also analysed using simple statistical techniques, especially 
correlation coefficients and cross-tabulations, to assess where there appears to be some sense 
of variables changing together, or against each other in a related manner. This analysis 
cannot assess causality on its own, but it provides a useful statistical background for the 
assessment of the case study firm performance (see Chapter 6).
Additionally comparisons were made using similar techniques of differences between firms 
grouped by size, age, ownership and whether exporting or not. Possibilities for international 
comparison were limited by the lack of available comparators, although this would be a 
useful avenue for further research.
It was found difficult to distinguish between the impact of various firm characteristics on 
changes in performance. If changes in skills, technology and the organisation of production
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are occurring simultaneously with an increase in productivity, it is difficult to assess the 
relative strengths of each of these influences on performance without employing some kind 
of regression analysis.
This methodology has problems, however, which limit its utility. An econometric approach 
would establish statistical relationships between changes in 'independent' explanatory 
variables, and the 'dependent' performance criteria. Such an analysis would need to be 
founded, however, on a theoretical framework involving certain restrictive assumptions, for 
example regarding the direct comparability across firms of the technological improvements 
or the quality of the training. Given the nature of the data, the assumption of independence 
of many of the candidate explanatory variables is inherently problematic. A dynamic firm 
is likely to conduct more training, introduce more technological improvements and improve 
its management techniques in a complementary fashion. Robust regression analysis would 
also have required a higher volume of data collection than was possible in this research. 
Such an approach is not applied in this study's analysis.
Another problem is that the data available from the ES Census are very limited in range, 
scope and detail. They cover a limited period; data on output are absent for some firms, and 
productivity data are crude. Consequently, trying to compare the changes elicited in the ES 
Census with changes in the wider economy is problematic.
While there are relatively few tests that could legitimately be conducted given the limitations 
of the data, output and employment growth figures from 1991 -95 could be used to ascertain 
responses to the changes in relative prices during that period. The data problems extend to 
the macro price data (see Chapter 5). With all price indices subject to revision, changes in 
relative prices are still very unclear at the time of writing.
The difficulties in analysing the ES Census data emphasise the importance of the case study 
approach taken in the research and from which the most useful and convincing analysis was 
derived.
90
3.3.2 Case Studies
The case study analysis examines the impact of non-price, non-cost based, institutional 
variables on the behaviour and performance of firms in the target sector. The firms' 
characteristics are analysed to understand differences between better and worse performing 
firms. A simple typology of firms assists in understanding the diversity of firm experiences 
in Zimbabwe.
To save time, it was decided not to obtain financial performance data on a continuous year 
on year basis. This focus on selected years had problems, however, in that sometimes the 
CSO data was missing for the particular year selected. Year on year, there were large 
variances in the figures presented to the CSO for individual firms. Consequently, the 
estimates of changes over time vary considerably depending on the starting year. The best 
solution might be to examine changes in moving averages, but with discontinuous data this 
is also not possible. Nonetheless, the data do show discernible differences from one year to 
the next. The precise figures should, however, be used with considerable caution.
Changes in firm behaviour are examined to see where these conform to 'orthodox* 
expectations of response to changes in the economic environment (see Chapter 6). The latter 
comprised both ES AP's changes in the economic policy framework and the macro-economic 
changes that followed ESAP. The macro changes included a reduction in domestic demand, 
partly as a result of the drought; reductions in real wages; and, high real interest rates. This 
type of before and after analysis is complex (as noted in Chapter 2). As with the ES Census 
analysis, one hazard is the difficulty of distinguishing directly between various possible 
explanations of change in behaviour and performance. By tracing the institutional histories 
and legacies of individual firms, explanations of change may be more convincing.
There were problems in obtaining reliable historical data on the firms pre-ES AP, apart from 
limited financial data from the CSO. The bulk of the analytical work centres, therefore, on 
variation in recent performance across different firms, rather than identifying the longer-term 
influences on individual company performance. This is supplemented by secondary data, 
the general historical survey of manufacturing in Chapter 4, and other literature.
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3.3.3 Institutional Analysis
This analysis, in Chapter 7, compares and contrasts many behavioural aspects of the 
supporting firms. It includes examining skills and experience of staff, handling of 
information, linkages with other organisations, and changes in strategy since the introduction 
of the changes in economic policies after 1990.
Given limited data, of uneven quality, there is little possibility of any serious comparative 
statistical analysis of these organisations. Without cost information and some objective 
assessment indicator of performance, much further analysis becomes problematic. It is 
impossible at this stage to make any direct assessment of varying performance across 
organisations, or over time. The emphasis therefore is on qualitative assessments of the 
changing roles played by the various organisations.
Likewise, it is impossible to establish any direct comparison of the efficacy of the 
organisational framework in Zimbabwe promoting industrial development, with that of other 
countries.
The organisations are examined both as independent entities, and in their social settings. 
This assists in understanding which interests are being served, the balance of power between 
them, and the conflicts which underlie the actions and performance of the organisations.
3.4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has outlined the methodology used to collect firm and non-firm institutional 
data, required to carry out a comprehensive case study of the nature of development of the 
mechanical engineering manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe.
Given the concern with path dependency and institutional legacies, the analyses in Chapters 
6 and 7 have to be viewed against the economic history of mechanical engineering and 
industry more generally in Zimbabwe since UDI. This is covered in the next chapter.
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4 THE HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE: 1965 - 1990
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a broad overview of the historical influences on and pattern of 
development of manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe from UDI until 1990. As with the rest 
of the thesis, the focus is on the engineering sector. Together with an examination of relevant 
macro and sectoral data, this critical review provides a background to the analysis of the post­
liberalisation industrial experience, contained in subsequent chapters.
This chapter draws mainly on secondary sources, including officially published statistics and 
other Zimbabwean publications, the published work of other authors, and interview notes.
4.2 MANUFACTURING SECTOR PERFORMANCE
Several writers suggest that the events of the UDI period (1965-79) heavily influenced the 
range of possible policies open to the government following independence in 1980 (for 
example, see Ndlovu (1992:75)). For a variety of reasons, there were few fundamental 
changes to the overall structure of the highly regulated policy framework in the first decade 
following independence. There was, however, a distinct shift in policy emphasis away from 
state support of international and settler capitalists. An examination of the UDI period, the 
policies followed and the political-economic outcomes is essential to understanding the early 
post-independence period and the economic policy changes after 1990.
In this section, we examine the evolving role of engineering in the context of manufacturing 
development in Zimbabwe. The engineering industry is a key part of manufacturing, but also 
includes important non-manufacturing activities like repair and maintenance services. In this 
analysis, we focus on the higher value adding, manufacturing sectors of the industry. Many 
engineering products are aimed at other productive sectors of the economy, whether they be
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agricultural implements and machinery, equipment for the mining sector, or machinery for 
other manufacturers. In addition, a number of products are produced for final consumption.
Overall Pattern
Zimbabwean manufacturing went through several phases during the period 1965-90. These 
are illustrated in Figures 4.1 to 4.6. They can be characterised as follows:
1966-1974 
1974-1978 
1978-1981 
1981-1984 
1984-1990
Engineering's share of GDP grew from around 4 percent in the late 1960s, to 8.4 percent by 
1975. The average periodised growth rates for manufacturing as a whole and the engineering 
sector are shown in Table 4.1.1
1 The value figures shown are single deflated using the manufacturing GDP deflator calculated from 
the Quarterly Digest o f Statistics. Prior to 1974 the CPI is used as a proxy for the deflator.
early UDI - rapid growth
late-UDI - declines in most performance indices
independence - brief growth spurt
regulated post-independence - small declines in most indices 
focus on exports - return to slower growth.
Figure 4.1 - Manufacturing Value Added
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Table 4.1 - Manufacturing Sector Average AnnjiaK3rowrtjiRa^^
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TOTAL MANUFACTURING
1966-74 12.5% 13.2% 23.9%* 8.0%
1974-78 -3.8% -3.1% -25.4% -1.7%
1978-81 11.8% 12.2% 47.6% 7.8%
1981-84 -2.8% 0.3% -19.4% -1.8%
1984-90 \ 7.0% 8.5% 21.8%** 2.5%
ENGINEERING SECTOR
1966-74 16.9% 19.5% 36.8%* 12.7%
1974-78 -5.3% -3.3% -36.1% -3.4%
1978-81 10.8% 6.5% 36.3% 7.3%
1981-84 -10.3% -9.5% -30.7% -5.0%
1984-90 13.4% 16.4% 30.8%** 3.0%
* 1967-74 only 
** 1984-88 only
Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics and Census of Industrial Production (Various)
The performance of the engineering industry has been more strongly influenced by the 
behaviour of GDP overall (year-on-year correlation of 0.89 - from 1966-1990), than any 
individual productive sector (see Figure 4.3).2 The most influential sector appears to have 
been agriculture (correlation of 0.85). Growth rate correlations are not as clear, the strongest 
also being between overall GDP and agriculture (both at around 0.6). The declines in 
engineering output after 1981 and 1986 were associated with steep drought-induced declines 
in agricultural output between 1981 and 1983, and 1985 and 1987. The impact worked 
through a drop in demand for agricultural outputs and inputs, a reduction in incomes in the 
sector, and a consequent increased shortage of foreign exchange.
2 Excluding engineering from GDP itself the correlation coefficient reduces to 0.87.
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Figure 4.2 - Manufacturing Volume Production Index
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Figure 4.3 - Productive Sector Shares of GDP
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The lack of reliable input-output data makes it difficult to track precisely the impact of 
changes in one sector on another.3 In Zimbabwe, the last input-output table was produced 
in 1965 and has not been substantially revised since. It is considered unlikely that the 
coefficients established in the 1960s would be of much relevance in 1990, as the shape of 
manufacturing changed throughout the period. Furthermore, the ways that data are 
disaggregated in the Census of Industrial Production and other official statistics are not fine
For example, see use of this technique to examine inter-sectoral linkages in South Africa in Fine and 
Rustomjee (1996).
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enough to be able to divide products by the sectors that are providing their inputs or most 
likely to be using them. This also means that attempting to suggest the percentage of the 
manufacturing sector which carries out minimal value-added processing of raw materials, for 
example, is impossible from the data available.4
Figure 4.4 - Investment Details
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Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest o f Statistics (various)
One feature of this analysis is the dependence of aggregate figures, in relatively poorly 
integrated developing economies like Zimbabwe, on a single sub-sector or firm. For 
example, total real manufacturing value added, including the iron and steel sub-sector grew 
by 7.5 percent annually between 1987 and 1990, but only by 2.7 percent without this 
subsection.
4 See Appendix 4.1 for more detail on the sources and use of official data on Zimbabwe.
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Figure 4.5 - Engineering as % of Manuf. Val. Added
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Figure 4.6 - Engineering Value Added by Sub-Sector 
1000
800
E 
N
o  600
05 
1=
$  400£= o O
200
0  '  I i i i i i i i i i i l l  i — f i  i i i i - I  i i i t i i
1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 
Base Metals Metal Products Transport Equipment
Source: UNIDO, Industrial Statistics and CSO, Quarterly Digest o f Statistics 
(various)
The economic isolation imposed on the Rhodesian regime after the declaration of UDI in 
1965 can be viewed as leading to the intensification of import substituting industrialisation. 
Riddell attempts to disaggregate the sources of growth between ’import substitution’, ’growth 
in domestic demand’ and ’export growth’ (Riddell, 1990a: 341-4).5 He breaks down the year 
on year changes in output according to whether they are replacing imports in the previous
5 His main motivation appears to be to clarify issues about the relative impact on growth of import 
substitution versus export orientation.
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year, meeting increases in domestic demand (of products already produced locally), or export 
driven. He finds that there was greater import substitution before UDI, while post-UDI it was 
mostly increases in demand for goods already produced domestically which drove growth. 
The emphasis on actuals says nothing about planned consumption levels, however. As 
foreign exchange availability diminished during the later UDI era, this constrained the 
importation of inputs, as well as final products, even in product areas where there may have 
been no domestically available substitutes for imports. Moreover, this analysis does not 
account for the rapid expansion in the range of products produced locally during the early 
part of the post-UDI era.6
Historical Path
Engineering growth during the first ten years of UDI was rapid, with rates in excess of 10 
percent per annum for gross output in each engineering sub-sector between 1967 and 1974, 
except for motor vehicle assembly. Ford liquidated its plant during this period, possibly as 
a result of international sanctions. Efforts were focussed on making iron and steel one of the 
leading export sub-sectors, with a shift to exporting more value-added products. Between 
1965-6 and 1974-5, the proportion of exports that were in the form of pig iron compared with 
higher value-added ingots, billets and blooms went from 6.6:1 to 1:1.7
Foreign exchange scarcity and the escalating costs of the war took their toll after 1975. 
Domestically, there had been a significant surge of investment from 1972 to 1975 (see Figure 
4.4), which undoubtedly created significant excess capacity. This investment led to the
6 The methodology is not well explained in Riddell's book, the best account appears in Lewis, 
Sharpley and Harvey (1990: 74-75). There are also a number of technical problems with the 
analysis relating to the quality of data. In the Zimbabwe account, trade classifications are made to 
correspond to industry ones, but there may be mis-classifications, also there are timing issues, the 
actuals for trade may reflect goods produced in different years. Nonetheless, it is considered that 
the split between export and domestic demand is unlikely to be significantly wide of the mark.
7 Figures calculated as two year average, taken from Kalyati (1991), Table 5.
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Figure 4.7 - Manufactured Exports and Imports
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accumulation of huge stocks through the late 1970s.8 The creation of excess capacity led to 
problems after independence, with inadequate revenues being generated to service properly, 
maintain and replace machinery. This may have subsequently made local capitalists more 
cautious about undertaking new investment (see Section 4.3.3).
Around independence, there was a brief flurry of increased investment activity. The backlog 
of demand for capital equipment replacement and manufactured inputs, and a surge in 
demand resulting from increasing real incomes, were met by liberalised imports (World 
Bank, 1990: 6).9
Manufacturing exports had declined from 15 percent of merchandise exports in 1964 to 6 
percent in 1979 (see GoZ, 1982:7). In the engineering sector, crude estimates suggest exports 
fell as a percentage of gross output from over 30 percent in 1980 to under 20 percent by
o
Bond (1993: 11) argues that under consumption was not the main problem. This was 
'overaccumulation', leading to 'over investment' in both heavy industry and luxury consumer goods. 
Pragmatically, however, there is no difference between the two. Bond fails to answer the more 
interesting questions about the reasons for the pattern of investment adopted by firms and why the 
drive into exports was not strong enough to increase demand for the escalating stocks (sanctions 
notwithstanding).
9 In 1982, the exchange rate appreciated to its highest post-independence level (World Bank, 1990: 6) 
and imports supplied 42 per cent o f the domestic consumption of capital goods, whereas they had 
only supplied 19 per cent in 1980. The value of locally manufactured capital goods consumed was 
lower in 1982 in real terms, (ibid., Figure 2.3: 16).
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1982.10 As a result, the nominal current account deficit rose from Z$157m in 1980 to 
Z$533m by 1982 (Muzulu, 1993:85). The post-independence increase in the availability of 
foreign aid and foreign borrowings was insufficient to avoid a foreign exchange crisis in 
1983.
Following this crisis, there was a further decline in the substantially import-dependent 
investment expenditure (see Figure 4.4).11 For the engineering sector, investment as a 
percentage of net output fell from 17.1 percent in 1981 to 8.4 percent in 1985.12
The government led a concerted effort to improve exports and foreign exchange earnings in 
the mid-1980s, through the introduction of a number of schemes, including the Export 
Incentive Scheme (in the early 1980s) and the Export Revolving Fund (in 1983). They 
contributed to exports increasing as a percentage of real gross manufacturing output from
4.1 percent in 1981 to 18.9 percent in 1990 (Muzulu, 1993:238).13 The recovery of 
engineering exports was assisted by the increasing value of ferro-alloys (see Figure 4.8), as 
well as a sharp increase in the value of nickel exports in 1988. The high reliance on exports 
of relatively low value-added products is shown by the very small percentage of total 
engineering exports accounted for by machinery and equipment exports, throughout.
10 Calculation from CSO data.
11 Between 1983 and 1986 the volume of capital goods imports fell by 34% (Muzulu, 1993:86).
12 These figures are for net investment expenditure taken from the Census o f Industrial Production 
data.
1 "3 Muzulu used World Bank's World Tables for time series data on manufactured exports and 
unpublished data from the CSO for exports by commodity classification (ibid.: 112-113)
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Figure 4.8 - Manufactured Metal/Engineering Exports
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Note: There are no figures available for 1989.
Growth in the manufacturing and engineering contributions to GDP returned after 1985 (see 
Figure 4.1). The late 1980s saw a relative decline in most metal product sub-sectors focussed 
on the domestic market, while according to official data there was rapid growth in the value 
of base metals production between 1987 and 1989, with real value added increasing at an 
average annual rate of 86 percent.14 This collapsed again by 50 percent in the following year.
4.3 POLICY DETERMINANTS
In this section, we critically examine explanations for the evolution of the national economic 
policy framework, as it affected manufacturing. We develop an account, which is based on 
the evolution of social relations and institutions during the 'closed' economy era. It 
establishes the paths and norms against which decisions were made to move away from that 
long-running policy regime in the late 1980s.
14 This compares with average growth during the previous three years 1984-7 o f 8.1 percent and seems 
rather excessive given other complementary data (see Appendix 4.1 for discussion on the difficulty 
of reconciling industry and trade data).
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4.3.1 The UDI Period
During the UDI period, the state served a coalition of often conflicting 'white' interests, 
including capitalists, skilled labourers and others within the governing institutions. With the 
racial basis of the social structure inhibiting the fuller development of capitalist class 
relationships, there was a deliberate attempt to match the interests of these various classes, 
with a social identification at the national level. Under this umbrella of racially-based 
common interest, there were still conflicts, however, which became increasingly open and 
transparent in the later years of UDI (Godwin and Hancock, 1995:14). These conflicts often 
had their roots in pre-UDI differences. The Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARnI) 
represented both local operations of foreign owned firms (mostly British and South African), 
as well as local white capitalists. Since the late 1950s, the ARnI had lobbied for 'closing' the 
economy to protect infant industries. Up to 1966, this had been resisted by commercial, 
agricultural and mining capitalists (Skalnes, 1995:62).
Following the introduction of international sanctions, trade and industrial policy were linked, 
with "a policy of selective tariff protection as the major incentive to industrial development 
..." (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1972:16). The Industrial Tariff Committee 
approved new goods for import control (quotas and high tariffs), with preference to "growth 
industries"; industries producing import substitutes; industries producing inputs for local 
manufacture; and industries with good export prospects. Through the Industrial Projects 
Committee, which approved new investment projects, the government effectively controlled 
most investment. Without approval, it was impossible to obtain the foreign exchange 
required for new equipment.15 The system was supplemented by rebates of duty "for 
specified uses in manufacturing" and duty drawbacks for imported inputs into export 
production. The evolution of industrial policy is explored in more detail in Chapter 6.
It is not very clear from available documentation, how the various sub-sectors of 
manufacturing and different industrial groupings were prioritised. It was argued early on in 
the import control systems's life, that insufficient priority was given to industrial interests as 
opposed to commercial ones (see Girdlestone, 1968). This implies that industrial investment
15 The 1971 Annual Report o f the Secretary for Commerce and Industry gives a full description of the 
various measures for implementing industrial policy (1972: 14-16).
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may have been lower, with more rents going to merchant or commercial capitalists, than if 
the system had been more consistently directed towards productive activities. The 
regulations were primarily based on historical allocations, which meant that firms which had 
a poor import performance in 1964/65 were penalised thereafter. New firms found it 
particularly difficult to become established.16 Once the annual ceilings for commerce and 
industry were set, the control of foreign exchange disbursements was managed by ARnI and 
ACCOR committees, giving further preference to established interests. Most product 
diversification, therefore, was undertaken by existing firms (World Bank, 1990a:2).
It can be deduced, therefore that the system was designed to ensure the majority of the 'white' 
community benefited from economic development. This enabled policymakers to maintain 
a balance of white class interests, and, thus, a majority of support behind the UDI government 
and 'national' unity. In the context of the struggle for independence, the drive for 
industrialisation was accorded secondary importance to the defence of white interests.
Nonetheless, government regulations did play a key role in the economic achievements of the 
first part of UDI. Legislation was passed to ensure that companies' actions were in the 
'national interest'. For example, redundant workers had to be paid to ensure that they were 
rapidly redeployed (Wield, 1982). Repatriation of foreign profits and dividends was not 
allowed, encouraging reinvestment. The state also facilitated the flow of private capital to 
manufacturing through the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).17
What is not immediately clear is why the economy and the state were able to achieve such 
satisfactory results before, but not after, 1974. The independence war is at the root of the 
most convincing explanations about the eventual decline. By the mid-1970s, many of those 
who had provided the core of national skills, were emigrating or seriously contemplating
16 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Import Control (1975). The report mentions a 
number of these type of technical problems with the controls, including many intimations of abuse 
of the system, including that by the members o f the ARnI (Association of Rhodesian Industry) and 
ACCOR (Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia), who were able to administer much of 
the system themselves. It was also noted that there was no provision within the system favouring the 
introduction of new technological developments through imports. It is not clear what amendments 
were made to the system following the report (ibid: 15-17).
17 The IDC had been formed prior to UDI in 1959, but became a useful vehicle for the intervenionist 
UDI government. Its investments in the engineering sector included motor assembly and metal 
products.
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doing so (Fallon and Lucas, 1993:245). Given the lack of any serious effort to educate and 
train the black population (see Section 4.6 below), shortages of skills appeared (Riddell, 
1990a:352).18 The exodus of skills is likely to have affected government as much, if not 
more, than it did the rest of the economy. Emigration also meant that domestic demand fell 
for many local products, which predominantly met the needs of ’white' consumers, fell. 
Furthermore, the remaining whites were becoming increasingly demoralised, which 
undoubtedly had a negative impact on their productivity, as well as their feelings of 'national' 
unity (see Godwin and Hancock, 1995).
External factors also affected macro-economic performance, if not the government's capacity. 
The oil price rise in 1973-4, together with sanctions, meant that Zimbabwe had some of the 
highest oil prices in the world after 1974 (Fallon and Lucas, 1993:245). This increased 
balance of payments problems, causing a severe foreign exchange shortage by the mid-1970s.
These factors contribute to understanding the poorer post-1974 performance, but do not 
explain the previous good performance. As in many 'war economies', this resulted from the 
"sense of unity and solidarity among the settler community which provided the drive and 
incentive to diversify, invest and engage in widespread sanctions-busting operations." 
(Riddell, 1990a:352). With "the industrialists and government of the day sharing a 
determination to overcome the impact of international sanctions, the system of controls was 
made to operate effectively." (Robinson, 1993:1).
Dependency-type explanations, which have been prominent among Zimbabwean analysts, 
only attempt to explain the worsening performance after 1975. Difficulties are suggested in 
following a capitalist development path in a peripheral economy, when the local market is 
very limited, as a result of the lack of penetration of capitalist relations (Raftopoulos, 1986).
None of the established views provides a satisfactory explanation, of the government's 
success in a developing its capacities during the early part of UDI. Such an explanation 
requires stepping further back, to an analysis of the British colonial administrative structure.
18 Neither of the above authors mentions numbers of emigrants as percentages of skills categories, so 
it is difficult to assess just how serious it was, but the general observation that the most capable and 
qualified find it easiest to relocate indicates that the net impact was likely to be greater than the 
percentage of skills lost.
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The close bonding of many colonial bureaucrats and the local settler population led to a 
closely knit white population.
The declaration of UDI led to the establishment of an implicit social and political pact to 
protect settler interests at all costs. As the independence struggle intensified, the white 
community weakened. With the intensification of the war and the deterioration in the 
economy, despondency increased, morale fell and increasing numbers of an already small 
community left the country.19 Cohesion between the various 'white' classes diminished. 
Many capitalists became defensive, secretive (encouraged by active public relations 
campaigns), inward-looking and concerned with protecting their individual interests, rather 
than an increasingly ill-defined 'national1 one. The enthusiasm and attitude of defiance to the 
world, which had driven the early successes, evaporated. The very reasons which made the 
government effective and the economy strong in the early UDI period, had the opposite 
impact in the later era.
4.3.2 Post-Independence
After Independence, government continued the interventionist strategy, albeit with a change 
in emphasis. In the foreword to the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 
Mugabe suggested the Plan was the "first endeavour at socialist transformation" (1982:i). 
The document itself is littered with references to "the ultimate goal of an egalitarian socialist 
and integrated society" (ibid.:2). There are mixed signals elsewhere in the document. 
Mugabe also suggested that "ample room has been reserved for performance by private 
enterprise" (ibid.:i).
Despite an avowed commitment to socialism, few changes were made to the inherited 
industrial policies during the first decade after independence (see Chapter 6 for more details). 
The major initial impact, was the greater emphasis given to the interests of workers (see 4.5 
below), through the introduction of minimum wage and employment protection legislation 
in 1980. Price controls were tightened as well, ostensibly to bring down costs to the poor and 
reduce the perceived high level of profits accruing to the private sector (World Bank,
19 Numbers of whites dwindled in both relative and absolute terms after 1976 (Godwin & Hancock, 
1995).
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1990:11).
Limited efforts were actually made to take direct control of "strategic" industries. In the 
engineering sector, government assisted a few firms nearing bankruptcy, including Stainless 
Steel Industries and F Issels, which were acquired by the Industrial Development 
Corporation. These firms are reported as not achieving substantial change in their 
management teams or capability after the take-overs. (World Bank, 1990a: 11). From 
independence to 1990, few new enterprises were established in the sector either by foreign 
or local investment (see 4.3.3 below).
The lack of major policy shifts was parallelled by a lack of structural change in industry. The 
favouring of workers' interests was short-lived, as real wages started to decline again after 
1983 (see 4.5 below). The new government's actions amounted to populist appeasement, in 
the face of pent-up aspirations over-flowing into post-independence wild-cat strikes.20 Moyo 
suggests government actions favoured the status quo to maintain stability through a 'politics 
of compromise' (1992:312-313). Skalnes notes the stronger influence of the more organised 
voice of business, balancing an implicit labour bias (1993:209-212). Ndlela, writing from 
a dependency perspective, noted the lack of change within the business sector. Zimbabwean 
industry was still characterised by the dominance of international capital (with local capital 
closely tied to it) and dependence on imported inputs and technologies (1986:156).
The continued dominance of established enterprises "was entrenched by the continuation of 
economic policies which explicitly gave established enterprises privileged access to key 
resources (particularly foreign currency)" (Robinson, 1993: 2/3). Price controls limited 
profits, so the focus for accumulation shifted to attempts to increase access to foreign 
exchange. With allocations still administered by industry and commerce's representative 
bodies, the establishment of more favourable annual ceilings required cordial relations 
between capitalists and the relevant government agencies. Robinson's account shows the 
mechanics of policy continuity, but lacks dynamic agency. It does not explain why the 
policies remained unchanged.
20 See Sachikonye (1993), Skalnes (1995) and Shadur (1994) for alternative views on labour relations 
aspects, which, although taking somewhat different stances, note the continued ineffectiveness of 
organised labour after independence (see discussion in 4.5)
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While the broad pattern of emerging capitalist social relations was maintained, important 
changes were taking place. These prepared the ground for the shift in the policy framework 
in 1990. After independence, "[t]he close working relationship between government and 
industry, that had been part of the explanation of the success of industrialisation under 
sanctions, ceased to exist" (UNIDO, 1993:3). Nor did a strong set of policies favouring 
workers' interests develop. In order to establish why the apparent initial maintenance of the 
status quo changed in 1990, analysis is required of the differing interests within the post­
independence ruling class.
The Importance o f Class
Several authors have attempted class based analyses of the political economy of post­
independence Zimbabwe.
Dashwood (1996) sees a conventional capitalist class emerge from the ruling post­
independence elite and identifies its common interests with the pre-existing (white) agrarian 
and industrial elites. She cites "a broad based consensus in the scholarly and journalistic 
literature that members of the ruling elite have enriched themselves" through the acquisition 
of farms, businesses and corruption (ibid:33). The introduction of a leadership code in 1984 
is taken as a sign that some within government and ruling party had already begun to 
accumulate wealth (loc. cit.).
Phimister, echoing Mandaza (1986), saw independence as opening a 'state' path to 
accumulation for the African bourgeoisie. The 'petit bourgeois' leaders of the independence 
struggle never had any obligations to the urban working class.21 Yet, due to historical 
weaknesses resulting from the repressive and exclusionary nature of the colonial regime they 
were unable to mount a serious indigenous challenge to the interests of international (and 
settler) capitalists (Mandaza, 1986:57).
Herbst suggests government used its control over the regulatory framework to "create a new 
class of Black businessmen, by giving them preferential access to import licenses."
21 Phimister in a seminar presented at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, on March
1, 1995.
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(1990:120). While it appears that accumulation did take place as a result of such access,22 
the relationship between emergent black capitalists and those in government during the 1980s 
is unclear. Ostergaard takes the view that the former were dependent on and beholden to the 
latter (1994:117). He suggests that once established in political power, the "governing group" 
developed a fear of the rise of a black industrial bourgeoisie, which might contest power. 
Little was done to promote its development. Instead, in order to preserve the productive 
capacity of the economy, those in power entered into a tacit alliance with existing (white) 
capitalists, who posed less of a political threat. T aylor (1997) develops this argument further, 
suggesting the government deliberately suppressed the emergence of a black middle class, 
by co-opting a few indigenous economic actors and marginalising others that it could not co­
opt.23
In the dependency approach of Mandaza (1986), much is blamed' on external historical 
factors and little attention is given to the potential for independent action by the new leaders. 
For example, an apparent lack of debate about the possibility that the state might take more 
direct control over the means of production, is implicitly ascribed to the fettering and 
historical constraints of "the midwife of imperialism" (ibid: 50) and machinations of 
international aid donors (ibid:39). On the other hand, there was rapid Africanisation of the 
civil service (ibid:44 - and see below).
Given the imposed 'ring-fencing' around 'white' business, the continuance of the pre­
independence ownership structures, as noted by Ndlela (1986), is not surprising. During the 
1980s, black Zimbabweans wanting to get into the private sector as capitalists, were publicly 
criticised. Nonetheless, as blacks' share of formal employment increased, so did their share 
of the pension fund and insurance company monies invested in listed companies, although 
not their effective control over the investment of those funds. The increased emphasis on 
earning foreign exchange after the government abandoned the IMF programme in 1984, 
intensified the need to promote exports. Without a substantial change in the share of public 
ownership in the productive sectors, export expansion was mostly left to existing private 
firms. Industrial capitalists’ allocations from the Export Revolving Fund increased from 23
99 This point was made by a significant number of interviewees.
23 Taylor (1997) further argues that this pattern was strengthened into the 1990s - see Chapter 5.
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percent in 1983 to 62 percent in 1988.24 Within the latter group, firms already exporting were 
increasingly favoured. These firms received 15 percent of industrial allocations in 1983 and 
71 percent by 1988.
Notwithstanding these favours shown to some white capitalists, the implication that the white 
capitalist class benefited strongly from the policies followed in the 1980s (see Ostergaard 
(ibid) and Taylor (ibid)), is not supported by the data. For example, private (non-financial) 
firms' gross operating profit share of gross domestic income was over 30 percent between 
1979 and 1983. This fell to approximately 27 percent in the mid-1980s and did not change 
substantially before 1990.25
Moreover, government's share of GDP and employment increased rapidly post-independence 
(see Table 4.2). Reduced real wages enabled government to increase public employment 
despite the relatively weak macro environment. The figures in Table 4.2 under-represent the 
full share of the economy controlled by government, as it was also modestly increasing its 
share of the productive sectors.26 For example, it is estimated that in 1981, through ZISCO, 
F Issels and Lancashire Steel, government contributed approximately 17 percent of the total 
output of the metals and metal products sector (UNIDO, 1985:44).
Table 4.2 - Government Share of GDP and Employment 1968-1990
Year
Share of GDP Share of GDP
Total Government Share 
of Employment
Education Share 
of Employment
' ■' *■ '>*- 
1968 25.5% 3.7% 14.9% 3.8%
21.9% 4.3% 14.3% 3.4%
1980 25.2% 5.2% 17.9% 4.1%
1983 29.7% 9.0% 22.9% 7.6%
.1987 31.9% 10.0% 25.2% 9.1%
1990 30.6% 9.1% 24.2% 9.1%
NB Government Total = public administration, education, health, transport and communications and water and electricity 
Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (various)
Figures from the “Performance audit report for the Zimbabwe manufacturing export project”, 
which had supported the Export Revolving Fund (World Bank, 1990b: 14).
Figures calculated at current prices from various Quarterly Digests o f Statistics.
This is countered to a limited extent by the inclusion of private transport operators and 
educational institutions.
110
Many of the above analyses are predicated on perceiving the 'state' as being dominated by a 
class apart from the rest of society, which is problematic (see Chapter 2). An alternative 
analysis would appreciate the accumulation of wealth through the state's mechanisms alone 
does not make a class; the ruling elite is not a homogenous group; moreover, not all members 
of the new government were 'petit bourgeois'. (Cokorinos, 1984).27 Conflicts were inevitable. 
Most obviously, the interests of senior bureaucrats were likely to develop differently from 
those of the politicians directing their work (James, 1995), even when they all came from a 
common 'struggle' background.
By the late 1980s, there was no resolution of whether accumulation by independent private 
interests, or those close to or involved in government, was going to take precedence. Partly 
as a consequence, a comprehensive industrialisation strategy had not emerged (see Chapter 
7). Understanding why particular policies were adopted involves paying more attention to 
the previous and emergent divisions within the pre-existing capitalist class, the consequent 
variety of alliances and contests between its members and members of the new 'elite' and the 
impact of these influences on relevant institutions. For example, available literature pays 
little attention to the impact of conflicts between the old colonial administrative cadres and 
the new political leaders after independence, the lack of experience of the new rulers and 
administrators, and the impact of the emigration of large numbers of Europeans after the mid- 
1970s (see Chapter 7).
From Mandaza's viewpoint, after independence, a comprehensive shake-up in the established 
order had been required, but the colonial ideology was so deeply entrenched that some of the 
African petty bourgeoisie "doubted their own capacity to rule efficiently without the 
assistance of the whites" (1986:47). However, as early as 1981, 52 percent of the senior 
administrative, professional and technical positions were occupied by blacks. By 1984, this 
had increased to 84 percent.28 Mandaza was head of the National Manpower Survey in 1981
27 The type of analysis attempted by Cokorinos does not adequately identify how the petty bourgeois 
roots or associations of particular individuals may have influenced their views. Furthermore, it is 
also important to acknowledge that individuals do not need such roots to aspire to, or adopt 
capitalist habits, lifestyles and prejudices.
28 Figures are from Annual Review o f Manpower (Ministry of Manpower, Planning and Development, 
1984:35, table 3.9).
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and therefore in an excellent position to comment on these matters. The weakness of his 
dependency-based arguments, relating to the lack of local options given the colonial legacy, 
precisely sums up the problem of that post-transition era. Too many individuals in the new 
government lacked a vision of how the country would be able to extricate itself from the 
legacy and rise above it. Effective political direction may well have meant that white 
bureaucrats could have been used to meet the demands of the new political rulers.
One of the legacies of the colonial and UDI eras was a shortage of educated, skilled and 
experienced blacks to undertake the transformation. This had an impact on management 
capacity in the public sector. In 1986, it was noted that the "coordinative capacity of the state 
still leaves much to be desired" (Ndlela, 1986:157) and that there had been "a disturbing loss 
of certain key skills from the public sector." (Raftopoulos, 1986:308).29 Apart from the loss 
of experienced whites, black skilled staff were leaving due, in part, to the problems of wage 
and salary differentials between public and private sectors, especially given the increasing 
use of supplementary benefits in the private sector (see section 4.1.4). The number of 
professionals in the public service fell from 2.1 percent of total employees in 1981 to 1.8 
percent in 1984.30 Furthermore, the process of Africanisation was not without "some veiy 
serious incidents of corruption, incompetence and inefficiency" (Raftopoulos, 1986:311).
It is possible that support for the status quo emerged because the political leaders found it 
easier to continue with old familiar control structures and their associated institutions, rather 
than to try and create new, viable and effective forms of state intervention. A more detailed 
institutional analysis is required.
4.3.3 Investment
One of the most important contributions to the continuing poor economic performance during 
the 1980s was a lack of productive investment. Discussion of investment determinants and 
issues are provided by Dailami and Walton (1989) and Muzulu (1993). Dailami and Walton's 
approach suffers from many of the drawbacks of typical neo-classical investment function
29 There is a frustrating lack o f data to back up these views. Bennell and Strachan refer to the 
"complete absence of reliable performance indicators and accompanying data" (1992:27).
30 Figures from Annual Review o f Manpower, as noted in footnote 28.
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analyses, as critiqued by Rustomjee (1993).
In the private sector, the level of investment was directly related to the availability of foreign 
exchange. Most capital goods required for manufacturing, as well as inputs for production, 
especially in the engineering sector given the technologies in use, had to be imported.31
Productive investment was government directed through the Industrial Projects Committee, 
both during UDI and after, but it was mostly undertaken by the private sector.32 After 
independence, the government used the Industrial Development Corporation to invest in joint 
ventures and strategic firm rescues.33 Government presided over a short-lived investment 
boom in infrastructure after independence (see Figure 4.9), which rapidly faded after the 
crisis of 1983.
Notwithstanding the policy commitment to attracting foreign and domestic private investment 
(GoZ, 1982:37), there was a difference in attitude towards existing and new investors and 
between local and foreign. Among already established firms, local capitalists were favoured, 
as it was perceived they would be more likely to reinvest profits and identify their interests 
more closely with the national economy (Ostergaard, 1994:131-3). It is impossible to 
ascertain the truth of this, as local capitalists who were contemplating leaving Zimbabwe 
would have had to resort to illegal means to export capital and build external centres of 
accumulation. Certainly, by the end of the first decade of independence there were many 
white capitalists who were yet to identify Zimbabwe as their home, or contemplate making 
substantial additional investment.34
New regulations were passed to encourage existing foreign investors to reinvest their 
earnings (Herbst, 1990:138-9), while the dependency-influenced government was not keen
31 There were a number of different causes of the foreign exchange constraint itself. These included: 
difficulties associated with boosting exports significantly under sanctions during UDI; and, their 
decline in the short lived boom in domestic absorption around independence. Other causes were 
beyond the scope of Zimbabwe's influence, such as the downturn in the international lending 
environment shortly after independence, with the onset of the debt crisis.
32 See Bond (1993) and footnote 8 above.
33 See First Five Year National Development Plan, 1986-90, Vol. 1 (GoZ, 1986:30)
3 4  _ ,
See various interview notes.
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on facilitating new foreign investment (ibid.: 123-5). The latter policy may have had some 
short-term domestic political advantages, but it did little to reduce the feelings of caution
Figure 4.9 - Government Investment as % GDP
12%  -I----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10%...................................
8%  —
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Note: Government Investment includes capital expenditure on electricity and water, 
transport and communications, education, health and other public expenditure. It does 
not include any shares of other productive sectors 
Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest o f Statistics (various)
among existing investors.
As noted above, ZANU-PF rhetoric and a lack of overt support measures discouraged 
independent indigenous investment. The establishment of the Small Enterprise Development 
Corporation (SEDCO) and the Zimbabwe Development Bank (ZDB) was intended to support 
financially smaller and larger enterprises respectively. In neither case were these institutions 
very successful in assisting new enterprises (Nicholas, 1994:102-3).
Moreover, government's lack of purposeful public investment in production, based on a well- 
conceived industrial strategy, meant that the public sector did nothing to replace failing 
private industrial investment. Overall, as happened under UDI for different reasons, existing 
investors were therefore protected from possible new competition.
In the latter part of the 1980s, because the confidence of many capitalists was increasing, both 
in their own continuity and in the government's competence, and, with increasing exports
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easing the foreign exchange constraint, there was a marginal increase in investment (see 
Figure 4.4). While non-manufacturing investment was flat at between 9 and 11 percent of 
GDP between 1985 and 1990, manufacturing investment rose from a low of 1.8 percent of 
GDP in 1985 to a high of 4.2 percent in 1989. It is not clear, however, what percentage of 
this investment was really new investment, rather than replacement, upgrading of existing 
capacity or pent-up plans which had been inhibited due to foreign exchange constraints.35
By the late 1980s, increasing accumulation by emerging black capitalists, whether through 
their links within government or independently, meant that government's rhetorical 
opposition to the private sector was beginning to conflict with the interests of a steadily larger 
group of people close to government.
4.3.4 Setting the Scene for Policy Shifts
Examining the process that led to the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) in 1990, provides another clue to the evolution of policy after 
independence.
Externally, the main instigator of the drive for 'reforms' was the World Bank. It refused to 
consider extending its US$70.6 million mid-1980s loan for the Export Revolving Fund, 
without more general reforms, in line with Bank practice across the continent. Two key 
country reports published in 1987,36 were followed by research by Dailami and Walton 
(1989), Fallon and Lucas (1993) and a Bank report on the capital goods sector (World Bank, 
1990a). T ogether with the establishment of the Bank's representative.office in the mid-1980s, 
these reports were part of the Bank's drive for policy change. With a very engaging and 
politically adept first Resident Representative,37 the role of the Bank in pushing for a more 
orthodox macro policy framework should not be underestimated. Such policies would not 
have been introduced, however, without internal forces pushing in the same direction and 
without a growing acceptance of such policies within government circles.
35 This could benefit from further research.
36 Zimbabwe - A Strategy for Sustained Growth and Zimbabwe - An Industry Sector Memorandum,
(World Bank, 1987a).
37 See interview notes: 23 April, 1996.
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The strongest initial support came from the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce 
(ZNCC). They were feeling neglected as a result of government support for the export push. 
Primary commodity producers also desired greater openness, to provide easier and cheaper 
access to inputs. Yet, it was only once the industrial capitalists were persuaded of the need 
for change that capitalists, under the umbrella of the Zimbabwe Association of Business 
Organisations (ZABO), were able to present a united face to government in support of change 
(Skalnes, 1995:124). Latent conflicts remained submerged, such as that over the most 
desirable sequence of liberalisation (ibid.: 129).
Industrial capitalists had been divided between domestic-oriented manufacturers, who 
supported protection, and exporters calling for trade liberalisation to assist in their efforts to 
procure inputs. It took the foreign exchange crisis of 1987/8 for the Confederation of 
Zimbabwean Industries (CZI) to resolve this conflict in favour of the exporters (ibid.: 126- 
13 0). Those firms exporting more, tended to be the larger firms, which were among the more 
vociferous and more influential members of the CZI.38 In addition, the World Bank country 
studies of the late 1980s encouraged local manufacturers to believe they were sufficiently 
well entrenched in the domestic market, to beat foreign competing products, even if these 
became available more cheaply.39 Moreover, many capitalists failed fully to appreciate the 
negative effects of rapid exposure to greater foreign competition (see Robinson (1993) and 
Skalnes (1995:138)).
The financial and organisational resources at the disposal of the settler-dominated lobbying 
groups, the CZI, ZNCC, CFU (Commercial Farmers Union) and others, enabled them to carry 
out an intensive government lobbying campaign in the late 1980s. Given its ambivalence 
towards the private sector, and the relative strength of capitalist groupings, the government 
did not manage to establish a single representative body for capitalist interests, in the same 
way as it had for workers (Skalnes, 1995:100-101). This lobbying for policy change was also 
supported by the non-government controlled press, as represented by the Financial Gazette.
38 See Chapter 7.
39 See Riddell's example of Tinto Industries and their machine-drawn agricultural implements (1990a: 
357)
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These increasing pressures provided motivation for the political leadership to consider 
change. Of key importance, however, were changes within government circles, which meant 
the 'voices’ of the previously ignored domestic and foreign capitalists, became increasingly 
influential. In 1987, within government structures, only the Senior Finance Minister, who 
had World Bank experience, and technocratic senior Reserve Bank officials were in favour 
of adopting "market-friendly" changes (Skalnes, 1995:132). Nevertheless, three years later 
these were introduced.
Explaining the dynamics of change in the late 1980s, Skalnes emphasises the increasing 
influence of outside lobbying interests, in the face of an internal policy-making vacuum, 
Dashwood suggests it was the 'embourgeoisiement' of the governing elite, however, that led 
them increasingly to identify their interests with those of established 'agrarian' and 
'entrepreneurial' capitalists. Both writers stress realisation by those in government of the 
potential political threats posed by rising unemployment.40 Yet, neither offers a sufficient 
explanation for the increasing influence of a ’market-friendly* group within the political 
leadership, that was eventually able to persuade Mugabe that change was required.
Herbst identified a split within the ZANU-PF leadership between ’technocrats’ and 
(nationalist) ’idealogues’, which led to gradual occupation of most of the economic ministries 
by the former group (1990:230-4). This is reflected in the divergence between the 
government's 1980s socialist rhetoric and its continuing failure to introduce socialist 
economic policies. The technocrats, many of whom were western trained, were receptive to 
arguments based on orthodox economic rationality, as put forward by the World Bank. They 
were increasingly concerned about the limitations of the government's administrative and 
directive capacity (see above), as well as the chronic and ongoing shortages of foreign 
exchange and new sources of investment. With the discrediting of many 'idealogues' and the 
departure from Cabinet in 1989 of a number of them, as a result of the Willowgate corruption 
scandal,41 the pro-change group consolidated its political influence.
40 See for example, Budget Statement, 1987 (GoZ, 1987:38) and Ministry of Labour, Manpower 
Planning and Social Welfare, Fourth Report o f the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Employment 
Creation, cited in Dashwood (1996:42).
41 See Report o f  the Commission o f  Inquiry into the Distribution ofMotor Vehicles (1989).
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Many idealogues were also among those most strongly behind the drive for a one-party state. 
Its adoption would have provided them with greater certainty of being able to use access to 
the mechanisms of state control to pursue their own accumulation strategies. The eventual 
abandonment of the one-party state drive by September 1990 had more to do with a 
groundswell of dissent from "various institutions in civil society" and within the ruling party 
(principally from the same technocrats), than any organised political opposition (Sachikonye,
1991). Chidzero and other 'technocrats', may have hoped to use the abandonment of the 
state-run economic control structures to reduce future possibilities for overtly corrupt 
behaviour and to 'clean up’ the ruling party's image. At the same time, they were trying to 
increase possibilities for independent accumulation by blacks within the private sector.
The labour movement and socially marginalised groups, including rural dwellers, had little 
effective representation among influential policy makers. They had no influence on the 
design of the ESAP programme. The trade unions' capacity to mobilise vocal dissent and 
lead a strong coalition against the new policies was judged to be too weak to cause undue 
concern (Sachikonye, 1995:46). The unions were accommodated by promises of both the 
employment generation potential of the programmes and freer collective bargaining.
Thus, a significant, albeit limited shift, occurred in the nature of capitalist social relations, 
away from the primarily race-based system prior to independence. The coincidence of 
interests between established capitalists and government 'technocrats', was instrumental in 
forging the path to adoption of ESAP. In so doing, despite supposed concerns about 
increasing unemployment, there was a marginalisation of the interests of the working class 
and the poor, as evidenced by the lack of consultation in the design of ESAP and its limited 
emphasis on social welfare and equity considerations.
4.4 PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITIVENESS
Much previous analysis has focused on how to increase price 'competitiveness', and on the 
achievement of export orientation, rather than on examining the determinants of structural 
efficiency in production (Amsden, 1997). In terms of long-run dynamism, however, the latter 
is more important. The relation between structural efficiency and relative price changes is
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complex and is dependent on changes in industrial structure over time.
In Zimbabwe, structural efficiency improvements were complicated by a number of factors 
not directly related to the changes in price 'competitiveness'. These included: the methods 
of allocating foreign exchange; the lack of locally developed technological capacity and 
organisational innovation; variations in levels of management competence and experience, 
attitude to labour relations, training, skill levels; and, other institutional factors, including the 
histories of particular firms.42
Price and Other Types o f Competitiveness
Nonetheless, one of the main justifications made for the introduction of the ESAP 
programme was that shifts in relative prices to reflect market scarcities would encourage 
firms to become more efficient and 'competitive1. While this argument was based in neo­
classical theory, supportive empirical research was conducted in the late 1980s.43 This 
research attempted to demonstrate the negative implications of the existing controls, and the 
positive outcomes of the proposed policy shifts.
Several surveys of Zimbabwean industry examined the question of efficiency in production.44 
Using neoclassically based measures such as Domestic Resource Costs (DRCs), and Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP), they found much production to be efficient and competitive. The 
World Bank was 'puzzled' by the results, as their studies were conducted during a period 
when production 'benefitted' from protection and industry structure was mostly highly 
oligopolistic (1990a:38). The Bank itself questioned these findings concerning 
competitiveness, noting that in the post-independence boom, while "sales of capital goods 
increased by 30 percent from 1980-82, sales of domestic capital goods stagnated" (ibid. 6). 
Nonetheless, the Bank used its findings to intimate that exporting firms would have a good 
chance of success in post-liberalisation local and regional markets.
42 These are discussed below and gave direction to the field research analysed in Chapter 6.
43 See Section 4.3.4 above.
44 These include the Jansen report (1983), UNIDO (1985), World Bank (1990a), Ndlovu (1994) and 
Mlambo (1994).
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The total factor productivity calculations used in the research discussed above require a 
number of assumptions for validity. These include constant returns to scale, perfect 
competition and factor rewards measuring corresponding contributions to output (Fine,
1992). None of these holds true in Zimbabwe (or, arguably, virtually anywhere), which 
undermines the results.
Price is only one aspect of competitiveness in the marketplace. The wide range of DRC 
scores within individual manufacturing subsectors (Robinson 1993) indicates that a 'correct' 
macro framework and incentive structure are inadequate for achieving competitiveness 
(Riddell, 1990a:350). DRCs are not a guide to long term comparative advantage, which is 
"a function of the evolution of the firms over time, which in turn is determined more by 
managerial and technical skills than by technological relationships" (Robinson, 1993:5). 
Product quality, design, timeliness of delivery, after-sales support and other non-price factors 
also affect competitiveness.45 It appears that in its early phases, protection may have assisted 
a number of Zimbabwean firms to move along the learning curve and achieve greater 
structural efficiency.
The age and condition of capital equipment influence the need for technological upgrading 
and new investment. Given the outdated technologies and equipment then in use, the 
technical efficiency of many Zimbabwean producers was dubious by the late 1980s. The lack 
of equipment replacement led to wasteful production methods (World Bank 1990:18) and 
raised operating costs for some firms.46
Increasing competition is not the only way to influence efficiency improvements. In 
Zimbabwe, the latter also resulted from government-administered price controls squeezing 
profits (Riddell, 1990a). This did not always produce the desired result, however. Even 
when there is good quality data available, it is problematic to set the 'right' price level, in 
order to: limit profits; provide an incentive for efficiency improvements; and, still leave 
sufficient incentive for investors to pursue their productive venture. For the metal products
45 See research reported in Chapter 6.‘
46 Older machines were reported by the World Bank (loc. cit.), however, as having the advantages of 
being less prone to breakdowns and having spares made locally. Kaplinsky contrarily found that 
older equipment increased production costs, due to high machine down-time (1994:155-7). The 
field research found a mixed picture in this regard (see Chapter 6 below).
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sector, there was the additional impact of ZISCO's pricing policy. Exported steel was sold 
more cheaply than steel in the domestic market.47 This undercut export opportunities for 
downstream producers of value-added products, and there was no rebate system for exporters, 
such as exists in South Africa.
Given various problems with updating technology and investment, efficiency was often 
enhanced through improved training, recruitment of higher skill levels and reorganisation of 
production (Riddell, 1990a:354-358). This established a path, which was also followed after 
ESAP.48
Industrial Concentration
Greater industrial concentration need not have a negative impact on efficiency and 
competitiveness. In a case study of firms manufacturing manual or animal-drawn agricultural 
implements, Riddell argued that while only two firms were supplying the domestic market, 
there was sufficient competition, especially in export markets, to keep costs down and deter 
collusion (1990a: 354-358).
By 1990, the manufacturing sector as a whole had become characterised by high levels of 
concentration. The fact that increasing concentration coincided with inefficiency in 
production, need not imply any causal relationship, however. Many early settlers' firms were 
little more than extended workshops, with small outputs, low capital to labour ratios and low 
productivity. Alongside these developed a small number of "firms with much greater capital 
stock and annual output, which substantially exceeded the average for the industrial sector 
as a whole." (Kaplan, 1977:285, quoted in Phimister, 1988:255). With the rush into local 
manufacture around the time of UDI, and lack of standardisation, many smaller firms ended 
up manufacturing similar products. For example, during the 1970s ten companies produced 
refrigerators and nine produced wet batteries, (Wield, 1982:164). Competitive pressures led 
to increasing concentration. By 1982, 50 percent of the more than 6000 separate 
manufactured products were produced by only one firm each and 80 percent were produced
47 While dual pricing is standard industry practice, it was the lack of rebates for exporters which was 
the critical factor in disadvantaging local firms.
48 See Chapter 6.
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by three firms or less (UNIDO, 1985:29).49
Furthermore, between 1970 and the late 1980s, employment and output became concentrated 
in larger enterprises (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 - Percentage distribution of Units, Employment and Net Output by 
Size 1970 and 1988_______________________________________________
Employment <50 
Size Category
: 201 ”1000 >1000? Totals 
f #  UoJZ$
Units 1970 71.1% 19.5% 7.8% 0.6% 1,240•aks: >• " * V?*,
CA no/lyoo o4 .d. /o 17.7% 15.2% 2.8% 1,082
Employment 1970* 11.1% 28.1% 35.7% 15.1% 125,600
6.8% 16.7% 38.5% 37.9% 182,649
Net Output 1970 11.2% 26.6% 48.0% 14.0% 307m
1 1988 5.6% 14.3% 41.7% 38.4% 3,804m
* The figures in Bennell add up to 90%.
Source: CSO, Census of Industrial Production 1970/71 (cited in Bennell (1992:139)) and 1988/89
High concentration levels are not necessarily detrimental to the development of industry.50 
By controlling the possible accumulation of extraordinary profits, the price control system 
may have limited some negative effects of monopolistic/oligopolistic structures (Riddell, 
1990a). For example, no significant relationship was observed between profitability, as 
proxied by 'prime cost mark-ups' and concentration in 1986/87 (Bennell, 1992:140-141). 
Yet, some possible gains from greater concentration may have been lost. For example, the 
difficulty in capturing rents from innovation may have diminished incentives to innovate.
49 For the engineering sector (at broad four digit ISIC levels), four firm concentration ratios were 
relatively low at less than 40% by 1986, having risen from lower figures in 1970 (Bennell, 1992, 
Table 1:137). The best known measure of concentration, the Herfmdahl-Hirschmann index, 
regrettably could not be measured due to a lack of access to CSO data.
50 Indeed, they may be quite the opposite, South Korea has developed rapidly on the basis of four or 
five major industrial groupings (Amsden, 1989).
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4.5 TREATMENT OF WORKERS
Labour productivity is an important component of efficiency and competitiveness. It is a 
function of many worker characteristics, including effort, motivation, training, and skills. It 
combines with labour costs in a complex and non-deterministic relationship. For example, 
the extra effort produced by workers if they are paid more, may not necessarily compensate 
for the additional cost.
This section examines the main changes in the treatment of workers in Zimbabwe from 1965 
to 1990, and organised labour's efforts to improve workers' treatment. There is no research 
available from this period linking changes in the treatment of workers to changes in firm or 
industry performance.
Despite the post-independence socialist rhetoric, real wages decreased for most workers 
during the 1980s, after an initial above-trend improvement between 1980 and 1982 (see 
Figure 4.10). This trend was accompanied by various measures which did little to improve, 
and in some cases further weakened the capacity of trade unions to represent workers' 
interests. This failure to develop an effective 'voice' explains why workers' interests were 
treated so cursorily in developing the ESAP programme.
4.5.1 Wages and Employment Conditions
The changes in real consumption wages during the closed economy era are shown in Figure 
4.10. Real wages rose steadily during the early part of UDI along with economic growth. 
During this period, overt interventions restricted access to, and conditions of, employment 
of African workers, with "(s)killed jobs, apprenticeships, and better education ... largely 
reserved for the Europeans" (Fallon and Lucas, 1991:397). In 1978, "the overall annual 
earnings of Europeans were some 10.4 times greater than those of African employees, the 
ratio being 7.3 in manufacturing and 24.5 in agriculture" (ibid.). The sharp rise in wages 
following the introduction of wage regulation after independence was partly a consequence 
of attempts to reduce this differential. The increase was shortlived, however, due to wage 
restraint associated with the mid-1980's macro stabilisation measures (Kanyenze, 1993:132). 
A similar pattern of change was observed in the engineering sector, although a significant
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wage differential existed in favour of engineering workers.
From Figure 4.11, we can see that the principal reason for the positive differential in favour 
of the engineering sector, is due to the iron and steel sub-sector. ZISCO, with its close 
affiliation to the government, was paying its workers consistently higher wages than other 
firms. After independence, this differential between ZISCO and the rest of the metal 
products sub-sector increased from 36 percent in 1980 to 63 percent in 1990.
Figure 4.10 - Real Wages per Employee
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Source: CSO, Census of Industrial Production and Quarterly Digest ofStatistics 
(various)
Looking at real wages as a percentage of value added, the evidence shows that there was also 
a sharp increase around independence, but a more pronounced decline thereafter, as value 
added per worker rose while real wages were static or declined (see Figure 4.12).
This reflected the national shift, as revealed by the percentage of Gross Domestic Income (at 
factor cost) accounted for by wages and salaries, compared to that accounted for by gross 
operating profits. Between 1982 and 1990, the former fell from 60 percent to 51 percent,
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Figure 4.11 - Engineering Subsectors: Real Wages
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Source: CSO, UNIDO Industrial Statistics and Quarterly Digest o f  Statistics 
(various)
while the latter rose from 38 percent to 43 percent.51 Within manufacturing as a whole, the 
changes from peak to trough are shown in Table 4.4. The post-1982 shift in favour of profits
Figure 4.12 - Wages as % of Value Added per Worker
70%
60%--
50%--
40%--
30% -
20%
1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988
Manufacturing excl. Eng Engineering
Source: CSO, Census o f Industrial Production and Quarterly Digest o f  Statistics 
(various)
is clearly seen; by 1984, their percentage share increased to levels above their peak during 
UDI.
51 CSO, Quarterly Digest o f  Statistics (various).
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Table A.4 - Profit and Wage Shares of Manufacturing
Gross Output Share Value Added Share
Year Profits Wages Profits Wages
1967 13.8% 18.4% 42.8% 57.2%
1974 17.0% 16.1% 51.4% 48.6%
1980" 16.6% 17.3% 49.0% 51.0%
1982 12.5% 19.2% 39.5% 60.5%
1984 20.8% 17.7% 54.1% 45.9%
>. V*-. V  ’ i.vv
1989 27.1% 14.7% 64.8% 35.2%
NB Profits [gross] are calculated as the residual after wages and payments for 
services are deducted from net output - all calculations at current prices 
Source: CSO, Census of Industrial Production (various)
Employment protection legislation did provide some improvement for workers. The job 
security regulations were described as "among the most onerous prescribed anywhere" 
(Fallon and Lucas, 1993:242). The "coverage extends to all sectors of the economy, and to 
all establishments irrespective of size. ... casual workers, who may be employed for a 
maximum of six weeks in any three-month period, are excluded from the permission clause. 
Contract workers, on the other hand, are protected by Zimbabwe's Employment Act for the 
duration of their fixed term contract." (ibid.:243). Casual workers had to be paid at twice the 
minimum wage, however.
There are various views of the impact of this legislation. Firms began to employ more 
workers on a short-term contract basis (less than six months), due to the difficulties of 
disciplining workers without the threat of dismissal, and the difficulties of firing if market 
conditions changed, or following poor performance (World Bank, 1990a: 18). It is possible 
that reductions in firm productivity resulted from the difficulty of matching workers with 
specific jobs; temporary workers acquiring fewer firm-specific skills; and problems of 
adverse selection associated with golden handshakes for voluntary redundancy. The most 
productive workers, who could most easily obtain new jobs, were the first to take advantage 
of such schemes (Fallon and Lucas, 1993:251). Thus, workers were employed repeatedly on 
short-term contracts to try and mitigate some of these problems.52 There was also an increase
52 See Chapter 6 for empirical support.
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in the number of less than full-time employees in manufacturing, which rose from 5.0 percent 
of the workforce in 1985 to 9.3 percent in 1991 (Kanyenze, 1993: 224).
Firms may also have employed fewer workers, as a result of the legislation. An attitudinal 
survey undertaken by the World Bank revealed that, “as a result o f ’ the strict legislation, 
firms indicated a preference for employing more capital intensive, rather than labour 
intensive techniques (1990: 18). By "raising turnover costs and perhaps by lowering 
productivity, job security regulations may thus act as a tax on employment, effectively raising 
the cost of labour. ... [which] would then tend to encourage adoption of more capital- 
intensive production techniques, to shift production away from more labour intensive 
processes, and hence to reduce the demand for labour." (Fallon and Lucas, 1991:402). 
However, the determinants of capital intensity were rather complex. The shortage of foreign 
exchange led to problems in changing techniques. Other important influences on capital 
intensity include investment incentives, cost of borrowing, and tax deductability of interest 
costs (Muzulu, 1994:217).
Throughout the 1980s, weak employment creation remained one of the greatest problems 
facing Zimbabwe (see Figure 4.13 for recorded employment). Employment growth was 
lower in engineering than in the rest of manufacturing. More generally, the number of formal 
sector jobs created was tiny compared with the numbers of job market entrants. Attempts to 
link this directly to weak demand, resulting from the employment legislation, have been 
inconclusive (see Hawkins et. al. (1988) and Fallon and Lucas (1993)). One result 
highlighted, without an explanation being offered, was that the greatest fall in employment 
was in the fastest growing industries (Fallon and Lucas, 1993:268). Other labour market 
changes from pre- to post-independence may have had some impact, including the loss of 
white skills. Furthermore, much of the sting of the employment security regulations was 
removed by the switch to contract hiring (Sachikonye, 1993:257), as opposed to not hiring 
at all, although this has other disadvantages, as indicated elsewhere.
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On the supply side, there was no critical shortage of skilled labour in the late 1980s, although 
this varied between skill categories, with a shortage of pattern and tool makers and 
journeymen. A sustained upswing would have meant that capacity boundaries would have 
been reached relatively quickly across the board, in the absence of some other changes in the
Figure 4.13 - Manufacturing Employment
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structure of production and skills supply (World Bank, 1990:18). While the emigration of
Figure 4.14 - Minimum/Actual Wage Differences
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1988/89
white skills around the time of independence may have contributed to a shortage of
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experienced workers, this shortage was more due to the failings of Zimbabwe's post­
independence education and training system (see 4.1.5).
While there is evidence to suggest that the 1980-82 period shifted the earnings structure as 
a whole above its historical trend (Kanyenze, 1993:173), the legislative interventions after 
1982 did not reduce real wages directly.53 Average wages actually declined less rapidly than 
the legislated minimum (see Figure 4.14). The multiple of average wages over the minimum 
increased from 2.8 in 1982 to 3.6 in 1988. This may have been a reflection of the payment 
of relatively high wages by a number of firms (see Chapter 6) and partly because of 
increasing differentiation in real incomes, as a result of the use of benefits and promotions 
as ways around the legislated maximum increases (Shadur, 1994:125).
Productivity continued to rise in terms of value added per employee after independence (see 
Figure 4.15), despite falling real wages. Yet, the real wage decline may have served to 
temper the rise in productivity, as workers may have engaged in extra occupations, altered 
their diet and adopted other survival strategies (Kanyenze, 1993:48). Morale, effort, and the 
incentive to be trained may well have fallen, while absenteeism may have increased (ibid: 
165). Chapter 6 explores these influences in greater detail.
By 1991, real wages having fallen for most of the 1980s, Zimbabwean employers were aware 
of both the need to limit further wage declines and the potential power of organised labour. 
Employers therefore agreed to significantly higher wage increases than the government 
recommendations (Sachikonye, 1993:257-8). This implies that government's earlier
53 See Fallon and Lucas, (1993:253) and Knight (1996:20) - although see also the impact o f the 1985 
Labour Relations Act in 4.5.2 below.
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Figure 4.15 - Value Added per Employee
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intervention in wage setting probably suppressed real wages below levels acceptable to most 
employers, as supported by the previous findings (above) of growth in the differential in 
excess of the legislated minimum.
4.5.2 Labour Relations: the Impact of Organised Labour
During UDI, white workers were encouraged not to identify with black workers. Rather 
government (and self interest) urged them to align their interests with those of white 
capitalists, in pursuit of the exploitation of black workers. In order to maintain high wages, 
white unions successfully blocked the training of blacks as skilled labour (Raftopoulos, 
1986:275-283). Black skills were persistently down-graded, job categories were reserved for 
whites and black professional and skilled workers were under utilised. By the mid-1970s, 
however, as the rate of white emigration increased, changes were observed. Manufacturing 
firms were forced to become more dependent on black skills (Wood, 1988:288), although 
this was frequently not recognised in remuneration or status terms.
Prior to independence, black trade unions had difficulty pushing for significant change. The 
Industrial Conciliation Act was made explicitly non-racial in 1959, but the weighting of votes 
towards those with higher skills, reinforced the white preference (Cheater, 1992a:3). 
Organisations representing their members' interests on the basis of race, colour or religion
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were prohibited, which helped to keep black unions marginalised. Intimidation, detention 
and torture were also used against the black labour movement in the years before 
independence (Wood, 1988:286-7).
Under colonialism, black workers were treated as temporary migrants into the urban and 
industrial areas. The system was dependent on the fact that migrants retained access to rural 
subsistence production which, however, was insufficient to meet family needs (Potts and 
Mutambirwa, 1990:678). This changed slowly. By the early 1990s, it was reported that a 
significant proportion of urban workers still had access to communal lands and migrated to 
towns for their working lives (Sachikonye, 1993:249 and Rasmussen, 1992:99).
Over time, the picture became more mixed. Even prior to independence, residence in urban 
areas became a permanent feature, despite influx control measures (Potts and Mutambirwa, 
1990:683). As workers gained firm-specific skills, employers were less willing to support 
the rotating migrant system. Workers in Cheater's case studies are "the 'urbanised' offspring 
of proletarians, their subsistence depended not on access to rural land, but on gaining 
employment" (1992b: 73). They looked to their companies to offer them lifetime 
employment and provide jobs for their families and children. By the mid-1980s, many were 
not using their access to land to contribute to their income or subsistence (Potts and 
Mutambirwa, 1990:688). An increasingly established urban proletariat offered greater 
prospects for the establishment of strong trade unions
The post-independence government professed to support workers' interests, while adopting 
policies which failed to create more private sector jobs,54 or to improve worker livelihoods. 
Following the spate of wildcat strikes in 1980, the government was most concerned to 
minimise disruption to the economy caused by labour disputes. "Balancing workers' interests 
and government's national development goals became a constant feature underlying state 
labour policy..." (Shadur, 1994:3). As the minimum wage and job security legislation was 
passed in 1980, simultaneous efforts were being made to minimise strike opportunities. 
Government inspired the formation of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in 
July 1980, as a single umbrella representative body for workers. The government justified
54 See Section 4.3.3 on investment.
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this policy by reference to the historical weaknesses of the black trade unions. The ZCTU 
made the government's task of trying to control worker opposition much easier, as it had only 
one body to deal with (Shadur, 1994:76-77).
The ZCTU leadership quickly became subservient to government and party. Lack of 
leadership accountability led to a drop in membership during this period, as members 'exited' 
to show their discontent. The most serious decline occurred in the engineering industry 
unions (Wood, 1988:297). This was due to particular industry characteristics. In this case, 
the large number of operating units and the power of the employer federation "provided 
ample scope for intense (union) leadership factionalism and employer manipulation", as well 
as corruption (ibid:298).
In the mid-1980s a new ZCTU leadership was appointed, "but they were still circumscribed 
and circumspect in what they said and did ..." (Shadur, 1994:111). Unions only gradually 
became more critical of government policies and voiced concerns about declining standards 
of living. This may have gained them greater attention, but did little to encourage an 
improvement of the weakened links between the unions and the shopfloor, in particular in 
the face of the establishment of plant level workers' committees (see Kanyenze, 1993:95, and 
below).
Unions were further compromised by the passage of the 1985 Labour Relations Act (LRA). 
This provided for Employment Boards and Councils to negotiate collective bargaining 
agreements, although in practice wages were determined by Cabinet after consultation with 
employers, represented by the Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ), and the 
ZCTU, through the Wages and Salaries Review Board (Herbst, 1990:209-210). With the 
better organisation of EMCOZ, relative to the ZCTU, the LRA was another change relatively 
in favour of employers. EMCOZ was able to present a strong case against high wage 
increases, as being bad for employment creation (Herbst, 1990:210-211).
The Minister of Labour was given very considerable powers over the membership and 
activities of both unions and employers' organisations (Shadur, 1994:140, and Cheater, 
1992a:7). While free to initiate their formation, unions had to be registered or certified to 
collect dues and to act on behalf of their members; and were subject to the Minister of
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Labour's discretion for permission to continue. They were also prohibited from using their 
funds for political purposes. The Minister was also able to institute the holding of elections 
within the unions and employers' associations, "where the national interest so demands" and 
even without that proviso, to intervene in the internal operations of these organisations (LRA, 
1985:209). The number of employers’ organisations or unions was limited to one per 
industry. The Minister also had to approve the level of membership dues. This situation only 
started to change after 1989, linked to other elements of the 'liberalisation' changes (see 
Chapter 7).
Workers' committees, which had appeared spontaneously during the 1980 wildcat strikes 
(Wood, 1988:291), were formalised to deal with industrial relations matters at the plant level. 
They provided a counter-weight limiting the influence of the unions, and led to the virtual 
absence of the shop steward structure in Zimbabwe, "Although in many instances the unions 
and workers' committees work closely together, they are not bound to do so and management 
has frequently been able to drive a wedge between the two structures." (Richer, 1992:67). 
Workers' committees often deprived the unions of control of communication channels, which 
further weakened the role of unions as the collective voice of workers. This has proven 
"enormously frustrating to workers with interests different from the mainstream, which they 
can no longer communicate to management.... Members of workers' committees ... run the 
risk of being categorised as vatengesi (sell-outs) as a consequence of performing the 
communications role that they are required by the state to fulfil." (Cheater, 1992b:76-7). For 
example, in signing retrenchment applications, workers' committee members risked being 
seen as aligning themselves with management against workers. This impeded the functioning 
of the committee's role as representing the workers.
Regrettably, there is no research available linking the effectiveness of workers' committees 
and relations with trade unions to firm performance in the 1980s. As shown in Chapter 6, 
by the mid-1990s union members were often more than proportionately represented on 
workers' committees, although there was considerable variation from plant to plant.
None of the legislative changes were brought about in response to direct pressure from 
organised labour. The post-independence wildcat strikes were not 'organised', although these 
clearly influenced government policy. There was substantial growth in employment during
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the 1980s in the public service. However, in this sector government ensured that workers' 
representative organisations were limited to passive staff associations, which were not 
allowed to join the ZCTU.
Many managers and foremen argued that in the absence of other avenues for conflict 
resolution, slowing down the work rate became a major method of worker resistance during 
the mid-1980s (Wood, 1988:301).
4.6. TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS
Skills, training, access to technology, innovation and management techniques are potential 
explanations of sectoral and firm level performance.
In this section, we establish that, since the mid- 1970s, technological innovation in Zimbabwe 
has mostly been limited to efforts to improve capital intensity. After independence, there was 
also a shift away from limited in-firm apprenticeships to higher level training and greater 
emphasis on certification. By 1990, these changes had not led to any apparent significant 
improvements in the quality of training or the availability of skills. Finally, a number of 
firms embarked on organisational improvements. These took place in the context of a 
bureaucratisation of management systems and procedures following independence.
4.6.1 Skills and Innovation
Various factors have been offered as an explanation of the manufacturing downturn in the 
mid-1970s. Technologically feasible activities for import substitution were exhausted. 
Further progress required importation of both foreign technology and equipment, better 
product design and higher technical standards (World Bank, 1990a: 13). In this view, local 
technological capabilities were adequate to operate, maintain and service most plant in use 
locally, but were insufficient to further develop the sector.
The UDI government had not attempted to circumvent these problems, for example, by 
creating local training and research and development institutions. It preferred to rely on the
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continuing immigration of skilled workers, training abroad and importing technology. This 
saved the considerable investment costs which would have been required to establish local 
training facilities (Raftopoulos, 1986:275-283). It was also easier to preserve skilled 
occupations for whites, if there was little local opportunity for blacks to be trained. By the 
mid-1970s immigration had slowed, however, and emigration accelerated. This was 
recognised in the findings of the 1974 Commission of Inquiry into Further Education in the 
Technical and Commercial Fields (1974:2). The Commission's recommendations to increase 
the number of blacks taken into skilled training had only limited impact. The percentage of 
white apprentices in mechanical and automotive trades did not fall below 60 percent between 
1975 and 1980 (National Manpower Survey 1981, Vol.l, Table 3.4.1).
The slump in technological change after the mid-1970s was also due to the shortage of 
foreign exchange (UNIDO, 1993:68). The collapse in domestic demand after 1974 and the 
availability of excess capacity (see Section 4.3.3 above) led to revenues which were 
inadequate to cover depreciation and maintenance costs, let alone the funding of innovative 
activities. The relatively low foreign exchange requirements for organisational innovation 
or improvements in management techniques made such changes more attractive. Yet, "where 
machinery is very outdated, investments to upgrade capital equipment may be required 
simultaneously with changing organisational practices." (Posthuma, 1993:10).
The availability of skills declined following independence. In fields relevant to the 
engineering sector, between 1979 and 1982, CSO recorded 6 406 professional and technician 
level emigrants and only 4 535 immigrants.55 At production worker level, net emigration was 
more significant at 6 196 emigrants and 2 264 immigrants. The net flow only reversed after 
1985. It is likely these figures for emigrants were considerably underestimated, as departure 
forms are less likely to have been correctly completed.
By the late 1980s, these skills had not been fully replaced (World Bank, 1990a: 17). 
Zimbabwean firms were establishing a pattern of relatively low skill endowments. In the 
mid-1980s, out of a sample of 144 firms, it was found that graduate engineers comprised only 
5 percent of the total number of technical personnel, including engineers, technicians and
55 See Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics, (various)
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other skilled workers. The skilled and technician categories comprised 65 percent and 30 
percent respectively (Ndlela, 1986:145).56
The World Bank's late-1980s survey found that firms grew through copying and reverse 
engineering (1990a: 17). Linked to the shortage of higher level skills, few instances of 
product development, or research departments were identified. Adoption of new technology 
was rare. The "formal sector engineering industries of Zimbabwe... employ technologies that 
can be described as the elements of the first industrial revolution. Almost all the machine 
tools and manufacturing processes are still under direct human control. ... The second 
industrial revolution with its CNC machine tools and CAD/CAM methods is only just 
making its appearance." (Zwizwai and Powell, 1991:26).
In its frequent rejection of import applications for more modem technology, government 
demonstrated a concern that more capital-intensive, labour-saving innovations, available in 
the advanced capitalist countries were inappropriate to Zimbabwe's post-independence 
circumstances (World Bank, 1990a:17).57 Yet, existing capitalists sought to adopt capital 
intensive technologies. This was justified by reference to the difficulties in enforcing labour 
discipline under the restrictive labour legislation.58
During UDI and under the cover of sanctions, the government worked closely with South 
African and other foreign companies and a host of middle-men. This enabled local firms to 
undertake indirect negotiations to obtain equipment and to break or be immune to licensing 
agreements. After independence, South Africa became hostile. Foreign capitalists were put 
off by the new government's socialist rhetoric (Herbst, 1990). Little effort was made to 
improve the institutional framework to enhance local innovation. The controlled price 
system, operating on a cost plus basis, also reduced the incentive to innovate to reduce costs.
56 Unfortunately, there are no comparable figures available pre-independence. Comparisons with the 
mid-1990s are made in Chapter 5.
57 Alternatively, a concern to save foreign exchange where possible.
CO
See notes from various firm interviews that reinforced this point.
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4.6.2 Training
The paucity of local training and technical colleges prior to independence was complemented 
by a belief that white skills were indispensable. The launch of a National Manpower Survey 
in 1981, as the basis for future manpower development, was consequently seen by many 
whites as a threat to their security (Raftopoulos, 1986:284). This survey highlighted 
shortages in many skill areas, including all the main professional and technical engineering 
disciplines. This implied a need for more deliberate and targeted strategies to ensure the 
development of local technological capability.
A number of new initiatives were started after independence, including the establishment of 
Vocational Training Centres and the upgrading of former 'semi-skilled' workers through the 
use of trade testing. The 1984 Manpower Development Act initiated a one per cent training 
levy on payroll to fund approved public and in-firm training activities.
Yet, while efforts have been made to expand training capacity, successes have been limited. 
By the late 1980s, training institutions were still not performing well. There was a shortage 
of qualified instructors and equipment (World Bank, 1990a: 19), explained in part by the 
relatively low levels of public sector salaries.59 The needs of the engineering sector were not 
rated as a significant priority. The enrolment of science/technical graduates at the University 
changed little as a proportion of total students, although the absolute numbers of scientific 
and technical enrolments at the University increased dramatically (see Table 4.5).
There were particular problems with the centralisation of recruitment and administration of 
the apprentice system under government control (Raftopoulos, 1994:4-8). Government’s 
adversarial attitude towards private firms contributed to a decline in the annual apprentice 
intake from 2 044 in 1981 to a low of 933 by 1988. In the early 1980s government also 
introduced another scheme for training skilled workers, known as 'institutional training'. 
Students participated in a college based programme, with industrial attachments, leading to 
a national diploma. Whereas apprentices spent about a quarter of their four years training in 
college, these trainees spent two of three years in college. There were problems associated
CQ
See World Bank, Zimbabwe: Manpower Development and Training Project - Staff Appraisal 
Report, (1987b:9-l 1) for an outline of the capacity problems, and see the analysis in Chapter 7.
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with the acceptability of such personnel to employers, who often made them complete the last 
year of an apprenticeship as well.60 During the 1980s, therefore, there was a relative shift to 
government administered training and higher level skills training, and thus greater emphasis 
on certification.
Table 4.5 - Technical Training: Student Enrolments
j 1965* i 1975“ 1980* 1985° 1990*
Apprentice Intake
Mechanical 145 451 511 582 555
percent of total 35.8 38.2 35.7 45.3 36.0
Automotive 86 258 328 245 339
percent of total 21.2 21.8 22.9 19.1 22.0
Technical College Enrolment*
Mechanical Engineering 1020 1362 886
percent of total enrolment 13.6 9.5 9.4
Automotive 264 444 720
percent of total enrolment 3.5 3.1 7.6
Total Technical Training 4097 4278 3592
percent of total enrolment 54.5 29.7 38.0
University of Zimbabwe
Enpineering 117 280 693
percent of total enrolment 5.8 6.2 7.7
Total Science/Technical 672 1437 3375
percent of total enrolment 33.2 32.1 37.5
* Technical College figures under 1980 are for 1981
Sources: a. Annual Report: Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower and Development 
Authority 1969;
b. Ministry of Manpower. Planning and Development, National Manpower Survey, 1981; c. Annual 
Review of Manpower 1986;
d. GoZ, Second Five Year National Development Plan 1991 -95
The pre-independence lack of certification of qualifications had tied worker loyalty to 
individual firms. The post-independence changes led to greater emphasis on paper 
qualifications rather than in-house experience, which led to loss of job status for many long- 
serving workers. This promoted disaffection among workers, and contributed to declining 
productivity and increased labour mobility (Cheater, 1992b: 72).
60 See notes from interviews with a number of firm respondents
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The difficulties in the national training system should be seen against the background of a 
failure to develop a national industrial and technology strategy (see Section 4.3 and Chapter 
7). Too much emphasis was placed on trying to adjust the supply of labour, without paying 
sufficient attention to the structures of production. Training was not adequately tied to areas 
where labour demand was likely to increase and production did not change in response to 
changes in the available pools of local skills (Raftopoulos, 1986).
4.6.3 Management Issues and Techniques
A significant difference in the ratio of direct (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled) to indirect 
(managerial and technical) labour has been found between Zimbabwe (at 13.6), India (1.63) 
and the UK (2.0-2.5) (World Bank, 1990:20). The World Bank has suggested technical 
reasons for this, including the relative simplicity of processes in Zimbabwe, the lack of local 
R&D and greater use of automation among the technical cadres. A better explanation, based 
on the historical context, might be the reluctance of local capitalists to see control over their 
capital challenged or diluted, or their surplus exploitation threatened as their firms expanded. 
With managerial salaries at many multiples of those of production workers', it may also seem 
quite rational to keep the management complement down to a minimal level.
"Old and outdated forms of organisation" limited the impact of what little new capital 
equipment there was, on output and growth (Kaplinsky, 1994: 159). In the late 1980s, a 
small number of firms began to adopt new (Japanese) management techniques (NMTs), as 
a way of innovating with limited foreign exchange. The changes included a number of 
common features, such as "just-in-time inventory reduction, quality-at-source... preventative 
maintenance, quality control circles, and single unit flow" (Posthuma, 1995:104).61 Some 
firm level case studies reveal varying degrees of operational success, including faster 
production response to changing market conditions and stock holding and work-in-progress 
reduced to more efficient levels (Kaplinsky, 1994 and Posthuma, 1993 and 1995).
61 A number of other organisational changes are typically combined with all or some of these, as 
discussed further in Chapter 6. See also the discussion of flexible production, NMTs and recent 
organisational change theory in Chapter 2.
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The determinants of success, as analysed by Kaplinsky, include commitment by senior 
management to the introduction of the NMTs and management allowing workers to have a 
greater involvement in production decisions. Management are supposed to look upon 
workers as "a resource which needs to be augmented" (1994:290), and put major emphasis 
on training and skills development. Generally, however, Zimbabwean management 
maintained the rigid hierarchical organisational frameworks already established. It is 
suggested that the changes were seen as leading to one-off performance gains, rather than the 
first step on a road to the adoption of a more participative and open management style (ibid.).
Management under UDI was very hierarchical and racially based, which leant itself to very 
strict control by white supervisors and foremen over black unskilled labour (Wield, 1982: 
172). After independence, the new labour and manpower development legislation signalled 
a shift from arbitrary to increasingly bureaucratic management procedures and practices 
(Shadur, 1994:220 and Cheater, 1992b:71). By the early 1990s, workers were typically still 
not involved in any technical or managerial decision-making and a "climate of mistrust 
exist[ed] between management and labour" (Posthuma, 1993:13). While Posthuma and 
Kaplinsky ascribe this mostly to racism, Cheater suggests that "[i]f anything, new black 
managers have tended to widen the already large gap between management and workers in 
ways that the newly introduced workers' committees have been powerless to control ..." 
(1992b:69). These managers tend to get caught in a paradox. They want to respond to pleas 
for paternalism from their subordinates emphasising the manager's obligations to black 
workers. Having developed as managers under the new system, however, they tend to be 
more bureaucratic in exercising their managerial functions than white settler managers. This 
has led to the growth of patron-client relations alongside a "heightening of workers' 
perceptions of their conflicts with management as a class of patrons who today treat workers 
as bureaucratised objects ..." (ibid.:80).
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
The literature seems to have a number of deficiencies in explaining variations over time in 
the performance of manufacturing and the engineering sector, in particular. There are few 
explanations provided of firm level differences.
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Some explanations are easily rejected. These include neoclassical interpretations highlighting 
the importance of relative price changes and the negative impact of market imperfections, 
especially those resulting from aspects of state intervention.
Others, which are not much developed in the literature, emerge as requiring further analysis. 
For example, the focus on changes in management techniques parallels the focus on changes 
in industrial organisation in other parts of the world. Such changes were relayed into 
Zimbabwe by large management consulting firms. Kaplinsky (1994) and Posthuma (1995) 
correctly point out the diversity of firm responses, but then attempt to simplify the 
explanations for this unevenness through the selective use of anecdotes. While this thesis 
uses similar case study techniques, theoretical constructs such as agency, linkage and 
structure provide a more solid base for the analysis. In Chapter 6, therefore, the changing 
behaviour of organised labour; and, firm level relations between capitalists, management and 
workers are examined.
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5. THE ESAP YEARS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter briefly outlines developments in Zimbabwean manufacturing after the 
introduction of ESAP in 1990. It draws on official published data and that collected and 
published by other authors. Among the many reports, papers and articles providing analyses 
relating to ESAP, this section focuses on those that deal specifically with manufacturing.
After an overview of the analyses to date of industrial performance and development under 
ESAP, the evolution of the economic policy shifts is outlined. This is followed by an 
overview of some of the major changes at macro and sectoral level, with particular emphasis 
on investment, exports and productivity. Changes in the treatment of workers are highlighted 
in terms of changes in wages and employment. This is followed by a brief look at changes 
in the numbers in higher education and training. The conclusion elicits some of the major 
questions that cannot be answered from the data presented, which provide a link to the 
empirical work discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
At the time of writing the CSO Census of Industrial Production data was only available up 
to 1993/94, so the longer term implications of the changes after 1990 are difficult to 
ascertain. Other data indicators were available for periods after 1993, as seen below. With 
the CSO still in the process of revising its deflators to adjust to a 1990 price base, there is 
much doubt concerning the validity of the GDP related data. Draft figures made available 
by the CSO show considerable changes from the published data. The CSO has not published 
a detailed breakdown of investment after 1991.
5.2 OVERVIEW OF ANALYSES TO DATE OF INDUSTRY UNDER ESAP
Since the start of the programme, a range of research has been conducted to understand the 
impact of ESAP. As with the more general literature on structural adjustment (see Chapter 
2), most of the work falls into one of two camps. Those sympathetic to the design of the 
programmes have attempted to find positive consequences. Those critical of the conceptual
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framework behind the programme's design typically attempt to highlight the social and 
economic costs of the programme's implementation.
5.2.1 Orthodox Interpretations
The World Bank itself has conducted a number of review exercises (World Bank, 1995a, 
1995b and 1995c). In addition, RPED (Regional Programme for Enterprise Development) 
surveys for Zimbabwe have been used to produce a number of reports, most of which are 
more relevant to the firm level analysis in Chapter 6 (Gunning, 1994, Gunning and 
Mumbengegwi, 1995 and Free University/University of Zimbabwe, 1995). More in-depth 
analysis of the RPED data has also been conducted on a number of specific subjects. These 
include technology (Teitel and Thoumi, 1994 and Biggs, et. al., 1995), finance (Fafchamps, 
et. al., 1995 and Fafchamps, 1996) and the treatment of workers (Velenchik, 1996 and 1997 
and Vemer, 1997).
Some research conducted outside the World Bank, but by economists broadly sympathetic 
to the Bank’s approach, has focussed on the manufacturing sector.1 Other research has taken 
a macro focus.2 There has also been research focussing specifically on the trade related 
aspects of the policy changes (GATT, 1995).
5.2.2 Critical Views
The main policy-oriented critical work has been undertaken by the ZCTU, which eventually 
produced the Beyond ESAP report in 1996. In addition, a number of more academic papers 
have been written directly addressing ESAP's impact on industry.3 Others have dealt with 
industry, labour markets and employment (Sachikonye, 1995, Kanyenze, 1996, Weeks and 
Mosley, 1996 and Knight, 1997). There have also been a number of papers examining 
aspects of ESAP less specifically related to industry (Davies, 1996 and Bond, 1996).
1 See Ratnayake (1994) prepared for the Ministry of Finance, and Braunerhjelm and Fors (1994) 
prepared for the CZI.
For example, see ILO (1993), and Gustafsson, Durevall and Mlambo (1995), which was prepared for 
SIDA.
3 See Robinson (1993), Latsch and Robinson (1995) and Carmody (1997) - the last of which focusses 
on textile, garment and footwear industries.
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5.3 OUTLINE OF THE ESAP PROGRAMME
This section briefly introduces the major policy changes introduced after 1990. These are 
described in more detail in a number of texts.4 The implications of the ESAP changes for 
industrial policy are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
The policy matrices laid out in various ESAP project documents and Policy Framework 
Papers prepared by the government, "in conjunction with" the IMF and World Bank, 
established the conditionality for programme compliance. The World Bank's Operations 
Evaluation Department's Performance Audit Report addresses some of the tensions arising 
from the need for government to "own" and to determine the pace and manner of 
implementation of the programme (1995c:31 -32). The Bank accepts some responsibility for 
poor implementation and the negative impacts on the poor and the vulnerable. However, it 
mostly attributes these to a lack of attention to detail in the setting of conditionality and in 
the relative emphasis on different programme components. No problems are linked to 
potential inadequacies of the overall approach.
It was clear that the manufacturing sector did not merit special attention in the programme, 
as the policy matrices contained no supporting sectoral initiatives for that sector.5 Instead 
" [ijndustry in general is expected to develop an outward-looking culture, which is responsible 
to the stimulus of competition to improve efficiency and productivity. This should be 
coupled with the development of innovative entrepreneurial, managerial and above all 
technical skills which can drive the sector on to a sustainable growth path" (World Bank, 
1991:50). In other words, industry was expected to respond automatically, in a positive 
manner, to the programme's changes in price, exchange and trade regimes. There were also 
changes to investment, financial and labour market regulations, which were to assist in 
economic restructuring. The last of these is examined in Chapter 7.
4 For example, see World Bank (1995), Chapter 1 and Sachikonye (1995).
5 For example, see World Bank (1991 and 1995c), and GoZ (1994a: 14-18).
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Domestic price controls were mostly eliminated early in the programme's implementation. 
On the exchange side, the first significant devaluation took place in 1991. There was a 
downward slide in the value of the Zimbabwe dollar relative to the world's major currencies 
for much of the rest of the 1990s. It is suggested, however, that this was continually being 
eroded by inflation (World Bank, 1995b: 15). The expected export-encouraging impact of 
the changes in relative price incentives is therefore questioned.
The devaluations were accompanied by reductions in the level of exchange control. The 
Export Retention Scheme (ERS) was introduced in 1990 and was gradually extended. The 
consequent increase in imported final manufactured goods served to increase competition 
(World Bank, 1995b: 18). It also created new divisions of interest between exporting firms, 
which had enhanced access to foreign exchange, and non-exporting firms, which did not, and 
yet were being hit by increased competition (Sachikonye, 1995:55). In January 1994, current 
account transactions were substantially liberalised through the introduction of foreign 
currency accounts in place of the ERS. Exporters were able to retain up to 60 percent of their 
export proceeds. This was ahead of the original target of 35 percent of earnings under the 
ERS by December 1993. The amount retained was increased to 100 percent by July of the 
same year.
On the import side, a gradually expanding system of open general import licenses (OGIL) 
was introduced from October 1990 onwards. This was also abolished in January 1994, ahead 
of the original 1995 target, leaving only a small negative list of prohibited imports. This list 
was also gradually further eroded.
In 1995, industry started to lobby for revisions to the tariff structure which had replaced the 
quotas. Many instances were revealed of finished goods facing lower import tariffs than their 
inputs, which were negatively affecting local manufacturers trying to compete with those 
imports. This resulted in several manufacturers becoming traders.6 A revised tariff structure 
was finally approved in 1997.
6 See ZCTU, (1996:49) and several ’firm’ interview notes, November 1995. There was limited evidence 
of this trend in the ES Census, however.
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Financial liberalisation saw real interest rates rise from negative in 1990 to significantly 
positive (up to approximately 10 percent) by 1992/93, at which levels they remained for the 
period covered by this study.
Overall, the pace of change was very uneven, with the further rapid trade liberalisation in 
January 1994, accompanied by the abolition of the 9 percent export subsidy. It is unclear 
exactly why the trade liberalisation programme was accelerated to such an extent at that time. 
The speeding up severely reduced the time anticipated to be allowed for domestic producers 
to adapt to the changes. One view was that the government lacked administrative capacity 
to monitor and implement a steadily evolving programme. Another was that a major change 
was required to signal a more serious commitment to change. A third was that the 
government was falling behind on other elements of the programme, especially the reduction 
of the fiscal deficit and privatisation. The accelerated changes were seen as a way of keeping 
the donors supporting the programme. Whatever the intention, the suddenness of the shifts 
left "the business sector in a state of shock" (World Bank, 1995b: 101).
The cutting of public expenditure proved to be very complex. It implied the reduction of 
support for government's constituencies. With insufficient support, some in government 
feared that ZANU-PF would not be able to maintain itself in power, or to continue with the 
implementation of ESAP (Sachikonye, 1995:54)7. Despite the lack of'sufficient1 cuts to 
meet ESAP targets, various cuts were made, which had a greatly damaging impact on the 
capacity of the public service (see Chapter 7).
The first phase of ESAP formally came to an end during 1996. By that time, government was 
heavily embroiled in consultations and planning exercises with a view to approving and 
implementing a redesigned programme, provisionally known as Zimprest (Zimbabwe 
Programme for Economic and Social Transformation).8
*7
For example, in 1997, promises of direct disbursements to the veterans o f the indepence war, as well 
as finance for land reform, were once again threatening the credibility o f Zimbabwe's budgetary 
process.
o
At the time o f writing, the document was still to be finally approved.
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5.4 POST-ESAP ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
This section follows the same format as in Chapter 4 above. The severe drought of 1992 
reduced domestic demand, as food prices soared. It is difficult to separate the effects of the 
drought on GDP from those of other policy changes, although this has been attempted by 
some analysts.
5.4.1 Macro and Sectoral Performance
Between 1990 and 1993, the absolute contribution to GDP of both engineering and the rest 
of manufacturing declined (see Figure 5.1). The manufacturing sector's share of GDP fell
Figure 5.1 - Manufacturing Value Added
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Source: CSO, Census o f Industrial Production and Quarterly Digest o f Statistics 
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by 5 percent of GDP between 1990 and 1995.9 The World Bank ascribed this decline to the 
impact of the drought on domestic demand, the introduction of tighter monetary conditions 
as part of the policy shifts, and the drop in the value of the local currency (1995a: 2).
The most significant decreases in value added within the engineering sector were seen in 
fabricated metal products (see Figure 5.4 below) and non-electrical machinery, which fell by 
14.8 per cent and 21.6 per cent per annum respectively. Overall, value added in the
9 Derived from unofficial CSO figures from 1996 using 1990 as base year. Note that Figure 5.3 shows 
different percentages, as it was derived from the old time series, which used 1980 as the base year.
147
engineering sector declined to below its level in 1980.
A longer term picture can be seen from the index of production between 1980 and 1996.10 
This clearly shows the negative turnaround in the fortunes of both the metals and metal 
products part of the engineering sector, as well as manufacturing as a whole after 1991 (see 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2). It also demonstrates that some sectors were able to perform 
against the overall trend, most notably wood and furniture and transport equipment. Thus, 
it is difficult to argue that ESAP has led to comprehensive de-industrialisation. Certainly 
there was a serious collapse of the clothing and textiles industries, with estimates of over 20 
percent of firms closing (see ZCTU, 1996 and Carmody, 1997). Yet, this does not seem to 
have extended to other sectors. More specific indicators of sectoral performance are 
required.
Table 5.1 - Relative Production Changes in Manufacturing Sectors: 1990-96
Sector Average Annual Change in Production 
Volume Index {%) ’
Wood & Furniture 10.1
T ransport Equipm ent 5.3
Non-metallic Minerals 2.0
Paper, Printing, Paper Products 1.9
Drink & Tobacco 0.1
Foodstuffs -2.0
Chemicals . xV-AV'- -2.4
Metals and Metal Products -3.6
Clothing & Footwear -5.7
Textiles -15.3
Mining 2.4
Source: CSO. Quarterly Digest of Statistics, March 1997 
Note: Mining is included for comparative purposes
The sectors which grew faster were not those which would have been expected to grow faster 
following the shifts in relative input prices. Orthodox theory would have predicted that the 
more labour intensive sectors, including foodstuffs and clothing, might have benefited from 
the policy changes. Relative prices moved against the non-tradeable goods sectors. Yet,
10 Value added data were not available for the longer time period,
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such sectors outperformed the tradeable sectors, including manufacturing (ZCTU, 1996:47).
Figure 5.2 - Manufacturing Volume Production Index
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Nor can increasing import competition following the liberalisation account for the observed 
changes in performance. For example, in 1992 wood and furniture had an import penetration 
ratio of 3 percent, against transport equipment with a ratio of 54 percent (Braunerhjelm and 
Fors, 1994:63). There is no direct correlation between import intensity and sectoral 
performance (although admittedly these are crude aggregate measures).
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The transport equipment sub-sector is a volatile sector, which is often dependent on single 
large orders of railway equipment. From 1992 onwards, the bulk of engineering firms in the 
metals and metal products sector were producing at lower volumes than at independence.
Figure 5.3 - Productive Sector Shares of GDP
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Overall, there was a relative shift in favour of the primary sectors (see Figure 5.3), with 
agriculture recovering swiftly after the 1992 drought. Following the recovery in agriculture; 
food products and agro-processing grew more rapidly than other manufactured sub-sectors 
after 1992, only to slump again during the drought in 1995.
Figure 5.4 - Engineering Value Added by Sub-Sector 
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The changing value added in the major engineering sub-sectors is shown in Figure 5.4. This 
shows the continuing influence of the rapid changes in the base metals sub-sector on the 
sector as a whole, as well as the above-mentioned decline in the fabricated metal products 
sector. It is not clear whether these large changes reflect volume changes, or are explained 
by fluctuating metal prices; or, indeed reveal statistical problems relating to the way the data 
is captured and recorded.
5.4.2 Investment
With the increase in production in the late 1980s, there was a short-lived increase in 
investment flows, as seen in Figure 5.5. These were further facilitated by an easing of access 
to foreign exchange after 1990. Aggregate figures from the CSO are still only available until 
1991. The figures do not yet allow for an analysis of investment post-ESAP.
Figure 5.5 - Investment as % Value Added
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Disaggregating the engineering investment surge to 1992, reveals that much of the increase 
was accounted for by the basic metals sub-sector (especially by the ongoing refurbishment 
and modernisation of ZISCO). Investment in the fabricated metals and machinery sub­
sectors increased at a lower rate. After 1992, with the introduction of high positive real 
interest rates, investment became problematic again despite the greater availability of foreign 
exchange (see Chapter 6).
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The World Bank suggested that the backlog and catch-up nature of much of the late 1980s/ 
early 1990s investment meant that it was aimed at the domestic market and, therefore, was 
unlikely to generate "commensurate output and employment increases" (1995a: 120). While 
the latter did turn out to be the case, it is difficult to verify the imputed cause thereof.
5.4.3 Exports
Total merchandise exports increased on average by 7 percent per annum in US$ terms from 
1991 to 1995. The economy remains heavily reliant on basic commodity exports. 
Nonetheless, tobacco, gold, ferrochrome, nickel and cotton lint declined from around 60 
percent of total exports up to 1991 to closer to 50 percent in the subsequent years. They were 
replaced by manufactured exports, which grew at twice the total export average, by 14 
percent per annum, from 1991 to 1995. In the 1990s, the fastest growing sub-sectors 
included foodstuffs and wood and furniture products (see Table 5.2). These segments grew 
from 11% of manufactured exports to 25% between 1990 and 1995.
Table 5.2 - Relative Changes in Manufacturing Sector Exports: 1991-95
Sector Average annual change in 
exports in current US$ (%)
Average ratio of value added 
to gross output 1990-93 {%)
Wood and Furniture 45.3 51.1
Paper, Printing, Paper Products 43.4 54.5
Foodstuffs 33.7 33.4
Drink and Tobacco a ; 16.6 77.0
Chemicals , ‘ ' 15.2 22.1
Ferrochrome : 14.8
Non-metallic minerals 11.5 26.5
Clothing and Footwear 10.9 48.2
Textiles 6.1 44.5
Transport Equipment 5.3 43.9
Metals and Metal Products -2.1 49.5
Cotton Lint -8.0
Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics and Census of Industrial Production {various)
Note: The values added in ferrochrome and cotton lint are included in the values added in metals and metal products and 
textiles respectively, but are not included in export figures for those sectors.
As with the relative growth in production volumes noted above, the sub-sectoral pattern of 
export growth cannot easily be explained in terms of orthodox theory. The fastest growing
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sectors were among those with the highest proportions of value added to output.
Despite the impressive growth in some sectors, overall manufacturing growth was not export- 
led after 1990. Export-led growth characterised the foodstuffs, clothing and wood and 
furniture sectors, where the post-1991 exports to gross output ratios were substantially above 
historical trends (see Table 5.3). However, each sector's situation was different, with textiles 
experiencing declining export ratios largely due to a sharp drought-related fall in the exports 
of cotton lint. Export rates in the engineering sector displayed little significant variation 
overall during the period (1991-1995), although there was a relative shift within the sector 
(see below).
Table 5.3 ■ Manufacturing Sector Exports/Gross Output: 1986-93
Sector ■ • ?r‘; 1986 ; ? 1990 / 1993
Foodstuffs, ■ ; # \  - 9.8 5.7 12.3
Drink and Tobacco ^1 ■ 0.4 1.3 4.2
Textiles ' • ■ 34.9 23.8 17.8
Clothing and Footwear 11.1 15.5 23.7
Wood and Furniture ; - • 5.9 7.3 21.9
Paper, Printing, Paper Products 2.3 1.9 2.3
Chemicals 3.7 4.0 7.5
Non-metallic minerals 1.6 2.1 2.1
Basic Metals , : 50.1 48.7 47.8
Fabricated Metals and 
Machinery
18.4 8.2 15.0
Transport Equipment 9.8 8.3 4.6
Source: CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics and Census of Industrial Production (various)
Note: The figures for textiles include cotton lint and for basic metals include ferrochrome, as there are no 
separate output figures for these sectors
In early 1994, an outcry from manufacturers, led by the CZI, followed the rapid removal of 
export incentives, both the 9 percent subsidy and the ERS premium (see Southern African 
Economist, 1994:9). A number of the most dynamic sectors saw a downturn in exports in 
1995. These included textiles, garments, beverages, wood and paper products and transport 
equipment. It is not clear why these sectors were hardest hit. Overall, the most export- 
oriented sectors in 1990 were not those which subsequently grew fastest. The reasons for 
sectoral differentiation appear to be peculiar to individual sectors, rather than attributable to
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any conventional orthodox explanation.
The export performance of the engineering sector was the weakest in Zimbabwean 
manufacturing. The discontinuation of production by ZISCO's main blast furnace after 1992,
Figure 5.6 - Manufactured Metal/Engineering Exports
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Note: no information was published for exports in 1989.
accounts for the rapid decline in exports of iron and steel products. Most of the residual 
ZISCO production was sold on the more remunerative domestic market. Engineering 
segments, excluding ferrochrome, fell from 20 percent of total manufactured exports in 1990 
to 10 percent in 1995.
Despite the efficiency of the engineering sector, assessed in the 1980s studies (see Section 
4.1.3), the sector as a whole did not move directly into export markets to any great extent. 
This is in spite of a significant number of firms in the sector having been previously engaged 
in exporting activities (see Chapter 6). In its 1995 Country Economic Memorandum, the 
World Bank offered the following explanation:
"[I]t is not clear whether the firms in Zimbabwe will be capable of expanding, 
as it requires exporting and maintaining their shares in the domestic market 
in the face of increasing import competition. Although Zimbabwean firms 
do have significant capabilities and are not found to be inefficient, the data 
suggested there is a lack of technological skills vis-a-vis other countries."
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(1995a: 130)
Thus, when efficiency is measured by DRCs (see above), it is acknowledged that actually this 
does not guarantee anything, if there is a relative deficit of technological skills. The static 
orthodox concept of efficiency is acknowledged, therefore, to have no practical relevance for 
policy making.
The lack of export success is also excused by suggesting that Zimbabwean firms have been 
exporting "small quantities of products designed for the domestic market to nearby markets 
with similar tastes and requirements, but this type of exporting rarely represents a promising 
basis for significant export expansion" (World Bank, 1995a: 133). Product design is thus also 
acknowledged as important. This is another production feature, alongside technology, which 
implies that static efficiency concepts have limited practical application. Elsewhere, the 
Bank confirms this, suggesting that "the technologically and institutionally more efficient 
firms, and those that have geared up for export, have been better off' (1995c:26). The latter 
rather bald statement is followed up and contextualisd in Chapter 6.
A large number of ongoing constraints to exporting are outlined by the World Bank (1995b, 
Chapter 5). The constraints include severe delays in receiving duty drawback rebates; 
difficulties with registering for and using the Inward Processing Rebate; poor product and 
service quality of many inputs; and, an ‘‘ill-developed and confusing” export financing 
system. These problems are likely to affect sectors which use imported inputs more 
intensively, which might partly explain the relatively poor performance of the engineering 
sector. They cannot explain, however, the varying performance of firms within the same 
sectors. Reasons for the variety of individual firm export experiences are explored in 
Chapter 6.
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5.4.4 Productivity
For both manufacturing as a whole, and for the engineering sector in particular, productivity 
(in value terms) declined between 1990 and 1993 (see Figure 5.7). For manufacturing as a
Figure 5.7 - Value Added per Employee
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whole it declined further to 1995.11 On the basis of sectoral data, it is difficult to establish 
whether this can be explained by declining margins, as a result of firms having to be more 
price competitive; by an increase in shop floor resistance to real wage decreases (see below); 
or, by the substitution of workers for capital, following the shift in relative prices.12 The 
latter seems most unlikely, given the fall in employment (see below) and rise in investment 
during this period. These results caused the ZCTU to conclude that there had been little 
change in production techniques towards more labour intensity (1996:51).
This topic is examined in more detail at the individual firm level in Chapter 6.
11 This calculation is based on draft CSO figures, 1996.
12 The latter was suggested by the World Bank, (1995b: 16).
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5.5 TREATMENT OF WORKERS
5.5.1 Wages
Alongside the decline in labour productivity, real consumption wages declined sharply 
following the introduction of ESAP (see Figure 5.8). The causality here is not clear, which 
again implies a need for firm level analysis. Between 1991 and 1993 real manufacturing and 
engineering wages fell by 13 percent and 20 percent per annum respectively. By 1993, real 
wages were substantially below their levels at independence. This was a direct result of 
wage settlements failing to keep up with the rapid acceleration in inflation, as well as 
reductions in labour demand associated with the 1992 drought. To a lesser extent it was also 
due to inflationary pressures associated with financial liberalisation (World Bank, 1995b: 16). 
Possible reasons for the difficulty in maintaining real wage levels are explored in Chapters 
6 and 7.
At the sub-sectoral level, the pattern is similar. ZISCO, the state-linked iron and steel 
producer, had been instrumental in maintaining higher real wages in the base metals sector
Figure 5.8 - Real Wages per Employee
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during the 1980s. Under ESAP, however, real wages fell rapidly, by 23 percent per annum, 
in the iron and steel sub-sector as well (see Figure 5.9).
157
Figure 5.9 - Engineering Subsectors: Real Wages
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These rapid falls in real wages outstripped the reductions in value added per worker, 
highlighted above. As a result, there was a continuation of the trend established in the 1980s, 
with a further reduction in the percentage of value added going to workers in wages (see 
Figure 5.10).
Figure 5.10 - Wages as % of Value Added per Worker
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Figure 5.11 - Manufacturing Employment
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5.5.2 Employment
These results demonstrate that there has been considerable real wage flexibility in Zimbabwe. 
These declines in real wages should, in terms of orthodox theory, have created opportunities 
for firms to increase employment. However, there had been very limited numerical 
employment flexibility in the 1980s, which established a basic pattern for the 1990s.13
As the rest of the economy slowed down in the early 1990s, there were reductions in 
manufacturing employment (see Figure 5.11). Between 1991 and 1993, nearly 19 000 or 9.6 
percent of jobs in manufacturing were lost. A further net 3 000 jobs had been lost in 
manufacturing by mid-1996, despite a brief recorded recovery during 1994.14 The increased 
investment in the sector during the late 1980s had had little impact on increasing the rate of 
job creation. This tends to confirm the impression created in Chapter 4 that this investment 
was mostly in more capital intensive technologies.
Manufacturing employment as a proportion of total recorded employment suffered as well, 
falling from around 16 percent in 1990 to approximately 14 percent in 1995. This low level
13 See discussion on the impact of labour market regulation during the 1980s in Chapter 4.
14 This is according to figures from CSO, Quarterly Digest o f Statistics (March, 1997), which are not 
directly comparable with the Census o f  Industrial Production data used in Figure 5.11.
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had not been seen since the mid-1970s. In engineering, employment fell across all sectors. 
Some firms started to retrench, while others were forced into liquidation (see Chapter 6).
In the metal products sector, by the end of 1995, the Ministry of Labour recorded that 124 
firms had retrenched a total o f6 094 workers since the beginning of 1991.15 This figure was 
the highest for any sub-sector in manufacturing. It comprised 47 percent of those retrenched 
in the manufacturing sector and 23 percent of retrenches across all sectors of the economy. 
The reasons for retrenchment were recorded as a "lack of orders" in virtually every case in 
the engineering sector.16 Given that in 1990 the engineering sector was responsible for only 
4 percent of total formal employment and 23 percent of that in the manufacturing sector, it 
is clear that the industry was particularly hard hit.
The quality of these employment statistics is highly questionable. For example, NEWU had 
figures of only 2 586 retrenched in the engineering sector, by mid-1996, although it appears 
their figures omitted many of the firm closures (only two were recorded) and the large 
number retrenched by ZISCO. The Ministry of Labour figures do not include central 
government retrenchments. These amounted to a net reduction of 17 000 (5.7 percent) 
between 1991 and 1996.17 The data are also assumed to have under-recorded changes in a 
number of other sectors.
5.6. SKILLS
In the discussion of industry in the orthodox publications reviewing the post-1990 changes, 
little attention was paid to changes in education or skill status after 1990.
The World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum, for example, focusses on changes to 
education. It highlights the steady fall in education's share of GDP, from over 9 percent in 
1988/89 to some 7 percent in 1993/94, and the consequences for primary and secondary
15 See unpublished data from Ministry o f Labour, 1996.
16 See unpublished data from the National Engineering Workers Union, 1996.
17 Calculation based on Quarterly Digest o f Statistics, March 1997.
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education (1995a:50-51). It pays minimal attention to the consequences for training and 
other forms of skills development.
Despite reductions in general education expenditure, the numbers engaged in tertiary and 
vocational training continued to increase after 1990, although doubts were expressed by a 
number of industrialists about the quality of those being trained.18 The numbers completing 
engineering apprenticeships increased significantly during the 1990s (see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 - Apprenticeships Completed in Selected Years: 1980-95
1980 1985 1990 19191 1992 ' 1993 1994 1995
Automotive 245 160 239 205 152 394 339 495
Mechanical: 309 416 474 388 328 570 431 723
Electrical £k~: 189 114 274 183 209 259 286 358
Total Engineering 743 690 987 776 689 1223 1056 1576
Total Apprentices 965 890 1239 986 947 1538 1252 2170
Engineering as%  
Total ■ ,. S;--:
77.0% 77.5% 79.7% 78.7% 72.8% 79.5% 84.3% 72.6%
Source: Registrar of Apprenticeships - unpublished data
In addition, the number of candidates being trade tested annually in the three main 
engineering disciplines increased from 1 450 in 1991 to 3 269 in 1995. It was estimated that 
this reduced the backlog of those requesting examinations, although it was not clear by how 
much.19
Table 5.5 - Summary Enrolments of AH Technical Colleges 1990s
Course Title 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
AutomotiveEngineering " 710 778 885 1503 2011 1662
Electrical Engineering 703 563 965 1080 1219 1098
Mechanical Engineering 757 1174 1250 1536 1426 1588
Engineering Total 2170 2515 3100 4119 4656 4348
All Colleges Total 9048 8056 10859 12565 13219 13390
Engineering as % Total v . 24.0 31.2 28.5 32.8 35.2
•
32.5
Source: Statistics on Tertiary Education, Ministry of Higher Education (various)
IS For example, see interviews dated 23 March, 1996 and 15 May, 1996.
19 See interview with Registrar of Skilled Workers, 18 June 1996.
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Technical college enrolments during the 1990s swelled to a peak in 1994 (see Table 5.5). 
The following year was the first in which engineering enrolments declined since the 1980s.
It is clear that there was a substantial increase in the supply of trained, skilled engineering 
workers, during a period when demand for such workers slackened off considerably.
5.7 CONCLUSION: CONTRASTING VIEWS OF ESAP
This overview has focussed on the broad macro and sectoral facts of industrial change during 
the 1990s. There are two sets of views on whether the shifts seen within industry since 1990 
constitute positive changes. This section presents a brief contrast of these views. Some of 
the shortcomings of these assessments are addressed, in order to justify the research focus in 
the subsequent chapters.
The strongest supply response to liberalisation should, according to conventional theory, have 
come from the sectors in which Zimbabwe has comparative advantage. Braunerhjelm and 
Fors argue that, in the short to medium term, comparative advantage in manufacturing is 
likely to be concentrated in semi-skilled goods and production using agro-inputs (1994:10). 
This chapter has shown that this does not explain the complex nature of the year-on-year 
changes in the relative shares of manufacturing sub-sectors.
Manufacturing exports grew more rapidly than production, during the 1990s, in accordance 
with ESAP's intentions. It is not clear that this was necessarily due to more than the lifting 
of the foreign exchange constraint, however. This enabled more inputs and equipment to be 
procured. Again, the complex nature of Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector means that 
orthodox interpretations are at best only a part of the explanation for differences in relative 
rates of export and production growth.
Typically, the World Bank's interpretations focus on the implementation of the ESAP 
Programme. For example, excessive fiscal deficits 'crowd out' a surge in private investment. 
There is an underlying assumption that, despite the poor record to date, the Programme would 
have achieved the results of the original plan, if implemented more effectively.
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For Braunerhjelm and Fors, the Programme itself requires some minor modifications to the 
price-based incentive structure to improve its efficiency. For example, they suggest 
introducing tax incentives for exporters and working towards a uniform tariff rate on 
intermediate and finished goods (1994:79). These recommendations are supplemented by 
supply side measures such as better promotion of foreign direct investment and higher tax 
breaks to encourage in-firm training. They are not, however, part of a comprehensive re­
think of the goals of ESAP, or the types of policy measures which might help Zimbabwe 
achieve them.
The second type of assessment of the impact of ESAP on industrial performance is well 
represented by the ZCTU, which emphasises that 'getting the prices right' has been shown to 
be insufficient to generate enhanced growth and industrial competitiveness. It takes a broadly 
structuralist line in arguing for the provision of additional institutional support (1996:55-58). 
This might include: controlling monopoly practices; implementing. efforts to boost 
productivity; more active public assistance for export marketing development; improving 
support for technology acquisition and capacity building; and enhancing access to skills 
required for industrial development.
The ZCTU also stresses the importance of an active promotion of skills development, linked 
to an employment intensive growth strategy (1996:73-78). In the latter, however, the ZCTU 
reverts to an approach used by the World Bank. The promotion of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) is seen as a major avenue for the creation of new jobs.20 It certainly is not 
clear that a strategy aimed at increasing the supply of skilled labour allied to a focus on 
increasing employment demand among SMEs is coherent or likely to succeed. SMEs 
typically engage in relatively low skill occupations and have few spare resources to spend on 
training, or skills maintenance.
The overall emphasis in the ZCTU's approach is a pot pourri of what appear to be 'better' 
strategies than are currently in place, in terms of their perceived potential to address structural 
problems. As with many structuralist-type analyses, there is little emphasis, however, on 
what should motivate the government to adopt such policies. Without being developed
20 See, for example, a comment on employment creation in World Bank (1995c: 11).
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within such an understanding, and without a planned lobbying campaign, the 
recommendations have relatively little prospect of successful implementation. For this, a 
better understanding is required of agency and the changes in social relations which have 
taken place since the introduction of ESAP.
Thus, overall, none of the analyses of the consequences of ESAJP offers a wholly satisfactory 
explanation. Both the neo-classical inspired approach of the World Bank and the structuralist 
based account of the ZCTU are at best partial in their understanding. Neither satisfactorily 
deals with the variety of experiences that have occurred. This becomes clearer in light of the 
detailed micro institutional analysis of Chapter 6 below. Chapter 7 extends the discussion 
on the evolving political economy of industrial policy making in Zimbabwe.
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6. PERFORMANCE AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE ENGINEERING
SECTOR
a
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the poor performance of the engineering sector as a whole since 1990, not all firms 
have been performing badly. Some dynamic firms have changed many aspects of their 
strategy, products and behaviour. Such changes have included those in organisation, 
technology, skills and aspects of worker treatment. Other firms have been virtually static.
This chapter seeks to understand determinants of these changes, as well as the influences 
causing some firms to be more dynamic than others. This is achieved through detailed 
examination of original data, covering the ES Census and case study firms. Specifically, 
there is an examination of how various characteristics of the case study firms influence their 
ability to. adapt strategy and behaviour, following changes in the macro-economic 
environment. This is followed by an investigation into the differential impact of these 
changes on firm performance. Particular attention is devoted to the institutional legacies and 
inheritances, which may either constrain or encourage the firms' efforts to change and adapt.
The overall conclusion is that the differential behaviour across firms reveals a lack of validity 
of the behavioural assumptions underlying the economic policy shifts contained in ESAP 
towards a more market-oriented and price-determined system. Thus, no positive outcome 
was ever likely to follow the adoption of ESAP.
The research findings indicate that a number of historical and structural influences on firms 
are of key importance in explaining their response to economic change. These include 
particular aspects of Zimbabwe's political/economic history, which have led to the majority 
of white-owned firms behaving as isolated islands of enterprise, for the most part poorly 
integrated with each other, or with potentially supportive organisations. They, thus, find it 
difficult to source or accept support for technological, organisational and skills change. The 
firms which are best able to circumvent these constraints are those with 'internal' support 
mechanisms. These mechanisms appear to be most effective in firms that are part of TNC-
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owned groups.
Other institutional legacies include: a lack of past investment, which (apart from financial 
constraints not examined here) limits the ability to undertake significant new investments; 
a dearth of established marketing functions within the firms, which inhibits their entry into 
exporting; patterns of agency internal to the firms, which inhibit change, including 
management with competing and more lucrative interests and senior staff lacking training and 
experience in managing change, which add up to a lack of enthusiasm and commitment to 
change; poor internal respect and trust relations between management and workers; and, 
poorly paid and unmotivated workers who are unresponsive to efforts to change 
organisational techniques and skills.
The Chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, an overview of the recent history 
and characteristics of the sector as a whole, as derived from the census data, is presented. 
Differential performance characteristics are analysed according to size, age, export 
orientation, and ownership. This section also indicates the intra-sectoral differentiation 
captured by the clustering exercise.
The second section introduces the case study firms and characterises them. Major changes 
in trading environments are highlighted. Changes in firm strategy, and investment are 
examined. In the following three sections, behavioural changes are reviewed. These are 
examined under the following headings: change in production technology and organisation, 
skills development and capital innovation, and changes in the treatment of workers. In each 
of these sections, the attempt is to identify the key facilitators of and constraints to change. 
The impact of the changes that have taken place on firm performance is also appraised.
The concluding section draws together key findings.
6.2 SECTORAL OVERVIEW
In this section, the object is to show how firm behaviour and performance have varied across 
the engineering sector. This is illustrated by using the ES Census data. Firms are
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differentiated according to structural characteristics such as size, age, whether exporting or 
not, and ownership. The Census firms are also grouped according to changes in products, 
organisation, technology and skills, where relevant, under the subsequent sections of this 
chapter. The final subsection contains information illustrating how these groupings compare 
with the firm clusters developed from the ES Census (see Chapter 3).
Overall, it is apparent that the era when the firm was founded, as well as the ownership 
structure of the firm, appear to be of major importance in explaining firm behaviour. A 
number of firms commenced operations after 1990 and are much faster growing in sales, 
employment and productivity than any others. The pre-UDI firms are the largest and have 
the highest productivity. Size is also important, however, as the largest firms are also the 
biggest exporters. Moreover, the situation is complicated. Firms do not neatly fall into one 
or other grouping. This complexity is part of the reason for adopting a case study approach 
and exploring particular firms in great detail in the following sections of this chapter.
6.2.1 Firm Size
Size is clearly of some importance in relation to a number of performance criteria. The 
correlation between size of employment and firm age in 1995 was 0.48, and the correlation 
between size and percentage of output exported in 1995 was 0.54.
As can be seen in Table 6.1., the largest firms tend to be older (13 of the 18 largest firms, for 
which information was available, commenced operations prior to UDI), export more (all the 
largest firms export), and have the highest manufacturing sales per employee. They have, 
however, shown the slowest growth rate in terms of employment, as well as showing declines 
on average in sales and sales per employee. These declines are not as great as those 
exhibited by the medium sized firms.
At the other end of the scale, the smallest firms are youngest (nearly half of this group started 
operations after 1990) and the fastest growing, both in terms of employment, sales and 
productivity, but are least likely to export (only four of the 23 firms in this group exported 
in 1995).
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Table 6.1. - Average Firm Performance by Size Group
Firm Size (1995) <20
workers
20-99 . 100-250 >250
Number of Firms , 24 68 23 21
Firm Age (years) 10.5 22.2 29.1 40.4
(10.1) (17.7) (14.8) (20.9)
Exports as percent of sales ' 1.6 5.6 11.2 17.3
■ (4.1) (11.3) (12.0) (17.5)
Annual % growth in employment 1991/2- : 12.9 5.4 2.3 0.2
94/5 ' . • (23.6) (17.8) (12.7) (8.0)
Annual % growth in total sales 1991/2-94/5 24.2 -4.9 -4.0 -2.9
(57.8) (22.8) (23.4) (30.5)
Ann. % gr. in total sales/worker 1991/2- 11.6 -10.3 -6.7 -3.7
94/5 \  V ’ .;;:T (36.4) (20.7) (20.7) (21.3)
Manuf. sales/worker 1994/95 (ZS'OOO) ; i 34.5 38.0 34.2 39.2
. •••• ‘-v - (38.9) (60.0) (46.6) (24.3)
Total sales/worker 1994/95 (Z$'000) 41.7 56.3 40.7 41.8
(38.3) (95.0) (50.7) . .,(23-7) _
Note: Standard deviations in brackets 
Source: ES Census survey data
Overall, the two medium sized groupings reveal the weakest performance. The larger 
medium sized firms had the worst productivity in 1994/95, while the smaller medium sized 
firms experienced the most rapid decline in productivity. The weaker case study firms fall 
into the latter group.
The performance differences are not statistically significant, however, except for the 
productivity changes between the smallest firms and the others. The data suggest that there 
may be sales and productivity differences related to size. These are difficult to establish, 
given the crude nature of the data available from the census survey. Furthermore, the 
products produced by these firms range across a variety of engineering sub-sectors, which 
may vary significantly in their tradeability, as well as in other characteristics, their local 
content for example.
6.2.2 Firm Age
The performance differentiation between firm age cohorts appears to be greater than between 
firm size groupings. The exception to this is trade orientation, with the largest firms 
exporting considerably more than the oldest. This implies that the historical influences are
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likely to be of greater significance than size differences in explaining many aspects of firm 
behaviour.1 This endorses the need for the historical approach to analysis which has been 
adopted in this research.
The age periodisation is split into pre-UDI firms; those formed during the post-UDI era; those 
which commenced during the first independent decade; and, those formed post-ES AP. Some 
of the major results can be seen in Table 6.2. Sharp differences appear in the growth patterns 
between the more mature firms and those still in their initial growth phase. The youngest 
firms are performing considerably better than the smallest firms in Table 6.1, which implies 
that the ongoing establishment of new firms across all sizes maybe more important than the 
promotion of SMEs per se. Looking over a longer period from 1980 to 1993 Risseuw found 
that there was no clear inverse relationship between age and growth (1994:40). Thus, it 
appears that ESAP gave greater opportunity for new firms to establish and develop 
dynamism.
Table 6.2 - Average Firm Performance by Age Group
Year of establishment pre-1965 ■; :• ;.:r-' . • • !-.v ■:
1965
1979
1980-1990 post-1990
Number of Firms 41 30 35 21
Exports as % of sales 10.2 10.4 4.7 2.3
(11.9) (14.9) (11.5) (4.4)
Employment (1995) ^ 214 126 61 31
■ : , ■ ; •- v, . . => - > v ; (204) (111) (82) (32)
Annual % growth tn employment 1991/2- -1.1 -0.9 8.5 37.7
94/5 (7.7) (9.6) (16.3) (24.6)
Annual % growth in total sales 1991/2-94/5 -9.3 -9.8 5.8 46.5
(12.5) (11.4) (33.1) (75.8)
Ann. % .growth in manufactured -8.3 -7.7 -4.7 9.9
sales/worker 1991/2-94/5 ’ (12.8) (17.8) (29.9) (82.9)
Total sales/worker 1994/95 (Z$’000) 74.2 28.4 52.9 29.8
(84.2) (17.5) (100.8) _  (24.1)
Note: Standard deviations in brackets 
Source: ES Census Survey data
Among the pre-independence firms, there are no significant differences between pre- and 
post-UDI firms according to many of the growth criteria. Both groups experienced poor sales
These results are similar to those emerging from the first wave of the RPED survey (see Risseuw, 
1994:36-41).
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and productivity growth in the 1990s (worse than for any grouping on the basis of size). Yet 
in terms of productivity and export levels, these are highest for the longest established firms. 
One might be tempted to conclude that this was indicative of learning that takes place over 
time, yet the firms established during the closed-economy UDI era appear relatively weak in 
terms of a number of criteria. This would tend to suggest that learning does not 
automatically accumulate over time. The firms established pre-UDI had the opportunity of 
serving a larger market in their early years, while the UDI firms were set up to service the 
domestic market only.
6.2.3 Trade Orientation
Exporting firms (59 percent of the firms) are older and larger than the non-exporters. There 
appears to be an association between non-exporters and those firms whose sales and 
employment are growing faster. While this seems to fly directly in the face of the orthodox 
expectations underlying the economic policy shifts, it is explained by the size and age factors. 
Nonetheless, the appearance of such a pattern does raise serious questions about the impact 
of the policy shifts.
While the productivity changes are not significantly different between the exporting and non­
exporting groups, the exporters do have significantly higher manufacturing sales per worker. 
Again, this appears to be associated with the age of these firms. Trade orientation per se does 
not appear to play an important role in explaining performance differences.
6.2.4 Ownership
Here we examine differences between the 23 percent of the firms which are foreign owned 
or affiliated (through joint ventures), and the domestically owned firms, whether 'white' or 
'indigenous1, public or private.
There are insignificant differences between the firms in terms of employment size or 
exporting percentages (although 74 percent of foreign owned firms export, against 54 percent 
of the domestic firms).
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The foreign owned firms are distinctly older, with just over 50 percent of the 41 firms 
established prior to UDI remaining under foreign ownership, while only two of 30 firms 
established during the UDI era were foreign owned at the time of the survey. Similarly, only 
seven of 55 firms established post-independence were foreign owned (see Chapter 4 for more 
information on changing patterns of foreign investment).
Given the importance of the age factor, foreign owned firms exhibit larger average declines 
in sales and productivity, although the differences are not significant. As with the exporters, 
the productivity levels of foreign firms are significantly higher than the local firms. The 
differential is greater, however, between foreign and domestic firms (366 percent higher for 
total sales per employee), than between exporting firms and non-exporters (148 percent 
higher). This indicates that in explaining performance differences, the ownership issue is 
more important than the question of trade orientation. As noted above, it is also a critical part 
of the firm age factor.
6.2.5 Cluster Differentiation
The cluster analysis of the census firms facilitated the development of a preliminary 
'typology' of firm types. This exercise provided a more profound view of the sector than the 
rather crude picture presented in the previous subsection. The principal defining 
characteristics of each cluster are presented in Table 6.3 The case study firms, the objects 
of investigation and analysis in the rest of this chapter, were drawn from these clusters and 
their code names are also presented.2
2
The high/low indicators are relative to the sample, and are not meant to imply any comparison with 
such indicators internationally. See Chapter 3 for methodological background on the use of 
clustering techniques.
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Table 6.3 - Typology of Metal Engineering Firms: 1991-1995
Cluster Number 
of firms
. Major Characteristics Firm Code(s)
1 19 Young, small, rapid sales and employment growth, higher 
skills
YOUNGCO
(A)
2 16 Small-medium, exporters, improving production 
processes, high unionisation
SOLIDCO (B)
3 25 Small-medium, few changes and stagnant performance STATICCO
(C)
4 18 Medium, higher productivity growth due to contracting 
workforce, many foreign owned, higher skills
SANDCO (D) 
and
RENEWCO
(E)
5 30 Larger, higher sales growth, exporters, most established 
pre-UDI, high technology
QUALCO (F) 
and
DELAYCO (G)
6 28 Medium-large, most exporting, low skills, most established 
post-UDI, all changing production organisation
PLASTICO 
(H) and 
PUSHCO fJ)
7 2 Large, high skill and technology and faster growth. MONOPCO
- w ----------------
Source: ES Census survey data
The clustering was made on the basis of relatively limited data about each of the firms. The 
characterisations are generalised. The differences between the clusters are not entirely clear 
cut. Not every firm fits the cluster description exactly or falls neatly into only one cluster. 
A number of firms sit close to boundaries between clusters. Nonetheless, the selection of one 
or two of the more dynamic, yet at the same time 'typical1, firms from each cluster provided 
an opportunity to investigate whether there was any basis for attempting to disaggregate the 
sector in this manner at all. It was also possible to evaluate whether this approach offered 
a fresh analytical tool for attempting to understand sectoral performance or not.
6.3 THE CASE STUDY FIRMS: STRATEGY AND INVESTMENT
In this section, the ten case study firms are fitted into a typology on the basis of ownership 
and dynamism. Differences in their strategy and investment patterns are linked to particular
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institutional characteristics of the firms. These in turn are linked to differences in dynamism 
and performance. This analysis assists in explaining both behavioural characteristics 
common to all firms, as well as differential characteristics between firms.
Initially, the case study firms will be examined to establish their basic structural 
characteristics. Then differential changes in their trading environment are highlighted, as 
well as their strategic responses to these changes. Alterations to their product mix are 
examined. A similar assessment is made of whether and how firms are making efforts to 
expand exports.
The indication of a changed strategy by a firm respondent does not indicate that the strategy 
was implemented, nor that it was done well. One indicator of implementation might be new 
capital investment. There may have been constraints on investment, however, for example 
from the financial sector. In examining the outcomes of the strategic changes, insight is 
obtained into the relative effectiveness of the adoption of the various strategies across the 
firms.
Finally, an attempt is made to link these changes to changes in performance.
6.3.1 Characteristics of the Case Study Firms
The available range of financial performance data varies considerably across the firms. Two 
firms (SOLIDCO and PUSHCO) provided virtually no financial data, and there is scant data 
for a third (YOUNGCO), a relatively new firm. Another firm (STATICCO) only provided 
information for the years since 1991/92. In the other cases, financial information was 
available for selected years, going back to around 1980/81. The only problem then, is with 
the reliability, as alluded to in Chapter 3.
All firms are undertaking full sequence manufacturing activities. The first three firms in 
Table 6.1 produce mainly for final consumers. Their products are not used in further 
industrial processing. The other firms manufacture goods which in many cases are used in 
other manufacturing activities, or in other productive sectors, such as mining and agriculture.
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Many of the products, fall into the three-digit ISIC category, 381, fabricated metal products. 
The categorisations in Table 6.4 capture the main products, but in some cases the firms also 
produce other products. For example, the foundry also manufactures some specialised 
machinery. The CSO's recording of manufacturing enterprises across sub-sectors of 
engineering is shown in Table 6.5. Six of the case study firms, unsurprisingly, fall within the 
sub-sector with the largest share of the sector's firms.
175
Table 6.5 - Distribution of Firms Across the Engineering Sector
Sub sector (ISIC code) Number of Firms (1991) , Share
Iron and steel (371) 20 5.4%
Non-ferrous metals (372) 6 1.6%
Fabricated metal products (381) 177 48.1%
Machinery, excluding electrical (382) 45 12.2%
Electrical machinery (383) 63 17.1%
Transport equipment (384) 57 15.5%
Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics 1996
6.3.2 Changes in the domestic marketplace
This subsection examines the changes in the domestic markets for the case study firms' 
products. The firms' consideration of the most important factors in their ability to compete, 
are linked to shifts in their corporate strategy.
Following the shifts in economic policy, and especially from 1994 onwards, firms have been 
facing increased competition and tighter margins in local markets, although the extent of 
change varies between products. Changes in competitiveness are not simply a result of 
changes in relative prices. The firms' survival and future well-being will be determined by 
how quickly and profoundly they can adapt to the new environment, and how well they 
overcome constraints along the way.
6.3.2.1 Market Structure
For many products, new market entrants appeared following the rapid liberalisation. 
Competition from imports also increased for some products. Yet, some firms also exited 
from product markets. Many case study firms remain dominant in the local markets for one 
or more of their products. While new foreign products are available on a price competitive 
basis, this has not proved decisive in changing local consumption patterns. Nonetheless, 
market conditions have shifted sufficiently so that no firm can hope to be successful merely 
by continuing with earlier strategies.
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Most products produced by the case study firms have been produced in fairly concentrated 
markets, typical in Zimbabwe.3 In 1991/92, two of the case study firms were monopoly 
suppliers locally. All products were produced in markets with fewer than seven leading 
competitors.4 65 percent of the firms’ products were produced in industries with four or 
fewer competitors. This demonstrates a more concentrated pattern of production, than that 
presented by the Zimbabwe RPED results, where it was found that only 16 of 37 metals 
sector firms reported that they had five competitors or fewer (Chigumira and Maphosa, 1995: 
51).5
Between 1991/92 and 1996, the case study firms reported that, on average, 2.8 firms had 
entered and 2.6 firms had exited the market for each product group. Overall, there was no 
net change.6 The RPED study data revealed that 31 percent of new entrants were reported 
as local or TNC importers. The rest were local micro or ’informal' sector enterprises. A 
number of the exiting firms had been long established. They were reported as exiting due 
either to collapse, or to a reorientation of their product mix. A further dimension to the exits 
was the taking over of competing or complementary firms. Two case study firms had taken 
over other local firms since ESAP had begun.
Only four case study firms reported increased foreign competition after 1993.7 This was 
mostly among the more technologically sophisticated products. Another firm (SANDCO) 
was about to commence production of a new product line of motor vehicle components in 
1992, but opted not to due to the opening up of the economy (see 6.3.4 below). While new 
or existing firms were being established as agents for the imported products, those with
3 See discussions in Chapter 4, Zimbabwe Monopolies Commission (1992) and Bennell (1992).
4 There are more competitors in the market for structural steel, but this is also a rather diversified market, 
so in the niche occupied by YOUNGCO, a similar pattern of'effective' competition is likely to have 
prevailed.
5 For manufacturing in total the percentage responding similarly was less at 35%. The difference between 
this research and the RPED is partly accounted for by the notion used in this research of'principal' or 
'effective' competitors. Not all firms producing in the same four digit product category are necessarily 
competing directly, so fewer competitors are noted.
6 The RPED Survey had reported a net increase for all except the smallest firms during 1994/95 (Free 
University/University o f Zimbabwe, 1995:26).
In 1993, the RPED first wave results showed a reported lack o f foreign competition in any sector, 
except textiles (Bade and Chifamba, 1994:182).
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already established local production or maintenance capacity found themselves in the best 
position to develop those agencies. They were able to offer local after-sales support and 
technical advice to customers. There was a strong impression that local customers had grown 
wary of ’briefcase businessmen' offering low prices for imported products, with no after-sales 
back-up.
Half the case study firms reported experiencing increased competition from new local small 
scale producers. Often these were being set up by ex-employees of the larger and longer 
established companies. A number of respondents complained that new micro firms were 
taking market share by unrealistic pricing. These firms then found they could not deliver 
products at the quoted prices and either came to the more established companies to assist 
them, or simply disappeared. At the same time, they were forcing the existing companies to 
reduce their margins to continue acquiring business.
Information is available on market share at the time of the field research, but not how this 
share has changed over the past few years. Most firms estimated serving between 25 percent 
and 100 percent of the local market for their products and at least one of their product lines 
had captured over 50 percent of the domestic market. While the impact of increasing 
competition may have reduced existing firms' market share and be influencing them to adapt 
to new trading conditions, it has yet to erode the commanding positions occupied by many 
in the domestic market.
6.3.2.2 Competitiveness Factors
Respondents considered product price and quality as equally important in enabling firms to 
compete in the local marketplace. These factors were followed by dependability of the 
product, which is closely related to quality and timeliness of delivery.8
o
Firms were asked to rate the importance o f different competitiveness factors in their ability to compete 
in the domestic market on a five point scale and also to rank the same criteria in order of importance. 
Interestingly it seems the order in which the factors were set down influenced the first scoring, as the 
scoring under the second listing was a little different. The rankings of the factors on both exercises were 
similar, however, with only a few items swapping places. Interestingly, the international exercise 
showed very significant differences as a result of the above two exercises, with the factors asked about 
later in the sequence scoring worse on the priority ranking exercise - see Section 6.4.2 below.
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It would have been useful to be able to establish how these considerations had changed in the 
recent past, but this was not possible. Anecdotally, it was reported that during the closed 
economy era, almost everything that could be produced could be sold.9 Alternative sources 
of availability were severely limited by the tacit competition policy followed, as a result of 
foreign exchange shortages (see Chapter 4). For at least one firm's products, there was an 
informal domestic cartel in operation, which shared out local demand among the main local 
producers and maintained prices at a profitable level. Capacity to respond to orders, 
determined by access to foreign exchange and appropriate inputs, must have been the 
principal factor enabling firms to compete at that stage.
Following the opening up of the economy, there was an early influx of cheap imports, 
especially from China. For a while, price alone became the principle factor. However, it was 
soon realised by many local consumers that the quality of the Chinese imports, in particular, 
was not always very high. Quality soon became more important.
6.3.3 Strategic shifts
6.3.3.1 Responses to changes in domestic trading conditions
This subsection focuses on how management went about trying to re-orient their firms to face 
the changed market circumstances outlined above. Shifts in strategy were not simply a 
response to changes in the nature of competition in the market. Other changes, such as the 
decline in domestic demand following the severe drought of 1992 and the change in real 
interest rates as a result of financial sector reforms, also influenced firm strategy. Strategic 
changes mostly dealt with price (cost) and other market related changes. The implementation 
of new strategies may also have lead to changes in firm behaviour, i.e. some combination of 
organisational, technological or human-related change. Such changes will be assessed in the 
remaining sections of this chapter.
The limited nature of change in many firms is consistent with the theoretical framework, 
which implies that 'institutional legacies' tend to constrain firms1 adaption of their behaviour
9 See interviews with various firms, November-December, 1995.
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to changes in incentives (see Chapter 2).
While the strategic shifts are explored in more depth below, at an overall level, it is possible 
to summarise the changes, as laid out in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 - Summary of Shifts in Firm Strategy
Shifts ip Strategy No. of
Firms
Common Causes
1. Increasing marketing focus 
in local marketplace
8 Response to declining demand and/or increasing 
competition
II. Changes in management 
systems and practices/ 
organisation of production
6 Attempts to increase flexibility in face of rapid 
changes in the market and to improve efficiency to 
enable pricing, etc. to be more competitive
III. Cost control/reduction push 5 Concern over declining profitability in face of 
declining demand/increasing competition
IV. Quality improvement drive 4 Links to strategy I. above, but where quality singled 
out as necessary to restore/enhance demand
V. Export Drive 3 To increase capacity utilisation in the face of 
declining domestic market and to take advantage of 
new opportunities
Source: Survey data
That the domestic market was a motivator for strategic change becomes clearer when we 
examine the factors considered by firms in adopting their new strategies. In a prioritisation 
exercise, customers' requirements emerged as the most important consideration, followed 
by competitors' actions. Costs, with their implicit linkage to prices and profitability, only 
appeared as a third consideration. With a limited focus on export promotion, external market 
characteristics were the least important, being ranked below the firms' structural 
characteristics.
Three broader groups of firms emerge from this analysis. Group I comprises dynamic, 
growing firms, which have attempted to find ways to continue expanding. Both Group II 
firms are change-oriented, size-conscious, Trans National Corporation (TNC) owned, 
repositioning firms. They seem most concerned with increasing profitability through higher 
productivity, using a variety of ways of achieving this, including down-sizing. Firms from 
both Group I and Group II adopted a fairly aggressive, dynamic response to the perception 
of increased competition. The firms in Group III are growth and performance constrained 
stunted firms. They have downsized and adopted a conservative approach to future
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development.
These groups can be seen as representing three parts of a matrix, as follows:
Dynamic Performer 
Non-Dynamic Performer
There are few immediately identifiable structural differences between the domestic-owned 
firms. Both groups contain firms which are large and small, sometimes but not always 
family owned and run, firms experiencing increased domestic and foreign competition and 
other structural differences and those that are not. The stunted firms all dropped product 
lines, or did not take up previously planned ones. They each went through a retrenchment 
exercise during the preceding five years.
Notwithstanding these broad similarities, each firm's market experience is different. In order 
to understand the role of past experience and other factors influencing agency, it is important 
to examine the firms individually. This is done briefly in the case studies below. Their 
histories clearly establish the breadth of concerns addressed by the firms, anH the 
considerable variation between their strategies, even when addressing ostensibly similar 
changes in market conditions.
The new strategies, as adopted by the ten case study firms, are summarised in the following 
table:
Table 6.7 - Case Study Firms - Strategic Changes 1991-96____________________________
'• := Firm 
Strategic Change :
A B C D E • F G H J K
New product development X X X X
Products lines dropped X X X X
1 Increasing market orientation ■ X X X X X X X (X)
ii Management practice change X X X (X) X (X)
Hi Cost control/reduction (X) X X (X) X
IV Quality improvement X (X) X X
V Export Drive • X X (X)
Note: The items in brackets were implicit, rather than explicitly mentioned as newly adopted strategies. The firms' codes are 
shown next to their names in Table 6.3 above 
Source: Survey data
TNC-Owned Domestic-Owned
Repositioning Growing
.. Stunted
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Group I  - Growing Firms
YOUNGCO
Young and looking for opportunities: This firm's scope was expanding. Operating in 
increasingly competitive markets, the firm was trying to diversify to the point where returns 
would be greater, rather than becoming an ever more efficient and larger player in one or two 
markets. Based on his previous experience, the entrepreneur saw it as preferable to develop 
a number of smaller businesses, rather than see one business expanding. The firm's strategy 
appeared to be primarily based on the entrepreneur's sense of market opportunity, as well as 
his assessment of his own competencies.
SOLIDCO
Post-puberty consolidation: This business had outgrown its smaller entrepreneurially- 
driven phase, although it was still primarily driven by the founder. The firm was compelled 
to reduce costs by the need to become more price competitive. Given its already dominant 
position in the local market, it was seen as necessary to push for increasing exports to try to 
capture economies of scale. The latter change, although it was after ESAP, was reported to 
be only indirectly linked to that programme. The firm's dynamism was also boosted by more 
market exits than entrants.
RENEWCO
A new broom: This was owned by a non-resident family of Zimbabwean origin. The
directors were content to leave the firm ticking over at a low level, rather than to inject new 
capital.8 A new management team arriving in late 1994, had changed strategy to increase 
capacity utilisation by obtaining more orders and increasing the pace of production. 
Previously, the firm had been dependent on the then managing director's friends for its ad hoc 
jobbing-type business. Now, an effort was being made to develop specific products which 
could be actively marketed to meet local demand. Dependability and quality were seen as
£
It is not clear why the owners have not sold the company, however, as it appears that there have been 
no dividend payments for many years. Possibly this was tried and it was difficult to find a buyer.
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the main local competitiveness factors. The company realised it was not able to compete in 
terms of price, either with newer small scale firms entering the foundry business, or with 
larger firms reaping economies of scale.
PLASTICO
The odd one out: This company, unusually, had seen a reduction in numbers of local 
competitors and little increase in foreign competition. The company was running three shifts 
and producing at 100% capacity to meet increased local demand. Nonetheless, competition 
among the remaining local firms had increased. Industrial customers, themselves facing 
increasing competition, always wanted the lowest cost supplier. Price was considered the 
leading competitiveness factor, followed by quality. Since 1993, this had led to a strategy 
of trying to arrange longer run supply contracts with customers to ensure that work flows 
steadily on a continuous basis, rather than the earlier jobbing type arrangements.
PUSHCO
Pushing quality and exports: A cartel-type arrangement with the firm's two leading 
competitors had been broken shortly after the introduction of ES AP, when another company 
initiated a price war. In the construction sector, local demand fluctuated with the droughts 
and falling real incomes. Competition from the informal sector had increased, although it 
was reported that new firms appeared and disappeared frequently. Price was seen as the 
prime competitiveness factor, with quality second. Nonetheless, the firm had pushed quality 
as part of a cost-rationalising reorganisation of production (see Section 6.4). This was 
reinforced by a drive for export markets, especially in South Africa, which required increased 
quality standards. The firm is supported by its locally listed manufacturing group parent, 
although this appeared not to carry the same advantages as the TNC parent firms. The firm’s 
strategies are those necessary to maximise its contribution to short term group profitability, 
rather than longer term corporate sustainability.
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Group II-  Repositioning Firms
QUALCO
Quality throughout: This firm had been exposed to new international competition, although 
it was suggested that most new importing firms had exited the market again. The strategic 
changes involved swifter reaction to changes in the marketplace and, in particular, pushing 
for improvements in quality. The company saw quality as the key to local competitiveness, 
followed by price. Its adoption of a cost containment strategy predated the shift in economic 
policies. Being part of a market leading TNC group has no doubt assisted the company in 
implementing these strategies.
MONOPCO:
Monopoly lost: This firm used to have a virtual monopoly in the local marketplace, but since 
the easing of foreign exchange restrictions had experienced increased import competition. 
The company shifted from being 'production-driven' to being 'market-driven'. It adopted a 
strategy, taking advantage of its local positioning, to compete in the area of customer service, 
in particular by responding swiftly to orders. Price was still considered important, however. 
Consequently, the company had been following a stricter cost control strategy since 1991. 
This has been associated, as discussed below, with new productivity-enhancing investments. 
As the company is locally listed and TNC owned, it has had to focus on maintaining short 
term profitability to support dividend payments, while also providing enough funds for re­
investment. Finally, as a way of improving capacity utilisation, the company has also 
implemented a regional export drive since 1994.
Group III - Stagnant Firms
STATICCO:
Conserving and holding: The firm had a considerable share of a declining local market 
(100% for one of its two major products). Its main priorities to cut costs wherever possible 
and to get rid of product lines where margins were too low. Production of items for the 
garment industry was stopped in the early 1990s. With reduced demand generally, after
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ESAP, the firm had decided to increase its flexibility to enable it to take on any available 
work, no matter how small. The firm tried to maintain its monopoly position in its main 
product line by cutting its costs to keep prices attractive in the local market and to dissuade 
its customers from attempting to import. This owner-directed firm was run at a distance, 
with its production operations in a different location from its head office. It appeared the 
main interests of directors were elsewhere engaged.
SANDCO
Head in the sand: This firm claimed not to have adopted any new strategies since the 
inception of ESAP. Its short-lived attempt at product diversification was suspended before 
production commenced. This abortive experience may have led the firm's directors to be 
wary of venturing in other new directions. Interestingly, the firm's South African parent 
appeared content to continue receiving a small annual dividend, in return for very little active 
input. Unlike the TNC subsidiaries, it is also possible that the parent firm lacked the capacity 
to adopt a more dynamic stance.
DELAYCO
Postponing substantive change: This locally owned firm was still the market leader in its 
main product line. It had clearly been feeling the impact of increased foreign competition. 
It sought to compete both on price and quality, and in particular by improving its product 
designs, which it considered the key to local competitiveness. It had an internal design 
department which predated ESAP. Due to the pressures of increased real interest rates and 
increasing market uncertainty, the firm had postponed its plans to re-equip its factory, shortly 
after the introduction of ESAP. While it had benefited over many years from licence and 
joint venture agreements with international market leaders, it had lacked the dynamic boost 
the TNC subsidiaries had received from their parents.
These accounts demonstrate the lack of a uniform explanation of the strategies adopted by 
firms in this sector. In general, the larger firms adopted a quality orientation. While three 
case study firms acknowledged price as the most important factor, only one of them was 
among the four firms which adopted cost containment strategies. The implication of this 
assessment is that it was not solely the firms' perceptions of what was required to become
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more competitive which drove their adoption of a diverse collection of new strategies.
The role of agency, in terms of its bearing on the detailed relationship between ownership 
structures and the firms, is also difficult to discern in these studies. Many of the 'growing' 
firms were run by the entrepreneurs themselves, highly motivated individuals whose 
livelihoods depended on making a success of their business. Vested with a greater degree 
of drive, they were continually on the look-out for better solutions to their problems. This 
is not to suggest they were necessarily investing more (see below). The repositioning firms 
both had professional management teams whose careers within their international groups 
were tied to the performance of their firms. During the post-independence, closed economy 
years they were the effective custodians of their firms, as the TNC parents tended not to be 
interested in subsidiaries which were unable to remit profits. With the lifting of many 
foreign exchange and capital controls parent firms became more interested in their 
Zimbabwean subsidiaries. Once back in the mainstreams of their respective groups, the local 
management teams felt they had much to prove.
It appears from this subsection, that it is the particular histories of each firm which best 
explain the approach to change for that firm, rather than any simplistic interpretation of 
uniform responses to relative price shifts. Nonetheless, there were some common constraints 
and limits to change across the firms. These are examined in the remaining sections of this 
Chapter. Before that, however, there is an examination of increasing exports as a strategic 
option of particular importance to the motivation behind the changes in economic policy (and 
to the prospects of future industrial development).
6.3.3.2 Shifts to greater export orientation
The characteristics of exporting firms were difficult to discern clearly from the broad surveys. 
Older firms were more likely to export. The ES Census data showed that only 28 percent of 
exporting firms were formed after independence.11 76 percent of firms established before 
independence were exporting in 1995, against only 38 percent of those formed after 1980. 
It was not clear from the ES Census whether those firms exporting prior to ESAP were those 
whose exports later grew more quickly.
11 The comparative figure from the RPED data was only 10 percent (Mafusire, 1995:33)
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This subsection examines what lead some firms to adopt an export promoting strategy after 
ESAP. It appears in the following analysis that such firms had prior exporting experience 
as well as an established marketing and sales staff. Yet this does not explain how the firms 
went into exporting in the first place. The recent policy shifts did not provide sufficient 
impetus for non-exporting case study firms to commence exporting, or for some of the 
smaller exporters to significantly increase their efforts in that direction.
Two of the export drive firms, PUSHCO and MONOPCO, were already exporting higher 
percentages of their exports than other firms before ESAP. These firms already had sizeable 
and established marketing divisions or departments. Prior success in exporting may have 
made the strategy more likely to be successful, and hence, possibly, more likely to be 
adopted. The repositioning firms were distinctive here. Both had over 10 percent of their 
staff in marketing functions. In the other firms such functions were mostly assumed by 
senior management.
That relative price changes following the macro-economic policy shifts provided an 
inadequate incentive for entry into exports is supported by responses from both growing and 
stagnant firms that they felt the quality of their products was inadequate, or they lacked 
capacity to explore export marketing possibilities by themselves.12 STATICO, for example, 
found itself caught in a catch-22 situation. The only export orders it was able to compete for 
were elsewhere in Africa and beyond its production capacity. The orders were not expected 
to be regular enough to justify the required investment in expanded capacity. With the 
emergence of South African producers as acceptable exporters in the region, STATICO was 
even less likely to invest in exporting. It is not clear that the firm's directors had conducted 
any market research to sustain these opinions.
These difficulties are also associated with characteristics of particular products, for example, 
structural steel products. There are economies for structural steel firms, if the firm is based 
close to the project site, as they are both manufacturing at their plant and installing on site. 
Similarly, this gives such firms some 'natural' protection in serving the domestic market.
12 The activities and constraints o f the export promotion agency, ZimTrade, which is attempting to 
encourage and facilitate local companies in the direction of exporting, are assessed in Chapter 7.
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6.3.4 Investment implications and impediments
As with the move to greater export orientation, it appears from the case studies that the firms' 
pre-ESAP investment history helps distinguish those which invested at higher rates 
thereafter. Again, this does not suggest why such firms initially became more consistent 
investors. Regrettably, there are insufficient data to address this matter. The important 
finding is that, as above, changed incentives do not provide a convincing explanation of 
investment patterns.
Investment ratios varied considerably from one firm to another and within particular firms 
over time. The best measure of new investment would have been capital expenditure as a 
percentage of capital stock. Data on capital stock is notoriously difficult to calculate reliably, 
however. In Zimbabwe, data on the book values of fixed assets gave little idea of capital 
stock in use. In most firms the average age of capital equipment was around 20 years, so the 
equipment value had long been fully depreciated.13 Book values were used, however, as no 
reliable alternative methods were available.
Only three firms decided to introduce new products after 1990/91. Of these, the only 
substantial investment for this purpose was by the repositioning MONOPCO. The firm had 
been one of the most consistent investors during previous years. Its capital expenditure had 
rarely been under 2.5 percent of its gross output and 8 percent of its fixed asset values. This 
appeared to be more or less sufficient for replacement purposes. As a result, the average age 
of its capital equipment was 15 years, as opposed to at least 20 years for most of the other 
firms.14
13 Gunning and Pomp (1995) use a complex technique to calculate an index of capital stock for the 
RPED firms. This involves estimating the value of capital stock in 1990 and using a continuous 
investment history since that date to establish changes year on year. To do this they work backwards 
from the 1994 "sales value o f capital stock" and apply a constant depreciation value and a fixed ratio 
between sales and the economic values o f capital stock. The problem with this method is that the 
authors make so many arbitrary adjustments, notwithstanding their base in actual investment 
expenditures, that the final values for capital stock have little necessary connection with a sense of true 
capital stock values. They also use the indices to indicate changes at sectoral level, which is of little 
use for the firm level investigations made here.
14 See further discussion in Section 6.5 below.
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The other most consistently active investor was PLASTICO. It had been steadily expanding 
its capacity. Nonetheless, it regularly operated at full capacity. It was in order to ensure that 
this capacity was well and regularly utilised, that the firm had attempted to change away from 
jobbing to seek more continuous supply contracts.
For both of the above firms, their investments were not part of any new post-ESAP strategy. 
Rather, these firms had established a higher investment profile during the years leading up 
to ESAP. This was maintained after 1990/91. Interestingly, these firms were the only two 
to operate on three shifts. While they were investing more, the burden of trying to make their 
investments pay, was driving them to maximise capacity utilisation. In most other cases, the 
adoption of new strategies did not lead to significant new investment.
Of course, looking at actual investment patterns tells us little about what the firms would like 
to have done. Seven firms suggested they had been constrained from investing since ESAP, 
including all three stagnant firms. Lack of access to finance or its high cost may account for 
the latter firms adopting more conservative stances. For SOLIDCO and SANDCO, their 
financial problems were resolved in part through capital injections. In the remaining cases, 
it seems the planned investment was either postponed or cancelled altogether - the most 
notable example being DELAYCO's decision to postpone indefinitely the re-equipping of its 
factory.
While this research has not made financial issues a prime focus, it is clear that investment 
constraints are more complex than high real interest rates and licencing difficulties alone. 
Again, the conclusion is that an explanation for observed variations has to be sought 
elsewhere than in the adoption of new strategies alone.
6.3.5 Outcomes, problems and constraints
If the chosen strategic changes were well implemented and appropriate, their effective 
implementation should produce visible and positive outcomes . This subsection examines 
some of the outcomes of the various strategic changes.
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6.3.5.1 Strategic Outcomes
No company seemed to be doing well on every performance indicator, or to have met all of 
its strategic objectives. Even those firms achieving most success in terms of the indicators 
faced difficulties regarding particular performance criteria.
This implies that surveys linking broad changes in relative prices, or in product mix, to 
performance outcomes, may provide indicators at a macro or sectoral level, but will be 
unable convincingly to account for the path of change. A more detailed and nuanced picture 
is required to trace a continuum from changes in an economic environment, through changes 
in firm strategies, to changes in firm behaviour. The remaining sections of this chapter are 
intended to provide some of the details to ensure an understanding of the routes firms take 
to adapt to change within or to effect change in their external economic environment.
The Push for Exports
Drives for export growth met with mixed outcomes, both within and across firms. Without 
a more detailed investigation of each firm, it is very difficult to assess the reasons for the 
uneven year on year performance. It is questionable how successful these strategies were, 
when QUALCO, which had not adopted a specific export growth strategy was amongst those 
which saw good export growth in the years after ESAP.
A Note on Investment
The data on continuous investment and performance were too limited to draw any significant 
associations between investment patterns and performance outcomes. The only suggestion 
was of a negative association between investment and gross output productivity in the same 
year, possibly reflecting a learning period, as workers adapted to the new machinery or plant.
Other Strategies
The outcomes of these also appeared very mixed. The main features included: narrower 
product lines across firms; retrenchment as the main form of implementing cost reduction; 
and, the fact that the repositioning firms were among the first firms in Zimbabwe to obtain
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ISO 9000 quality accreditation. It is very difficult to assess whether the last of these could 
have been more effectively supported through different changes in economic policy. The 
first two are not so clearly positive changes, and depend on the success and impact of other 
changes examined in the following subsections.
6.3.5.2 Strategy implementation: problems and constraints
Of the 22 recorded changes in strategy adopted by the firms, six were implemented without 
any problems. The most common problem was resistence by other managers, as experienced 
in nine cases. This form of institutional legacy can impede, or retard change, when those 
most affected have their normal practices and interests challenged or threatened. Such 
resistance will tend to be stronger when there is a lack of information available to those 
affected, or they are not involved in the decision process leading to the change, and/or respect 
and loyalty are low.
Managers had been accustomed to producing the same products for many years, for a market 
which was pleased to absorb whatever was produced. In many cases, little regard had been 
paid to quality; to when the product was required; and, to whether it precisely met 
specifications. Changing such an approach took time. The managing directors or chief 
executives, who had been in their firms for some time, would first have had to deal with such 
resistance to change within themselves.
Other types of resistence to change are examined in the following sections.
6.4 ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION
While for analytical purposes organisational changes are examined separately from other 
changes, such as those in technology or skills, they are often not implemented independently. 
This section seeks an explanation for the positive, indifferent or negative impacts of 
organisational change on firm level performance.
An assumption runs through the writings of Kaplinsky and Posthuma, among others, that the 
introduction of so-called new management techniques (NMTs) is essentially beneficial for
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companies, being an alternative or complement to technological change (see Section 6.5). 
The only problem is how to persuade firms to do it, and to do it well.15
In essence, there are two groups of questions that need to be answered in this section. The 
first group deals with the character of the changes themselves. How and why does the pattern 
differ across the firms? How well implemented were they? Was there any resistance to their 
introduction? Were there other problems and constraints? How sustainable are the 
implemented alterations? The second group relates the organisational changes to firm 
performance. What has been their impact on other aspects of firm behaviour? What 
differentiates the performance outcomes?
Here, the first subsection examines the pattern of organisational changes adopted by the case 
study firms. This includes examining the stated causes; workers’ awareness of the changes 
taking place; sources of information used in introducing change; and, problems encountered. 
The analysis includes examination of workers' experiences of team work, rewards for 
suggestions made and overtime.
The second subsection examines whether there is any association between implementation 
of organisational modifications and other alterations in firm structure and behaviour, or 
changes in performance.
6.4.1 Changing the Organisation of Production
6.4.1.1 What has been changed?
Given that the case study firms are among the more dynamic of the entire ES Census sample, 
it is not surprising that six of the 10 firms were found to have introduced at least three 
organisational changes. This compares with 49 percent of the ES Census firms overall.16 
The actual changes introduced are indicated firm by firm in Table 6.8. As noted in Chapter 
3, a list of possible changes was offered to respondents. The responses were undoubtedly
15 See discussion on the Zimbabwe research by these authors in Chapter 4 above.
16 While the changes are supposed to relate to those introduced since the start o f ESAP, in several of the 
case study firms, they were started prior to ESAP. Where they were non-continuous, they have been 
excluded from further consideration.
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biased, therefore, in the direction of these changes.
Table 6.8 - Case Study Firms ■ Organisational Changes 1991-96
Firm
Organisational Change
A B c : D E . F G H J K
1 Reorganise layout of plant X X X X (X)
II just-in-time inventory reduction X X (X)
111 Quality-at-source/task forces X (X) X X X
IV Continuous improvement X X X X (X) X
V Increase team work X X X X X X
VI Expand worker-management 
communication
(X) X X X X X X (X) X
VII Introduce/increase shift work X M
Note: The firms' codes and names are shown in Table 6.3 above. The items in brackets are of lesser importance and not 
refered to in the following analysis, which limited the detailed coverage of firm changes to three per firm (not including team 
work).
Source: Survey data
The 'stunted' firms, SANDCO and DELAYCO introduced the fewest changes of all the case 
study firms. Although STATICCO introduced two changes, as did RENEWCO and 
PLASTICO, as will be seen below, these changes were of a more conservative type.
For the sake of comparison, to see how typical of the broader sector the case study firms are, 
Table 6.9 shows the percentages of firms implementing these changes across the various size 
groups in the census sample as a whole.
Table 6.9 - Engineering Sector - % Firms introducing Organisational Changes 1991-96
Firm size1
Organisational Change 20-99 100-249 >=250 Total2
Case Study 
Firms
N one, 10 9 0 13 t . 0 f
I Reorganise layout of plant 63 70 67 62 60
II Just-in-time inventory reduction 16 22 48 22 30
ill Quality-at-source/task forces 28 39 71 34 50
IV Continuous improvement 59 70 71 56 70
VI Expand worker-management 
communication
54 61 67 54 ‘ . / 9 0 V  ’ 
1 .1 ’ ' ’4{ r '‘
VII Introduce/increase shift work 15 30 24 16 20
Av. No. of Changes 2.4 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.3
Notes: For the sake of comparison, the case study firm responses include those pre-ESAP changes included; 1 - Size is 
in number of workers; 2 - Totals include firms with fewer than 20 workers as well; Change V was not listed as an option in 
the census questionnaire 
Source: ES Census Survey data
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Table 6.9 shows that larger firms implemented more changes, especially those classified as 
New Management Techniques (NMTs).'7 Many larger firms didnot introduce largenumbers 
of changes, however. So size is not sufficient to explain the frequency of change. Older 
firms, especially those established before UDI, also implemented significantly more changes 
on average, than post-independence firms (2.9 versus 2.1). Exporters made an average of 3.1 
changes, compared with 1.6 for the non-exporters. Possibly this is an indication that, despite 
the opening up of the economy, exporting firms receive more information about the types of 
changes being introduced elsewhere, and are under greater pressure to improve their 
efficiency to stay abreast of their competition.
The frequency data are of limited value, indicating nothing about the quality of the changes, 
or their impact. This is examined below.
6.4.1.2 The changes in detail
In general, the changes in the repositioning firms seemed to be the most effective, which is 
probably due to their greater management capacity; these firms were also able to follow 
examples and learn from elsewhere in their TNC groupings. The changes were not 
introduced, however, without conflict. The ’stagnant’ firms implemented the fewest changes.
I  Reorganised Plant Layout
In only one case was this change specifically part of a firm-wide plan to improve production 
efficiency. Around 1993, PUSHCO implemented a range of organisational modifications 
under the KPS (Kawasaki Production System) rubric. This was complementary to the firm's 
quality improvement strategy (see Section 6.3). It was also an effort to retain market share 
by being able to match production levels more rapidly in response to demand fluctuations, 
while controlling costs in the face of increasingly fierce domestic competition. In research 
utilising the RPED survey, it was noted that KPS "seems to be a fad in some circles in 
Zimbabwe" (Biggs et. al., 1995:136). This is confirmed by the prominence it is given in the 
work of Kaplinsky and Posthuma. The research results in this thesis demonstrates that KPS
17 The main ones that generally fall into this category are changes II, III and IV.
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was just one, amongst a number, of different types of organisational change taking place in 
the 1990s.
II Introduction o f Just-in-time (JIT) Inventory Reduction
With the increasing cost of credit and therefore of working capital in the early 1990s, it is 
surprising that this was the least popular change at sectoral level. A number of managers 
from non-case study firms suggested there was a lack of information available to these firms 
about how to go about introducing the change, in the face of problems in obtaining 
predictable, reliable and timely steel supplies from ZISCO and other suppliers.
Managing directors from the three implementing firms all said stockholding had been 
reduced following the implementation of the changes. Two of the three said that work-in- 
progress holdings had been reduced as well.18
III Quality-at-source/Quality Task Forces
This change is the most closely correlated with firm size (see Table 6.9). None of the 
'stagnant' firms implemented such change.
The effectiveness of the change can be assessed by examining the reject or defect rate in 
production. Most companies did not keep precise information on this indicator, however.19 
Three of the firms introducing quality at source reported reductions in reject rates of up to 
90 percent since 1991 (PUSHCO and SOLIDCO). These were estimated, among 
implementing firms, to be as low as 1 percent and as high as 20 percent in 1991. By 1996, 
none of the implementing firms were estimating their reject rates at higher than 5 percent. 
Of the non-implementing firms, only one talked of a significant reduction. Reject rates 
remained as high as 17% among these firms.
Another impact of the change was a reduction in staffing of the quality control function 
among the repositioning firms. QUALCO was the only firm to disband its quality control
1 ft The third suggested no change.
19 The same was noted in the RPED survey (Biggs et. al., 1995: 135).
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unit at the start of the change.in 1994. It had to reinstate it, as quality plummeted. At the 
time of the survey, it was in the process of trying to eliminate the unit again. MONOPCO 
reduced the number of personnel in that unit, but in addition downsized its staffing across the 
board.
IV  Continuous Improvement
Usually, these changes are understood to mean instituting measures to ensure that workers 
are continually looking for ways to improve the production processes. In some firms, 
implementation was associated with the introduction of team working (see Table 6.10). 
Regular production meetings of the teams discussed ideas for work process improvements. 
In some firms, this was supplemented by a suggestion box, in two cases supplemented by a 
rewards system (see Table 6.4.3). These boxes had met with little success in some firms and 
had been abandoned.
Effectiveness of implementation was difficult to assess. None of the firms appeared to have 
systems in place for recording the number of ideas or suggestions contributed. There was 
also little correlation between firms implementing and frequency of suggestions received.
The changes amongst the 'growing' firms seemed less effective. At PUSHCO, the 
sustainability of change was questionable. Relatively few of the workers making suggestions 
at the time of the survey felt their ideas were being implemented. Only 16 percent of workers 
interviewed were of the view that there was still a performance award system in place and 
none had been rewarded.
All management respondents agreed that implementation rates increased with the grade of 
worker making the suggestion. There was a correspondence between the grade of worker and 
the likelihood of their suggestions being used, with 81 percent of foremen/supervisors' 
suggestions being implemented as opposed to 25 percent of unskilled workers' ones. It is 
possible that unskilled or semi-skilled workers made suggestions to their supervisors or 
foremen, who either did not pass them on to management, or presented them to management 
as their own.
This change is important in that firms with greater percentages of workers contributing to the
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improvement of production processes are likely to be able to manage change better, to be 
more innovative and be better able to adapt to change. It appears that a move to continuous 
improvement is insufficient on its own, and that other firm characteristics, such as respect 
and trust relations are also important in understanding how such moves can be more or less 
effective (see Section 6.6).
V Increased Team Work
It is argued that along with multi-skilling, this is particularly appropriate in the face of 
increasing economic uncertainty. Firms can more easily reassign workers or their teams to 
other tasks during slack periods. There was some association between team work and multi­
skilling, as can be seen in Table 6.10.20 Overall, the changes are not necessarily associated 
with dynamism, as two of the 'stagnant' firms have also introduced elements of these changes, 
as part of their moves to increase their flexibility.
QUALCO (F) and PUSHCO (J) had introduced team work alongside other changes some 3-4 
years before the survey was conducted. Fewer of their workers noticed an additional 
emphasis on team work during the 12 months prior to the case study survey, than the other 
firms, which had made the change more recently.
Table 6.10 - Case Study Firms - Team work
. Firm A B C D E F G H J K
Firms introducing team work1 X X X X X X
% of workers indicating they had 
worked more as part of a team during 
the past year
50 64 45 25 62 39 60 53 37 67
% of workers indicating their work 
intensity increased in the past year2.
29 46 18 25 62 67 53 33 28 55
Firms which have reassigned tasks . 
during slack periods in past year1
X X X X X X
Firms introducing multi-skilling1 X X X X X X X
% workers not doing same tasks 
every day
37 36 64 50 31 61 60 47 37 58
Note: 1 - information from firm management, ail other information is from workers; 2 - measured by asking about change in 
number of tasks required per hour.
Source: Survey data
20 The questionnaire did not ask about the change in the same way as the others covered here. 
Consequently the information available is less comprehensive.
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In order to optimise the benefits of team work, and for them to be able to be more flexible 
and adaptable, to cover for each other in case of sickness or change in workload, workers 
need to become multi-skilled. This aspect of team work is a source of one of workers' 
objections to it, as being multi-skilled increases work intensity and associated stress, 
especially if there are daily targets for teams, regardless of the non-availability of team 
members (see Lloyd, 1994).
The 'repositioning' firms were again among those which appeared to have implemented the 
changes most effectively. They had observed the greatest increase in work intensity. They 
also had relatively high percentages of multi-skilled workers.
VI Expanded Worker-Management Communication
In many of the case study firms, the attempts to improve communication were essentially top 
down. They were driven by managers trying to get their workers to understand them better 
or to perform better. No reciprocal obligations were recognised by management to respond 
to what the changes might imply about their attitude to their workers.
Improved communication seems to be rather a catch-all category for organisational change. 
Nine of the case study firms indicated they had implemented it within the previous five 
years.21
Effectiveness of this change was very difficult to assess, but seemed poor, in general. The 
three 'growing' firms, which did not highlight this improvement (YOUNGCO, SOLIDCO and 
PUSHCO), had the highest percentage of workers saying they were consulted about work 
improvements, as well as asked to contribute ideas about the future of the firm. It is likely, 
therefore, that the claim to have introduced such improvements was, in itself, an indication 
of problems in that area. This theme is returned to in Section 6.6 below, when respect and 
trust issues are discussed.
21 This was a much higher percentage o f change than the average for the census as a whole - see Table 6.9.
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VII Introducing/Increasing Shift Work
Only PLASTICO and MONOPCO, with more modem and more automated production 
machinery, were running on three shifts which they had been doing since before ESAP. 
Changing shift work patterns was not considered by any firm as a solution to the external 
changes taking place, which means a major method for improving productivity was accorded 
little attention.
The RPED results found a similar proportion of their firms using shift work (six of 35 
plants). Moreover, where more than one shift was worked, "the higher night wage and other 
costs exceeded the savings from using fixed capital more intensively." (Biggs et. al., 
1995:132). The other constraints, not covered in that survey, were the limited numbers of 
managers in each firm and the lack of developed trust relations. Together, these meant that 
night working was not easily delegated to more junior staff (see Section 6.7).
6.4.1.3 Sources of Information and Advice
One aspect of how effectively, or not, the changes were implemented may be related to the 
sources of advice and information used. A total of 23 organisational changes were 
introduced by the 10 firms. The most common information source, involved in 14 cases, was 
in-house knowledge. For six changes, it was the only source. It was not surprising to find 
that the smaller 'growing' and 'stagnant' firms featured the 'home-grown' approach 
substantially.
The 'repositioning' firms both relied on extensive parent company knowledge and advice. 
The greater depth of experience available is reflected in the greater effectiveness of 
implementation noted above. The capabilities of local management and relevant workers 
were still important, however, to adapt the imported methods to local cultural and business 
norms and to translate effective implementation into improved (firm) performance.
6.4.1.4 Problems Encountered
The most common implementation problem according to the managing directors, in 10 of the 
total 23 cases, was worker resistance. Many of the NMTs, for example quality-at-source, in
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particular, increased the levels of responsibility to be assumed by production workers. 
Consequently, there was a strong likelihood of early resistance. In particular, it appears that, 
where there was no potential immediate reward for implementing the changes, beyond vague 
and poorly backed up reasons such as “the survival of the company depends on it”, there was 
no reason for workers to develop any sense of commitment to any particular change. This 
was particularly true where respect and trust relations were already poor within the firm.
Eight of the 10 problems, reported as being due to worker resistance, were related to the 
introduction of NMT-type measures. In eight of the instances of worker resistance, however, 
management noted that worker involvement ultimately facilitated the changes.
There was little pattern of association between other problems and specific changes or firms. 
The major item of interest was the lack of frequency with which skills were referred to as a 
constraint.22 Given the difficulties inherent in the adoption of changes, this may reflect the 
limited awareness of management about what it takes to change organisations successfully, 
rather than that skills were really not a problem.
Looking at the changes as a whole, it appears that the larger, more dynamic firms, such as 
QUALCO, PUSHCO and MONOPCO, with access to the greatest amount of external 
advice, implemented the most changes and, in their own terms, probably did this best.
6.4.2 The Impact of Organisational Change on Performance
Overall, given available data, it is very difficult to identify specific causal relationships 
between any of the organisational changes and any performance indicators. Of 26 specific 
measures to increase productivity, cited by production manager respondents, only seven were 
directly related to organisational change.23 While Kaplinsky (1994) and Posthuma (1994 and 
1995) suggest that many firms adopted NMTs as a way of improving performance, more 
cheaply than through the introduction of technology and without having to spend scarce 
foreign exchange, none of the other organisational changes were mentioned as specifically
22 This was only mentioned three times.
23 The great majority ofproductivity improvement measures are examined in Section 6.5 below, including, 
in order o f frequency, expanded training, changes in production process, and introduction o f new plant 
and equipment.
201
aimed at improving productivity.
Various indicators of productivity have been calculated.24 Apart from numerical measures, 
there are managing directors' and production managers' indications of change in firm 
productivity on a volume basis. There is a great disparity between these indicators (see Table 
6.11). It is almost impossible, therefore, on the basis of available data, to be categorical in 
asserting the presence of strong associations between particular organisational changes and 
productivity, on the basis of a single indicator. This would require more detailed firm level 
performance measurement.
Examining each change in turn, Table 6.11 summarises whether organisational changes are 
associated with a positive productivity outcome or not. The table shows a "+" when the 
majority of firms introducing a particular change have experienced a positive change in that 
productivity indicator.
6.11 - Organisational Change and Productivity Outcomes
Productivity. , 
Indicator
Actual Change in ; 
1990s
(net output basis)
Actual Change since 
the Organisational 
Change1
Managing
Director’s
View
Production
Manager's
View
1 Reorganise layout of plant . + + +
li JIT = + +
ill Quality-at-source = t= + +
IV Continuous improvement = + + +
VI Worker-management
communication
+ + = +
Note: V  = the majority of implementing firms shows a productivity improvement; '=' = the same number have an improvement 
as a decline; = the majority show a decline; 1 - data is very thin here and for two of the changes is based on one 
implementing firm only.
Source: Survey Data
The Table suggests that, on balance, implementation of the organisational changes was not 
associated with declining productivity. However, this analysis does not address the 
counterfactual of whether the improvements would have been greater without the 
organisational changes, or indeed whether alternative types of changes would have had a 
more beneficial impact. It is important, for example, to establish where these changes 
accompanied the introduction of new technology, or whether they were being perceived as
24 These include gross and net output per worker - see Appendix 6.1.
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a substitute for technical change.
Statistically, a number of associations emerge.25 Productivity change (net output) in the 
1990s and the percentage of workers experiencing more team work in the previous year 
produce a Pearson correlation coefficient o f-0.67, significant at 3 percent. This indicates a 
strong negative association between the increasing extent of team work in a firm and change 
in productivity. The correlation is stronger between the same indicator of change in 
productivity in the last year from which data is available (1993/4 to 1994/5) and the same 
team work indicator (-0.74).26 Given the timing issues here, it may be that the causality, if 
any, was from poor productivity experience to team work, rather than the other way.
There is also a negative correlation of -0.71 (8 percent) between the one year productivity 
change indicator and the percentage of workers asked to make suggestions for work 
improvement in the firms. Again, the causality if any, may be from poor productivity 
performance to a hunger for new ideas within the firms, whether formally incorporated in the 
implementation of “continuous improvement”, or on a more ad hoc basis.
The implications of the last two points are that it may be that changes internal to the firm, 
such as worsening productivity, which drove the need for change as much as those external 
to the firm.
Finally, there are positive correlations between the percentage of workers being rewarded for 
contributing ideas and 1990s productivity change, whether measured by net or gross output.27 
The rationale here may be that the firms which were able to improve their performance were 
those which chose, inter alia, to reward their workers.28
Given the uncertainty about any particular indicators, due both to poor quality data and the 
small sample size, it is perhaps safer to examine the firms individually and assess whether
25 Although the correlations may appear significant, given the small sample size, any such interpretation 
is risky.
The significance is lower, however, at only 6%, as there are only seven firms with the necessary data.
97 The stronger one is with net output productivity change at 0.66 (4 percent significance).
28 This in itself might be related to better internal respect relations - see Section 6.7.
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those implementing particular organisational changes, or doing so more effectively, are 
reaping greater rewards. However, examining the data on this basis provided no conclusive 
support for superior performance by firms which were implementing more changes. Neither 
of the 'repositioning* firms has seen the highest growth in productivity in the past few years, 
despite their evident dynamism.
Overall, it appears that organisational changes alone are unlikely to be able to significantly 
improve firm performance. Apart from the difficulty of implementing them well and 
sustainably, there may be a number of associated negative aspects, such as increasing 
responsibility and stress for workers who are not prepared for such changes, which may in 
turn impinge upon on performance in other unforeseen ways.
6.5 SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITAL INNOVATION
The objective of this section is to understand both the overall pattern of change, as well as 
reasons for the differences across the firms. The relationship between different technical and 
skills development approaches and firm performance and dynamism is also highlighted. The 
ability to develop and implement new strategies and production processes is dependent on 
a firm's capabilities, both in terms of its workforce skills, including management, as well as 
the state of its technology in use and that which it is capable of developing.29
In Zimbabwe in general (Biggs, et. al., 1995), and among the case study firms in particular, 
limited innovative activity was taking place. While to some extent this was due to 
investment decisions and problems discussed in Section 6.3 above, it was also related to the 
skills composition of most firms' management and workforce. For example, problem 
diagnosis skills are important in deciding on new types of technology. Training will make 
it easier for machine operators to adapt to new machinery.30 Other technical characteristics 
of the firms, including in-house maintenance and trouble-shooting capabilities, are also skills 
related and affect firm performance. Thus, as a source of firm performance differentiation,
29 See Enos (1991) and Lall (1993) on “technological capabilities”.
30 For more extended discussion of this, see Wood (1995), and various articles and papers by researchers 
from the National Institute o f Economic and Social Research (UK), for example Daly et. al. (1985).
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it is likely that better explanations will be found through examining firm skills characteristics 
in detail, rather than technology.
Despite the close linkage between firm skills and technology practices, for clarity these are 
treated separately. The first subsection provides an overview of the technological status of 
the case study firms, as well as the technical changes they have introduced since the advent 
of ESAP. The second subsection examines the skills portfolios, recruitment and training 
practices of the case study firms. Throughout the analysis, firm differences are assessed and 
associations are sought between the skill and technology profiles and firm performance and 
dynamism.
It is apparent that the associations between technical capabilities and firm performance and 
dynamism are complex. There is little substantive innovation in Zimbabwe, which means 
that firms are more reliant on developing their human capabilities to create greater internal 
dynamism. Likewise, it is the development of skills within the firm, rather than the 
employment of a larger proportion of highly qualified artisans, which appears to have the 
greater linkage with firm dynamism.
The ’repositioning1 firms, with their external TNC linkages, have shown the greater 
propensity to improve the breadth and quality of their training. It is not clear, however, that 
this is sufficient to complement the organisational changes outlined in the previous Section 
and contribute adequately to the future growth and development of the firms. The more 
independent 'growing1 firms tend to try and do most of the training in-house. There are 
serious doubts concerning the quality of training and management in those firms. Two of the 
'stagnant1 firms employ relatively high levels of skill, but are doing little to encourage their 
workers to develop them further and to make an active contribution to the future of those 
firms.
6.5.1 Technical Characteristics and Change
Despite the undoubted importance of technical change for industrial development, there has 
been very little technological upgrading since ESAP. This is closely related to the problems 
with investment examined in Section 6.3.
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Most of the metal engineering firms in the case study purchased their main production 
technologies through the acquisition of appropriate machinery from abroad. A few have 
some in-house capacity for making new dies and tools. In most instances these would be 
copied from earlier models or other firms. The most advanced technical activities conducted 
by any of the firms is some design work. Original research and development is minimal.
During UDI and post-independence era, much product and process innovation was through 
adaptation and incremental improvement. On the eve of ESAP, therefore, many firms were 
using long-since fully depreciated machinery and internationally obsolete technologies. As 
outlined in Section 6.3 above, this did not mean, however, that firms were incapable of 
competing. In a number of areas, simple agricultural implements and structural steel, for 
example, the relatively cheap capital costs (from old equipment) and other structural 
advantages (for example, location advantages for heavy engineering products) meant that old 
technologies were still producing appropriately priced and suitable quality products for 
potential consumers.
6.5.1.1 Technology in use
In comparison with international figures, the ES Census data shows that Zimbabwean 
technology is rather undeveloped. For example, by late 1995, only 31 percent of local 
engineering firms were using numerically controlled (NC) or computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machinery. Virtually the same percentage of firms were using computer- 
aided design (CAD). Eric Wood's 1993 survey of 41 South African engineering firms found 
56 percent using these newer technologies (1995; 106). In the early 1980s, Daly et. al. (1985) 
found that 94 percent of German firms and 44 per cent of British firms were already using 
the same types of machinery.
Technology is clearly size-related in Zimbabwe. Only 22 percent of firms with under 100 
employees claimed to be using NC or CNC machinery, while, 57 percent of the firms with 
100 employees or more were using this type of machinery. This latter figure is still less than 
for the South African survey, where all firms in the latter size category either had such 
machinery, or were considering its introduction (Wood, 1995: 107).31
31 The Zimbabwe data does not capture information on firms "considering" machinery investment. It is 
not clear what "considering" introduction of such machinery means.
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Of the case study firms, three use CNC machinery, namely QUALCO, DELAYCO, and 
PLASTICO. MONOPCO also uses modem machinery, but its machines are all manually 
controlled, not automatic or computerised. For QUALCO and DELAYCO, the CNC 
machines comprise a little under 10 percent of the total number of machines in use, while for 
PLASTICO, NC and CNC machines comprise 60 percent of the total.32
For most of the firms, the average age of their machinery was reported as between 20 and 30 
years old (see Table 6.12). This was similar to the World Bank findings in the late 1980s 
(1990:18), which indicates that equipment has been replaced at a steady rate since that time. 
PLASTICO and MONOPCO's lower average ages reflect those firms' more persistent and 
regular programmes of capital expenditure (see Section 6.7). All the CNC machines were 
purchased after ESAP was introduced.
Table 6.12 - Firm Machinery Characteristics33
Firm D E ■ F G H J K
No. of standard machines 20 30 30 120 60 40 120 10 460 35
Average age of those . ; 
machines ^
6 30 12 30 28 23 20 13 21 15
No. NC/CNC machines / 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 15 0 0
average no. operations per 
product
6 8 5 3 10 28 75 3 8 9
Source: survey data
CNC purchases are associated with the complexity of the production process. One indicator 
of this technical complexity is given by the number of discrete operations involved in the 
manufacture of each product. Firm DELAYCO stands out as being involved in a 
significantly more complex production process than any other firm, although firm QUALCO 
is also more complex than the rest. By the end of the period under review both firms have 
already purchased CNC machinery.
32 Most of firm H's machines are computerised plastic moulding machines, which are a little different and 
less sophisticated than CNC metal working machines (although their machinery complement includes 
one of those as well).
33 .. • * . . .There is some imprecision likely in the data on the number of machines per firm, as there will be a 
minimum size o f machine that each respondent used. This was not standardised across the survey.
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Other technical indicators, such as set-up time, frequency of set-up change and batch size, 
would only be meaningful bases for comparison if several firms were manufacturing similar 
products.34
6.5.1.2 Technological change since ESAP
Overall, it appears that there has been relatively poor development of technological 
capabilities since ESAP.35 The differences between the changes made by the case study firms 
are not easily classifiable by the broad firm groupings. Table 6.7 showed that only the 
'growing* or 'repositioning' firms conducted product development. Size appears to be one of 
the major factors associated with technical change, even the 'stagnant'DELAYCO introduced 
some technical change.
The case study firms had slightly higher rates of change than the ES Census averages. The 
most common type of innovation across the engineering sector was the purchase of new 
production machinery. This was carried out by 42 percent of ES Census firms (including six 
case study firms - see Table 6.13).36 Of these firms 21 percent carried out some form of 
computerisation (three of the case study firms), while less than five per cent indicated 
introducing either new process technologies, line automation, or some other type of 
automated machinery linkage. No technological changes were recorded by 36 percent of the 
firms.
These results were also size related. Only 23 percent of the smallest firms (with fewer than 
20 employees) introduced new machinery, and/or computerised, while 52 percent did 
nothing. Of the 21 firms with more than 250 employees, 75 percent introduced new 
machinery and 20 percent introduced line automation. The importance of size seems to have 
waned a little through the 1990s, however.37 As the 1990s have progressed, factors other
34 This was so in the research conducted by Wood (1995) and the N1ESR researchers.
35 See survey results reported in Teitel and Thoumi (1994), and Latsch and Robinson (1995 and 1997).
36 Latsch and Robinson note, however, that most o f this was to replace worn out equipment, rather than 
upgrading (1997:18).
The correlation between firm size and a technology index, composed of use of computerised 
technology; average age of capital equipment; and, the introduction of new technology, was slightly 
higher in 1991, than in 1995 (both in terms of employment and sales). The correlation with size by
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than size have become relatively more important to firm dynamism. It is these which are 
examined in the rest of this section.
Table 6.13 summarises the technical changes stated as introduced by the case study firms.38 
Some changes were associated with organisational changes outlined in Section 6.4 above. 
For example, PUSHCO's changes are part of the KPS changes mentioned earlier.
Some stated reasons for the changes were market-related, including response to competition, 
adapting to changes in orders and attempting to improve product quality. Unsurprisingly 
SOLIDCO, QUALCO and MONOPCO were the principal firms citing these causes of 
change. While SANDCO, DELAYCO and PLASTICO knew of local competitors which had 
introduced new technologies since ESAP, none cited this as a reason for introducing 
technical change. All these firms were concerned about controlling costs, which might be 
an indirect indicator of downward pressure on margins resulting from their competitors’ 
actions.
Table 6.13 - Case Study Firms - Technological Changes 1991-96
Firm ■
Technological Change
A B Q .D E F G H J K
i. reducing/streamlining production • 
stages
X X X X
ii. energy saving X X X X X
iii. capacity stretching X X X
iv new tools, dies and fixtures X X
v. new production machinery X X X X X X
ii new production process X X
Source: Survey data
The only change linked specifically to new products is vi.39 New processes are linked to 
research and development and/or design. For SOLIDCO, the change was mainly an in-house 
design issue, supplemented by copying from other firms/products. For MONOPCO, it was
employment decreased from 0.41 to 0.33 over the period.
38 *Often a single technical change would encompass more than one type, so the best description is chosen.
39 It is not implicitly linked to new products, however. New production processes could have been used 
only to improve existing products.
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adapting technology developed by the parent company for local production. Apart from 
being technologically more dynamic, SOLIDCO and MONOPCO were also two of three 
firms adopting export promotion strategies.
The lack of association between technical change and research and development, or even 
design work, is immediately evident. Most technical change in Zimbabwean engineering was 
incremental. Such change was not likely to lead to or be associated with radical changes in 
product mix, or the ratio of the various production inputs. Nonetheless, in seven cases of 
technical change the desire to increase productivity was cited as a principle cause of the 
change. PLASTICO ’ s management was clear that it preferred to rely on machines rather than 
on workers to generate consistent output quality. They wanted to automate where possible. 
In only one case (firm B) was a licence procured along with the change, which was also the 
only incidence of new product development being noted as the cause.
Source o f advice
Firms not affiliated to local or international groups were more likely to want to conduct their 
affairs without the involvement of outsiders.40
As with the organisational changes, in 70 percent of the technological changes, in-house 
expertise was the principal source of advice. This was particularly so among the smaller 
companies, namely SOLIDCO, STATICCO, SANDCO, and RENEWCO. In two cases the 
firm's in house expertise was supported by equipment suppliers (QUALCO and 
PLASTICO). Half the firms also received installation and commissioning assistance from 
suppliers. In three cases this was related to the more complex CNC machinery.
The size correlation is significant here. Many smaller firms were restricted in their ability 
to introduce newer techniques. In addition to possible skills deficits, this may have been due 
to concerns about paying others for possibly expensive advice. Larger firms, typically 
employing a greater range of skills, were more able to interact effectively with potential 
advice givers. Smaller firms also had difficulty gaining access to certain types of external 
support. For example, only 25 percent of the smallest firms in the ES Census used foreign
40 This is with the exception of the smallest firm.
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equipment suppliers and 43 percent used local suppliers.41 50 percent of firms with more 
than 250 workers used the former and only five per cent the latter. Thus, the technological 
learning value for the economy as a whole is greater from the larger firms.
Relatively few problems were reported by the case study firms with the implementation of 
technical change, with no problems at all in 57 percent of the cases. The most common 
problem was worker resistance, cited in five (22 percent) of the cases. In each this was 
temporary, while workers adapted to the new technology.
Technical Change and Performance
The major performance benefits cited by the production managers following the technical 
changes were improved productivity and throughput/speed of production. Both were cited 
by eight firms. Seven firms saw a reduction in rejects in production, but less than half the 
firms reported reductions in production bottlenecks or machine down-time. With the 
performance data problems, it is difficult to be more precise than this about the performance
impact.
This subsection illustrates the complexity of using firm-based analyses. By no means all 
firms which attempt to become more market-oriented in the face of increasing competition 
go about implementing that strategy in the same way. While technological progress has an 
important role to play in ensuring longer-term product competitiveness and firm growth, 
there are many constraints on technological change. It is the more continuously dynamic 
firms like SOLIDCO, QUALCO, PLASTICO and MONOPCO, which seem to have a more 
positive attitude to using new technology. Of course, this does not indicate why such firms 
became more dynamic in the first place.
6.5.1.3 Maintenance and trouble-shooting capabilities
While most case study firms have relatively good in-house maintenance capacity, they have 
done little to develop this further or to move to implementing a more preventative approach 
to maintenance. As elsewhere, firms prefer to be self-reliant where possible both for routine
41 The remaining firms did not procure any equipment during 1991-1995.
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maintenance and one-off trouble-shooting. There are no sharp distinctions between the firm 
types, although the growing firms tend to have fewer in-house capabilities on average.
Given the age of much of the capital equipment in use, maintenance capabilities are of major 
importance to the smooth flow of production in Zimbabwean firms. It is surprising, 
therefore, that only four firms had established routines for preventative maintenance. The 
pattern amongst the rest was to fix breakdowns as and when they occurred. Half the firms 
indicated they would like to upgrade their in-house capabilities. There has been little change 
in this practise during the post-ESAP period.
A summary of maintenance related characteristics is presented in the following Table.
Table 6.14 - Firm Maintenance Characteristics42
■ Firm A B c ; ; D E : F : G H J K
routine for preventative ■ 
maintenance
X X X X
extent to which can maintain 
in-house1
ii i iii ii ii ii iii ii i iii
average % of machines 
breaking down in past year
60 40 17 15 20 5 40 4802 10 18
days production lost in past 
year
0 0 25 0 0 0 18 30 180 10
days lost per machine" 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.2 1.2 0.4 0.3
Note: 1 - i = oiling and replacing accessible items; ii = 1 +stripping most machines and replacing standard parts; iii = complete 
service/repair; 2 -100% would mean that each machine broke down once per year.
Source: Survey data
The definition of machinery “breakdown” is not necessarily consistent across the firms, 
which may explain some of the variation. Most of the firms which experienced breakdowns, 
yet had not lost production during the prior year, either used spare machinery,43 or worked 
overtime to make up for the lost days. With PLASTICO (H) running non-stop three shifts, 
its machines came under excessive stress which led to productivity losses. PLASTICO's 
computerised and automated machinery also requires longer repair time without adequately 
skilled in-house maintenance capacity.
42 It is difficult to rely too much on the breakdown data, as it is not clear that all respondents used the same 
definition of “breakdown” when responding.
43 Which must have taken time to set up and switch over to.
212
The firms were asked about their most recent technical problems and how these were solved. 
The main problems were quality of raw materials and skills-related problems. Materials 
problems were noticed more by firms trying to improve product quality, such as 
SOLIDCO (B), PUSHCO (J) and MONOPCO (K). In three cases, imports replaced locally 
sourced inputs of unreliable quality. As with technology choice aspects, most problems were 
solved in-house. Many skills problems were also quality related with management finding 
it difficult to get reliable output. Most firms suggested this issue was resolved by improving 
supervision and management. Training was not cited in this regard. This mix of skills 
problems and management-centred solutions was refered to more by the less dynamic firms, 
such as SANDCO, RENEWCO and DELAYCO. This is a possible indication that 
management skills inadequacies are at the core of the problems.
Overall, technology has not made a major contribution to firm dynamism or performance. 
This has not been assisted by the rather isolationist tendencies of many firms. Those firms 
which re-examined and appraised their technology in use more frequently in the past, have 
been better able to benefit from the trade liberalisation and to search for more appropriate 
technological solutions. This ties in with the similar analysis of investment patterns (see 
Section 6.3).
6.5.2 Case Study Firm Skills Portfolios
This section examines the present composition of the firms’ workforce, in terms of its 
distribution across various levels, to establish the basic pattern of skills distribution across 
the firms.
This subsection illustrates the wide variety in the stock of skills across the case study firms. 
By international standards, skills portfolios appear to be relatively weak. There is no relation 
between firms having higher skills stocks and being the most dynamic or best performers. 
Nonetheless, there are signs that skills are also relevant.
6.5.2.1 Employment Structure
Table 6.15 shows the percentages of production and total workforces for a number of skills
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categories, as reported by the firms.
The ES Census indicated a weak positive correlation between firms with higher skills, 
defined to include craft and technical skills, and growth in employment. There is no 
relationship between skills structure and any other performance measure. This seems to be 
borne out by the case study firms.
Table 6.15 - Skills Breakdown of Firms' Workforce
Firm
as % Production Staff
c D E F G H K
Unskilled/Semi-skilled 88 57 74 86 65 93 78
Apprentices 2 17 5 0 9 1 3
Artisans 5 17 16 7 20 5 6
Foremen/Supervisors 5 9 5 5 2 1 9
Technicians/Engineers .. 0 0 0 2 4 0 4
as % Total Staff
Foremen/Supervisors: 4 4 4 2 1 1 7
Managers 1 4 4 4 2 1 4
Source: Survey data
Note: The higher values in each skills area are highlighted in bold type.
Some of the less dynamic firms, including SANDCO, RENEWCO and DELAYCO, have 
relatively high craft skills on the shop floor. In addition to the artisans, only two of the 
foremen surveyed had completed apprenticeships. The percentages of the workforce with 
artisan qualifications in the lower skilled firms, therefore, is very low by international 
standards (see references in subsection 4.2,5.2 above). The employment of technical level 
skills (technicians and engineers) appears more closely related to firm size. This is borne out 
by the ES Census, which shows a 65-70 percent correlation between firm size and 
employment of graduate engineers, but no correlation between employment size and general 
manufacturing skills.
Some less dynamic firms (STATICO, DELAYCO and PLASTICO) are sparsely staffed at 
management and supervisory level. In the cases of STATICCO and PLASTICO, the figures 
do not include the entrepreneurs themselves, however, which increases the management 
percentages a little. These firm owners are not necessarily actively involved in managing
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production on a day-to-day basis.
6.5.2.2 Relative levels of experience
The above static picture suggests little about the quality of those filling the various positions. 
Through learning by doing, it is possible that longer serving workers had developed higher 
levels of firm-specific skills. However, younger and shorter-serving workers were likely to 
have been better educated. This subsection examines the experience gained from the existing 
job.
In Zimbabwe, there was a distinct pattern to firm tenure, as can be seen from the following 
table.44 Here, there is an obvious tendency for longer established and larger firms to have 
longer serving employees. In support of the value of learning by doing, the more dynamic 
firm MONOPCO (K) had the longest serving workers across the sample. The stagnant 
DELAYCO (G) also had a longer serving workforce.
Table 6.16 - Length of service in firm:
Firm
Years with the firm
A B c P E F G H J K
0 - 4 (% of workers) 88 53
4 -1 2 73 75 54 47
>12 56 53 47 79
Mean no. of years 2 7 10 7 9 13 15 7 12 17
Note: STATICCO (firm C) had a very even split across the three categories, with no age cohort having more than 40% 
Source: Survey data
SANDCO (D) and RENEWCO (E) are exceptions. In the former case, this is possibly due 
to some of the longest serving workers having been retrenched. Staff turnover in the year 
prior to the case study survey was highest for SANDCO and RENEWCO, at over 10 percent. 
For the other, which provided figures, the average was closer to 6 percent. While the reasons 
were mixed for SANDCO, in the case of RENEWCO, most of the losses were because 
workers resigned. Possibly this had something to do with the arrival of the new management 
team (see subsection 5.6 below).
44 To make the table easier to read, entries are only made where the percentages of workers falling into 
the category are greater than 40 percent.
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Semi-skilled workers tended to have been employed for significantly longer than unskilled 
workers across the sample as a whole.45 Without formal qualifications, most workers starting 
as unqualified workers tended to spend most of their careers as semi-skilled workers.46
Jones (1994) finds the average years of experience to be a key influence on firm productivity. 
This presumably embodies both workers' years in their present firm and their previous 
experience, although this is not made clear. Here the data are insufficient to make an
adequate comparison.
Overall from the evidence presented in this Section, there appears to be very limited 
association between in-firm experience and firm dynamism or performance. Even firms with 
a shorter average tenure of seven years are likely to have had workers with a good base of
firm-specific skills.
6.5.3 Educational and Experience Backgrounds of Workers
Before they begin work in a new firm, the potential of individual workers has been developed 
by three broad categories of experience. These are their educational background, pre-work 
vocational training and previous work experience (with any constituent training which may 
have been part of that experience). Data were collected in each of these areas, although the 
duration of vocational training and previous experience was not captured.
Few findings are clear in this subsection. Educational attainment is negatively correlated 
with length of service for the firm, and is not, therefore, directly related to dynamism or 
performance. Larger and more dynamic firms tend to recruit better educated workers, 
without emphasis on previous experience. Yet they employ workers for longer, so this does 
not show clearly when viewing averages across the firms. What appears more closely related 
to firm dynamism is the percentage of recruits with post-school vocational training.
45 While the mean for unskilled workers was 7.6 years (Standard deviation 6.3), that for semi-skilled was 
15.1 (8.7). The means for artisans and foremen were close to 10 years.
46 The large number of semi-skilled graded workers employed by MONOPCO, also influenced this 
pattern.
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6.5.3.1 Schooling and post-school vocational training
The Zimbabwean educational system experienced a major reform around the time of 
independence, as attempts were made to achieve rapid change fiom racial bias in favour of 
the minority, to conditions which now favoured the majority. In the rush to expand the scope 
and scale of post-independence education, quality may have decreased, in the short-term at 
least, while a new much larger generation of teachers was being trained. The youngest 
workers, serving for the shortest periods, may now have among the highest levels of
education.
While workers' age was not collected in the case study survey, those with less education had 
been working for longer. The correlation between years in education and years m the job is 
significant at -0.44, while that between educational qualification and years m the job is - 
0.56.47 Older workers with lower qualifications were less likely to move jobs voluntarily, as 
they would have had greater problems finding another position. This goes against the view, 
expressed above, that firms with longer serving workers might be more dynamic.
Table 6. i /  - Average cauuctuv
Firm
iidi nu
/ : A V; B 0 D E F ■ G H J K
Average years of schooling 11 9 9 11 10 10 9 8 10 10
% workers attaining higher 
than junior certificate
88 53 45 75 61 44 40 53 53 42
% workers doing training 
after school before taking up 
work1
63 36 27 17 23 44 40 21 26 42
% learning at least one 
technical subject at school2
100 67 82 75 62 78 73
H c ru  iln ti
79
n r r  P  -  tt-
79
ese incli
71
i d e
Source: Survey data
The correlation between qualification and job classification was 0.37. It was weakened by 
only 36 percent of semi-skilled workers having achieved higher than junior certificate (JC), 
while 52 percent of unskilled workers had. Due to legal difficulties in dismissing workers,
47 84 percent o f those working for more than 12 years have no more than 10 years of schooling, while the 
same figure for those working for four years or less is 14 percent.
48 See Chapters 4 and 7.
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established firms have long been unable to upgrade the educational attainments of their 
existing workforce, as the standard of education improved. Consequently, younger and better 
educated workers were often blocked from promotion by older, less educated workers.
The more dynamic firms YOUNGCO, SOLIDCO, QUALCO and MONOPCO represented 
four of the five with the highest percentage of workers with post-school vocational training. 
The other was the skills-intensive DELAYCO. In analysis of the RPED Ghana data, 
vocational training was found to be the only type of education with a significant impact on 
firm productivity (Jones, 1994). This was "despite the fact that workers with vocational 
training have less total years of schooling" (ibid: 19).49 Conversely in Zimbabwe those who 
had done post-school training spent longer than average in full-time education by 1.4 years, 
at 10.5 years versus 9.1 years for all workers.50
All findings in this subsection are somewhat tenuous. They rely on averaging the background 
of workers and making imputations from that average about firm performance as a whole.
Management skills are undoubtedly important and in part are likely to be related to the 
educational background of management (Wood, 1995). Regrettably the data collected on this 
matter are very tenuous, covering only half the firms. The more dynamic firms SOLIDCO, 
QUALCO and MONOPCO all have university graduates in scientific disciplines among their 
management teams, as well as others holding professional qualifications, such as, 
accountants.51 Firms YOUNGCO and RENEWCO on the other hand are run by managers 
holding technical diplomas at Higher National Certificate level.
49 Jones' work faced a number of methodological problems. The paper was based on the use of a modified 
Cobb-Douglas production function employing questionable assumptions, such as constant returns to 
scale, and which ignores the possible composition effects of different firms employing different mixes 
of workers at different levels. Nonetheless, she does try to control for the impact of worker effort, 
unionisation, R&D and product market structure, through the use of dummy variables.
50 The mean difference is significant with 99% confidence. This data is likely to include the workers' time 
in vocational training, for those who completed it on a full time basis, so it need not imply that 
schooling per se was longer.
51 In another survey three o f the top four performing firms had technically skilled managers (Latsch and 
Robinson, 1997:42).
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6.5.3.2 Previous work experience
Limited information is available on previous work experience, as outlined in Table 6.18 
below. Larger firms with more highly-skilled workers tend to take workers straight from 
school and develop their skills themselves, while smaller and less skills intensive firms, such 
as SOLIDCO, STATICCO and RENEWCO were more likely to take workers who have 
already gained experience at the appropriate level in other firms.
The number of times that workers have been unemployed is an indicator of the number of 
jobs they have had before.52 SOLIDCO, STATICCO and RENEWCO are among those 
employing workers with a greater range of previous experience.
Table 6.18 - Work and Unemployment Experience
Firm A B D E . F G H J K
% workers for whom present 
job is first
25 0 9 33 23 39 33 37 37 21
% workers joining from 
another firm at lower level
13 36 9 0 23 21 47 21 21 25
% workers joining from 
another firm at same level
38 36 46 42 39 33 13 26 11 38
average number of times 
workers have been 
unemployed
0.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.4
Note: 1 - Figures adjusted to average tenure of 10 years for workers across firms 
Source: Survey data
6.5.3.3 Recruitment Preferences
The education and experience requirements of firms have risen since independence. Six 
firms (almost all larger ones) suggested that required educational qualifications had risen in 
that period. Four (all are 'growing' firms) suggested that required levels of experience had 
risen. The finding supports the impressions in the above subsections of the relative 
importance of education to experience across the firms.
It is not a direct reflection, however, as workers may have moved directly from one job to another, 
without a period o f unemployment in between.
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Further confirmation of the pattern emerges from data revealing that the stagnant firms 
STATICCO and SANDCO required minimum experience qualifications for entry at unskilled 
and semi-skilled levels and no educational minimum. Both repositioning firms had 
minimum experience qualification, but specified O levels even for the most junior recruits.
This subsection suggests that studies which take years of education as a proxy for skills are 
oversimplifying the assumptions dramatically.53 Overall, there are some suggestions of 
association between workers' backgrounds and firm performance and dynamism, but it 
appears that what happens to the workers once they join the firms is of greater importance.
6.5.4 Training and Skills Development
This subsection examines the firms' stated training policies, the training they provide and the 
experience of their workers. This is linked to workers' perceptions of their recently acquired 
skills. Finally, evidence is assembled for the existence of institutional legacies and 
constraints in the firm-level training sphere.
Overall, it is clear that firm dynamism and higher productivity appear to be associated with 
greater training efforts. Other considerations, such as the quality of training, the credentials 
and authority of the trainers and the scope of the training are also revealed as important.
6.5.4.1 Firms’ approaches to training
Only the repositioning firms aimed to be active training organisations. They were the only 
firms to employ training specialists and to have training plans for the whole firm. QUALCO 
supplemented this with individual training plans for all staff.
There the resemblance ends, as QUALCO offered a narrower range of training. It did not 
support longer term training of any kind, whether apprenticeships or degrees. It will,
53 This is not to deny the importance of education on skills development and therefore productivity. It is 
more to suggest that while it may be necessary it is not sufficient. Knight and Sabot (1990) emphasise 
that the most important benefits o f education are that it “allows individuals to develop higher levels of 
cognitive skills, which are positively related to firm productivity. Workers who are more literate and 
numerate are more productive" (ibid.:23).
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however, refund costs to successful course participants on the commercial side of its 
operations. MONOPCO provides its staff with a comprehensive range of training 
opportunities.
In addition to these two firms, managers in two growing firms (SOLIDCO and PUSHCO) 
also indicated having annual performance reviews for their workers, at which training 
opportunities were discussed. Cross-referencing this to workers perceptions provides a 
different picture, however (see Table 6.19). The workers of SOLIDCO and MONOPCO 
recognised this process far more clearly than those of the firms QUALCO and PUSHCO. 
In these latter firms, management's intention to have the firm and its workers consider their 
training priorities on an annual basis is clearly not being effectively achieved.54
Table 6.19 - Workers' perceptions of firm training
Firm A B ' C l r D E F G H J K
firm indicates annual worker: 
training review1
X X X X
% workers with annual 
performance review2
13 64 27 0 39 29 20 16 16 79
% workers discussing i 
training at annual review
0 36 18 0 23 17 13 5 5 42
% of those then doing the 
training ; : i :  '
•• 50 50 0 67 0 0 50 80
% workers ever discussed 
training with manager/ 
supervisor
63 82 27 50 77 56 53 21 32 71
Note: 1 - response from managing director; 2 - responses from workers 
Source: Survey data
Discussing training, actually undergoing it, and successfully completing it, are all different 
things. The formal training review process does seem to play a role in ensuring that workers 
undergo the training discussed.55
54 There is no correlation between the job level of respondent and those indicating an affirmative 
response to training discussions.
55 While the percentages look satisfactory for the 'formal' firms, apart from MONOPCO, they only 
reflected one or two workers, which means the reliability o f these indicators must be questionable.
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Asked whether they had ever discussed training with their supervisors, many more workers 
gave positive responses, yet overall the pattern was not all that different,56 Three firms 
appear not to have encouraged discussions about training, namely STATICCO, PLASTICO 
and PUSHCO. PUSHCO ostensibly cultivates a learning approach in the firm, alongside its 
implementation of the KPS system. Yet it was found wanting on implementation,
6.5.4.2 Training experiences
This section provides evidence that an active approach to skills development, through greater 
volumes of training, appears to be associated with enhanced firm dynamism and higher 
productivity.
Table 6.20 shows the types of training, which workers said they had been exposed to since 
joining the firms.57 There are possible problems with these data. For example, longer 
serving workers may only have a poor recollection of the type of training they received when 
joining the firm.
Of the four firms, the three with the greatest number of workers undergoing formal training, 
namely SOLIDCO, QUALCO and (especially) MONOPCO, are the firms that emerged above 
as being the most organised in terms of training, and are among the most dynamic firms.
56 In cross-checking to see whether the same workers were those who had discussed training at annual 
reviews, as at any time, an anomaly emerged. Five of the 49 workers who had had annual reviews 
suggested that while they had discussed training then, they had not ever discussed training! This 
provides a limited amount of evidence to support the view that questions were not well understood.
57 This table excludes the current apprentices, the percentages of which are shown in Table 6.15. Those 
who have previously undertaken their apprenticeships though the firms are recorded under 'formal'.
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Table 6.20 - Workers1 participation in-house training
Firm
(% of workers)
A B C D E F G H J K
none 25 18 18 8 23 6 0 0 5 4
basic educational 25 9 9 0 0 17 13 0 5 29
on-the-job -9'. ' 50 73 82 75 69 72 87 95 95 58
formal1 25 36 9 42 31 39 27 11 32 63
% workers whose job 
classification upgraded since 
joining firm1
57 93 19 100 16 25 31 30 30 22
Note: 1 - includes short-term in-house and external courses and longer-term external training; 
Source: survey data
Statistically, there is a significant positive correlation of 0.78 (significant at 4 percent) 
between the percentage of formally trained workers per firm and productivity as measured 
by average net output per worker for 1994/95 (and also therefore with average 
wages/eamings - see 6.6 below). There is no significant correlation between formal training 
and growth in that productivity indicator.
The above picture says little about the timing or quality of training. Information was supplied 
by the production managers on the amount of training firms had conducted during the prior 
twelve months. In most firms this was very limited. Supporting the above impressions, 
QUALCO and MONOPCO were the only firms which claimed to have provided anything 
other than on-the-job training to unskilled and semi-skilled workers and artisans. A larger 
number of firms sent some supervisory staff on external short-course supervisory training.
6.5.4.3 Skills learned
It is difficult to establish a precise link between training volumes, scope and firm 
performance. Apart from problems inherent in this type of research, this is surely due in part 
to variations in the quality of training.
Apart from some of the supervisory training and the organisational training conducted by 
QUALCO and MONOPCO, the training was almost exclusively conducted in-house. Yet 
again, this reveals the insular nature of most of the firms. Conducting training in-house 
prevents the firms from extending their ranges of skills. While this may have been
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satisfactory in the past, this will not develop the necessary human resources required to 
enhance firm dynamism, in a more competitive economic environment.
Table 6.21 > Quality of instruction/Skills learned58
■■V;:: . - V. Firm S A :;v S ;B - :rc t E f  ; G H J K
% ori-the-job instruction by 
worker ait same level
25 25 22 11 22 38 15 0 22 7
Firm adopted multi-skilling1 X X X X X X X
% learned no new skills 38 55 27 42 54 6 13 26 42 13
% learned new production ' 
machinery : ^
25 9 45 50 23 56 47 63 16 54
% learned new maintenance 
practices
13 9 9 42 0 39 33 26 16 33
% learned new quality - - .. 
control practices ■ "
13 18 0 25 8 39 13 5 26 38
Change in semi-skilled 
workers' skills in last five 
years2 . . ;■ ;;
+ + = = - + = + n +
Change in artisans' skills2 + - = - + + + + +
Change in managers' skills2 ■ V + + = + + + = +
Note: 1 - response from managing director; 2 - also from MD = declined;"=” = no change; = improved 
Source: Survey data
Individual trainees had an awareness of skills acquired in the recent past (in this case 1994 - 
96). Managers also had an impression of how skills have changed. Table 6.21 provides 
indicators regarding these issues.
It is hard to obtain a precise indicator for the quality of instruction. It is possible, however, 
that although a worker at the same level may be in some sense the best guide, as they are 
doing the job all the time, they may not have a broader view of how the job fits into the work 
process as a whole. It is not surprising, therefore, that MONOPCO has one of the lowest 
figures for same level instruction. QUALCO, however, has the highest, which may call into 
question the quality of its on-the-job training.
58 In addition to the skills indicated in the table, a few workers in QUALCO and MONOPCO also 
mentioned learning communication skills, as part o f the introduction of new organisational methods. 
One or two other workers mentioned supervisory and management skills, while others mentioned 
computer skills.
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The patterns of newly acquired skills, as reported by workers themselves, especially the use 
of new machinery, reflects to some extent the pattern of adoption of multi-skilling. On this 
indicator of quality (i.e. perceptions of skills learned), the repositioning firms again 
performed best, followed by the higher skill utilising firms, SANDCO and DELAY CO. The 
exceptions are SOLIDCO and PUSHCO with high percentages of workers claiming that they 
had learned no new skills. This reinforces concerns about the quality of management of these 
firms. For SOLIDCO, this was especially problematic as management suggested skills had 
increased at all major staff levels.
Most firms were reasonably positive about skills improvements, except for STATICCO, 
SANDCO and RENEWCO. It appears that STATICCO and RENEWCO laboured under the 
delusion that other firms and institutions should do the training for them, especially the 
training of apprentices/artisans. Their management respondents were also under the 
impression that the quality of apprenticeship training elsewhere had declined. While this 
matter will be taken up in some depth in Chapter 7, here it should be noted that this reaction 
fits the emerging pattern of the less dynamic firms and managements.
6.5.4.4 Training and skills changes
The repositioning firms (QUALCO and MONOPCO) and several of the growing firms 
(SOLIDCO, RENEWCO, and PUSHCO) indicated they have introduced new or expanded 
training programmes during 1991-96. The new programmes included literacy training 
(MONOPCO), quality training (SOLIDCO and QUALCO), supervisory training 
(RENEWCO, PUSHCO and MONOPCO) and training alongside organisational changes 
(QUALCO, PUSHCO and MONOPCO). In general, however, the changes were minor; none 
of the firms appear to have reorganised their thinking on the types of skills required.59
The relatively higher frequency of attendance at formal training courses by workers in 
QUALCO andMONOPCO tends to support the positive emphasis on organisational training. 
It is disconcerting, however, that the figures, which were relatively high at 39 percent of
59 For Latsch and Robinson, the post-ESAP experience was worse: “training is not an area in which firms 
have responded to liberalisation... there is a general lack of interest in increasing investment in human 
capital” (1997:26).
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workers and 63 percent respectively for the two firms, were not higher. At PUSHCO, the 
KPS introducing firm, the figure of 21 percent is indeed cause for concern.
Multi-skilling and teamwork frequently were introduced together, as workers in teams could 
have replaced each other or supported each other within their team, as a result of sickness or 
more intense working periods. SOLIDCO and PUSHCO seemed somewhat vulnerable to 
doubts around the effectiveness of those changes they had introduced, as their workers did 
not seem to accord much recognition to skills improvements.
On the technical side, the major relevant change was the introduction of new machinery. 
There appeared to be little correlation, however, between those firms reporting new 
machinery as a technical change and those having the higher percentages of workers who 
acquired relevant new skills.
Looking at productivity improvement, there was some correspondence to productivity 
improvement measures. S ANDCO, for example, which introduced preventative maintenance 
practices, was also the firm which had the highest improvement in maintenance skills. There 
appear to be few easily discemable difference between the retrenching firms and non­
retrenching firms.
In summary, it emerges that of the more dynamic training firms, the repositioning firms 
(QUALCO and MONOPCO) appeared to have the better quality of training, while S ANDCO 
and DELAYCO focussed on maintaining their higher skills profiles. The former firms are 
amongst the more dynamic performers. This demonstrates that it is the ongoing development 
in scope and quality of skills, rather than the levels of skills employed, which provides a 
greater linkage with firm dynamism.
6.6 TREATMENT OF WORKERS
This section is the final area of inquiry into the relationship between the characteristics of the 
case study firms and their behaviour. The objective is to establish whether there are 
particular aspects of the ways that workers are treated within the firms, which influence the
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way that firms in general are performing.
There is an examination of a variety of matters relating to the way that workers are treated 
in each of the firms. These include the components of total remuneration, including basic 
wages, monetary and non-monetary benefits; structural influences within the firm, such as 
the existence of monetary rewards for performance, be they at the individual, or firm level; 
as well as, the status of the worker.60 Performance motivators also include non-wage 
benefits;61 performance rewards, like worker of the month and on-duty celebrations for 
breaking production records; and support for individual worker's training and skill 
development. Gender issues are not covered, as all except one of the production workers 
interviewed were male.62
Respect and trust issues within the firm are also examined. Respect includes supervisors 
allowing workers into their offices and inviting them to sit down. Trust is demonstrated 
when firms consult workers about changes in firm plans and practices, and provide workers 
with information about the firm, in terms of costs and other performance indicators.
Many of these matters relate to areas examined above. For example, it is a matter of trust 
whether in the preparation of and the communication about a corporate plan, workers are 
consulted. While management may have the skills to prepare a good and well-founded plan, 
without communication it becomes merely a motivator for management performance. 
Workers may be able to advance their skills through firm training programmes, but may be 
highly motivated to pursue their key areas of professional interest through external study. 
Whether the firm materially supports such worker initiatives, or not, will be likely to impact 
upon effort in the work place.
The Section also examines variations in collective bargaining structures between workers and 
management across the firms and the associated relation to firm performance and flexibility. 
Thus, the extent of unionisation and the role of the union, as well as of the workers'
60 Whether permanent, or temporary forms of employment contract.
61 For example, free or subsidised meals, transport etc..
f i l The only female was a packer, not a production line worker.
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committee are examined. This links to Chapter 7, which analyses how the broader sectoral 
and industry patterns of labour relations are changing and attempts to explain a number of 
institutional rigidities observed at that level.
6.6.1 Earnings: influences and impact
The national labour market in Zimbabwe at the time of ESAP had a history of regulation in 
both employment (numbers employed) and wages. As part of the package of shifts in 
economic policy, there was a sharp move away from this practice, especially regarding 
wages, with the stated objective of promoting the interplay of market forces in determining 
labour market outcomes (see GoZ, 1991).
The interest here lies in establishing to what extent there are rigidities in firm behaviour, 
which have constrained the response to shifts in the economic policy environment. There is 
complementary interest in understanding the various changes taking place within the firms 
and why some changes appear to be associated with improvements in firm performance while 
others do not.
Unlike in many of the above sections in this chapter, however, in labour markets the inherited 
constraints are not necessarily negative. A shift to full wage flexibility in a situation of high 
unemployment, as in Zimbabwe, for example, may lead to reductions in productivity as 
workers increase shirking and other forms of resistance within existing jobs, but cannot move 
to other jobs to improve their earnings.
Recent research in South Africa has examined notions of labour market flexibility, under 
three headings, employment (numerical), functional and wage flexibility (Standing et. al., 
1996). Functional flexibility has been examined in the above subsections on work 
organisation and skills. In this subsection, the focus is on examining whether there are signs 
of increasing employment flexibility and its impact on wage flexibility. Other factors 
affecting wage differentials and non-wage remuneration across the case study firms are also 
examined.
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6.6.1.1 Employment
Flexibility here alludes to the ease with which firms can replace their workers, in order to 
dispense with the services of unproductive or otherwise problematic workers for the firm, and 
to improve the quality of the workforce by recruiting more skilled or experienced individuals 
(as opposed to training them from within).
There has been a tendency for the status of workers to become more formalised within firms 
over time. Across the case study firms in 1996,13 percent of permanent workers had started 
as casual workers, while 16 percent started as contract workers.63 While both casual and 
contract workers had mostly started as unskilled workers, many had been upgraded since
. . . fi4joining.
Only four firms (MONOPCO, PLASTICO, RENEWCO and YOUNGCO), admitted to 
employing casual workers at the time of the survey.65 Firms increasing their total number of 
workers were the only ones which had seen the percentage of casuals increase since 1991. 
Some retrenching firms had used retrenchments to increase the percentage of contract 
workers, however. Most firms used casual and contract workers to increase their 
employment flexibility, as well as to try out workers without having to put them on full 
probation. This was attested to by the above-mentioned transition rates. The finding 
supports Velenchik's similar conclusion from analysing the larger sample of firms in the 
RPED data (1997:756).
On its own the present pattern of employment status across the firms appears to have little 
correlation with broad performance indicators. However, in SANDCO and DELAYCO 
about half the interviewed sample had started with those firms as either casual or contract 
workers, while the proportions for the more dynamic SOLIDCO and QUALCO were around 
17-18 percent. MONOPCO had an even lower percentage (13 percent). The implication of
Half of those starting as contract workers were now permanently employed. Only one presently 
employed casual worker Was included in the sample, so the figure for casuals would be meaningless.
64 There was no clear difference between the development patterns o f either group.
65 As noted in Chapter 4, casuals were not that popular a source of additional labour in Zimbabwe, since 
they had to be paid at least twice the minimum wage.
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this picture is that the more dynamic firms on average had a better quality recruitment 
process and a better quality workforce.66 Thus, these firms avoided wasting resources on 
training workers who did not remain with the firms for long.
6.6.1.2 Wages
Workers are motivated by a number of wage related factors. These include: real consumption 
wages; wage differentials between different groups of workers; and, the possibility of 
increased wages for increased responsibility and seniority.
Real Wages
Macro-economic and sectoral evidence suggests workers saw substantial declines in real 
consumption wages after the introduction of ESAP. This followed years of slower wage 
decline, after the initial post-independence boost (see Chapter 4).
Table 6.22 presents average levels and changes in average real wages. It is difficult to be 
categorical in making claims around the firm data due to uncertainties about data consistency 
over time.67
There is only a weak link between the observed changes in real wages and firm 
performance.68 The weaker firms were among those with the larger real wage decreases. 
MONOPCO seemed to be the odd firm, with a larger decline in productivity than in real 
wages. Much of the data runs counter to the orthodox economic rationale behind the ESAP 
changes. According to that, firm performance should have improved, partly as a result of 
unleashed market forces leading to declines in real wages.
66 This fits with the observation in Subsection 6.4, that these firms insist on a higher educational 
attainment amongst new recruits.
67 The forms sent to the CSO by the firms were filled in by different individuals in different years. It is 
clear in a number of cases that there were glaring inconsistencies in the way the forms were completed. 
Where these are most obvious, limited, well-supported corrections have been made. Where this is not 
possible, and the figures appear too inconsistent, data have been omitted.
68 Given the small sample size, there are no correlations of statistical significance with other leading 
performance indicators.
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The large variation in average real wage changes across firms indicates that the labour market 
in the sector was not operating on a competitive market-determined basis, even following the 
ESAP policy changes. The workers' own data, unreliable as these might be, reveal a similarly 
varied pattern across the firms. Similar differentials in average wage changes were seen 
between firms from 1986 to 1990.69
Table 6.22 - Annual change in average real consumption wages: 1990s70
Firm
% '
. C D E >' F ■ ?'■. G H K
Firms1 figs. - average growth4 -7.61
CMCD
Ttt -13.63 -4.93 -9.52 0.93 -1.42
Firms1 figs. - production workers only . . 0.9 -12.0 2.5 -5.0
Firms' figs - non-production workers .. -17.3 -18.1 -12.1 16.3 . .
Workers' figs - average growth 1991-1996s
CO> 3.5 -3.5 -4.8 5.6 2.1 -5.0
Wkrs' figs - non-promoted only -1991- 
1996s
-7.3 -5.9 -5.1 -6.5 1.6 -5.9
Firm average monthly wage (Z$) - 1994/956 1000 3350 1420 5000 2300 1960 5330
Firm production average (Z$) -1994/95® 2150 1130 3400 1370 . .
Worker's average basic wage (Z$) -1 9967 830 1960 1570 3160 3210 780 4100
Worker's average total earnings (Z$) - 
-,996s -■ * V --V i
960 2660 1720 4020 4780 1260 5340
Notes: 1 - from 1991/92 to 1994/95; 2 - from 1990/91 to 1994/95; 3 - from 1989/90 to 1994/95; 4 - Firms’ data is from 
submissions to CSO and is not necessarily constructed on a consistent basis; 5 -workers’ data is from workers' survey 
responses; 6 -1994/5 prices; 7 -1996 prices; 8 - ie basic wages, plus overtime and monetary benefits, before deductions 
Source: CSO unpublished and Survey data
The higher skills quotient and higher productivity level firms (SANDCO, QUALCO, 
DELAYCO and MONOPCO) were the higher average payers. Even among the seven firms 
listed there are correlations of 0.94 and 0.81 (significant at 1 percent and 5 percent 
respectively) between average wages in 1994/95 and 1996 and net output per worker in 
1994/95. The pattern was heavily influenced by the large values for QUALCO and 
MONOPCO's productivity levels. A fuller explanation for this pattern is developed in the 
following subsection on differentials.
The general fall in real wages over the period is supported by Velenchik's analysis of RPED
69 When average changes ranged from 9.5 percent, average annual increases for MONOPCO to an average 
decline o f 4.1 percent for PLASTICO.
70 The figures for the firm averages, include all employee related expenditures, including overtime and 
all other allowances. The figures for the production workers only do not include all allowances.
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data (1997). In trying to explain changing wage patterns, she examines firm differences. 
Firms may have a higher degree of unionisation, which changes wage patterns. Secondly, 
firms may pay ’efficiency wages, the faster growing firms needing to pay larger increases (or 
reduced decreases) to counter increasingly severe monitoring and incentive problems. 
Finally, firms may employ a rent-sharing approach, depending on the ability of firms to pay, 
such that as profits rise, firms "keep government happy" by increasing workers' wages. In 
Zimbabwe, given the general disregard shown by government for both the interests of private 
firms and unionised workers, the 'rent-sharing' thesis is implausible. Arguably, the first and 
the last of these explanations can be reduced, therefore, to the extent that workers in more 
unionised firms could put greater pressure on firms to share more of their profits (Konings 
and Walsh, 1994; Teal, 1995). The issue of the impact of unionisation will be examined 
below.
The 'efficiency wage' thesis is also problematic. For it to hold requires an assumption that 
employers calculate rationally how much to pay their workers to ensure that they attain a high 
nutritional status as a result of being paid higher wages. What does seem to be the case is 
that some firms pay relatively well. These firms have fewer workers resigning. The highest 
resignation rate of 9 percent between 1995 and 1996 was for RENEWCO, the firm with the 
largest decline in average real wages.71 The lowest resignation rate was for PLASTICO, the 
only firm to raise average real wages (notwithstanding that it pays close to scale minimum).
Wage Differentials
There are two sets of differentials. One is the set implied in Table 6.22, the differential 
between firms. Underpinning this is the changing differential between the average wages 
paid per firm and the minimum wage. The second is the differential between workers within 
the same firm. According to the orthodox expectations, labour market deregulation should 
narrow both of these to differentials that can only be explained by human resource 
endowments, which can be valued in the market. This subsection demonstrates that in spite 
of the changed policies, other factors are more important in explaining these differentials.
71 This disagrees with Velenchik's (1997) findings.
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In part, the differential across firms can be explained by variations in occupational levels 
employed, as well as differences in experience, education and many other components of an 
orthodox earnings function.72 However, this does not fully account for such differentials, 
as can be seen by examining the average wages for those with similar occupations, 
educational levels and years of experience across the firms.
Some examples of these differentials are given in Table 6.23. While the differentials on the 
occupational basis were large, up to 400%, they were smaller than the differentials on the 
basis of education and experience (neither of which are controlled for occupation). What is 
effectively being examined here is a form of earnings function for average workers of each 
firm, but the pattern indicates clearly that it is not just the level of education, or the 
occupational level of the worker which influences total earnings. There is clearly a firm- 
specific effect, which is of greater importance. Velenchik (1996), after a protracted attempt 
to control for allpossible explanations of wage differential, finds a premium, which remains 
firm specific.
Table 6.23 - Average Total Monthly Earnings: 1996
Firm
($'000)
A ; B C D E F G H J K
machine operator or 
welder/assembler
1.0 0.9 1.0 2.0 0.9 2.8 2.3 1.1 1.1 3.4
unskilled & semi-skilled worker 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.8 0.8 2.8 2.3 1.1 1.1 3.3
worker with O' Levels only 1.1 1.6 0.9 3.0 1.5 5.8 4.3 1.2 1.2 6.8
worker with <= 4 years 1.1 0.9 2.9 5.0 -. 1.0 0.9 ..
Note: blanks indicate insufficient data to give meaningful response 
Source: Survey data
The repositioning firms were paying significant premia to their workers. Lesser premia were 
also being paid to workers in the two stagnant firms, DELAYCO and SANDCO. The 
growing firms, were the ones with the lowest relative wages. The exception to this 
categorisation was STATICCO, which was paying very poorly and performing poorly as 
well.73
72 See Jones (1994) for an example of that type of analysis..
73 It should be recalled that this was the one firm, which was selected as the worst firm in its cluster, as 
opposed to the others, which were all selected as being the best in their respective groupings.
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After 1990, minimum wages were set as a result of a collective bargaining process, on a 
sectoral basis (see Chapter 7). The lowest agreed grade minimum for the engineering 
industry in 1995/96 was $3.28 per hour, at grade A1. In practice virtually all jobs in the 
industry were graded at a minimum of A2, for which the minimum was $3.64.74 On the basis 
of a 44 hour week, worked by much of the industry, this gave a basic monthly wage in 1996 
of approximately $640. Firm PLASTICO was the lowest paying, with many workers being 
paid at the scale minimum. Many other lower paying firms were still paying a premium to 
their machine operators/welders, with basic average wages of around $800.
A survey conducted by the NEC (National Employment Council) in 1994, which covered 25 
per cent of engineering firms, found that the margin above the scale minimum increased with 
occupational level.75 At A2 level only 23 percent of workers were being paid 30 per cent or 
more above the scale minimum. At skilled worker class 1 (journeyman) level, this proportion 
rose to 82 per cent. In the 1996 survey, conducted for this research, the proportion varied 
across the firms. Taking A3 as the average grade for machine operators and welders, only 
four firms paid these workers on average more than 30 percent above scale minimum. In the 
sample surveyed none of the six firms with artisans were paying them less than 30 percent 
above scale minimum.
The main conclusions to emerge from this subsection, are that two patterns are associated 
with firm dynamism, in relation to wages. Higher skills firms paid higher wages to all their 
workers, not just the skilled ones, while lower skills firms paid at or closer to the scale 
minima for their lower skilled workers, but had higher internal differentials for their few 
skilled workers. Furthermore, changes in labour market policy under ESAP had relatively 
little impact on wage flexibility in the metal engineering sector.
6.6.1.3 Other earnings related influences
There was a difference across firms in the margins between basic wage and total earnings.
74 See National Employment Council for the Engineering and Iron and Steel Industry (NEC), "Notice of 
Wage Adjustments, 1995/96", 4.10,95, Harare. This gives the full scale o f agreed minimum wages on 
an hourly basis, for both classes of skilled workers and graded jobs.
75 See confidential note from NEC, 1995.
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At the average level, this can be seen in Table 6.22 above. It ranged from 10 percent for 
RENEWCO to 62 percent for PLASTICO. The way that this difference was made up could 
have had considerable impact on the motivation and stress under which workers were 
working (as well as on intra-firm wage differentials).
The differences arose from three sources. These include additional wages earned through 
overtime; benefits with a financial implication, such as medical aid and pensions; and, 
performance bonuses, such as a monthly or annual bonus payment of some kind. Each of 
these is examined in turn.
This subsection reinforces the impression gained above, that the repositioning firms treat 
their workers considerably better than the other firms, while the stagnant firms tend to be 
worse, at least in terms of overtime.
Hours worked and Overtime
Hours worked on average, as well as overtime hours and earnings, are indicated in Table 
6.24. The stagnant firms S ANDCO and DELAYCO show relatively high levels of overtime. 
This is likely to indicate management weakness, or reluctance to take on new staff, having 
already gone through retrenchment exercises. Workers in those two firms are likely to have 
been working under greater stress than in other firms, which may account for their relatively 
poor performance. This assumes, of course, that the overtime data are not simply a reflection 
of a cyclical or short-term phenomenon.
In South Africa, a recent study concluded that working time arrangements had become quite 
rigid (Standing et al., 1996:349). There, production workers in metal/engineering firms 
worked an average of over 23 hours per month overtime in 1995. This compares with the 
even longer overall average of about 28 hours among the case study firms in Zimbabwe. If 
this were an established norm in Zimbabwe, there is a strong case for the reduction in the 
working week introduced in South Africa in 1997.76 This would compel firms to consider 
taking on additional workers, rather than forcing existing workers to work additional hours,
76 The Basic Conditions o f Employment Act 74 of 1997, included a reduction in the normal working week 
to a maximum of 45 hours with an overtime maximum of ten hours per week.
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when they are stressed, tired and not at their most efficient. Many workers have no doubt 
also become dependent on the considerable overtime wages they earn regularly. Reducing 
their overtime may lead to demands for higher basic wages in compensation.
Table 6.24 - Hours worked and overtime earned 1996
Firm A B ce: \  d E : G H J K
Average hours worked per 
day \
9 8.3 9 9 9 9 9 8.3 9 8.8
Average monthly overtime 
hours (prior 3 months)
0 3 14 23 9 9 44 71 39 15
Percentage of respondents ; 
working overtime
0 8 36 42 62 33 93 100 79 50
Average overtime earnings 
per worker as % bf basic 
wage
0 2 12 21 4 6 37 58 19 12
Capacity utilisation (%) - - 83 50 60 97 71 100 - 77
Source: Survey data
Other benefits and bonuses
The benefits pattern tends to follow the wages pattern, with higher paying firms also 
awarding higher percentage benefits. Across the ten case study firms, there is a correlation 
of 0.81 (significant at 1%) between the percentage of benefits and the level of the basic 
monthly wage.
This may have arisen as a legacy of the wage controls of the 1980s. The set ceilings (as well 
as floors) were incentives for firms, that wished to pay higher wages, to load some of the 
extra wages into benefits packages (Kanyenze, 1993). Furthermore, before independence, 
due to racism or paternalism, higher grade (mostly white) workers were paid higher benefits 
as well. The legacy of that era was still apparent in the wage structure of the case study 
firms. Finally, loading the remuneration with benefits meant that employment costs were 
substantially lower when casual workers were engaged.77
77 This pattern was also found in South Africa - see Standing et al. (1996:342). The workers' data from 
the case study firms did not reveal a significant difference between benefits to the contract workers, and 
to other unskilled workers in the sample. Unskilled workers as a whole seemed to receive considerably 
fewer benefits than other workers.
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6.6.1.4 Other income earning activities
Workers were asked whether they had received any money for tasks performed outside the 
firm, as well as whether they performed any income earning activities outside the firm.78 
There is likely to have been a significant underestimation by respondents. With high rates 
of disappearance of tools and small pieces of equipment from most of the firms, workers 
found to be doing something akin to their occupation, e.g. welding, in private, would fall 
under immediate suspicion as to how and where they had procured their equipment. Thus, 
while it was more likely in principle that in the lower wage firms, more workers were 
supplementing their income in the evenings and at weekends, they were less likely to admit 
to it in firms where management displayed greater suspicion and accorded low trust to 
workers.
There are many additional reasons why responses may have varied. These relate to the 
workers’ particular circumstances, especially the number of dependents and demands 
resulting from extended family obligations.
This difficulty in interpreting the data manifests itself in a lack of association between 
responses and firm types. Many workers (at least 43 percent overall) were conducting non­
firm commercial activities. Some of these may have been stuggling to survive on their 
primary job earnings. Others may have been using suiplus income to accumulate other 
assets, for example, those related to farming. It was not clear whether the frequency of such 
'outside' activities was increasing. Although this requires further research, there is little doubt 
that while many of the organisational changes in the firms were exerting greater stress, at the 
same time as managers were expecting more effort for lower real wages, the impact on 
individual workers was adverse.
6.6.2 Non-fmancial Performance Motivators
Wage conditions were not the only problem felt by the surveyed workers. When questioned 
what they liked best about working for their firms, 26 percent of workers said "nothing", and
7 0
A much higher positive response to the latter question was curious, given the similarity of the two 
questions.
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another 17 percent said that they had a job (at all).
A number of non-wage features of the work environment may have had a major impact on 
workers' incentives, as well as creating an efficient working environment. Some of these 
pertain to respect and trust, both of which will be examined in the following subsection.
In this subsection, the focus is on rewards and other features of the job situation itself. These 
include examining allowances for annual, sick and compassionate leave; recognition rewards, 
like worker of the month/year and in-company performance celebrations; and links back to 
the responsiveness of the firm to individuals' requests for training. The availability of breaks 
during the day and subsidised meals also varied. This revealed little additional insight into 
firm differentiation.
6.6.2.1 Health and Leave
Higher funeral attendance rates may have been seen in some firms than others due to the 
often-found practise in Zimbabwe of employing many related workers. While there may 
have been good reasons for this (see Cheater, 1992b), it did mean that larger numbers of 
workers were likely to be absent for the same funerals. This policy was reported as having 
been followed by SANDCO, which proved to have among the highest rates of funeral 
attendance (see Table 6.25).
In all firms, managers suggested that unauthorised absenteeism was minimal, but noted there 
had been an increase in the numbers of days in which workers were taking sick leave. If 
there were significant differences between firm averages, this is likely to indicate something 
about the workplace itself.
There was considerable variation both within and between firms on most indicators in Table 
6.25,79 As a result the differences are rarely statistically significant. The above impression 
of higher worker stress in DELAYCO due to the disparity between overtime and capacity 
utilisation, is reinforced by a number of problems relating to attendance for that firm.
79 Data were also collected on frequencies of headaches experienced by workers and numbers of accidents 
in the workplace. Neither of these indicators revealed anything of significance.
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Table 6.25 - Days off and other health matters (per worker) -1996
Firm A ; b C 0 ; E F G H J K
average number of funerals attended 
in last 6 months
1.9 0.5 0.3 1.8 1.2 0.6 1.9 0.8 1.1 0.7
% workers taking sick days in past 
three months
25 27 36 50 23 33 53 32 37 52
average days annual leave2 19 20 19 17 19 21 18 17 23 21
average days away from workplace in 
past year1
28 23 23 28 24 24 30 20 29 27
Note: 1 - sum of annualised days sick and funerals (one day assumed per funeral), plus paid leave; 2 - average of estimate 
by responding workers 
Source: Survey data
Although the evidence is not absolutely clear, it appears that at the margin, there may have 
been a differential impact on productivity as a result of the past treatment of annual leave and 
health matters. Pressure on workers in the form of limiting annual leave, not allowing them 
to attend funerals, or take sick leave did not necessarily result in their being more productive.
6.6.2.2 Recognition, rewards and celebrations
This topic has already been discussed under subsection 6.3.1 above, with respect to the 
relationship between recognition for suggestions made and moves to introduce new 
management techniques. Awards like worker of the month and year are not only related to 
the changes in production organisation, however. They can, if  well used, be a source of 
motivation and recognition for outstanding work within the firm. Larger firms, which 
generally had more reward schemes, appeared to extract some benefit at a collective level. 
It is not clear in most firms, however, that any award provided a serious work motivator on 
its own.
There seems to have been little correspondence between the fact that workers in some firms 
provided responses suggesting they were less happy, and that those firms were less 
productive or dynamic. Nor does it seem to be the case that most firms' practices changed 
significantly over the five years after ESAP, except that, if anything, there was a move away 
from some of the reward schemes by some of the smaller firms.
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A better indicator of and link to poorer firm performance is a negative incentive mechanism. 
Over 20 percent of workers across the firms had put in requests for training which had been 
turned down. This proportion seems to be better correlated with the stagnant firms, being 
joined by YOUNGCO, where about 40 per cent of their workers suffered this type of 
disappointment. It is not clear how this changed over time, as workers tried to improve their 
skills or their opportunities in an increasingly competitive labour market.
Indeed, the patterns of change in all of these non-income related motivational areas were not 
clear. The appearance was, however, both in Section 6.5 above and here, that there was no 
coordination between changes in organisation and technology and the various types of 
remuneration and reward structures instituted by the firms.
6.6.3 Respect and Trust
In the case study firms being examined, after 16 years of independence, the senior 
management in each was still predominantly white. Of the interviewees, two of the 
production managers in two of the larger firms were black, but all the chief executives were 
white. As observed in Section 6.2 above several indigenous or black owned firms appeared 
in the ES Census but, with a few notable exceptions, they were at the smallest end of the 
metals sector. Consequently respect and trust issues would easily be tinged with racial 
overtones.80
6.6.3.1 Matters of respect
Some rough proxy indicators of the extent to which employers respect their employees are 
given in Table 6.26.
Across all the firms, the frequency of the offer of a chair in the production manager’s office 
rose sharply with job classification, from 34 percent amongst the unskilled workers to 100 
percent amongst the foremen and supervisors. There were some firm specific differences as
on
A number of management respondents were overtly racist and patronising in their attitudes. A number 
of worker respondents complained about racism in their firm's management as well. These matters are 
explored to a limited extent later in the section.
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well. For example, in two of the stagnant firms, S ANDCO and DELAYCO, a significant 
number of workers in each case suggested they were not allowed to enter the production 
manager's office. More than half of these respondents were artisans. A number of others in 
many of the larger firms said they had never been to the production manager's office.
Table 6.26 - Treatment with respect
■ ''’-• ■Firm'; B C D ; EE : f  ; G H J K
% workers offered chairs in 
production manager’s office
63 91 46 33 46 50 47 42 47 50
% workers sharing toilet with 
supervisor • , ■
63 82 64 33 69 39 73 53 95 67
% workers talk to production 
manager about work .'•••• 
problem
25 18 0 17 15 33 7 21 21 17
% workers talk 1o 
supervisor/manager about 
personal problem;
38 73 36 25 15 50 27 26 53 71
% taking part in firm 
sport/social activity in 
previous year
25 36 36 0 8 61 20 0 58 58
Source: Survey data
The pattern of respect changes depending on the indicator being examined. The firms which 
appear most frequently in the top four according to each indicator may be regarded as having 
had relatively high respect for their workers. On this basis SOLIDCO (B), QUALCO (F) and 
PUSHCO (J) emerged as the best firms, with MONOPCO just behind. These indicators do 
not merely correspond to the size of the firms.
The firms which introduced the more far-reaching organisational changes, therefore, were 
also those with better methods of showing respect. It is not clear, however, whether these 
firms had better respect relations and thus found it easier to introduce the organisational 
changes, or whether the organisational changes led to an improvement in intra-firm respect. 
The type of regard for workers which is embodied in higher levels of respect would not 
appear to be easily changed, so the former sequencing is preferred. It is still not clear, 
however, how some firms developed these higher respect relations.
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6.6.3.2 Trust
A wide number of indicators could be used to establish the extent of trust relations within the 
firms. For the sake of brevity, two are selected. These pertain to the levels of consultation 
concerning change which take place within the firm and the provision of information on firm 
performance (see Table 6.27).
The trust information is linked to the consultation concerning production matters outlined in 
Section 6.4.1 above and represented in Table 6.27. The picture which emerges here is 
similar, albeit more alarming in revealing the degree to which the firms did not consult and 
trust their workforce. Omitted from the Table was the complete absence of consultation with 
workers in any firm on decisions to introduce new technologies. Here, more clearly even 
than above, unlike QUALCO (F) and MONOPCO (K), SOLIDCO (B) appears as the 
outstanding firm. This latter firm was not affiliated to a TNC group, and was not particularly 
large. Its high levels of respect and trust relations perhaps had more to do with the 
personality and background of the owner and managing director, than anything else.
Table 6.27 - Trust Indicators
Firm, a ■ B C D E F G H J K
% workers having discussed: ? 
health and safety with.; 
manager/ supervisor
100 91 73 67 69 83 80 68 74 79
Firm consults below manager 
level in corporate planning
X X
Firm consults workers in 
deciding to change production 
organisation
X X
% workers being given regular 
information on sales ,
0 55 0 17 15 17 13 9 21 54
% workers being given regular 
information on labour 
productivity
38 73 45 33 23 67 20 9 47 75
Source: Survey data
While in all firms workers were aware of more information on labour productivity than on 
sales, the gap between the two was highest in the repositioning firms. In these latter cases, 
both firms appeared to be aware that their workers would benefit from access to productivity 
information. Both firms were working towards the production of up to the minute
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information on individual productivity to tie in with requirements of their performance bonus 
schemes. They were not, however, so imbued with the necessity of letting their workers 
understand how well the firm was performing financially.81 The bonus schemes may have 
served to distract workers further from focusing on firm sales and profitability as a basis for 
their bargaining strategies.
Overall, it appears firms can be dynamic and perform well with or without good/effective 
respect and trust relations. Yet, firm specific differences in the patterns of these relations did 
have behavioural consequences. While the repositioning firms rated higher overall, they did 
so in ways that were not a threat to management autonomy. SOLIDCO appeared more 
genuinely inclusive. The 'stagnant' firms tended to have lower rated trust relations. Better 
performance on these indicators does appear to be a requirement for firms to manage 
organisational change effectively. Underlying the indicators presented here are the attitudes 
of employers towards their workers.
6.6.4 Workers' Collective Representation
Chapter 7 explores the efficiency of the workers and firms' representative bodies and how 
they attempted to respond to changes in economic policy and the macro-environment. This 
subsection examines the representation of workers at the level of the individual firm and its 
correspondence with firm behaviour and performance. Overall, there is little evidence 
revealing any influence of unionisation on firm dynamism and performance.
In bringing about the changes in production organisation and technology examined in the 
above subsections, management in most firms were of the view that they had consulted with 
workers, directly or through the workers’ committees about the details of implementation 
(more so for the organisational changes). Management did not consult widely with workers, 
however, before deciding to introduce change. Furthermore, there were no instances of the 
union having been involved. Indeed the only reference to the union was regarding the 
resolution of labour disputes, for example, when workers were attempting to gain redress for 
unfair or wrongful dismissal.
81 MONOPCO is a public company and its semi-annual sales figures are easily available from the statutory 
reports the firm must make in the press.
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Information on the degree of unionisation of the case study firms, as well as worker 
committee representation is presented in Table 6.28. The table shows a considerable range 
in the degree of union penetration between firms.82
The percentage of unskilled, semi-skilled workers and foremen/supervisors who were union 
members was significantly higher at over 60 percent, than the percentage of artisans (40 
percent). With higher union membership among lower skilled workers, membership was 
lower in firms with higher skills. There appeared to be no tendency for workers to leave the 
union, as they increased their skills or seniority.
It appears most likely that membership of a union reflected a desire to increase wages. The 
larger, better paying firms, such as QUALCO, DELAYCO and MONOPCO, were among 
those with lower proportions of members (see Table 6.28). Indeed, there is a weakly 
signficant negative correlation of -0.65 (significance 0.1) between the level of unionisation 
in 1996 and average total earnings per worker per firm.83 There is a similar correlation with 
average growth in real wages during the 1990s.
Across the sample of workers, at all job classification levels, union members earned 
somewhat less than non-members. For most job classifications, there were no significant 
differences between the mean wages of union members and non-members, with only the 
semi-skilled workers non-members having a significantly higher wage at a 7 percent 
significance level (according to t-tests).
Workers' committees played a vital role in internal firm communication, with respondents 
in most firms citing the workers' committee as the main source of information about the 
changing plans for the firm. The suggestion that there may have been conflicts between the
82 Furthermore, it shows a much higher level of membership than that shown by the union’s own records. 
This could mean that there was an over-representation of union members among those surveyed, despite 
efforts to ensure randomness. Alternatively, it could mean that, while from the union viewpoint those 
not paying dues were no longer considered members after some time, the individual workers still 
considered themselves members.
Although this is partly explained by occupational structures, due to some firms paying higher than 
others for the same skill level/position, the correlation between unionisation rate and job classification 
across the firms is not significant.
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union and workers’ committees is not supported by the data84. Union members were more 
likely to be members of the workers' committee, with 33 percent of union members also 
workers' committee members, while only 19 percent of non-union members were on workers' 
committees. Nonetheless, the workers' committee may have achieved prominence at the 
expense of the union.
Table 6.28 - Union and Workers Committee Membership -1996
■ Firm B D . . ■ F\,. G H J K
% workers who are now 
members of the union
38 82 91 50 77 56 53 47 63 38
% other workers who were * >: 
previously members of the 
union
38 9 0 17 0 33 34 18 0 25
NEWU estimate of % union; 
membership2 ?
95 27 47 44 4 19 57
% workers taking part in 
industrial action
0 0 18 0 92 6 33 11 21 38
% respondents who are 
members of the workers v  
committee
1 46 36 42 46 17 27 21 21 21
Note: 1 - Firm A is so small it does not have a workers' committee. The managing director talks directly to all workers in an 
open meeting when needs arise; 2 - taken from NEWU computerised membership records (Jan 1996) - see note in Chapter 
3 above
Source: Survey data
The weakness of the union at firm level is further endorsed by the lack of association 
between the percentages of workers having engaged in industrial action and union 
membership. In all cases the incidents were relatively minor and mostly happened some time 
ago.85 While fewer than 10 percent of workers starting with their present firm during the 
prior four years had been involved in such activities, almost half of those working for more 
than 18 years had been involved.
The main question of interest here is whether there was any influence on firm dynamism and 
performance to be found in the degree of unionisation. The correlation between unionisation
84 See Chapter 4 and 7.
85 The most recent incidents, within the previous three years, involved protests about non-payment of 
bonuses. Workers in RENEWCO were upset that management would not address them to explain why 
they were not being given a bonus. Workers were locked in the plant and eventually the police were 
called in by management and broke up the demonstration. In DELAYCO, some workers refused to 
attend a long service awards ceremony and downed tools at their machines for a few hours.
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and productivity as measured by average net output per worker is -0.67 (significance 0.1). 
This is the corollary of the positive association between wage and productivity levels shown 
in 6.6.1,2 above. It appears that due to the limited strength and influence of the union, it was 
difficult for workers to push for higher wages in low productivity firms.
Moll's (1993) work on South Africa in the 1980s revealed a significant union-wage effect, 
especially for unskilled workers in the form of wage compression across skill levels, which 
was also similar to patterns observed in the advanced capitalist countries. In Zimbabwe, 
under the post-ESAP regulations the unions negotiated the minimum wage for each sector, 
which then became legally binding on all registered firms. Indicative of the union's 
weakness, firms which were more unionised did not exhibit higher wage increases.
There is a hint of a positive association between the extent of unionisation and dynamism as 
reflected by growth in both gross and net output productivity indicators of the case study 
firms during the 1990s, although these are of no statistical significance. From the ES Census, 
the only correlations of significance are weak indicators of negative association between 
higher percentages of unionisation and slower growth in sales and employment. This might 
relate to the connection between high unionisation with lower wage-lower skill firms, which 
are less dynamic and are therefore growing more slowly. This pattern was not borne out by 
the case studies, however.
In summary, differing degrees of union membership in firms do not appear to exert a major 
constraint or influence on performance or on the ability of firms to change and adapt to 
change. Most probably this is explained by the weakness of the union. This is explored 
further in the following chapter.
6.7 CONCLUSIONS - PUTTING THE FIRMS TOGETHER
In this section, two of the core themes of this research are addressed. By examining the 
structural and behavioural characteristics of each firm holistically, an attempt is made to 
understand how institutional inheritances and legacies affect individual firms differently, 
constraining some from changing and yet facilitating change in others. The next step is to
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understand how different changes adopted by the firms have affected their performance. 
Subsequently, in the conclusion to the whole thesis (Chapter 8), this assessment becomes part 
of an examination of lessons to be learnt, from Zimbabwe's experience, about the response 
of firms to the type of changes in economic policy brought in under ESAP.
ESAP was predicated on the belief, in keeping with its underlying orthodox theoretical 
perspective, that years of protection and a controlled economic policy framework had led to 
the development of largely uncompetitive and inefficient manufacturing industries in 
Zimbabwe. A number of studies had suggested that not all industries were totally inefficient 
and beyond hope (including World Bank 1987, 1990).86 With the right policies in place they 
would thrive. Under a programme of market oriented economic policy shifts, even relatively 
efficient firms would be encouraged to become more so. The swift opening up of the 
economy under ESAP was expected, therefore, to lead to a rapid and significant process of 
change in Zimbabwean industries.
This chapter has revealed how the case study firms fared in the period after ESAP was 
introduced. Some firms appeared hardly to notice changes in their economic environment, 
while others attempted to transform themselves. Characteristics, such as age, size, skills, and 
product types were mixed across the firms. One evident characteristic, however, is that the 
most dynamic repositioning firms were both subsidiaries of trans-national corporations 
(TNCs). Furthermore, the existence of close ties to foreign firms does not have the same 
impact on introducing and managing change as actual participation in the TNC structure 
itself.87
The behavioural changes have had varying impacts. The results have not always been in line 
with what was intended by the firms' owners and managers, and the performance impact has 
not always been beneficial. In part, this is due to the persistence of a number of institutional 
legacies. These have constrained and guided the actions of firms in much more complex 
ways than those predicted by orthodox theory, with its simplistic behavioural assumptions.
]j£
See critiques of these studies in Chapter 4.
87 DELAYCO, for example, had licenses for local production or joint ventures with foreign firms in the 
past.
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Resistance to change appears from a number of internal sources, including managers who are 
used to certain practices, which may involve directive, if not dictatorial, relations with their 
subordinates and who may resent shifting to types of organisation where they are expected 
to consult and listen to the same workers. Workers may resist changes which increase their 
stress levels or reduce their opportunities to take breaks, without increasing remuneration.
The greater dynamism of some firms appears to be related, in part, to the nature of internal 
agency within firms' ownership and control structures, as outlined in Section 6.3. Such 
explanations provide only a motivational basis for dynamism, however. Managers and firms 
then need specific capabilities to be able to effect changes successfully. It is evident that the 
reasons that some firms are more or less dynamic are complex. This means that an 
examination of relative price changes and crude firm efficiencies, for example, in terms of 
domestic resource costs, is not an effective basis for any estimate of which firms are going 
to make a more dynamic effort to survive and grow, following the changes in their economic 
environment.
While it appears the stunted firms were mostly interested in corporate survival, it is not clear 
that they had any idea how to achieve this. So, they battened down to face the storm of 
increased competition, with minimal investment and a lack of new product development. 
There is no easy answer as to why these firm were less dynamic than the others. In part it 
seems to be due to a lack of serious commitment and enthusiasm for sorting out the problems 
of the business in a more proactive and positive manner. Again, this appears to be related 
to the nature of agency in individual firms. STATICO for example, has directors who are 
physically removed from the site of production and seem to have other interests, which may 
be more rewarding and remunerative. The lack of dynamism also seems related to other 
structural characteristics, for example, the respective management teams' level of education, 
experience and amount of training.
6.7.1 Changes in Firm Behaviour
From the evidence it seems that, in terms of the extent of change they are implementing, 
together with the more effective implementation of those changes, the more dynamic firms 
are not necessarily those which employ the highest skill levels or are the best trainers. They
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do, however, tend to maintain more successful respect and trust relations within the firm and 
also have better paid and motivated workers.
Generally, there was a lack of.technological solutions adopted by firms implementing cost- 
cutting strategies. The repositioning firms employed higher percentages of workers with 
post-school vocational training. They were also the most organised firms in their approaches 
to training. They put far higher percentages of their workers through formal courses, than 
other firms did. A number of firms, including both repositioning firms, introduced a 
comprehensive package of changes, including many NMTs (see Section 6.4). The 
repositioning firms, which were larger and had greater access to external sources of advice 
through their international groups, were more successful at implementing these changes.
6.7.2 Performance Outcomes
It is not clear yet whether the change oriented, dynamic firms performed better after ESAP. 
Indeed, it is difficult to know when is the right time to appraise the impact of changes in firm 
behaviour. Without sound counterfactuals, which are problematic to construct, it is doubtful 
whether such an analysis can ever be convincingly conclusive.
For example, the outcome of the organisational changes was uncertain. In a number of firms, 
such changes served to expose workers to further stress. For example, MONOPCO removed 
a layer of supervisors and increased the supervisory and quality control responsibilities of its 
remaining production workers. While these workers were being paid well above the industry 
minimums, and the rates offered by most other firms, there was no compensating increase 
in wages for the new responsibilities.
The growing and repositioning firms, in many cases, saw productivity dip relatively after the 
introduction of changed practices. The greater the changes in a firm, the greater the 
likelihood of significant short-run costs. However, the retrenchment and down-sizing of the 
repositioning firms, painful as it was to the particular workers involved, maybe less worrying 
if those firms become able to grow and develop more in the future. As a result, this research 
placed greater emphasis on firm dynamism, than short-term improvements in performance.
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There is no support from the data for any conclusion that the reduction of real wages, one of 
the corner-stones of the structural adjustment approach, had a beneficial impact on 
performance. Despite evidence of wage flexibility in the labour market as a whole, some 
firms continued to pay higher wages. Indeed, those firms which paid more highly and which 
offered a range of supporting rewards, including more training and better respect and trust 
relations, were among the most dynamic firms. While the highest productivity firms were 
among the higher payers, the lower paying firms had higher measured productivity growth 
in the post ESAP years. However, this was partly due to the impact of retrenchments. At the 
same time, the firms with the largest falls in real wages (although not necessarily the lowest 
paying), were also among the firms with the steepest declines in productivity.
6.7.3. Explanations of the Differences
The major strategic and behavioural differences were between the growing and repositioning 
firms and the stunted firms. The latter firms were less prepared (and able) to confront the 
need to change and constructively revise their approach to the businesses they are in. They 
were among the firms doing less training; where skills improved less; and, where there was 
less consultation between the workers and their supervisors on the technical side. These 
differences are not obviously related to differences in performance.
There is no linear relationship that can easily detect the best from the worst firms. There 
appeared to be something more pessimistic and resigned in the management attitudes in the 
stunted firms than the others. It is not clear that this was a primary cause of the lack of 
dynamism, however. It may have been a consequence, rather, of the lack of change in those 
firms, in the face of changes in the wider economy, and a feeling that they were falling 
behind. Inadequate information was available to link this point specifically to the capacities 
of the management teams, although it does appear that the stunted firms were among those 
with smaller management teams proportionately, who perform only moderately on various 
management capacity indicators. Over all, the 'stunted' firms lacked any sense of distinction. 
They were not the best at anything.
For the core argument of the thesis, it is sufficient to note that there were substantial 
structural and historical differences between firms, which influenced the various approaches
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taken by firms after 1990/91. Consequently, it was a far more complex myriad of interacting 
factors than relative price shifts and the tradeability of different product segments, that 
influenced which firms were likely to adapt to and survive the recent shifts in economic 
policy. The behavioural assumptions underlying the policy changes are not evident in the 
patterns of behaviour actually observed in the case study firms.
Finally, the value of the typology of firms in explaining the situation of firms is examined. 
It seems that while there are many reasons why firms of each type are differentiated from one 
another within the groups, the typology does provide a way of indicating that some firms are 
changing in a more dynamic way and performing better than others. Explanations can then 
be built around that pattern, rather than on a purely firm specific basis.
Firms, once located within a particular type, are not doomed to be there for ever. It is quite 
likely that at certain times in the earlier lives of the 'stunted’ firms, they would have fitted into 
one of the other categories. What is of great interest is how firms change over time and shift 
from one category to another. Managers and owners, who are wholly committed to their 
firms one day, maybe distracted by more lucrative or rewarding activities elsewhere the next. 
In order to explain this complexity more fully, more detailed case study research into the 
histories of individual firms and capitalists would be required.
251
252
7. THE DYNAMICS OF NON-FIRM INSTITUTIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses changes in public and private organisational support for industrial 
development during the five years following the introduction of ESAP. Lessons from the 
East Asian countries and elsewhere (see Chapter 2 above), point to the importance of 
competent organisational support for industrial development. This can assist firms in their 
efforts to develop export markets, access new technologies and increase their skills base. 
Much of the relevant literature, however, is not clear about the determinants of such 
organisations' capabilities and how to strengthen them in situations where they are weak. 
One way of addressing this question is to examine in detail the dynamic determinants of the 
relative effectiveness of organisations supporting industrial development.
It is also suggested that having active and responsive unions and employers' organisations 
may assist in setting better standards across sectors and in promoting better respect and trust 
relations within firms. From the firm case studies, these emerge as important influences on 
corporate success (to varying degrees - see Section 6.5). There are arguments in favour of 
'voice' regulation, as a way of avoiding the excesses of either government or market 
regulation. "The institutions of Voice Regulation must be inclusive in character and they 
must be balanced." (Standing et. al., 1996:10). Accordingly, there is a detailed investigation 
of changes in labour market institutions, to establish in which way they have changed and 
whether their effectiveness has improved.
Industrial 'support' organisations do not exist independently from their members or clients. 
Member and client involvement with, and responsiveness to, organisations will affect how 
strong the organisations become and how well they perform. It is argued that the legacy or 
inheritance from the closed economy era was a set of generally incompetent or weak 
organisations. They were, for the most part, poorly integrated with industry itself and 
unresponsive to firms' needs. The reasons for this relate in part to the competence and 
capacities of the staff of the organisations themselves.
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Such observations merely beg questions about why organisations were not more effective or 
more developed. As noted above, there was an entrenched distrust of outsiders by many 
firms' managers and owners. Capitalists and managers preferred to continue operating as 
virtual islands and were not particularly interested in seeking (or receiving) outside 
assistance. Even if the capitalists and managers were, the capacity of local organisations was 
doubted; the former would rather have received support from foreign organisations. As a 
result, capitalists’ commitment to involvement in lobbying for improvements in their trading 
conditions varied considerably. In part this was a legacy of the secretive pre-independence 
sanctions-busting era, and in part a continuing, racist distrust of the former post­
independence black 'socialist' government and its agencies, despite its new market 
orientation. This 'culture' spread to the support organisations themselves, which were also 
poorly integrated with each other, especially across from private to public sectors, but also 
within each sector.
The government, for its part, failed to devise an approach to promoting industrial 
development. The adoption of market oriented policies was used as an excuse to do very 
little, especially for existing firms. Much of the promotional effort focussed on assisting the 
creation of new SMEs. There was a failure to understand that efficient markets do not simply 
come into being on their own, but need to be actively nurtured and guided. Strategies to build 
effective market enhancing institutions were not agreed upon or implemented.
In the labour relations field, government's focus was somewhat different. Creating and 
enhancing effective organisations, including both trade unions and employers organisations, 
was not seen as a way of either promoting voice regulation for improved bargaining, or for 
improved productivity and industrial development. Here government, for a variety of reasons 
had been interventionist during the 1980s (see Chapter 4). The post-ESAP picture was one 
of government ostensibly trying to reduce its role, and yet, covertly, still maintaining its 
influential position for reasons that had nothing to do with industrial development. Strong 
organisations outside the government sphere were not established.
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7.2 THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY FRAMEWORK IN THE 1990s
This section traces the evolution of implicit and explicit industrial policy stances adopted by 
the various governments since UDI. There had been no specific, documented industrial 
policy prior to ESAP. Later, there were difficulties in arriving at an agreed policy document. 
Even where policy pronouncements were proposed by the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, little attention was paid to developing implementable guidelines, especially on 
the organisational front. This in turn is related to the lack of cohesion and coherence in 
policy formulation between various ministries.
Examining various policy drafts and documents provides a useful backdrop for the 
subsequent sections' analyses of the roles and effectiveness of various supporting 
organisations.
7.2.1 Documented Industrial Policy Prior to ESAP
Although there was strong emphasis in many policy pronouncements on the primacy of 
industrial development in national policy priorities after UDI, an industrial policy document 
per se was never produced. In 1969, Mussett, then Minister of Commerce and Industry 
suggested that the policy was one of "selective assistance designed to encourage those 
industries which seemed likely to make a net addition to national income" (1969:8). 
Measures such as import control were only to be used temporarily "to protect our balance of 
payments position in an economic war" (ibid.: 12).
By and large, this approach guided industrial development up to the time of independence. 
The ongoing and increasing severity of the balance of payments constraint caused import and 
other controls to become long established and well entrenched. In turn, this, together with 
the close co-operation between government and industrial capitalists (see Chapter 4), made 
it politically easier for the latter to ensure the continuation and preservation of such measures.
After independence the new government wanted to intervene in production, in order to 
remove the structure from white colonial domination. The Transitional National 
Development Plan (TNDP -1982) was poorly implemented for several reasons: ambivalence
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towards the extent of control which should be exerted over white business interests; pressures 
in support of the existing system from within industry; and, the lack of experience and 
expertise of recently incoming post-independence public servants. Among the 
unimplemented commitments were the "formation and implementation of an industrial 
strategy for the sector"; the promotion of greater forward and backward linkages; the 
promotion of labour intensive technologies (ibid.:72); and, the creation of an "effective 
relationship and machinery for cooperation between Government and the private sector" 
(ibid.:27).
By the publication of the First Five Year National Development Plan in 1986, mention of an 
industrial strategy had disappeared, as had mention of the need to cooperate effectively with 
the private sector. In keeping with the more self-reliant ideological approach of the time, 
stronger emphasis was placed on reducing import dependence through the establishment of 
new intermediate and capital goods industries. Again, few plans were implemented. Practical 
efforts focussed on the severe foreign exchange constraint, with exports again receiving the 
most active support, through the introduction of the Export Bonus Scheme in late 1987.
From 1987 onwards, there are reports of struggles over the direction of industrial policy in 
the context of debates about the broader policy shifts culminating in the introduction of 
ESAP.1 The then Minister of Industry and Technology and his Permanent Secretary were 
among the main supporters of government taking a leading and active role in promoting a 
self-reliant and integrated approach to industrialisation. For example, the latter was the 
initiator of plans for a government-run foundry industry training centre, in order to broaden 
the scope of local skills development (see Section 7.4). The interventionist approach became 
increasingly marginalised through the late 1980s, however, as government embarked on a 
major retreat from the implications of its 'socialist' rhetoric (see Chapter 4).
7.2.2 Industrial Policy Implications of ESAP
The ESAP document^ Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95), has no Sections dealing 
specifically with the needs of industry, apart from a short section on informal and small scale
1 See Skalnes (1995:130-2) and interview note, 12 January, 1996.
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enterprises. No references were made to measures directly in support of the development of 
any particular industries. Trade liberalisation was seen as the major policy change which, by 
being phased in with the initial lifting of trade restrictions on first raw materials and finally 
on consumer goods, was to ensure that consumer goods industries "restructure and become 
competitive within five years." (GoZ, 199la: 10).
Organisationally, few innovations were suggested. The Zimbabwe Investment Centre was 
established to expedite investment approvals and adopt a promotional role. Apart from this, 
and some organisational support for the development of SMEs, the implication emerges that 
industrial adjustment was to take place as a result of the impact of unleashing market forces, 
without government or other organisations playing an active supporting role.
The Second Five Year National Development Plan (SFYNDP) (GoZ, 1991b) put some flesh 
on the implications of the shifts in economic policy for the manufacturing sector. This 
document, which like its predecessors was largely ignored in terms of policy implementation, 
ended up as a hybrid extension of its predecessor, with a continuing emphasis on the 
development of capital goods, metals and chemicals industries, albeit on the basis of 
comparative advantage (ibid.:38-41). New foreign investment in comparative advantage 
determined industries, in particular in downstream processing activities, was expected to 
further the process of import substitution, as well as to fuel export growth.
It is not clear, however, how this growth in particular industries was to be achieved. Wording 
such as "this (chemicals) sub-sector will be encouraged to expand" and the "capital goods 
sector will be further developed" (ibid. :41) lead to the question of how this was to be 
achieved. A few organisational support measures were proposed in the Plan (and not 
implemented). As with the ESAP document, the reader is left with the impression that the 
market would lead to the proposed outcomes. Moreover, the contradiction between the 
SFYNDP proposals and the orthodox macro policy shifts helps explain why there was so 
little implementation.
7.2.3 Post-ESAP Industrial Policy Development
With the changes introduced by ESAP, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) now
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found itself stripped of many of its traditional controlling functions. A process was set in 
motion in the early 1990s to produce an industrial policy Or strategy document. This initiated 
a series of drafts and redrafts. By 1997, at least five had been produced. A final document 
has still to be approved.2 By briefly examining the evolution of these drafts, the process of 
policy determination can be illuminated. This provides a background to the subsequent 
examination of the changes experienced by various organisations involved with and 
supporting industrial development.
The first available draft3 used the SFYNDP as its launchpad. In addition, it pointed out that 
given the highly concentrated structure of Zimbabwean industry "industrial policy in the 
period ahead will have to concern itself with the promotion of a more competitive 
environment including reducing barriers to entry." (p.6). This included reference to the 
establishment of a Monopolies Commission.4 Like the SFYNDP, the first draft was a hybrid 
of calls for increased private sector activity and government direction and support, aimed at 
priority sectors. No reference was made to any organisational framework within which 
government and the private sector would take on their new or amended roles more 
effectively. In a reiteration of the TNDP, a "meaningful dialogue" with the private sector on 
policy priorities was called for. Although, “[t]o avoid the "them and us" type of approach the 
representatives of industrialists would need to be carefully selected..." (p.25). While seeking 
greater consultation, the government wanted to control representation from the private sector.
A second draft was prepared by a UNIDO consultant in early 1994. A version of this, 
amended by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, reveals a clearer shift away from the 
interventionist remnants of the earlier draft. A two track strategy was mooted for dealing 
separately with the needs of medium to large firms (MLIs) and micro and small industries 
(MSIs). The former were to have their fate decided by "market forces with a minimum of
•y
The document was among the first to be discussed by the newly proposed Zimbabwe Economic 
Consultative Forum - see footnote 17.
The draft is undated, but from its context and references, it must have been written during 1992/3.
4 A Study o f Monopolies and Competition Policy in Zimbabwe was prepared by a consultancy firm, 
Implementing Policy Change, in 1992. This formed an important input into the Competition Bill, 
published in 1995,- which provided the framework for the formation of an Industry and Trade 
Competition Commission. The Bill was criticized by the ZCTU as being premature, since there was 
no "clearly defined non-ambiguous competition policy" (1995a:6).
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targeted policy measures" (p.2 6), while the latter were envisaged as the source of job creation 
and said to require more targeted and supportive interventions. The former were seen as 
likely to update their equipment simply in response the changed incentive structure. That 
was expected to improve their productivity and profitability, without creating large numbers 
of new jobs. Hence the need for MSIs to provide new employment opportunities. The earlier 
draft's mention of targeting particular sectors is all but dropped in the second draft.
A further draft was prepared following consultations within and outside government - 
although not full public consultation. Representing a broader range of interests following the 
consultations, the third draft restored some of the. contradictory character of the first draft.
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) officials suggested these delays were not of 
critical importance, as they were proceeding with policy implementation, anyway.5 This was 
misleading. Yet, implementation has not stood entirely still during the drafting years. The 
Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC), for example, which 
was proposed in the first draft, was launched, although this was not the result of actions by 
the MIC (see next Section). Other policy proposals, however, are still far from seeing the 
light of day.
Approval is important. Examining the drafts, it is clear that there were subtle, but significant 
shifts from one document to the next. The first draft was imbued with a hangover of the pre- 
independance, its calls for targeting and supportive interventions. This was significantly 
reduced in the more orthodox, UNIDO drafted second version. The third draft was an 
attempt to retrieve something more appropriate to local needs, which led to increasing 
contradictions.
All the drafts limited their proposals to organisations and programmes within the ambit of 
influence of the MIC. Consequently, while export promotion was discussed, the role that 
ZimTrade, the export promotion agency (which falls under the Ministry of Finance) could 
play was not mentioned. These documents, therefore, could not be used by all agencies of 
government as a guide in their dealings with industry.
5 See interview dated 13 March, 1996.
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7.2.4 Assessing the industrial policy process
The slowness in completing a final draft of the document for wider consultation is indicative 
of several institutional characteristics of the industrial policy process in Zimbabwe. First, 
throughout the period, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce lacked the experience and 
skills necessary for policy formulation and strategy development. S econdly, making coherent 
and credible industrial policies in the face of ESAP macro-economic policy shifts proved 
problematic. The type of support that could be envisaged for industries was limited, without 
being directly contradictory to the liberalisation programme and the associated budget cuts. 
This account also demonstrates how hegemonic the Ministry of Finance (MoF) had become, 
under the amended policy regime. Policy making in other line Ministries became 
increasingly constrained.
Overall, the fractious nature of the governing institutions in Zimbabwe becomes apparent. 
There were many inter-ministerial rivalries and contests for policy prominence. In the wake 
of the economic policy shifts, ministries other than the Ministry of Finance were struggling 
to find their feet and carve out policy space and effective roles for themselves.
These factors combine into the resulting lack of coordination of industrial related matters 
across government. While the MIC recognised the need for more active and supportive 
government and public agencies, it lacked the power to push through an appropriate 
industrial policy around which all of government could rally.
7.3 POST-ESAP CHANGES IN THE ORGANISATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
Those organisations pre-dating ESAP faced constraints on and rigidities in their own ability 
to adapt to the policy changes, given their particular histories. Newly established 
organisations faced constraints of a different kind, as they sought to carve out their roles and 
functions and attain effectiveness.
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Due to the particular balance of class forces in Zimbabwe, there was considerable suspicion 
of any organisations outside their firm on the part of many managers and capitalists. Such 
suspicion and doubt were mainly directed towards government and, to a slightly lesser extent, 
its affiliates. Government organisations were unable to develop levels of effectiveness and 
professionalism fast enough to persuade a sceptical public of their competence and the need 
for cooperation. The institutional pattern thus tended to reproduce itself.
The sections following this present detailed examinations of how the organisational 
framework, in the areas of skills development and labour relations, has been adapting. This 
section, briefly examines changes in relevant government, quasi-government, business and 
science and technology organisations.
7.3.1 Government
The macro policy framework was ostensibly designed to favour efficient businesses. Yet, 
by 1996 businesses had not yet become efficient and needed nurturing to do so. The 
supporting organisations acted as if they knew how best to nurture, in a directive manner. 
However, they did not, and they were not linked to industry in a meaningful way to learn how 
to perform their roles and functions better.
Relevant government organisations include various economic ministries, the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce and Ministry of Finance, as well as the Ministries of Higher 
Education and Labour. While the Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and 
Cooperatives endeavours to support the informal sector and micro and small industries, it has 
no focus on larger firms and will not be examined further here. Here the focus is on the MIC.
The second draft of the industrial policy included suggestions for improving the analytical 
capacity of the MIC. It should be in a position to assess the impacts of relevant changing 
international and regional trends and disseminate the analysis to local firms. The Ministry 
should also assist firms searching for detailed organisational and technological information, 
either directly, or indirectly through, for example, business associations. With many 
industrial support activities being carried out through autonomous agencies, such as the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the Ministry also has to monitor and coordinate
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those agencies more effectively.
Other suggestions were for the MIC to take on directly or to supervise a number of directly 
supportive functions. One example is the improvement of sub-contracting linkages between 
large and small firms.
All such functions require considerable capacity within the Ministry, in areas where it has 
had little experience. In addressing its need to develop new capacities, the Ministry enlisted 
the assistance of donors. By late 1995, however, it had only got as far as developing a 
mission statement. This statement, based on earlier work conducted by external consultants, 
was generalised, vague and premised on the passive government role implicit in the ESAP 
programme. It read as follows:
To formulate policies providing advice and guidance in order to promote the 
development of Zimbabwe's industrial and commercial sectors by balancing 
the interests of the business community, the consumer and Government so as 
to effect a self-sustaining, vibrant and internationally competitive economy.
This will be achieved by means of relevant professional expertise, skills and 
information systems, (quoted in ILO, 1995:8)
The relevant division of the Ministry was that of Enterprise Development and Consumer 
Affairs. The main function of this division was the establishment of "an economically 
enabling environment for business, entrepreneurs and consumers... with particular attention 
to the promotion of small and medium scale enterprise and greater indigenisation of the 
economy." (ibid.:9).
Apart from policy formulation, the Ministry's primary role was that of information provision. 
The major focus of attention was to be SMEs and indigenisation. In a subsequent review of 
the functional implications of the mission statement, the ILO report added a more active role 
for the MIC in developing strategies and programmes for enterprise development, as well as 
coordinating those programmes. This implies, nonetheless, that no substantive active role 
was envisaged for the Ministry in providing support for existing medium and large industries 
(MLIs). This is in keeping with the implications of the industrial policy drafts reviewed 
above.
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Notwithstanding the limited role envisaged for the MIC, the ILO report assessed a number 
of "competency gaps" in the skills set of the senior Ministry staff. These included a lack of 
work experience outside the Government, in enterprises; a lack of staff with higher degrees; 
and, a lack of background in policy planning, formulation and research. With low staff 
turnover, many of the present senior staff obtained their work experience managing the 
control and allocation programmes of the pre-ESAP era. Evidence of the inadequacies is 
given by the contradictory nature of the industrial policy drafts, as well as the very poor 
standard of the Manufacturing Sector Review compiled by MIC research staff (MIC, 1996). 
Furthermore, there was no plan in place to address these serious deficiencies (ILO, 1995:21). 
By mid-1996 a programme to this end was beginning to get underway, with support from 
USAID. A further indicator of limited capabilities in the MIC is the time it took for the 
ministry to begin tackling its problems.
To be effective the MIC needs to be able to lobby within government for industrys interests. 
The failure of the MIC to slow the liberalisation programme in 1992-94 indicates its lack of 
'voice' within government. There were delays in finalising a major tariff revision exercise 
between 1995 and 1997, including a false start which was hastily withdrawn in mid-1996. 
This was yet another example of capacity constraints. These incidents indicate the lack of 
serious attention given to industrial issues at the highest levels within government.
Finally, alongside the shifts in economic policy, there was a disintegration of intra- 
govemmental cooperation, especially between the MIC and MoF. During the period when 
various committees were in place, including those for control of foreign exchange allocations 
and new projects, there had been regular exchanges across government about the fate of 
particular industries. By 1996, it was reported that even the inter-ministerial Economic 
Coordinating Committee was meeting increasingly irregularly and that regular quarterly 
meetings between the MIC and MoF has ceased some three years earlier,6 The removal of 
controls also led to the loss of a valuable source of information about firm and trade 
performance. As a result, the MIC started to move in the direction of becoming more self
6 See interview, 1 July, 1996.
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sufficient in information collection, industrial surveys and even investment promotion.7
7.3.2 Quasi-Government Affiliates
Despite the lack of an approved industrial policy, the economic policy shifts resulted in some 
organisational change and innovation. Attempts were made to support certain industrial 
development activities, as part of the restructuring programme. The need to encourage 
exports led to the establishment of ZimTrade in 1992, funded by a 0.01 per cent surcharge 
on exports. Investment regulation was centralised under the Zimbabwe Investment Centre 
(ZIC), which subsequently dropped the regulatory function and has evolved into an 
investment promotion agency. Although established in principle in 1989, it only became 
effective operationally in 1993.
The following accounts indicate some of the problems of establishing new organisations. 
They also illustrate the difficulties of attempting to promote industry in the absence of 
coherent and well communicated industrial policies. Here the influence of the past is not the 
institutional inflexibility of the organisations, but the environment into which they are thrown 
and within which they are attempting to carve out a performance niche.
ZimTrade
ZimTrade saw itself as supporting exports in two ways. The first was through direct 
assistance to exporters, through the provision of information about export markets and 
opportunities. This includes conducting market surveys and research, both for specific 
sectors as well as for individual firms, on a commercial basis. The organisation also took on 
a lobbying role on behalf of exporters and potential exporters. For example, ZimTade was 
pushing for approval of the industrial policy, to enable Zimbabwean firms to enjoy more 
support in developing their competitiveness.8
n
ZIC falls under the responsibility of the Ministry o f Finance and was reported to be paying too much 
attention to promoting FDI and not paying attention to domestic investment (interview, 13 March, 
1996).
O
Although apart from the need to reduce interest rates, particular policy recommendations were not 
highlighted (interview with ZimTrade chief executive, 6 June, 1996).
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By 1996, limited attention had been given to the metals sector. Efforts were underway in 
1996 to get local firms to participate in trade promotion missions to neighbouring countries. 
18 firms participated in die first one to Zambia in February 1996. Efforts to take trade 
missions outside the region were hampered when local firms believed that they would not be 
able to compete. As a result ZimTrade was starting to bring in international specialists in 
particular product areas to assess the competitiveness of local products and where 
improvements would be required. Firms were required to demonstrate their commitment, 
by undertaking to follow-up on the recommendations, although there was no legal 
enforcement of this. Firms proved very reluctant to come forward and take advantage of the 
scheme.9
From the case study firms, it is apparent that while three of the firms had some contact with 
ZimTrade, there had been few if any benefits. In two cases, there were accusations that there 
had been either poor performance, such as when displays arrived after an exhibition was over, 
or a lack of follow-up to initial enquiries. The main comments were that staff seemed under­
qualified, inexperienced and lacking in sectoral knowledge. Two of the firms which had 
adopted export drives as part of their strategy changes said they had no support from 
ZimTrade, although in one case the firm was still awaiting the results of a request for 
assistance.
The chief executive acknowledged that his staff were still relatively inexperienced. While 
there was an active training programme for all staff, there had to be a balance, between the 
training of staff and the performance of work, He was also taking steps to upgrade the profile 
of the marketing discipline in Zimbabwe, including supporting the recent establishment of 
the Zimbabwe Institute of Marketing.
While there was some assistance from donor-supported foreign expertise, this was 
insufficient to ensure that the organisation was able to perform effectively from the outset. 
Secondly, there were communication problems between the organisation and its clients. 
Firms felt they were not having their needs effectively met and ZimTrade staff felt they were 
implementing action programmes, which firms were not responding to. The chief executive
9 Interview with ZimTrade official, 30 May 1996.
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claimed that smaller family owned firms especially were not interested in new technologies 
and were resistant to change, especially that suggested by outsiders. With annual reviews of 
performance by external organisations and an open and participatory management style, it 
is anticipated that ZimTrade will improve its effectiveness given time. The major problem 
is that for those firms that are already struggling the time required to improve effectiveness 
has been too long.
Finally, it is not clear that ZimTrade, any more than the MIC, has capacity, or a central 
enough political position, to have a serious impact on policy-making. The chief executive 
of ZimTrade resigned in April 1997, claiming that the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
and the chairman of the ZimTrade board could no longer work with him.10 It is possible that 
in part this was due to his continued frustration at the lack of opportunity for him to have 
impact at the policy level.
Zimbabwe Investment Centre
ZIC, established for a similar period, has certain features in common with ZimTrade. It is 
an information resource centre on investment opportunities in Zimbabwe. It also has a policy 
advisory role on investment related matters. ZIC has a third role, that of investment 
facilitation.
While ZIC has a primary focus on FDI, since 1995 it has been focussing increasingly on 
promoting domestic investment. This came about as a result of the need to find more local 
joint venture partners for foreign investors.11 From the MIC staff views, this shift has not had 
a strong profile or impact. None of the case study firms reported having had any significant 
contact with ZIC. It appears that little was done to improve the liaison with existing firms 
at a detailed enough level to support and promote their own investment plans.
There have been long-standing problems between ZIC and the department of immigration, 
which continued to present obstacles to work and residence permits for foreign investors.
10 See Financial Gazette, 17 April, 1997.
11 Interview with ZIC, assistant director, 24 July, 1996.
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While new institutions like ZIC and ZimTrade were acting on the basis of the new policy 
framework, older organisations were still staffed with those who were implementing a quite 
different set of policies during the 1980s. Such officials have not fully adapted to the 
implications of the policy shifts. Furthermore, in some areas corruption also acts as a 
constraint. Unless the access to immigration permits, for example, is reportedly eased by side 
payments, it is lengthy and uncertain.
ZIC, like ZimTrade, has taken on a lobbying role to represent investors’ concerns. Its ability 
to do this successfully depends, as it does with ZimTrade, on its capacity and the 
receptiveness of the rest of government. MIC staff clearly perceived ZIC as being controlled 
by the MoF.
One indication of the lack of serious policy priority given to ZIC is its funding situation. 
With 90 percent of its funding from a direct government grant, ZIC has become increasingly 
restricted, as government has sought to reduce its budget deficit. Up to 1996, it had 
experienced difficulty in sourcing other funds, with only 5 percent from sale of publications 
and services and 5 percent from foreign donors. The constraint put limitations on the 
flexibility of rewarding staff performance.
7.3.3 Business Organisations
Despite the observed weakness of the government agencies charged with industrial 
responsibilities, and a policy framework, which implies the retreat of government agencies 
from direct support to industry, firms were unable to organise themselves collectively to 
provide alternative forms of support for their growth and development. The business 
organisations represented particular capitalist constituencies and were more effectively 
geared to lobbying government for their members, than to providing wide-ranging support 
for their members’ activities.
Serious rivalries existed between various representative organisations, limiting their 
effectiveness. Rejecting long established institutions such as the Confederation of 
Zimbabwean Industry (CZI) and the Zimbabwe National Chambers of Commerce (ZNCC) 
as white dominated, a number of indigenous business groups sprung up during the 1990s.
267
These included the Indigenous Business Development Centre (TBDC) and the Affirmative 
Action Group (AAG). Since the number of indigenous-owned engineering firms is small, no 
organisation has yet been established for that industry.12
A series of organisations represented capitalists' interests in dealing specifically with labour 
issues. Indigenous groups interests played no part in these organisations at all. Rival 
groupings had not been established. While the Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe 
(EMCOZ) is the national organisation, its engineering sector affiliate is the Engineering 
Employers Association ofZimbabwe (EEAZ). These organisations will be examined in more 
depth in Section 7.5 below.
With the removal of the foreign exchange allocation systems administered by the CZI and 
ZNCC, the two organisations have had to redefine their roles. Change has been managed 
differently in the two organisations. From the draft industrial policy documents one of the 
key issues driving change was the identified need to develop a better framework for 
consultation with the private sector. Evidence of improved openness about policy making 
emerged in 1995 and 1996. For example, government requested budget inputs from the 
private sector. The development of the second phase of the structural adjustment programme 
'Zimprest\ and the broad national visioning exercise, Zimbabwe Vision 2020, have also 
involved extensive public consultation.
7.3.4 Science and Technology Organisations
The second draft of the Industrial Policy emphasised the facilitation of technology and quality 
improvements by the 1993 established Scientific and Industrial Research and Development 
Centre (SIRDC) and the Standards Association of Zimbabwe (SAZ). Government was to 
monitor the impacts of technology development and transfer. It was also to provide 
"institutional support to improve access by industry to ... information" on products and 
processes13. Little has happened in either regard.
12 These organisations are being studied in some depth by ongoing PhD research into the role of lobbying 
groups in influencing policy-making - see Taylor (1997).
13 See second available draft (1994:33)
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No public bodies, either governmental or private sector based, were oriented towards 
changing production organisation. This appeared to be supported almost entirely by private 
consulting firms, who attempt to sell the need for such transitions to firms on a commercial 
basis. Thus, there was no recognition at a public level of a need for any organisational 
coordination of such activities, nor was there recognition of the value to the public in finding 
out more about the pattern and impact of such changes.14
Here again were examples of public supported organisations attempting to direct and support 
changes in private firms, but finding that firms were not necessarily interested or 
communicative. Much apathy, if not antipathy, was shown by many capitalists towards 
organisations directly affiliated to government, whatever their functional area, as well as 
concerns about such organisations’ capacity.15
Even the SAZ, which had a reasonable reputation with many firms, did not attain a solid 
enough reputation to achieve its goals.16 The SAZ could only be effective if local firms 
sought to produce to standards. Yet, Zimbabwean firms appeared to be reluctant to consider 
adopting standards for their products and production processes. After considerable time and 
expense the two case study firms giving the issue some consideration were still uncertain 
about the value to be added to their products and operations. Despite the serious effort given 
to the promotion of standards by the SAZ, with the support of ZimTrade and the CZI, a report 
in August 1995 concluded that "without a Government lead, new certifications will not 
happen fast enough to meet the competitive pressures already faced by exporters overseas and 
by local suppliers in the home market." (Titchener, 1995:2).17
In the past, the CZI had not supported the decision in 1987 to introduce a standards 
development levy, which by 1996 was contributing approximately 70 per cent of the SAZ's 
funding. The CZI had not seen the need for the SAZ and had low expectations from a local
14 There is also a Department of Technology under the Research Council, which examines patents and 
other national concerns (interview with MIC official, 1 July, 1996). This was not surveyed.
15 Noted in various interviews with industrialists. See also Latsch and Robinson (1997:33-34).
16 Latsch and Robinson’s survey highlighted comments that the SAZ was too “passive” in its approach 
(loc. cit.)
1 7 *ZimTrade itself has obtained ISO 9001 certification, as an example to others.
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organisation.18 In the closed economy era, this was understandable, as quality was not a 
consideration for local manufacturers, who had a ready market for whatever they could 
produce. For those firms focussed on the domestic market in 1995, the legacy of this was 
ongoing doubt about the role of standards (see Titchener, 1995:10).
Organisations operating in related fields in Zimbabwe behave as rivals. This is perhaps due 
to a lack of clear-cut national leadership, common purpose and national identity. In this case, 
the SIRDC perceived the SAZ was threatened by the former’s size and resources. The SAZ 
for its part was concerned that the SIRDC was over-ambitious in its scope. Nonetheless, 
SIRDC staff sat on SAZ committees and the SAZ was intending to hand over its metrology 
functions to the SIRDC, as the latter was to have better measuring and testing equipment. 
If, in future, these organisations could resolve their differences and be more supportive, they 
would have greater prospects of providing more tangible and needed support to industry.
7.3.5 Collaborative Consultative Initiatives
Some moves to greater consultation were noted in Section 7.3.4 above. However, since 
private capitalists were so radically split both on commercial/industrial lines and on racial 
lines, that in some cases they did not communicate at all, it was difficult for them to agree 
on how to proceed in negotiation with government. Notwithstanding that government may 
not have been unified in its approach, it tended to remain the more powerful partner in the 
consultative process. Most business organisations noted that many members were not active 
in the activities of the association. For example, when surveys were sent out there were few 
returns. Firms wanted to know what others are up to, but were hesitant to let out much 
information on their own operations. This reduced the capability of the organisations to be 
effective partners in government's consultation efforts. In principal, moving towards greater 
openness and a more formalised approach to consultation depends on the willingness of the 
various 'social partners' to move ahead together. This in turn depends on improving levels 
of trust developing between the parties. This has not been in evidence in Zimbabwe, as is 
shown in the following analysis.
18 Interview with SAZ Director-general, 13 May 1996.
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Efforts have been made to forge a more comprehensive coalition of interests to represent 
private capital in its dealings with government since independence. The longest established 
has been the Zimbabwe Association of Business Organisations (ZABO). ZABO does not 
include indigenous groups. More recently several proposals have been made to establish 
more all-embracing structures for consultations between government, business groups and 
other social partners. These have included efforts to establish a Zimbabwe Economic 
Development Council, which was pushed during 1996 by a broad range of social partners, 
most particularly the ZNCC and ZCTU. The CZI developed its own proposals for a 
Zimbabwe Centre for strategic and international studies. A further proposal was made by 
prominent Zimbabweans associated with non-indigenous firms. Finally, there was a 
movement from within the labour relations sphere by ZCTU and EMCOZ to establish an 
institution closely modelled on South Africa's National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC), under the Ministry of Labour. There was little substantive progress on 
any of these during the period covered by this research.
Each organisation, especially the membership driven ones, wanted to be the one to have its 
initiative or proposal established first. Without a clear lead from government, as to which 
it preferred, an ever increasing number of proposals appeared and competed to establish a 
centralisation of the consultation process.
By 1996, Government was saying that once business had organised itself, government would 
participate. Y et, as a result of the confrontation between the older established groupings and 
the indigenous groups, the business sector could not organise itself. The indigenous groups 
were demanding shares of existing white businesses and their markets, and were using their 
hostility to white business as a political lever to further their accumulation strategies.
Proposals were made to government by the established groupings, that they invite all the 
groups to participate in consultations. In Zimbabwe political executive decisions were only 
made if the President accepted that these were required. This enabled those close to the top 
to postpone matters by claiming that it was difficult to arrange meetings with the President. 
Even when meetings were held, there was no guarantee that a clear-cut decision would be
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made.19
Consultations on Industrial Development: A Case Study
Some valuable insights about the opportunities for and limitations of efforts to promote 
consultation, as well as problems with social cooperation on industrial matters, emerged as 
a result of a particular research initiative. The organisations seeking to collaborate, despite 
their varied constituencies and objectives, were all pursuing more direct input into policy 
making. Government had been maintaining its aloofness from all possible interested parties, 
including the quasi-govemmental agencies. As can be seen from Section 7.2 above, 
facilitating access to the MIC would not necessarily improve the situation. The ministry was 
equally excluded from major policy decision making.
None of the above proposed fora intended to focus on industrial development per se. In 
reaction to this perceived deficit, and to witness at first hand some of the problems with 
coordinating a framework for industrial development, during 1995/96 the researcher became 
involved in assisting an initiative to bring various social partners in industrial development 
together.
A number of organisations were interested in being part of this initiative. These included the 
ZNCC, CZI, ZIC, ZimTrade, EMCOZ and the ZCTU. The level of commitment varied. CZI 
and ZimTrade played a very minor key role. It appears that this was so for the former, 
because the initiative was perceived as being driven by ZNCC. It was decided by these 
groups not to invite the indigenous groups or government to participate at that early stage, 
until the conception was clear and a plan was in place. It was felt that the indigenous groups 
would try to disrupt the initiative, or seek to control it. It was feared that government might 
block the programme.
The immediate goal was to convene a forum or seminar to review common goals and 
objectives for industrial policy. The seminar was to examine industrial problems and
19 The Zimbabwe Economic Consultative Forum (ZECF) was finally launched on 9 July 1997, with all 
the competing groups involved. Its first meeting took place in January 1998 {Zimbabwe Independent, 
23 January, 1998).
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constraints. It was also to examine how to move forward pragmatically to improve 
communication and cooperation between the various organisations involved in developing 
Zimbabwean industry. Securing finance proved problematic. Partner organisations were 
insufficiently committed to fully fund the proposal themselves. Donors were concerned 
about disruption by excluded groups and wanted to be sure that government was fully 
committed to the process.
7.4 SKILLS DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATIONS - CAPACITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS
This section examines the changing organisational structure of higher education and 
vocational training, in particular highlighting attempts to respond to the changing needs of 
the engineering sector. This comprises examination of firstly the control and funding 
structures, secondly the administrative structures within the Ministry of Higher Education, 
and thirdly the training organisations themselves. The training organisations are presented 
as a case study of a small sample of organisations.
7.4.1 The Changing Structure of Higher Technical Education and Skills Development
During the 1980s there was a change in the focus of vocational training, with greater 
emphasis on formal institutional training, complementing traditional apprenticeship 
structures (see Chapter 4). This led to the creation of a number of new technical training 
organisations. There was also a rapid increase in the number of students at university level. 
The polytechnics and other government vocational training centres (VTCs), geared towards 
craft qualifications, fell under the Ministry of Higher Education (MHE). The Ministry also 
housed the registries of apprentices and skilled workers. The universities fell under the more 
autonomous National Council of Higher Education, which was responsible to the same 
Minister.
The number of private vocational training organisations increased during the 1990s, although 
in a recent survey, only one of these was directly relevant to the engineering industry; training 
motor mechanics (see Bennell, 1997).
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According to the Manpower Planning and Development Act, 1994, the tri-partite National 
Manpower Advisory Council (NAMACO)'s main functions are:
"on its own initiative or at the request of the Minister, to investigate and make 
recommendations to the Minister on any matter affecting national manpower 
development and training ..." (p. 173 - emphasis added).
Previously, from 1984, its role had been limited to that of overseeing and advising on the 
collection and allocation of the manpower development levy (1 % of all firms' wage bills) by 
the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (ZIMDEF). The extension of NAMACO's 
role signalled a move away from the situation where the government made decisions about 
manpower development with little external consultation.
7.4.2 Manpower Development: Control, Consultation and Funding
NAMACO provided an opportunity to examine the workings of a tri-partite (government, 
labour and business) structure in action. The Council of NAMACO was drawn from the 
public sector, business and labour organisations, as well as technical and training experts. 
NAMACO also had a number of sub-committees dealing with the needs of particular 
economic sectors.
This subsection reveals the time it took to shift attitudes away from a centrally controlled 
system, where every decision had to be referred up the line, to a system where individuals 
clearly understood the limits of their authority and were held properly accountable. 
Consequently, the centre of the system, albeit a weakened one, retained an influential and 
powerful position for some time after the strategy had shifted. Associated with this, industry 
representatives participating in the consultative structures were poorly motivated, and 
consequently did not perform well, nor did they consult widely within their own sectors and 
colleagues.
The second draft of the Industrial Policy contained suggestions that the funds raised by the 
training levy be redirected towards "a demand driven programme, managed under the 
responsibility of a given business association, where large companies would provide training,
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facilities, equipment and instructors, and develop in the process a solid network of future 
sub-contractors." (1994:51). In the third draft, while this concept disappeared, there were 
calls for greater involvement of the private sector in determining the use of ZIMDEF funds. 
This shift reflected the demands of industrial capitalists. As a concession to such interests, 
NAMACO's responsibilities were broadened in the mid-1990s.
According to the Manpower Planning and Development Act, ZIMDEF funds are intended 
to be used to rebate firms sending workers on approved training programmes for designated 
trades20, or taking on apprentices, and to provide grants to employers and training institutions 
for manpower development programmes.21
Changing Strategy
During the 1980s, NAMACO members were appointed by government from those it knew 
would be sympathetic to its control over ZIMDEF. After 1990, NAMACO members were 
nominated by the constituencies represented. While this improved the level, breadth and 
openness of discussion, it did not change the control over the funds. The Minister continued 
to intervene and allocated a good percentage of ZIMDEF funds to the MHE for the purchase 
of equipment for public training institutions and training institution running costs 
(Raftopoulos, 1994:7). These financial diversions were in response to severe fiscal 
constraints experienced under ESAP and concomitant efforts to control government's direct 
spending. Government effectively turned the manpower development levy into an additional 
form of taxation. Capitalists, who perceived limited benefits would arise from many of the 
public training organisations, would rather have had rebates for training they could influence 
directly. As an example of government's increased responsiveness to public concerns, 
expressed through NAMACO, by 1994, the percentage of ZIMDEF expenditure on capital 
items had fallen to 18 percent.
20 Trades are designated by government for rebates and official recognition as crafts, when they are seen 
to benefit industry, in some manner.
21 See “Approved Training Eligible for ZIMDEF Rebates”, circular letter no.l, 1993, to employers, 
Ministry o f Higher Education.
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Problems arising from the diversion of funds came to the surface in 1996, with, inter alia, 
controversy over the purchase of inappropriate and expensive equipment for various technical 
colleges, which was not being utilised.22 This resulted in part from the adoption of a more 
decentralised approach by the MHE to control over the training organisations, implemented 
after 1992. This was mainly aimed at giving principals greater control over recruitment and 
the courses they taught. The implementation of this change has suffered from a hesitancy on 
the part of some principals to take on extra responsibilities, while others have taken it too far 
(as shown by the equipment problems).
One of the reasons for the emergence of equipment problems was that the MHE's budget had 
reportedly been curbed over a long period. This meant demands for replacement equipment 
and improvements had built up over a long period.23
Many of the Council members felt the post-1994 NAMACO was still too limited in its 
responsibilities to be effective. Proposals were being developed in 1996 for the Council to 
be upgraded to a statutory authority, while its members become the trustees of ZIMDEF.
In addition, the 1995 NAMACO Congress argued that there was a strong need to improve 
coordination and information flows between industry, training institutions and the relevant 
ministry, despite the improvements introduced under the 1994 Manpower Development Act. 
Furthermore, despite the reportedly reduced politicisation of NAMACO membership, the 
trade union movement was excluded from the Council in 1995.24 Their failure to nominate 
delegates reflects trade union capacity problems and a lack of focus, as much as it reflects 
relations between the trade unions and government or business.
Capacity
NAMACO had little institutional capacity of its own. Another reason for the statutory 
authority proposal was the need for capacity to conduct its own investigations. In 1996, it
22 See Zimbabwe Independent, 31 May, 1996.
23 See interview with past Chairman of NAMACO, 28 May, 1996.
24 See interview, 16 July, 1996.
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was still dependent on the MHE for its information and human resources. While the MHE 
and NAMACO had a vision of improving the provision of manpower information as the 
basis for decision-making, there were serious data collection and availability problems (see 
below). Government surveys tended to elicit poor response rates from capitalists. 
Furthermore, the reliability of the data submitted would be questionable. NAMACO and 
ZIMDEF had small secretariats, which lacked capacity to carry out surveys of this nature.
Nonetheless, substantial financial resources existed which could have financed such work 
being done by independent contractors.25 The amount of money required to fund a system 
of regular research and surveys would have been a fraction of that spent on programmes 
whose efficiency was probably limited because of data insufficiency.
Instead industrial sectors were urged to carry out their own studies. This met with limited 
success. The computer industry was one of the few sectors to study the supply of and 
demand for professionals in 1994, as a basis for surveying manpower development needs. 
At the end of 1995, NAMACO urged its sectoral committees to develop manpower surveys 
for their industries.26 It was not clear at the time of the field research how many sectors 
would respond positively to this, but it was suspected it would be a limited number.
NAMACO's sectoral sub-committees had even less capacity. By 1996, the mechanical 
engineering committee had made no moves to adopt the above recommendation. The 
committee's minutes showed that meetings were frequently postponed. At those meetings 
which were held, members were frequently absent. Items tended to stay on the agenda for 
a long time without being resolved. Possibly, this had to do with the lack of sense of reward 
for contributions made, either in terms of professional recognition, or in terms of 
remuneration for time and effort.
Concerns were also expressed about the technical capabilities of NAMACO committee 
members to address skills development matters.27 With respect to the trade testing
25 *This did not appear to have been thought of. Instead, the funds were spent as above, or invested in 
property development (Zimbabwe Independent, 18 July, 1997).
26 See NAMACO's end of year report, 1995.
27 See interviews with NAMACO official, 16 June 1996, and GTZ advisor to MHE, 4 July, 1996.
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committees, the unions had demanded equal representation with business, but only attained 
one representative per committee. This favoured a strongly technocratic attitude, which was 
likely to reflect the interests of the business members of the committees. Involving the 
unions would have enabled their officials to gain an improved understanding of skills issues, 
which they could bring to bear in collective bargaining.
The NAMACO sub-committees were also fairly small. For mechanical engineering, there 
were representatives from only five firms. Reflecting the poor communication structures 
prevalent within the private sector, the interests of any committee were likely to be 
determined by those of its industry representatives. There appeared to be a failure in most 
segments of the engineering sector to achieve mutual in-depth consultation about skills 
development issues. The substantive items on the agenda of the mechanical engineering 
committee in April 1996 reflected the interests of three of the five member firms, and no 
others. Some respondents stated they had withdrawn from the committee's work, as a result 
of both feelings of futility and its narrow and parochial scope.
Furthermore, firms tended to be represented by personnel or technical managers. Chief 
executives, who might have had a sense of the broader picture, rarely participated. This 
applied to participation in NAMACO, as well as the boards of training organisations.
7.4.3 Manpower Development - Administration
Given the lack of institutional capacity within NAMACO and its committees, technical 
training was still managed by the MHE. Greater emphasis on capitalists driving patterns of 
development put MHE officials on the defensive. Staff hid their own failure to develop 
appropriate skills to manage skills development behind accusations of racist or paternalist 
attitudes on the parts of white capitalists and managers. Equally, white capitalists often were 
racist in their attitude towards the possibility that black people might be capable of running 
efficient organisations. The success of the changes was dependent on the development of 
increased trust across the government, non-government divide; on the evidence of this 
section, this was not happening.
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Changing Strategy
Business had been complaining for a long time that the post-independence, administratively 
centralised vocational training institutions had produced a low standard of certified skills. 
A number of owners and managers reported recruiting individuals on the basis of 
certification, yet finding the worker knew little about skill areas for which s/he was certified. 
Consequently, workers who had completed government institutional training often found it 
difficult to secure employment at the level for which they were certified. In many cases, they 
had to agree to complete an apprenticeship or further training period within the firm. It was 
to address such problems that a decision was taken to establish industry-controlled trade 
testing centres.
Firm managers and owners had other problems with the existing system. The institutional 
training path followed a non-work oriented path to skills development. Individuals saw 
themselves as students rather than workers, unlike traditional apprentices. When such 
students were on company attachments, their attitude to work and discipline was frequently 
reported as poor. Firms, not regarding those on attachment as employees, were reluctant to 
incorporate them fully in the work routines of the firm. The value students gained from short 
periods of work exposure was, thus, strictly limited.
Following ESAP, however, the MHE increasingly saw itself as attempting to take a more 
open attitude to private sector views.28 This included taking NAMACO more seriously on 
a broader range of matters and following up on its recommendations, as noted above. While 
some positive progress was perceived from the MHE side, a feeling remained that the private 
sector was not specific enough in its demands in terms of number of trainees required and 
type of skills.29 Some MHE officials perceived that the mainly white capitalists and 
managers were not prepared to accept that the quality of training post-independence could 
be good enough to satisfy them. A highly defensive attitude was pervasive among public 
officials, who perceived a hangover from the past in sceptical attitudes about and a lack of 
trust in government's intentions coming from the private sector.
28 See interview with Deputy Director, MHE, 5 June 1996.
29 Senior MHE officials professed ignorance o f why capitalists were unhappy with the levels of technical 
skills available (interview, 5 June, 1996).
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In spite of these reservations, progress was made. For example, following the suggestion by 
many employers that the theoretical content of the institutional training for engineering 
disciplines was relatively high, MHE officials were in the process of reviewing the curricula.
Another strategic change was a move to greater rationality in the preparation of plans and 
policies. In 1991, the first four year Human Resource Development Plan was developed. In 
1994, this was evaluated (see below). The experience fed into a more systemised approach 
being used for the next plan. The first plan had not been available for public consultation 
before being approved. The new spirit of participation and greater openness towards 
involving private businesses led to a decision to discuss the draft of the second plan through 
NAMACO structures.30
Capacity
In NAMACO's 1995 end of year report it was noted that there were "serious performance 
deficiencies within the department of Research and Planning in the Ministry of Higher 
Education" (1995:2). It was noted above that NAMACO did not have capacity to carry out 
its own surveys. Manpower needs analysis had not been conducted by the MHE on a regular 
basis. MHE officials explained that the curtailing of annual manpower reviews was due to 
the lack of response to the annual questionnaires sent to private firms.31 The review had been 
stopped in 1986.
In the early to mid-1990s, efforts were being made to improve the MHE's capacity; to carry 
out more frequent and more comprehensive surveys; and, to develop a computerised database 
of manpower development needs. One specific capacity problem mentioned by MHE staff 
was their high staff turnover rates. This was ascribed to the central administration of public 
service careers. At any time, a high percentage of staff were likely to be inexperienced. It 
was not established whether this enforced amateurism existed throughout government, or was 
an indication of the relatively low priority given to building up capabilities in particular areas 
of government.
1ft This was ongoing during 1996.
31 Interview, 30 May, 1996.
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An outside observer, closely linked to the MHE, noted that staff retention was not a problem 
and many MHE staff had enjoyed promotion within the ministry.32 The key problem was the 
ad hoc way in which ministry staff were being trained.
Physical resource problems existed across the Ministry of Higher Education. For example, 
the Registrar of Apprentices could not provide information on different classes of 
apprentices, as his department lacked information systems to process the data.33 A request 
submitted some years earlier to ZIMDEF for computers, had not been supported.
The evaluation of the 1991-1995 Human Resources Development Plan (HRDP), compiled 
by an in-house team from MHE, revealed a number of capacity related problems. These 
related both to defects within the plan itself, as well as problems of implementation. Most 
staff were unaware of the plan; the plan had not been guided by national manpower needs or 
any other research; and, the plan had excluded most other (i.e. non-MHE) organisations 
involved in manpower training and development (MHE, 1994:32-36). The plan had also not 
been effectively monitored or evaluated. It seems clear that the plan had not played a central 
role in the working life of the Ministry. Consequently, there had been no commitment to its 
implementation, or adherence to its behavioural parameters. It is not clear why the plan 
should have been thus marginalised. Possibilities include management staff incompetence, 
as well as problems with intra-ministry communication. The MHE had only been formed in 
1988 from Sections within the Ministries of Labour and Education. More effective 
development and implementation of the plan could have facilitated and assisted with 
common new organisational identities.
The intention was to avoid many of the above shortcomings in the preparation of the second 
plan. In 1996, it did not appear, however, that adequate precautions were being taken to 
ensure this would be so, although there certainly was more consultation taking place around 
its preparation.34
32 Interview with head of GTZ office, Harare, 23 July, 1996.
33 Interview 9 July, 1996.
34 Interview with MHE officials, 12 June, 1996.
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7.4.4 Educational and Training Organisations - Case Studies
Three such organisations are briefly examined to assess changes in their strategies and their 
capacities. These are the mechanical engineering department at the University of Zimbabwe 
(UZ), which educates people to degree level; the Bulawayo Technical College (BTC), which 
trains people to artisan, national diploma and higher national diploma level; and, the 
Westgate Vocational Training Centre, in Bulawayo, which trains people up to artisan level.
The analysis compares and contrasts the changes in these organisations. In this section it can 
be seen that, while there may be considerable legacies tending to inhibit change, where there 
are sufficient pent-up demands, change can be achieved relatively quickly and such legacies 
overcome.
Changing Strategy
There were two major thrusts to the strategic changes introduced by the three organisations 
during the early to mid-1990s. The first was a greater orientation towards meeting the needs 
of industry. The second was attempting to increase direct revenue generation by the 
organisations themselves. Sometimes the two went together, with, for example, the 
establishment of customised training programmes for firms, which were charged for on a fee 
basis.
Each organisation had an advisory committee or board, which has representation from a 
number of local firms (usually between 6 and 10), as well as trade unions in the case of the 
VTC. In addition, university students were attached to industrial firms to conduct research 
projects. The polytechnic attempted to expand its use of in-company facilities to conduct 
training in areas where the polytechnic was short of modem or relevant equipment.
Most firms' desired confidentiality, however, and were reluctant to allow outsiders to observe 
and participate in their production processes. This constraint has featured elsewhere. Here 
it led to firms refusing to allow BTC students to use equipment, even outside normal 
production hours. Moreover, many firms resisted the proposal that university students would 
write up and publish the findings of their projects.
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The push for decentralised revenue raising was directly caused by financial constraints. The 
university allowed the mechanical engineering department to set up its own account, so that 
it could receive and utilise its own income, without reference to higher authorities.35 In 1996, 
the VTC was still trying to attain the same arrangement. It was constrained by the fact that 
its spending votes were all centrally controlled and that revenues went to the central fiscus.36
Revenue generating activities mostly took the form of either short training courses, or 
education with production initiatives, where the process of learning or training itself raised 
revenue by selling products or services. Courses were oriented towards firms, or directly 
towards members of the public. The VTC was particularly successful at running part-time 
courses at weekends. These were attended by small scale entrepreneurs, as well as workers, 
whose firms were not supporting their initiative, wanting to refresh or upgrade their skills. 
Running such courses outside standard educational or training arrangements allowed 
lecturers to obtain extra income, when they were able to keep some of the course fees. This 
helped to motivate staff and compensate them for reductions in their real income.
The final area of notable strategic shift was change in the curriculum. By 1993, most older 
skilled workers had their skills upgraded through the four-tier trade testing system. VTCs 
were then asked to train apprentices as well. This was swiftly followed by a shift in the 
apprentice qualification to the introduction of the National Certificate (NC) programme, as 
an attempt to standardise the level of skills across all trades. In 1996, the VTC admitted its 
first contingent of direct entry, institutional training students.
The new curriculum was beset with problems. Some lecturers could not cope with the new 
teaching requirements, which resulted in increased failure rates. The design of the 
curriculum placed greater emphasis on mathematics and technology theory, to prepare 
workers to progress to the technicians' course, the National Diploma (ND). It became 
evident, however, that not all students wished to progress past becoming qualified 
journeymen. The qualification was not relevant to their needs. A proposal to make the
35 Interview with chairman of mechanical engineering department, UZ, 22 May, 1996.
36 Interview with principal, Westgate VTC, 13 June, 1996. The University has its own funding 
arrangements and operates more like a parastatal outside the Ministry's financial,votes.
283
mathematics and technology elements optional was rejected.37 Furthermore, entry 
requirements for the ND were 5 'O' levels. It was not evident, however, that the best 
craftsmen are necessarily the most gifted academically. These problems indicate the lack of 
adequate consultation with both firms and skilled workers prior to the curriculum change. 
It is another example of a well- intentioned shift in strategy, which was inadequately tested 
before implementation, by government officials who were rather detached from industry.
As competition increased for scarce jobs at all levels following ESAP, pressure appeared for 
higher levels of certification from workers who had seen their prospects of retaining 
employment, or of promotion decline. In response, BTC introduced the Higher National 
Diploma (HND) in 1996. The engineering department at UZ was also in the process of 
developing a new master’s programme in manufacturing systems and operations 
management. This was also partly in response to recommendations from industry for more 
appropriate training.
Competition for jobs has also had the opposite impact. As employers attempted to get more 
skills for less pay, they assigned higher grade tasks to workers with lower qualifications. 
According to the Registrar of Skilled Workers, this led to class 1 or 2 skilled workers (the 
higher grades) seeking re-registration at the lower class 3 to secure employment.38 Firms then 
expected the workers to work at the higher skills levels but for class 3 pay.
Capacity
There was a clear gap in staffing capacity between the university and the other organisations. 
All professional staff at the university had higher degrees. Only three of 34 lecturers in the 
mechanical engineering department at BTC had even undergraduate qualifications.39 
Similarly, while almost all the staff at the UZ department had over 5 years' experience in the 
department, this was only true of four staff members at BTC. Localisation had been achieved 
fairly successfully in both cases. In 1986,50 percent of UZ and 32 percent of BTC staff were
37 Interview with GTZ advisor, 4 July, 1996.
38 Interview 28 July, 1996.
39 Similar information was not supplied for the VTC.
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expatriates. By 1996, these figures had fallen to 22 percent and 11 percent respectively.
One of the main problems experienced by most technical education organisations was their 
ability to retain skilled staff. Initiatives were mooted at NAMACO to use ZIMDEF funds 
to subsidise salaries, as well as to provide housing and car loans.40 Nonetheless, under 
ESAP, staff vacancies at technical and vocational colleges fell from 29 percent in 1990 to 2 
percent by 1993, but increased again to 7 percent by 1995.41 These changes were more to do 
with reassigning posts, than a reflection of demand for the courses. For example, in 1993, 
vacancies in mechnical engineering were still at 17 percent. They had mostly disappeared 
by 1995.
The HRDP Evaluation Report raised doubts about staff quality. For example "in some cases, 
lecturers were teaching a level only slightly below their own qualification" (p.5). Concerns 
were also expressed in the HRDP about the quality of instructors' training at the Gweru 
College. Quality was also subject to a constant barrage of criticism from industry. Most 
firms were not prepared, however, to employ their own trainers to develop their skilled 
workers.
A GTZ project had supported three training centres, but no finance was made available to 
replace the donor's funding, which was withdrawn in 1995/96. Budgets became so tight, that 
even out of order photocopiers could not be repaired.
One way of assessing the quality of the training would have been to assess pass rates at 
different institutions. There were data availability problems, however.
An example of the problems in moving ahead with training development in the changing 
social environment in Zimbabwe is given the Foundry Training Centre. This case study 
neatly encapsulates the nature of the underlying difficulties42.
40 See NAMACO's end of year report 1994.
41 See Munetsi and Simango (1994:18) Table 12 and Statistics on Tertiary Education (MHE, 1995).
42 See appendix 7.1
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7.5 UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ORGANISATIONS - CAPACITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS
7.5.1 Introduction
Bargaining over wages and conditions of service takes place at the sectoral level, so the 
organisations dealing with the engineering industry are the focus of analysis. In this case, 
however, the sectoral organisations were considerably weaker than the national ones. 
Therefore the analysis is set in the context of changes taking place at the national level.
7.5.2 Labour Relations: The Evolving Institutional Framework
This section examines the structure of labour relations in the engineering sector, against a 
background of recent changes in legislation and regulations, as well as how both of these 
changed labour relations in practice. Given the increased frequency of firms reducing their 
labour force under ESAP, particular attention is paid to retrenchment regulations. A picture 
emerges of a government reluctant to let go of its central role in labour relations matters and, 
in addition, a lack of capacity in the non-government organisations. In practice, however, 
government had lost most of its ability to influence events, as shown by its hesitation and 
inability to intervene effectively to prevent firms from closing, or to save jobs.
Three organisations are the focus of attention. These are the national union, the National 
Engineering Workers Union (NEWU), the main employers' association in the sector, the 
Engineering Employers Association of Zimbabwe (EEAZ) and the National Employment 
Council for the engineering and iron and steel industry (NEC). Wage and other negotiations 
took place between NEWU and EEAZ under the umbrella of the jointly nominated NEC. 
The NEC was responsible for assisting its members in any aspect of collective bargaining, 
or dispute resolution. Disputes that could not be resolved at industry level were referred to 
the Ministry of Labour and ultimately to the Labour Relations Tribunal (LRT).
Registered companies had to register with the NEC by law and submit regular returns on their 
number of employees. In addition, the NEC collected union dues from firms, on behalf of 
NEWU. Thus, the three organisations worked closely on a monthly basis.
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Legislative Changes: 1990 and after
The engineering industry's basic collective bargaining arrangement was changed in 1990 (see 
Chapter 4), as laid down in the industry's collective bargaining agreement.43 SI 282 set out 
detailed accords on wages Job  evaluation, conditions of employment, and the establishment 
and responsibilities of workers' committees and works councils (worker members to be 
nominated by and from the workers' committee). This included the specification of a 
maximum of 72 hours work per week (42 hours on night shifts); overtime to be paid at 150 
percent of normal rates and Sunday work at 200 percent; automatic payment of a gratuity for 
workers working for more than 10 years (reduced to five years in 1995); minimum days of 
annual leave (15 up to end of first five years and 20 thereafter); and a minimum number of 
days sick leave per year on full benefits.
After the restoration of sectoral collective bargaining, there were a number of complementary 
changes that allowed for differential labour relations arrangements across industries. These 
included changes to the regulations for employment codes of conduct (SI 379), Industries 
were allowed to agree and register a code of conduct. Codes could also be established by 
firm level works councils, which effectively meant that individual firms might choose to opt 
out of the sectoral arrangements. This was relatively rare. Only MONOPCO went this route 
among the case study firms .
The engineering industry took four years to agree on its code of conduct. This was finally 
passed as SI 57 of 1994. The code of conduct included disciplinary procedures and outlined 
procedures for various categories and severity of misconduct. Dismissal could be immediate 
for serious misconduct, otherwise various stages of procedure were to be followed. 
Misconduct included such matters as unsatisfactory work performance and indiscipline. 
Each firm had to have a disciplinary committee of equal numbers of worker and employer 
representatives. This committee considered internal appeals on disciplinary matters. Appeals 
then went on to the NEC and ultimately to the LRT.
43 Statutory Instrument (SI) 282.
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While this code was a significant move away from the government centred system in 
operation during the 1980s, most capitalists found difficulty adapting to the new regulations 
and did not perceive the change as being that significant (see below). Consequently there 
was little increase in employment flexibility. The emphasis remained on a series of specific 
procedures to be followed before dismissal, as opposed to having a system that was based 
more on options for recourse after a wrongful dismissal, such as in the UK.
Few changes were made to the LRA under the 1992 amendment. The restriction on the 
number of unions and employers' associations per industry was removed, as was the 
Minister's discretion over the setting of dues. Scope for ministerial intervention in internal 
union affairs remained considerable.
Retrenchment
In 1990, retrenchment regulations were also established These specified in great detail the 
steps to be followed and documentation required by firms wishing to retrench workers. They 
provided for the establishment of a National Retrenchment Committee, appointed by the 
Minister of Labour and including representation from government, employers and trade 
unions. Retrenchments could be handled in-company through the works council. Only if 
agreement could not be reached at that level was the matter to be referred to the National 
Committee.
In an effort to avoid bureaucratic delays, a clause in the retrenchment regulations indicated 
that if the Retrenchment Committee spent more than two weeks considering matters, the 
documents should be passed to the Minister (SI 404,1990: 2278). The Minister would then 
decide within two weeks. In 1994, the regulations were amended to allow for appeal against 
the Minister's ruling to the LRT.
The retrenchment rules suggested that retrenching should be avoided if it could be done 
"without prejudicing the efficient operation of the undertaking in which the employees 
concerned are employed", and the consequences to employees mitigated as far as possible 
(ibid.:2279). It was not clear, however, who was to take responsibility for enforcing these 
matters and how firms were to implement the regulations.
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In amendments passed in 1992, it was made more explicit that firms should try to restrict 
overtime, reassign employees, j ob-share, rotate unpaid leave and voluntary retirement, before 
retrenching. The Retrenchment Committee had to be satisfied that the employer had tried 
his best in exploring alternatives. How that satisfaction was to be arrived at was not clear, 
which left it open to reliance on the word of the employer himself.
Changes in Sectoral Practice
The legislative and regulatory changes appeared to complement ESAP's shift away from a 
more directly interventionist and directive style of governance. In practice, the change was 
less well defined.
The central role of government, rather than being reduced was altered, but essentially 
maintained. Although the Minister of Labour and the ministry no longer played a central role 
in all decision-making, the Minister still appointed the members of statutory bodies 
examining labour matters. The LRT was accused of being open to government pressure to 
prioritise cases.44 Ministerial intervention, as well as the limited capacity of the LRT, 
reportedly contributed to the fact that it became more and more bogged down in its work. 
Another contributory factor was the absence of any charge for workers bringing appeals to 
the LRT, so there was nothing to lose for those already dismissed in pursuing a claim.
Many employers suggested that dismissal procedures were still very complicated and 
problematic in practice.45 In part, this was attributed to a lack of comprehensiveness in the 
list of misconduct actions, as well as ambiguity in the wording of the code of conduct.
Among the case study firms, the most common form of labour relations dispute involved 
dismissal procedures. Six of the case study firms experienced problems with dismissals 
during the period following 1990, although none said there had been more than two or three 
such incidents. In at least half the cases, the core of the problem was incorrect following of 
procedures by the firms. None of the firms that had retrenched workers suggested that they
44 Interview with a labour relations lawyer, 17 July, 1996.
45 Various interviews.
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had major problems in making the retrenchments. It is not clear how to account for the 
difference between the experience of dismissals and retrenchment. It is most likely that in 
the latter case, there were opportunities for negotiation and a neutral framework established 
for the resolution of disputes. This was less clear in the case of dismissals, and most workers 
would end up without benefits on dismissal. Despite problems with the code of conduct, and 
despite the fact that the code was under the control of the sectoral organisations, little serious 
effort was made to improve it. This is an indicator of the weakness of the sectoral 
organisations.
The revised procedures still offered considerable protection to workers, as firms had to be 
able to demonstrate that there was just cause for dismissal. Consequently, supervisors could 
not use dismissal threats as the major means of imposing discipline among their workforce. 
Given the results of Chapter 6, firms that attempted to extort hard work from their workforce 
through threats were unlikely to be the most successful. Firm respondents indicated they 
would like to be able to dismiss at will, as was the case before 1980. This was unacceptable 
to the union. With NEWU relatively content with the present code, it was up to employers 
to organise themselves to bring about pressure for change. Yet, according to one respondent 
connected to the EEAZ, it was easier for managers and capitalists to blame others, rather than 
to take responsibility themselves for either changing the code or ensuring that existing 
procedures were properly followed. Critical explanations as to why employers' organisations 
were weak are to be found in apathy and a reluctance to get involved.
In practice, because many disputes were continually being referred to government, with its 
limited capacity, the retrenchment system was much slower than the regulations stipulated. 
Despite its lack of evident support for workers’ interests, government was still seen as a 
possible saviour, albeit as a last resort. On the occasion of large scale closures, workers and 
unions gravitated towards the Minister of Labour's offices to seek assistance. Government 
rhetoric persisted in supporting the illusion,46 but the reality that government could offer very 
little became increasingly evident.
46 See "Government told (by Mugabe) to save companies from closing", Herald, 22 June, 1996.
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7.5.3 The Evolution of National Collective Bargaining in the 1990s
The continuation of government's central role in labour relations is also revealed by its 
ostensible efforts to move to free collective bargaining after 1990. A provision existed in the 
1985 Labour Relations Act for the Minister of Labour to hold up registration of a collective 
bargaining agreement, if  he considered it to be, inter alia, "unreasonable or unfair, having 
regard to the respective rights of the parties” (GoZ, 1985:221). This allowed for either 
unions or employers to use the Minister as an escape route. The possibility of having 
recourse to government perpetuated the lack of development of capabilities among unions 
and employers' associations.
The disengagement of government from collective bargaining proceeded gradually. In 1991, 
the first year of free collective bargaining, there were still some major interventions. 
Government first convened a tri-partite meeting on 1 August, 1991 to express fears that high 
wage increases might undermine ESAP. This was already long after the negotiation process 
had started and various agreements had been reached (EMCOZ, 1993:5).
Furthermore, government produced regulations later in August 1991, indicating that wage 
increases should be effective from 1 July 1991 and indicating to whom this was to apply. In 
a commentary on this, Lloyd (1991), a lawyer and administrative officer for the EEAZ, noted 
a number of inconsistencies and problems with these regulations. He noted that the 
regulations referred to the negotiation of incomes, which he took to mean wages, salaries and 
other allowances and benefits. In a curious relic of a limited bargaining past, he attempted 
to dismiss the idea that benefits and allowances should be up for negotiation as part of the 
bargaining process.
The unions attempted to use the new-found freedom of the collective bargaining process to 
broaden its scope to include benefits. The unions lacked capacity to force this through, 
against employers who wanted to maintain the narrow wage focus. The unions received little 
support for their proposal from a "vacillating government" (Dhlakama, 1992:11). With 
arbitration still having to be referred to the Ministry of Labour, there were long delays in 
finalising agreements (EMCOZ, 1993:6).
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In 1992, despite the harsh drought, there were improvements. Government launched the 
bargaining season in May, with a meeting of the Wages and Salaries Advisory Board 
(WSAB), which set broad guidelines for wage adjustments. This resulted in a nation-wide 
call for wage restraint to save jobs, in the face of high drought induced inflation, which led 
to a significant decline in real wages (see Chapter 5). In 1993, with the economy still 
suffering the after-effects of the drought, a similar pattern was repeated. Government's 
suggestion that wage increments should remain at about half the rate of inflation was 
generally followed (EMCOZ, 1994a:5). Real wages declined again.
Following these early experiences offfee collective bargaining, the WSAB continued to meet 
on an annual basis, although its prescriptive role slowly diminished. Consequently, the range 
of collective bargaining outcomes across sectors increased, as industry-specific factors 
became more important. In 1994, when no guidelines were indicated, settlements ranged 
from 7.8 per cent in the travel goods industry to 24 percent in the tobacco and cigarette 
manufacturing business (EMCOZ, 1994a:8). Given the important role that government 
continued to play, this board could be one route to attempt to broaden the scope of the 
collective bargaining exercises. Yet, this has not happened.
In 1993, with government perhaps realising it was losing its influence in the labour sphere, 
there was talk of establishing a formal tri-partite structure to deal with labour relations.47 A 
draft revision to the LRA was circulated incorporating a proposed structure. By 1996, 
associated with the delays in developing a more general economic consultative forum (see 
above), this had not led to any formal arrangement emerging. The climate for consultation 
had improved, however, substantially as a result of joint pressure by the unions and business. 
Nonetheless, any sense of common interests across the capitalist/worker divide would be 
likely to break down, if the institutional structure were to be established.
7.5.4 Negotiating the Treatment of Workers in the Engineering Industry
The collective bargaining experience highlights many of the institutional characteristics of 
the organisations contesting the treatment of workers in the engineering industry. After a
47 See article in Horizon, August 1995.
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review of recent experiences, there is an examination of the changes in strategies, as well as 
the capacities and constraints of the union, NEWU, and the employers’ association, EEAZ.48
Weak unions and employers organisations did not have sufficient “voice”, to take the place 
of earlier government regulation. The sectoral representative organisations were weak, both 
in their ability to represent the interests of their sectors effectively, as well as in being able 
to be innovative and break away from the continuing dominant centrality of government in 
labour relations. While there was a move to market determined outcomes to collective 
bargaining, the balance of power and influence remained largely with government.
Collective Bargaining in Engineering
The annual wage negotiation process was the core of collective bargaining in the engineering 
sector. The main negotiations concerned increases in minimum wages. Lower paid workers 
formed the majority in the industry and dominated the union. Firms were concerned with 
keeping minimum wages as low as possible (see Chapter 6). The higher the grade of worker, 
the larger was the average differential above the scale minimum.
If the bargaining process was not resolved between the two negotiating parties, it was referred 
first to the Ministry of Labour and secondly to the LRT. There was a great incentive to come 
to an agreement before referral to the LRT, where decisions were frequently delayed by nine 
months or more. Many engineering sector negotiations became deadlocked during the 1990s, 
which meant that the labour relations officers in the Ministry of Labour (MoL) were often 
left to broker the outcomes of collective bargaining.
One legacy of the narrowness of the past system is that productivity and skill issues were 
consistently ignored. Prior to ESAP, given uncertainties about foreign exchange availability 
to purchase improved equipment, firms had been reluctant to commit themselves to 
productivity increases. The continuing problems besetting investment meant this did not 
change significantly after ESAP. A bad experience with a productivity agreement in the 
textile industry in 1992/93, which failed to satisfy any of the parties involved, led to other
4 0   ^ ^
The discussion in this Section draws on interviews with NEWU, EEAZ and NEC officials during 
February to July 1996.
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sectors being reluctant to follow the same path .49 With the formation of the MHE in 1988, 
training and skills development were separated from the Ministry of Labour. The MHE was 
poorly integrated with other ministries (see above), and not well disposed towards improving 
the involvement of the private sector in public policy. Consequently, consultations on skills 
and productivity took place through different channels, with NAMACO mostly having a 
technocratic focus, without participation from the trade unions (see above).
There was some encouragement from the employers’ side to reduce the bargaining scope to 
the minimum wage increase alone. They argued for this in 1991 and again in 1996, but 
NEWU resisted, insisting that a minimum increase for actual wages was essential, to avoid 
any erosion of differentials. The EEAZ representative suggested the union was the stronger 
party in the negotiations as it had a single goal, namely improved wages. Yet, the outcome 
of bargaining in .the 1990s has been a steady decline in the real wages (see Chapter 6). The 
lack of serious industrial action during 1991-1996, notwithstanding legal restrictions on 
striking (see GoZ, 1985:233-239), further undermines a view which perceives the unions as 
relatively strong.
National Engineering Workers Union
NEWU was formed in 1984 as a result of the merger of the General Engineering and Metal 
Workers Union (the pre-1980 union for general lower skilled workers) and the Zimbabwe 
Engineering, Iron and Steel Workers Union. The latter was part of the ZANU-sponsored 
post- independence effort to break down the old order and union structures.
In interviews, NEWU officials were critical of the government's failures to save jobs, or to 
provide for workers' welfare following company closures. The union still held the view that 
the key avenue in seeking redress lay in approaching the government. The LRT was seen as 
too slow and not in a position to make a substantial difference to workers' lives. In a number 
of cases, the union had approached government to assist in helping workers take over the 
firm’s assets.50 No examples were cited of success in gaining government support.
49 Interview with EEAZ official, 28 June, 1996.
50 Examples include the Industrial Manufacturing Company (1993), Zimbabwe Engineering Co. (1995) 
and WS Craster (1996).
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The immediate question that occurs is why NEWU persisted in these approaches to 
government? The answer appears to be that the union was too weak to be able to do anything 
else. The union was better able to assist in supporting workers in-house negotiations with 
management, for example regarding retrenchment. Nonetheless, the value of that support 
was questionable. Retrenchment settlements in engineering varied considerably, from 
nothing, through an industry standard of two weeks pay for every year worked,51 to flat rate 
payments of up to 6 months pay.52 While works councils had equal voting power between 
workers and management, NEWU officials considered that management was normally in the 
more powerful position. Management had all the facts at their disposal and workers often 
lacked the tools to be able to analyse their firm's financial and market position, beyond what 
they were told by management.
The union had some successes in bolstering the negotiating position of workers and assisting 
in finding an alternative to the firm's initial plans, which resulted in job saving. In the case 
of one firm, this was achieved by finding a buyer for one of a firm's operating divisions, 
which otherwise would have been closed.
The union's major reported capacity constraints were finance and skills. In response to 
declining union resources, due to the reduction in the number of workers in the industry and 
possibly a fall in membership amongst those remaining, the union increased its membership 
levy from 0.5 percent of wages to 1.0 percent of wages in 1995. Other types of fund raising 
activities were not very successful. There had been problems associated with lax financial 
controls. Skills had not been developed due in part to difficulties in funding programmes. 
In addition, the traditional approach in the union was to recruit and push people who had 
demonstrated long term commitment to the union, rather than intellect or ability. There was 
some sense that this was beginning to change during 1996, following the death of the long­
standing general secretary. Personal development programmes were being assembled for 
individual union officials. In part, the drive for this was coming from the ZCTU. Much of 
the ongoing training effort was aimed at regional and branch officials, training them in 
grievance handling, mobilisation and collective bargaining.
51 In about 47 per cent o f the recorded cases from 1991-96.
52 NEWU unpublished figures.
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One indication of the lack of union capacity at the central level, was that NEWU experienced 
serious leadership problems during the period of the fieldwork. Apart from the demise of the 
general secretary, his acting replacement was also ill for substantial periods.
A further indicator of the limited capacity was the absence of union publications, apart from 
the occasional circular. There was a lack of data collection and analysis in the union. While 
the union has a computerised membership data base, there are reasons for suggesting that it 
was not entirely reliable and up to date (see Chapter 3). Records on retrenchments were 
poorly maintained by hand. Information flowed mostly through consultations and 
discussions within union structures, from the national to the local level. Apart from the 
annual bargaining cycle, consultation was mostly ad hoc.
The most recent strategic change to improve mobilisation efforts was driven by declining 
membership. By June 1996, it was estimated that total union recruitment since the start of 
ESAP was greater than the loss due to liquidations and retrenchment. Unfortunately, there 
were no reliable data to back this up.
Engineering Employers Association o f Zimbabwe
At the end of 1995, the Association represented approximately 150 firms, or about a third of 
the manufacturing firms in the sector (see Chapter 3). This included the majority of the 
larger firms and eight of the ten case study firms. Many smaller firms were content to leave 
collective bargaining, and labour relations in general, to the larger firms. Even among the 
larger members, only a few managers in a handful of firms were at all active. Apart from 
arguments raised elsewhere that the smaller firms preferred to operate more autonomously, 
an EEAZ official suggested these firms considered they were unlikely to have much 
influence. Some firms preferred to save the membership fees, in the hope that the 
negotiations would take place in any event. For others it was the familiar collective action 
problem. They would pay the fees to support the organisation, but if the bargaining was 
taking place in any case, there seems little reason for any particular firm to actively 
participate.
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The EEAZ was a tiny organisation, with a part-time administrator and a secretary. Its 
activities were focussed on the annual cycle of negotiations. The EEAZ proposals for wage 
offers were reportedly set at a jovial and social event, in a very ad hoc manner.53 This 
became the employers' first offer. As with the union, there was a lack of information 
collected and research performed, as a basis for bargaining.
The organisation's strategic changes in the 1990s have largely been reactive to changes in 
legislation. The one significant area of increased focus has been training. The pioneer of the 
only substantial private training organisation in the engineering sector, part of the Delta 
group,54 became the President of the EEAZ in 1996, which cemented that broadening of 
focus. The EEAZ was already being consulted on a number of skills related matters, for 
example, UZ had sought its assistance in locating industrial placements for its trainees.
One of the key constraints experienced by the organisation, as with NAMACO, was the level 
of its members' staff attending meetings. Typically, they were personnel managers, who were 
still compelled to consult their employers to ratify their contributions. As a result, 
information sent to members would often not reach the most senior man in the firm. 
Although EEAZ was a membership driven organisation, this diminished the weight of the 
opinions put forward and the input into the work of the organisation.
National Employment Council
The NEC originally had a mandate to register journeymen, as well as providing support for 
and monitoring of collective bargaining and the implementation of agreements. With the 
centralisation of skills development after independence, this function passed to government. 
This left the NEC with the task of overseeing national labour relations and administering a 
medical aid fund for the industry.
53 Interview with EEAZ official, 28 June, 1996.
54 The Delta Engineering Training Centre itself had an uneasy and ambivalent relationship with the MHE, 
which makes another interesting case study (for some background reading - see Titus (1990)). There 
is insufficient space to explore this in the thesis.
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The scope of responsibilities and functions of the NEC did not change after ESAP. The only 
strategic change was to improve the management of the Secretariat, moving from a largely 
autocratic style to a more participatory style and improving the training of officials, as part 
of an effort to enhance its performance.
The organisation was answerable to both the union and employers. As such, the general 
secretary of the NEC did not consider himself empowered to do anything, except with the 
instructions of his stakeholders. He felt inhibited as he considered himself to be trapped 
between the employers and the union. Even the appointment of staff became a political 
matter. In one instance it took over a year to appoint one of the NEC's field staff.55
Government's central role was maintained, in part, due to the lack of enforcement capacity 
of the NEC. For example, firms were legally obliged to register with the NEC and to pay 
the sectorally agreed minimum wages. If a firm did not adhere to its sectoral agreements, the 
monitoring NEC could do little except refer the firm for prosecution. Given capacity 
problems within the legal system, this could take a long time. Another example is the 
practice of employing higher grade skilled workers, registered at grades below their expertise, 
as noted above. Again, the NEC had an inadequate number of designated agents to 
effectively police these negative trends in the industry.
The NECs are very sector specific as well. In the early 1990s, a forum was proposed for all 
NECs to consult with each other. This came to nothing. The organisation remained 
essentially an administrative body which was not provided with professional staff. In the 
engineering NEC, the only graduate was a woman in charge of the medical aid fund.
The organisation was in an ideal position to assume a range of additional activities to benefit 
the whole sector. These might have included coordinating skills development programmes 
(as it had done in the past), and collecting information on working conditions, wages and 
benefits in the sector on a more regular basis, to feed into the annual bargaining process. In 
1996, the NEC lacked the capacity to take on such additional responsibilities. Since the 
sectoral partners were also very weak, there was no impetus for such a change.
55 These were known as 'designated agents'.
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7.5.5 The Engineering Industry in a National Context
The same pattern was repeated at national level, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent. As noted 
above, government, lacking innovative and creative approaches to productivity improvement, 
effectively and tacitly supported the continuation of the restricted focus of collective 
bargaining on wage issues alone. The weakness of the ZCTU and EMCOZ and lack of 
significant moves to strengthen voice regulation, maintained government's prominent role. 
Nonetheless, over time there was a steady loosening of government's hold on and control 
over the bargaining system.
Zimbabwe Congress o f Trade Unions
The ZCTU was considerably broader in its scope and activities than most of its sectoral 
affiliates. It supported the latter through negotiating the macro collective bargaining 
environment, providing guidance to the sectors in collective bargaining and assisting its 
affiliates in organising to increase their membership.
After 1990, it assumed a broader focus. This included providing an independent voice in 
representing labour interests at the macro policy level. An example here was the publication 
of Beyond ESAP during 1996, as an alternative framework to government's macro-economic 
strategy. According to the Secretary General of the ZCTU, this gave the labour movement 
greater coherence and unity in its views on economic policies.56 The capacity in the sectoral 
affiliates to take the debate further is still very limited, however, which in some ways widens 
gaps between the centre (ZCTU) and the affiliates. By 1996, the primary focus of the 
affiliates, as with NEWU, was still on collective bargaining and other immediate needs of 
their members, such as support during and after retrenchment. While the outcome of debates 
on broader economic policies would impact on those areas, the affiliates lacked capacity even 
to handle their narrow remit effectively. The Secretary General identified a strong need to 
improve the skills of a broader group of trade unionists at both central and affiliate levels, in 
terms of their abilities to handle analysis and debate on a broader set of economic and social 
issues.
56 Interview, 8 July, 1996.
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In the meantime, the leadership of the ZCTU was developing its views on economic policy 
and strategising without the involvement or support of the grass roots of the union 
movement. This strategy also drove wedges between the grass roots, the affiliates and the 
ZCTU leadership.
As a result, another strategic change was an attempt to develop capacity on the shopfloor. 
The purpose of this was part to address the above needs and in part as the basis for a 
wholesale strengthening of the trade union movement. It was also associated with increasing 
pressure for a move away from the workers' committees to a shop steward system. Early 
successes were the greater development of regional and district structures. Yet, while the 
case study research indicated a high level of association between union membership and 
workers' committee membership, loyalties could still be divided. Furthermore, by 1996 this 
initiative had yet to translate into stronger affiliate unions more generally.
The ZCTU also played a supporting role to sectoral affiliates' efforts to find alternatives to 
firm closures and retrenchments. According to the ZCTU, it was frequently the Congress 
which took the lead in analysing the situation and trying to source funds to support workers 
efforts to take over company assets. In this role, the ZCTU came face to face with efforts to 
promote indigenisation. The ZCTU pursued the following line: workers are indigenous too 
and should be given a share of whatever public funds are used to support indigenisation. 
Supporting worker buy-outs was an obvious route to directing the available public funding. 
Many problems were associated with this view, however. If a company failed, was it any 
more likely that the workers would be able run it profitably than its former management? 
Why should public funds be directed in that direction in particular? Was this not a 
resurrection of the 'rescues' staged earlier and subsequently abandoned as an IDC strategy? 
This stance by the ZCTU provoked a very sharp reaction from the capitalist leaders of the 
indigenisation movement.57
Employers Confederation o f Zimbabwe
A general perception prevailed amongst survey respondents in 1996, that EMCOZ was a
57 See "AAG rounds on ZCTU over its unions threat", Herald, 9 May, 1996
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weak organisation. Affiliates charge that it was neither a useful source of comparative 
information across sub-sectors, nor did it provide sensible commentary and inputs on behalf 
of employers on draft legislation.58 It was seen to have poor quality staff, who were given 
few incentives to be effective. There was an inadequate vision of common and shared 
interests across the private sector, in particular of employers' dealings with labour, to 
effectively build and empower their umbrella organisation. In the labour sphere, given that 
firms were not confronted by a strong and powerful, unified labour movement, capitalist 
employers saw little need to develop a strong representative organisation for themselves.
Furthermore, employers' interests were frequently in conflict, especially between larger firms 
and smaller firms. The interests of EMCOZ's constituents were diverse. Uniting them under 
one strong body was consequently problematic. As economic hardship has intensified 
through the 1990s, many firms have had to spend most of their resources struggling to 
survive.
EMCOZ suffered, as did the ZIF above, from not being fully representative of its 
constituency. The construction industry left EMCOZ in the late 1980s. During 1996, groups 
of larger firms, which were still members, were meeting to discuss labour related issues 
outside of EMCOZ's structures.59 This move was ascribed to the limitations of EMCOZ's 
capacity and its lack of a sufficiently tough approach when dealing with government and the 
trade unions. While information is scanty as to exactly what constituency these breakaway 
groups represented, the fact that such meetings were taking place further weakened the 
cohesiveness of the employers' organisations, which lead to a further strengthening of 
government's role, as it became a stronger focus of interest by a greater range of competing 
groups and interests.
Nonetheless, like the ZCTU, EMCOZ processed some information for the benefit of its 
members. It was distributing regular publications and information to its affiliates. These 
included the EMCOZ Bulletin. In 1994, for example, this encouraged employers to be more 
open with their workers in providing "as much information as possible ... It is only with
58 Interview with an engineering sector representative, 25 March, 1996.
59 Notes from several interviews.
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mutual understanding and trust that agreements satisfactory to both parties can be reached" 
(1994b:7), It encouraged employers and workers to develop their negotiating skills and to 
carry out thorough research prior to negotiations. Only one case study firm, however, 
referred to EMCOZ as a useful source of information or support.
As with other organisations, the level of participation in EMCOZ was questioned by EMCOZ 
officials,60 with personnel managers, rather than managing directors typically being the ones 
to attend meetings (and probably the ones reading the circulars as well).
7.6 CONCLUSION
Successful industrial development requires a certain level of integration between strong and 
capable organisations supporting the development of industrial policy, technology, skills and 
labour relations. Such organisations should be able to coordinate the activities of public and 
private organisations and agents towards broad and well established goals, as part of an 
approved industrial strategy, or with the common goal of improving industrial development.
In Zimbabwe, none of these developments have been the focus of special effort, either by 
government, or (partly as a result thereof) by non-government agents or organisations. There 
has been too much focus of attention on the crude, ideologically driven approach to changing 
economic policy frameworks, summed up by ESAP. There has been too little attention to 
creating appropriate and strong industrial policy and supporting institutions. This has 
resulted in weak organisations both within and outside government. As is evident from a 
number of examples in this Chapter, since ESAP, government has remained at or close to the 
centre of power and decision-making in industrial issues. The precise complexion of this 
involvement has evolved, however. Furthermore, government has done little to give voice 
to, or to encourage the development of strong partner organisations. In part this has been a 
result of the fact that those in power have feared the creation of potentially powerful political 
rivals, from within both the indigenous business sector and the trade unions.
60 Interview, 27 February, 1996.
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Given both its limited capacity and more recently pressures from outside interests, such as 
the World Bank and UNIDO, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce has failed to develop 
a coherent industrial policy. Consequently, there has been neither pressure for government 
agencies to coordinate the development of state capacity oriented to industrial growth, nor 
has there been a firm base for the growth of public-private networks and institutional 
structures. Moreover, the state-led initiatives that have been established, such as training and 
technology organisations, have been beset by the usual free-rider problems, where private 
industrialists want state support, without levies and regulations.
The problems of forging effective links with the industrial capitalists has also been a result 
of problems within that class. This has incorporated two main elements. The first is an 
ambivalence towards the most desired type of state. On the one hand, capitalists want the 
state to have a limited role and not to interfere. On the other, state-subsidised training and 
intervention in favour of local industries are also desired. Such mistrust of state-led 
initiatives exists in most capitalist countries, however.
The second has resulted from the particular nature of the balance of power between different 
class forces in Zimbabwe. Private capitalists have been split into several groups and have 
experienced problems acting collectively, beyond the problems typically inhibiting business 
associations in most advanced countries. Historically, the climate of secrecy and mistrust has 
led to firms being very cautious about trusting others or allowing them to see or understand 
any aspect of their business. Moreover, since independence, many white capitalists have felt 
very distanced and isolated from any possibility of influencing policy-making. In part, this 
has resulted from racist attitudes towards the possibility of a black government developing 
sufficient capacity to run its agencies effectively.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapters divide this thesis into separate, yet related, analyses aimed at 
improving the understanding of the dynamics of industrial development in Zimbabwe. This 
has included: locating a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis; reinterpreting the 
historical development of Zimbabwean manufacturing prior to the introduction of ESAP in 
1990/91; and, examining changes within the metal engineering sector, at the level of both 
firms and relevant non-firm organisations, since 1990/91.
Overall, this thesis has utilised concepts of path dependency and institutional legacies in the 
analysis of Zimbabwean industrial development. These concepts have not been widely used 
before in empirical analyses, which lends originality to the research. The case study of the 
metal engineering sector has attempted to address a number of questions regarding the 
determinants of industrial change in Zimbabwe, under a liberalised economic environment, 
during 1990-96. Original empirical material was collected from firms and non-firm 
organisations involved in or related to industrial development in Zimbabwe during a nine 
month fieldwork period in 1995 and 1996.
The overall conclusion is that orthodox economic approaches are at best partially useful in 
understanding processes of industrial change. The findings make a strong case, that without 
better firm data collection and an improved understanding of historical contexts and 
constraints, policy shifts to promote industrial development will not have the desired results. 
Even though the research collects a better data set than previously available, it is difficult to 
draw the types of definite conclusions and recommendations presented by most 
commentators on similar questions.
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 summarise the arguments made earlier. Section 8.4 suggests a number 
of possible policy directions and other measures that might be adopted to improve future 
prospects for industrial development in Zimbabwe. In the final section, some suggestions 
are made for further research.
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8.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The thesis adopts a mixture of institutional and class-based analytical frameworks, as 
outlined in the critical review of literature contained in Chapter 2. Industrial development 
is viewed as path dependent and evolutionary. This approach is used to reject equilibrium- 
based neo-classical economic orthodoxy and its new institutional economics and new 
political economy progeny.
8.2.1 The Orthodox Underpinnings of "Structural Adjustment"
An orthodox economic framework underpins the types of economic policy shifts in typical 
structural adjustment programmes, such as the one introduced in Zimbabwe. Removing the 
market “restraints” of the UDI and post-independence era government-regulated regimes, was 
expected to lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. This was to improve, inter alia, 
the prospects for future industrial growth and development.
According to orthodoxy, market-regulated prices were expected to indicate the optimal 
allocation of resources for industrial (and all other) producers. The removal of trade 
restrictions and foreign exchange controls should have promoted exports in product lines 
where Zimbabwe had a comparative advantage. By removing labour market controls, and 
controls on other "factor" prices, including finance, raw materials and imports, inputs were 
to be used more "efficiently". This was to influence investment, technology choices and 
product mixes towards labour intensive products, as wages were considered to have been 
maintained artificially highly, and away from capital intensive products, as interest rates had 
been maintained at below market rates.
Existing industrial enterprises in the favoured sectors were to become more competitive and 
export-oriented. It was expected that transition costs might include the closure of industries 
in some product areas. For obvious reasons this was not stressed in the programme 
documentation. Furthermore, World Bank assessments in the late 1980s using domestic 
resource cost (DRC) analysis had shown that many segments of manufacturing (and 
engineering in particular) were potentially price competitive with products from abroad.
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In many new institutional economics (NIE) approaches, some of the more restrictive 
orthodox assumptions are relaxed. For example, transactions cost imply that alterations to 
product mixes and changes in technology are unlikely to be costless. Nonetheless, the market 
system as a whole is still expected to work more effectively than any other. The system will 
still tend towards functional equilibria. The process of transition may be less smooth than 
under more rigid neoclassical assumptions, but the need for ESAP type economic policy 
changes is not questioned fundamentally. Other problems with this type of approach include 
the lack of a well developed framework for its empirical application.
Given the, at best, partially useful nature of neoclassical analytical approaches, these are 
inadequate as the bases for the formulation of policies to improve the prospects for successful 
industrial development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
8.2.2 Path Dependency and Institutional Legacies
Path dependence suggests historical patterns of behaviour and interaction constrain the 
possible outcomes of shifts in policy frameworks and firm behaviour. In this research, 
changes in firms and industries are seen to proceed from economic agents' actions, either 
individually or collectively. These do not take place in a social vacuum, however, as 
assumed by orthodox economics. They are influenced and constrained by the evolution of 
production relations in any particular society. Individual and group actions are limited by 
institutional legacies, and power relations. Shifts in economic policies may lead to changes 
in firm strategies and behaviour, but themselves result from the actions of agents taken in a 
specific historically influenced, political economy setting. The consequences of exogenous 
changes for firms or industries are constrained by the pattern of evolution of those firms or 
industries and associated organisations. Regulation of economic systems by markets is not 
seen as a natural order, leading to optimal outcomes, which would emerge once artificially 
imposed impediments and restrictions are removed.
It is not clear from the above theoretical construct, why some institutional characteristics 
become legacies that limit change and others do not, and why in some cases actions taken by 
individual capitalists, workers or firms may offset apparent constraints. It is also not to be 
interpreted that the institutional legacies are the types of rigidities, which if eliminated would
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lead to free and flexible markets. This is where political economy considerations, such as 
the relationships between classes, become relevant. For example, the need for secrecy among 
the Rhodesian white community during the 1970s independence war, left a legacy of intense 
secrecy, which was compounded by the post-independence antipathy of the Zimbabwe 
government towards established private capitalists. This has acted as a more severe 
constraint than usual in capitalist societies on firms being prepared to share information 
publicly, or with other partners in the production process (for example, their workers). Such 
institutional legacies are not deterministic, however, but they may constrain change 
possiblities. Regarding secrecy, for example, one possibility might be for a strong 
government to enforce and monitor increased levels of disclosure.
The importance of various class and institutional factors can only be gleaned from a detailed 
examination of the particular history and other characteristics of a specific industrial setting. 
By the late twentieth century, capitalism has spread to virtually all parts of the globe, and at 
a most fundamental level involves a similar process leading to the majority, in order to ensure 
their social reproduction, having to sell their labour power to owners of capital. Yet, the 
manifestations and dynamism of capitalism vary considerably from nation to nation. A 
number of studies of individual industries and national industrial development refered to in 
Chapter 2, indicate the range and variety this may take. This variation leads to the need to 
understand the dynamics of particular industries in particular countries. Merely taking a 
class-based approach is no guarantee that there will be sufficient consideration given to 
relevant facts, however.1
The theoretical framework leads to a need for empirical analysis for two basic purposes. 
Firstly, the analysis is used to demonstrate that the orthodox framework, which is implicit 
in ESAP's design, is fundamentally flawed. Secondly, the analysis is used to outline a more 
convincing account of the evolution of industrial development in Zimbabwe, as well as its 
requirements. This is used below in Section 8.4 as the basis for suggestions as to how the 
policy framework could be shifted to improve the prospects for the further development of 
Zimbabwean industry.
1 This comment also applies to neoclassical analyses as well.
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8.3 ASSEMBLING A COMPOSITE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Examining the recent evolution of industral development in Zimbabwe is problematic for a 
number of reasons. At the time of the fieldwork, during 1995 and 1996, the ESAP 
programme had been in place for five years. The pace of implementation had been uneven, 
however. Adherence to the programme's design was mixed. Some components, for example 
privatisation and the reduction of the fiscal deficit, had been poorly implemented. A serious 
drought in 1992 and a less serious one in 1995 had impaired the possibility of achieving 
many of the set targets.
Nonetheless, this thesis has a broader objective than that of assembling data to demonstrate 
ESAP's ineffectiveness. It has also sought to provide a better way of understanding the 
dynamic process of changes in industrial development more generally. Assessing whether 
firms' actions improved or damaged their prospects is complex. Changing work practices or 
new investments, for example, have short term costs which may have impaired short run 
performance, yet create greater long term viability for the firm.
An effort was made to limit the impact of these problems, through detailed examination of 
particular firm histories. Using mostly original data, collected in Zimbabwe during 1995 and 
1996, the post-ES AP behaviour and performance of firms and non-firm organisations was 
examined in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. This included assessing constraints on their attempts to 
change. The assembled data would provide a useful basis for further research (see Section 
8.5).
8.3.1 Institutional Legacies and other Characteristics
The evolution of industrial development in Zimbabwe led to highly diversified firms. 
According to orthodoxy, essentially competitive industries should improve following 
liberalisation and those that are not should decline. Instead, the picture is much more 
complex. Many metal products firms have been suffering, while others within the same sub­
sectors have done relatively well. This has not been related to whether they are in tradeable 
sectors or more labour-intensive sectors.
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Since 1990, most firms have experienced increased competition from foreign entrants into 
the local market place, or from new local firms. The increased competition was initially 
perceived to be through prices. This emphasis shifted to product quality over a number of 
years. As a result, some firms changed relatively little, continuing to cut costs and hoping 
to dissuade new entrants on the basis of price. Other firms tried to introduce a range of 
changes in products, organisation, technology and training in order to improve their 
performance.2 Many of the latter firms had already begun to introduce a number of such 
changes prior to the introduction of ESAP. They have displayed patterns of behaviour which 
are more change-oriented for reasons other than liberalisation.
In general, recent efforts at change have focused more on less costly forms of change, such 
as in the organisation of production. There has been relatively little shifting of product mix 
and investment in new technology. It is not clear from our new data, however, that any 
particular types of change have been consistently associated with superior firm performance 
since ESAP. It seems clearer, however, that firms which are more prepared and able to 
consider new investment and other more dynamic changes, seem to be positioned for a more 
viable future.
Many institutional legacies have constrained firm level change. The most important are 
featured in the rest of this section. Some deal with differences between firms, including: 
differences in ownership; deficiencies in management and technical skills; and poor 
motivation of production workers. Others are more general in explaining resistance to 
change. They include: the legacy of secrecy and non-cooperation; and low levels of 
interaction with weak supporting organisations, which have not been appropriately bolstered 
through government actions. While these topics are treated discretely, there are many areas 
where they are interrelated, and mutually reinforcing.
Local versus TNC ownership
Zimbabwe's industrial structure comprises a number of TNC-owned firms, alongside a much 
larger number of private local firms, mostly in the hands of settler capitalists. Many of the
2
“Performance” here meaning not simply profitability, but contributory factors including productivity 
and product quality.
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latter remain smaller to medium-sized. There are also a number of local, publicly listed 
multi-business conglomerates, some with TNC shareholders. The case studies reveal the 
TNC affiliated firms as more ready and able to change than others. They have greater access 
to relevant examples from within their international groupings, and to technical support. 
Their international groupings tend to have well developed norms of responsiveness to 
changes in their external trading environments. These firms appear to be more suited to 
survival and development under a market-regulated regime.
Many local firms are run by individuals with relatively low level technical backgrounds and 
even more limited exposure to management, finance and business skills training. These 
'entrepreneurs' formed a class that could prosper in the past relatively closed economy, with 
limited competition, when considerations of cost efficiency, quality and timeliness of 
delivery were not of vital importance. With a more open playing field, some of these local 
capitalists are trying to learn, adapt and change to survive and grow while others are not. 
Firms belong to one or other group according to their particular histories, capabilities and 
patterns of agency. Even those which are more dynamic, face limited access to appropriate 
and useful sources of advice and support, as well as a questionable willingness to employ 
them. This results from having a limited network of potential advisers, restricted financial 
resources, and a long-standing suspicion of outsiders, especially black people and those from 
government (see below).
Lack o f management and technical skills to implement changed strategies
Even those firms which have developed appropriate strategies to respond to the changed 
economic environment, may not have had the management expertise (derived from years of 
experience, educational background, training etc.) to implement them effectively. For 
example, moving into or upgrading exporting requires marketing and sales skills. Due to 
sanctions during UDI, few firms moving into manufacturing during that era developed their 
own marketing and sales functions. Sanctions-busting exporting activities were often 
handled by middlemen. With increasingly concentrated local production leading to a lack 
of local market competitiveness, local firms generally had not developed sales and marketing 
divisions. Thie legacy added a dimension of difficulty to efforts to build exports after 1990.
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During the closed economy era, many firms exhibited high levels of inventiveness in 
producing a wide range of products, and maintaining equipment of steadily increasing age. 
Due to a lack of capital equipment replacement, however, technologies in use slipped further 
behind the international forefront from the early 1970s onwards. By the early 1990s, the 
investment required to sufficiently modernise their operations, so that firms could compete 
with new imports, was beyond many Zimbabwean firms, both technically and financially.3 
Instead, efforts to improve competitiveness and productivity frequently implied the adoption 
of poorly understood and implemented changes in organisational practice. The potentially 
more beneficial investment in, and adoption of, new technologies has been sorely lacking.
Relatively low levels of shop floor skills, and a lack of attention to their development, in 
many firms is a further legacy of Zimbabwe's past. Before independence, there was a 
national reliance on imported artisans and engineers (mostly from Europe) to provide the 
skills necessary to staff and develop Zimbabwean firms. With white workers attempting to 
secure their position as a racially identified “labour aristocracy”, policies were structured 
against training and recognition of black workers' skills. After independence, many skilled 
workers emigrated. The government took centralised control of the development of skills. 
As outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, as firms opted out of the system, this led to serious problems 
in both the volume and quality of skilled workers emerging. While the frequency of in-firm 
training has improved a little in the past few years, major concerns remain about the 
seriousness with which firms are pursuing it, the quality available through public training 
institutions and the value of, and recognition for, the skill certification process.
Poor worker motivation
Attempts to cut costs are among the most important ways in which firms attempted to deal 
with the changed economic environment. This has led to organisational changes, including 
improving the speed of the production process (for example, by reorganising the workshop), 
or reducing working capital requirements (for example, by introducing just-in-time 
production). The implementation of such changes is inhibited if workers are not motivated 
to implement the changes effectively and improve on them further. The best firms
3 The financial constraints on increasing investment after 1990 are also referred to, although not focussed 
on in Chapter's 4, 5 and 6.
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internationally do not see such changes as one-off improvements, but use them as part of a 
process of creating a more integrated workforce striving for continuous improvement in the 
performance of their firm. This requires a higher level of work motivation and commitment, 
than that exhibited by most manufacturing workers in Zimbabwe.
The reasons for this include a variety of factors. In many firms, the most important of these 
are relatively low and declining real wages for most workers and low levels of intra-firm 
respect and trust relations, partly related to a legacy of racism. The more dynamic, and less 
change constrained, firms perform better in both these categories. Not all institutional 
legacies are negative. Some of the more dynamic firms have benefited from their persistent 
payment of above-average wages. Even for these firms, however, real wages have been 
declining since 1982. The pace of that decline increased after 1990, occasioned particularly 
by the high inflation associated with the 1992 drought. This had a one-off ratchet impact, 
with no semblance of catch-up in subsequent years. The introduction of freer collective 
bargaining did nothing to change this trend. This was related both to the continuing 
intereference of a government unsupportive of workers' interests and institutionally weak 
organisations representing both employers and workers.
Respect and trust relations also vary considerably across firms. In many cases, this is a result 
of the character of the individual capitalists or managers running the firms, While the TNC 
linked firms may have adopted consultative habits from elsewhere in their international 
corporate groups, many firms have a history of having used black workers as little more than 
human “picks and shovels”, reinforcing racial and other stereotypes. These have persisted 
and continue to inhibit capitalists and managers from regarding their workers as worthy of 
being fully consulted and advised about developments in the business. The lack of trust, for 
example, means many managers consider that any revelation their firm is facing difficulties, 
is likely to drive workers to lose motivation and seek alternative employment. This is 
regardless of the fact that there has been high unemployment in Zimbabwe for many years, 
and most workers' greatest chance of secure long term employment is bound to be by 
assisting in ensuring the long term future viability of their current employer. Workers 
suffering losses in real income, however, have problems identifying themselves with firms 
towards which they feel no loyalty, and which they consider do not respect them.
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Secrecy and non-cooperativeness
Another constraint on change, common to most private firms in Zimbabwe, is a lack of 
willingness to cooperate, assist or share information with other local firms, or supporting 
organisations (whether part of the government system or not). This is related to a legacy of 
secrecy and the political and class history of Zimbabwe. It inhibits the effectiveness of 
organisations trying to support industrial and trade activities. While it might be questioned 
why this might be important, one of the lessons to emerge from the late industrialisers is that 
there are few examples of individual firms achieving major industrial success, without 
significant local support through private-private networks, and through public-private 
networks (see Chapter 2).
This institutional characteristic is due to a number of factors. Secrecy campaigns of the 
1970s left a lasting hangover in terms of the negative attitude towards any form of 
collaboration with outsiders. Moreover, the post-UDI era saw very close collaboration 
between a particular group of white capitalists and government to evade sanctions, as the 
whole formal economy was put on a war footing. This changed rapidly following 
independence. While the new government did little to actively oppose the settler capitalists, 
the atmosphere in Zimbabwe was one of considerable mutual distrust and misunderstanding 
between the previously dominant class and those now in government. This prohibited close 
relationships from re-emerging after 1980. Even during 1996, when this research was being 
conducted, this extreme suspicion persisted for many of those interviewed in both private and 
public sectors.
'Weak' supporting institutions
The high levels of distrust and suspicion had a negative impact on the effectiveness of 
various organisations intended to support industrial development. Generally government, or 
quasi-government agencies designed to support training, technology development, export 
promotion or investment face problems in carrying out their mandates if their clients are 
resistent to getting involved with them. The Zimbabwe government's post-1980 rhetorical 
antipathy towards private enterprise led to many officials within its agencies being 
unmotivated and/or unaware of how to re-orient themselves under the changed environment
313
of the 1990s. Few examples were provided of how to forge closer linkages with capitalists 
and managers in the private sector. While government promised more open policy 
consultation between itself and other social interests, most of government's actions between 
1990 and 1996 belied any suggestion that such consultations were being viewed as serious 
policy influences. An increasingly acceptable facade deflected pressure, while substantive 
decision-making remained the servant of a very small cadre of politicians and senior public 
officials.
The lack of an agreed industrial policy, together with the orthodox framework underpinning 
the macro policies being followed under ESAP, meant that government focussed its 
promotional efforts on creating new SMEs, rather than attempting to assist already 
established larger firms to prosper and generate growth in employment and output. The 
attention paid to developing supporting institutions for these firms was therefore limited.4
Weaknesses of organisations supporting industrial development are both prompted and 
illustrated by the difficulties and delays in achieving agreement on an industrial policy 
statement. These reflect: a lack of capacity and experience in the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce; the conceptual inconsistency of attempting to forge a coherent and coordinated 
industrial strategy in the face of ESAP's macro-framework; and, fragmentation within 
government. The latter leaves most of those agencies directly involved with supporting 
industrial development, with remarkably limited influence on macro policy formulation.
While most of the above weaknesses are common to a number of developing countries, 
additional problems faced by supporting organisations in Zimbabwe have included internal 
divisions between various capitalist representative groups. Most recently, this has been seen 
with the rise of indigenous business groups, which, in the short term, have interests conflict 
with those of the older more established representative bodies. The indigenous groups were 
formed mostly by those well-connected to the political elite, seeking to pursue strategies for 
their own benefit, rather than to exert pressure on government to improve conditions for 
capitalists more generally under a national development programme (see 8.3 below). 
Consequently, the already limited influence of the established organisations representing
4 Not that those supporting SMEs have performed particularly impressively either.
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merchant and industrial capital, has been further weakened.
8.3.2 Overall Assessment of Industrial Development under ESAP
Assessing the impact of ESAP on industrial development is very complicated (see Chapter 
2). Before-and-after analyses, counterfactual construction and cross country comparative 
analyses, all have serious problems. Consequently, the emphasis in this thesis has been to 
establish whether the post-ESAP changes in Zimbabwean industrial development per se, 
conform with the expectations of ESAP's architects and congruent currents within economic 
orthodoxy, or whether alternative approaches could provide a more satisfactory method for 
understanding the patterns of change.
Overall, the process of industrial development and the development of the engineering sector 
in particular, have not deepened since the introduction of ESAP. Notwithstanding problems 
over the definition of the boundaries of manufacturing in Zimbabwe, there has been 
relatively little new or even replacement industrial investment, and consequently an absence 
of technological improvement. A number of large enterprises have failed, some to be re­
opened with much of their asset value and employment depleted. The sector's productive 
capacity and share of manufacturing GDP have both declined (see Chapter 4).
Nonetheless, some firms exhibited considerable dynamism. The reasons are mostly related 
to structural and behavioural factors which enable particular firms to overcome many of the 
institutional legacies identified above. These might include: affiliation with TNCs; higher 
skills of the workers; and more positive attitudes of respect and trust by capitalists and 
managers towards their workforce. In general, the more dynamic firms, and those investing 
more, are those with established historical experience of such behaviour. Such characteristics 
do not, however, determine success. Firms' behaviour and performance can change and 
fluctuate rapidly due to external or internal events (for example, a particular member of the 
management team that has led such processes may leave).
The complexity of the determinants of individual firm performance does, however, 
resoundingly confirm the rejection of the simplistic behavioural assumptions that underlie 
the ESAP approaches. Static price based analyses of competitiveness, while possibly
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influencing whether new products can be introduced at a particular time, appear to have little 
to do with the dynamic efficiency of already existing firms. For example, opportunities for 
capturing economies of scale and scope could be achieved with sufficient investment and 
expertise to enable firms to expand their sales and product ranges through the penetration of 
export markets. Yet, it is in precisely these areas that most firms in Zimbabwe are lacking, 
and therefore failing.
The removal of virtually all previous mechanisms supporting the firms, including export 
subsidies, and domestic protection, has left Zimbabwean firms relying very much on their 
own resources. Substitute supporting measures rely more heavily on institutional interaction 
(for example, through the export promotion agency, ZimTrade), than earlier trade and fiscal 
policies. Given legacies of social fragmentation, racial antagonism and secrecy, such 
measures have proven far less successful. The same legacies also militate against routine 
policy impact by pressure from particular firms, either directly or through their representative 
bodies.
The ESAP policy framework, with the associated difficulty in developing an active or 
coherent industrial strategy, has assisted in maintaining the weakness of potentially 
supportive organisations, as indicated above. Organisations which are not aware of how to 
be more proactive in the more open economic environment, also lack capacity and are not 
integrated into a national industrial development drive.
In essence under ESAP, therefore, firms have been expected to transform themselves into 
dynamically efficient organisations which are able to compete with firms receiving much 
more state support in other countries. These other firms may have already accumulated 
significant expertise in producing for international markets; have captured economies of 
scale, scope and speed; and, in many cases only developed on the basis of strong support 
from experienced, skilled and well embedded institutions within their own countries. A 
national industrial development strategy is unlikely to be successful at the macro level, in the 
present era, if it is built on waiting for individual firms and capitalists to become winners, 
without any broader mechanisms of support.
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8.3.3 Political Economy and Social Relations
Zimbabwean industrial development suffers from a dislocation of interest between those 
owning most of the productive industrial capital and those formulating the policies that affect 
industry. The disjunction between economic and political power since independence 
explains the lack of coherence and uneveness in industrial policy making during the 1980s. 
This has persisted into the 1990s. The indication in the late 1980s that industrial capitalists 
were gaining a stronger hand in influencing the shape of government policy was an illusion 
arising from a concurrence between their lobbying and an internal shift in governmental 
interests which led to a shift away from the centralised policies of the earlier pre and post­
independence eras.
Those accumulating most in the post-ESAP era have developed into an indigenous class 
comprising those close to, and including, those in political power. Their pursuit of industrial 
interests has mostly been through redistibutive strategies, focussed on existing productive 
assets, rather than investing in new manufacturing ventures. For these strategies to be 
successful, it was important that no other classes were able to maintain or develop strong 
political influence. Consequently, any organisations which have threatened their new found 
influence and political directions, including both those representative of existing industrial 
capitalists, as well as the trade unions, have had to be marginalised.
Although this has been portrayed in the Zimbabwean media as a racial issue, it is not. The 
race card has been used as a way of giving the campaign some popular credibility. In the 
1990s, many black Zimbabweans have attempted to become industrial or merchant capitalists 
and play important roles in other classes' representative organisations. They have run the risk 
of being branded “Uncle Toms” in the process. Equally, others, striving to become 
successful capitalists in their own right, have not managed to gain support from either the 
existing institutional structures, or the politically favoured indigenisation structures. These 
actors, challenging both established capital and emergent capital, have been the least 
successful.
Recently, however, there have been indications that, in order to continue to improve the value 
of their assets, some indigenous capitalists have become more dynamic in their behaviour.
317
This has included lobbying government to introduce programmes which are more directly 
supportive of national industrial growth and dynamism, rather than their own particular 
money-making ventures.
At the same time, many of the established white capitalists, especially those of settler origin, 
have not seen a secure future in Zimbabwe, and have been hesitant to invest their earnings 
in existing ventures, preferring to pursue capital flight and other strategies to spirit their 
accumulated earnings out of the country and away from the prying eyes of the hostile 
authorities. Consequently, many locally owned businesses have not undertaken serious 
improvements in their productivity and competitiveness.
Nonetheless, the influence of the established industrial capitalist class could still have a 
policy impact. For example, widespread corporate lobbying, led by the CZI, led to revisions 
to the tariff structure in 1996/97. A great deal of time and commitment from a number of 
industrialists eventually pressured government to accept, in principle, the reintroduction of 
some measure of protection for many local manufacturers. Due to the weaknesses of both 
the representative organisations and government counterparts, following this acceptance it 
took considerably longer for the review to be implemented.
The indigenisation groups made some headway through their divisive campagins. By the 
mid-1990s a number of their leaders were established on the boards and committees of 
power. Over time, they appear to have interests more and more in line with those of the 
already established capitalist class. The recent appointment of a number of prominent white 
capitalists to the boards of firms being taken over by indigenous interests heralds a change 
in Zimbabwe's social dynamics. At its most positive, this may lead to the building of more 
solid relationships between government and larger groups of capitalists, once more.
8.4 FUTURE PROSPECTS AND POLICY OPTIONS
Where is Zimbabwean industry headed? What could be done now to attempt an alternative 
approach to the process of revitalising the manufacturing sector and giving it significantly 
improved prospects for future growth and development?
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There are two complementary ways of approaching these questions. One is to look at 
relevant examples from elsewhere, to see what lessons could be adapted and applied. The 
second is to suggest ways that Zimbabwe could possibly evolve more positively in the future 
by extrapolating from the empirical analysis carried out in this thesis, given the political 
economic realities.
8.4.1 "Globalisation" and Asian lessons
There are many problems with the globalisation thesis, not least is the highly questionnable 
evidence that it is happening at all (see Chapter 2). With the implication that government 
action can do very little to promote competitive industries, it becomes an excuse for 
inactivity. If globalisation is not happening, and its supposed symptoms are merely a 
reflection of the increased international penetration of capitalism, then the policy implications 
fall away. The need for government organisations and class alliances committed to national 
industrial development, to play effective supporting roles in the face of highly competitive 
world markets, becomes all the stronger.
An alternative view is prescribed by those who attribute the success of Asian industrialisation 
to the key positive role played by efficient government organisations, in varying degrees of 
alliance with the nations' large-scale capitalists (see Chapter 2). The main recommendation 
is for a strong focus on developing capable and proactive public organisations. Policies 
should maximise the long term potential competitive advantage of local industries, using 
whatever means seems most appropriate.
A great deal of debate has occurred about the applicability of such examples to Africa. One 
of the main problems seems to be that the conditions for close collaboration between public 
and private organisations are dependent on the class relations existing within a particular 
society. As outlined above, the current state of these relations in Zimbabwe is not conducive 
to the kind of social collaboration seen in many East Asian countries. For this reason, it is 
interesting that Zimbabwe is attempting to follow a particular interpretation of the Malaysian 
experience. This includes embarking on a national visioning exercise, Vision 2020, and 
establishing a National Investment Trust to assist in transferring ownership in publicly owned 
enterprises to private black Zimbabweans. The latter is similar to activities which assisted
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in transferring much ownership in the Malaysian economy to the Bumiputra. There have also 
been many recent visits to Malaysia by the Zimbabwean head of state and other senior 
political and executive individuals, as well as the encouragement of considerable foreign 
investment from Malaysia. Nonetheless, the relevance of Malaysia is highly questionable. 
The rapid expansion of education and employment for Bumiputra by the state was among the 
most important features of the Malaysian experience (see Rasiah, 1995). In Zimbabwe, the 
direct use of state organs for employment creation has been severely curtailed since the 
introduction of ESAP. Furthermore, the Chinese community in Malaysia was relatively large 
and they were more nationally identified with Malaysia, in comparison with Zimbabwe's 
white population.
One of the key factors in most Asian countries' success was the focus on developing 
competent and efficient public sector technocrats. Zimbabwean efforts to reform and 
improve the competence of civil service staff are likely to take some time to show positive 
results. Reasons for this include: the non-elite status of civil service positions within 
Zimbabwean society; the lack of class coherence between those in the ruling party and those 
in the administration; and, the relatively poor remuneration received by senior officials. This 
is an area which should receive significant and immediate attention, since it is amenable to 
policy change. At a more fundamental level, the social dislocation between public officials 
and capitalists may be harder to resolve.
8.4.2 Developing Homegrown Approaches
This section explores the potential paths to be followed by Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is 
endowed with substantial natural resources,5 both mineral and agricultural, and has good 
tourism potential, already partially exploited. Its manufacturing sector, while developed to 
some extent, has shown considerable vulnerability over the past few years. The main 
comparative advantages behind the engineering sector, are the nation's resources of iron ore 
and coal. Yet, the requirements to enable ZISCO to be an efficient and cost effective 
integrated iron and steel producer, to provide the basis for a cohesive downstream industry, 
seem to be huge. Although the government has embarked on the refurbishment of ZISCO,
5 The local availability o f raw materials may well prove to detract from rather than enhance the 
possibilities o f dynamic growth (for example, see Auty (1994)).
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and is well advanced with plans for its partial privatisation, it is not clear whether this 
programme will be able to offer local producers cheap, good quality, steel supplies (which 
it certainly is not doing consistently at present).6
This does not mean, however, that there is no potential competitive advantage for Zimbabwe 
in downstream steel and engineering activities, building on the pool of skilled and 
experienced workers which has developed over the life of the industry to date. This then 
begs the question about how to develop the potential competitive advantage.
A number of possible complementary approaches are outlined briefly in the following 
paragraphs. This research has not been detailed or exhaustive enough to provide more than 
basic suggestions at present. Clearly, following through on any of these would require 
further research, as indicated in Section 8.5. Some of these recommendations are generally 
applicable to countries at Zimbabwe's level of development. Others, particularly those 
dealing with the consequences of Zimbawbe's institutional legacies, are more country- 
specific. In applying these recommendations more generally, the need for similar types of 
research, attempting to understand country-specific patterns of path dependence and 
institutional legacies, is paramount.
In Zimbabwe, a pre-requisite for more dynamic progress is agreement on a detailed and 
action-oriented national industrial development strategy. As shown in Chapter 7, this has 
proven particularly problematic to date. It requires greater pressure by representative groups 
of capitalists and workers on senior policy makers to accept the need for such an approach. 
At present, policy makers are not attempting to resolve the contradictions between a more 
active industrial strategy and the frameworks behind ESAP. Macro policies must be 
developed which are more supportive of productive investment, if many of the following 
recommendations are to be adopted. It is not at all clear how this might be brought about, 
when the government is committed to pleasing the major funding agencies and their 
orthodox, non-interventionist approach.
6 There has been relatively little attention paid to ZISCO in the rest of the thesis, as from most other 
firms ’ point of view, its fortunes, while potentially important if it were able to supply good quality steel 
at less than world prices, have not been critical to their survival. From the industry point of view, 
however, the potential contribution that ZISCO could make to the development of downstream 
industries could be very significant, as is attested by the role that POSCO has played in the development 
of South Korea (Rodrik, 1995:91).
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One of the key matters to be addressed in such a strategy would be the implementation of 
active policy measures to increase the rate of industrial investment, both by existing firms 
and by new entrants (both local and international). This is likely to require a more active role 
by government agencies, such as the IDC, to revitalise and lead the process. It will also 
require financial and information constraints, amongst others, to be relaxed. Other policy 
elements would focus on attempting to alleviate the various institutional legacies outlined 
above, as well as building more capable public and private institutions to support many facets 
of industrial development.
There might be scope for more concerted lobbying by the combined weight of business 
organisations and the trade unions to push through such an industrial strategy. At present, 
it is only the latter which have proposed a comprehensive alternative to the ESAP 
programme. Changes need to be made therefore, to promote the influence of the voices of 
the representative groups of various classes and social interests. Evidence that government 
is committed to taking this route would be likely to encourage existing members to become 
more active and potential members to join.
There needs to be a rapid strengthening of expertise available to government organisations 
involved with industrial development, in all spheres (trade, technology, training, etc.). 
Mechanisms need to be introduced to encourage the relevant organisations to consult and 
communicate more effectively between themselves. Should this need be accepted, stronger 
leadership and direction will be required within government to force this through.
The various organisations which will be required to implement a more active industrial 
policy approach have to develop mechanisms to ameliorate the consequences of legacies of 
social fragmentation; racial friction; and, secrecy and non-cooperation. Finding a way of 
developing a more genuine sense of national vision and purpose could assist in this. Given 
the various legacies, it will not be easy to persuade all Zimbabweans to accept that they must 
share in the growing fortunes of a more successful nation. Clear incentives need to be 
offered to firms to encourage improved performance and openness. Cheap finance, tax 
exemptions or subsidies of some kind, could be awarded for superior firm performance in 
exporting, training and productivity improvement. Over time, this could also be extended
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to the full Human Development Enterprise framework proposed by Standing (1995). Awards 
would be conditional on firms supplying certain types of information on themselves, which 
would encourage greater openness.
Workers representative bodies needs to be strengthened at industry and firm level, to increase 
their scope for meaningful participation in pressing for improved firm performance. The 
government can play an active role in this process, by, for example, financially supporting 
the unions (without dominating them politically) and strengthening public sector unions 
(either through financing them, or at least by allowing them space to organise). Unions, 
themselves, might consider bringing issues of training and productivity improvement into 
collective bargaining discussions. This has to accompany much greater emphasis on the 
education of capitalists and managers about the merits of different ways of organising and 
involving their workers in production and other decisions. This is not to suggest that there 
is one way of organising production which will always be appropriate or superior. Such a 
programme may require legislative backing. It would have to be based on discussion with 
the best firms locally. It should also take into account the need to avoid discouraging the 
majority of productive capitalists, or deter others from entering production in Zimbabwe.
The training and certification system needs to be reviewed to promote the development of 
the types of skills required most urgently. These include technical and managerial skills. 
The control of the system needs to be made more transparent. Greater encouragement and 
recognition needs to be given to public participation, in order to encourage the best and most 
senior expertise within industry to play a guiding role. Similarly, TNCs need to be 
encouraged, possibly through regulation, to share their wisdom and practices more openly, 
so that local firms can gain from their experience. This may need to be supported by 
regulation as well.
These suggestions are sketchy at present. They depend largely on the ability of government 
to achieve swift development of capacities aimed at effective management of the more 
interventionist elements. This implies the need for policy changes to be carefully phased and 
monitored, so that learning-by-doing characterises these institutions, as well as 
manufacturing firms.
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8.5 FURTHER RESEARCH
One of the key findings of this research has been the lack of reliable and good quality data 
available in Zimbabwe. Consequently, there is a critical need for better data collection and 
analysis by the appropriate Zimbabwe institutions as a pre-condition for improved industrial 
policy-making. In government, for example, these include the Central Statistical Office, 
which is already undergoing certain organisational and skills improvements, and the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce. The relatively small costs of improving data collection and 
analysis can easily be justified on the grounds of the improved incomes to be realised through 
more dynamic efficiency and growth in manufacturing.
The present research has been hampered by the difficulty of establishing a consistent 
historical picture. There is a need, therefore, for this type of very detailed case study, in- 
depth and historically based empirical research to be repeated on an ongoing basis. Surveys 
of industrial managers and workers should become routine. The research should also spread 
to other key sectors within manufacturing. The choice of organisations to conduct this 
research will need to be carefully considered, given the legacies of secrecy and suspicion.
Finally, there is a need for complementary research. This should examine those areas which 
fell outside the scope of the research in this thesis, including the impact of financial 
deregulation and institutional legacies and other constraints in the financial sector. The 
preliminary research into the less visible types of institutional legacies and evolution, 
initiated in the fieldwork, but not reported in the thesis, should also be pursued. This 
includes examination of evolving patterns of contracting, developing business norms, and 
changes in the legal framework relevant to industry.
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Appendix 3.1
ZIMBABWE: ENGINEERING SECTOR CENSUS
Questionnaire to be kept in strictest confidence Date:____________________
Name of Firm:____________ _________________  Year of Establishment_________
Postal Address:__________ ______________________________________________
Physical Address: _ _ _ ___________________________________________
Phone No.:   Fax_No.:________
Name of Respondent:  Position in Firm: ______________________
NOTE: The following questions refer to your MANUFACTURING division or operations only, except where specified. 
MANUFACTURING includes wrought iron and sh eet metal work, fabrication, assem bly and refurbishment.
It d o es not include repair, m aintenance or distribution activities.
1 Indicate the main ownership of your firm
[Please circle where applicable] Domestic Private [1], Govemment/Parastatal [2], Domestic Listed [3],
Foreign Private [4], Joint Venture [5], Other (specify ) [6]
2 Indicate the category that best represents your manufacturing operation
[Please circle all applicable] Production of components for assembly by third party [1]
Assembly of final product only [2]
Full sequence manufacturing operations up to final produc [3]
Production of equipment for use by other manufacturers [4]
Other (specify_______________________________ ) [5]
3 What was the value of your annual sales in .... ?
z$ Last year Two years ago Four years ago [1991]
Manufacturing Sales
Non-manufacturing Sales
[If annual sales are not known, please indicate the half year, quarter or months' sales and the period. .3
4 List Products that account for more than 10% of the value of your manufacturing sales (with their percentage of total sale
Product % of Manufacturing Sales
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
5 Which of these have been introduced as new product lines within the past four years, since 1991 ?
6 What improvements, if any, have you made to the products listed in question 4. above in the last four years? 
[Please tick for each type of improvement, which was made for each product. Where none, leave blank]
Product Quality
Improvement
Production Process 
Improvement
Marketing/Distribution
Improvement
Other
(Specify)
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
7 What product lines have you ceased producing in the past four years?
8 How much of your output in value terms did you export in the last full year?
[Please circle where applicable] 0% 1-10% 11-25% 26-50% 51-100%
9 How many employees (including full-time, part-time and casual) did you have on 30 September 1995?_____________
10 How many employees (including full-time, part-time and casual) did you have in 1991 ?___________ _______________
11 How many apprentices do you employ at present?____________________________________________ _______________
12 What percentage of your present workforce holds a technical (engineering) or metal-working qualification?
[Please circle where applicable] 0% 1-5% 6-10% 11-20% over 20%
13 How many qualified graduate engineers do you employ at present?_____________________________ _______________
14 Do you have a separate ....
In-house maintenance unit or department? Yes [1] No [2]
Quality control unit or department? Yes [1] No [2]
345
15 Do you use any ....
Numerically controlled (NC) machinery in production?
Computer numerically controlled [CNC] machinery in production?
16 Do you carry out any computer aided design [CAD] in-house?
17 Regarding the plant or production line machinery currently in use in your firm ....
How old is the oldest piece? [years]
How old is the youngest piece? [years]
When did you last purchase new/secondhand equipment? [date]
Yes [1] No [2]
Yes [1] No [2]
Yes [1] No [2]
18 What new technology in production have you introduced in the last 4 years?
[Please circle all applicable] None [0], Computerisation [1], Line automation [2], Automated machinery linkages [3]
New Production Machinery [4], Other (specify ..__ .. .  .) [5]
19 Where do you source the production technology you are using?
[Please circle all applicable] Foreign Parent Company [1], Foreign Equipment Supplier [2], Local Equipment Supplier [:
Copying [4], Develop in-house [5], Other (specify________________________________ ) [6]
20 What changes have you made in the way production work is organised in the last 4 years?
[Please circle all applicable] No Changes [0]
Reorganised layout in workshop(s)/factory(ies) [1]
Introduced/extended “just-in-time" inventory reduction [2]
Introduced quality-at-source/quality task forces [3]
Introduced continuous efforts to improve productivity/layou [4]
Expanded worker-management communication [5]
introducedfmcreased shift work [6]
Other (specify_________________________________   ) [7]
21 What percentage of your workers and artisans belong to a recognised trade union? Which one?
[Please circle where applicable] 0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 75-100% Name:____ ____________________
22 Do you have a workers'committee in operation at your plant? Yes[1] No [2]
23 Does the firm's management belong to an employers' association? Ves [ 1] No [2]
Name of Association(s):___ _____________________________
Please comment on your present major constraints and problems [add extra sheets if required]
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND ASSISTANCE.
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Appendix 3.4
ZIMBABWE: ENGINEERING SECTOR DETAILED STUDY 
Employee Survey
Interviewer ______________ Date
code [ _Name of Firm 
Gender Male [0] Female [1]
JOB TITLE code
Work
1 How many years ago did you join the firm?
2 What was your first job title in this firm?
3 What were you doing immediately before joining?
School [1], Unemployed [2], Working for another firm at the same level [3],
Working for another firm at lower level [4], Other [specify_______________
a. If [2], was your first job after school with this firm?
4 What is your present status?
Casual [1], Contract [2], Permanent [3], Probationary [4]
5 What was your initial status?
Casual [1], Contract [2], Permanent [3], Probationary [4], Don't know [99]
6 How many hours did you work PER DAY last month on average?
7 Did you have days off in the last three months when you were sick and you were paid?
a. if yes, how many? I I
8 Do you perform the same tasks every day?
9 Do you work in a shift?
years I
- ] [ 5 ]
Yes [1 J/No [0]
|___________ hours I
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0]
10 How has the number of tasks you are required to do per hour on average changed during the past year?
increased [1], decreased [0], no change [3], don't know [99] j ~
* 11 Have you worked more as part of a team in the past year, than before?
Education and Training
12 How many years were you in full-time education?
13 What is your highest educational qualification?
None [0] A 'levels [3] Degree [6]
Primary leaving [1] Vocational School [4] Other [specify _
O' levels [2] Polytechnic [5]
14 Which of the following did you learn in school?
Science [1] Technical Drawing [3] Computing [5]
Metal-working [2] Technology [4] None[0]
15 What training did you get after leaving school before taking up work?
None[0], Vocational [1], Other [specify_______________________
Yes [1 ]/No [0]
yearsj
.][7]
J[2]
16 What training have you had since you started with this firm?_______ TICK ALL THAT APPLY
Basic Educational T11
On-the-job \2]
Short term in-house course f3l
Short term external course |41
Apprenticeship f5l
Longer term external course T6l
Sponsored Degree [71
Professional qualification f8j
17 If you put [2] - On-the-job, in 16 above:
a. Who was teaching you?
worker at same level [1], worker at next level [2], artisan [3] 
technician [4], supervisor [5]
367
b. Did you have an evaluation or test? Y es [1]/No [0]
days/weeks
18 If you put any of the courses [3], [4], or [6], in 16 above:
a. Over what period did the most recent course take place?
b. Was it full-time [1] or part-time [2]?
c. Did anyone explain why you were going on the course before it started? Yes [1]/No [0]
d. Did anyone ask you what you had gotten out of it afterwards? Yes f 11/No fOI
e. Who was teaching you? I
In-house trainers [1], line managers or supervisors [2], public training establishment [3], 
private training establishment[4], consultants [5], other [specify_________________ ] [6]
f. Did you have an evaluation or test? Yes [1]/No [0]
19 Did you have an annual, performance review in the last year? Yes [1]/No [0]
a. If yes, did you discuss training at the review? Yes [1]/No [0]
b. Did you then do the training discussed? Yes[1]/No[0]
20 Have you ever had a request for training turned down? Yes [1]/No [0]
21 In the last five years, have you ever asked to be given a different job in the company? Yes [1]/No [0]
a. If yes, did you get the job you asked for? Yes[1]/No[0]
22 In the last three years, have you learned any new skills, which you now use? Yes p11/No fOI
a. If yes, what? computers [1], new production machinery [2], new technology [3\ 
new maintenance practices [4], new quality control practices [5], 
other [specify ]  [6]
Work History and Remuneration
23 Have you ever been unemployed?
a. If yes, how many times?
b. In total, how long have you been unemployed, since leaving school?
24 Why did you leave your previous job?
Retrenched [1], Better wage offer [2], Dissatisfied with work [3], 
Disagreement with bosses [4], Otherfspecify________________
Yes rn/No roi
months/years
. 7 / 5 /
25 Are you paid per day or week or month?
Daily [1], Weekly [2], Monthly [3]
26 What was your basic wage/salary when you started with the company, or in 1991, whichever was more recent?
a. BEFORE deductions
b. AFTER deductions?
27 What is your present basic wage/salary BEFORE deductions?
28 How much overtime did you earn per month, on average, during the last three months?
Gl
* 29 What other benefits do you get in cash?
13th cheque [1], medical aid [2], pension [3], otherfspecify.
a. What is their approximate total monetary value per month?
* 30 What other benefits do you get which are not in cash?
transport[1], education [2], housing [3], otherfspecify____
J  [4]
][4]
31 What is your present take-home basic wage/salary after deductions?
32 Have you had a headache while at work in the last three months?
33 If female, what period of full-pay maternity leave do you get, if any?
34 How many days paid holiday do you get per year?
35 Do you get time off for family funerals?
a. Is this taken from your annual leave?
b. How many family funerals did you go to on working days in the last 6 months?
36 If you have a problem at home, do you talk to anyone in the company about it?
Who?
37 Have you ever had an advance on your salary?
a. What was the maximum advance or amount of credit given to you?
b. Was the amount repaid larger than the original sum advanced?
H.
Yes [1]/No [0]
I weeks/months!
days I
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes f 11/No [01
Yes [1 ]/No [0]
Yes f 11/No fOI 
[$
Yes [1]/No [0]
38 Has anyone outside the company given you money for tasks you have done for them in the last year?
Yes [1]/No [0]
a. If yes, what for?___________________________________________________________________
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* 39 Do you do something for yourself outside the company, which gives you income?
a. if yes, what?  ____________________________________________
Y es [1]/No [0]
General
40 Are you a member of a trade union?
a. If no, have you ever been a member of a trade union?
41 Are you a member of a workers committee?
a. If no, have you ever been a member of a workers committee?
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1 ]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0]
42 Have you ever been asked for your opinion about new technology or new ways of organising your work?
Yes [13/No [0]
a. How and when?___________________________________________________________________
43 Have you ever been asked to give your ideas for what the company should do in the future? Yes [1]/No [0]
a. How and when? ____ ______
44 How do you learn about the company's plans?
Don't [0], Staff Circular [1], General Meeting [2], Workers'Committee [3]t 
other [specify___________________________________________ ]  [4]
45 Do you receive information on a regular basis o n  ?
a. Work accidents/injuries
b. Labour productivity
c. Labour costs
d. Sales
e. Other Financial Information
46 When you go to the production manager's office are you offered a chair?
47 Do you share a toilet with your supervisor?
48 Do you share a toilet with managers?
49 If you have a problem at work, do you talk to anyone at work about it?
a. If yes, who? _______________________________________________
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1 ]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [ 1 ]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0]
50 Does the production manager know your name?
* 51 Have you ever discussed your views [even if different] with your manager/supervisor, on:
a. pay
b. working hours
c. promotion
d. training
e. health and safety
52 How many breaks from work do you get during the day?
53 What form of refreshments are you provided with for free during the day?
Food-snack [1] Food - lunch [2] Drinks [3] None[0]
54 Do you have a company canteen with food cheaper than that available outside?
55 When you achieve a new production record, are there on-duty celebrations?
56 At your company, is there a ... ? I
Worker of the month [1 ], worker of the year [2], nothing [0], don't know [99], 
other [specify___________________________________________ ]  [3]
* 57 Have any suggestions you have made for changing the production process ever been used? Yes [1]/No [0]
* 58 Have you ever been given a reward for contributing an idea for changing the production process?
Yes [1]/No [0]
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes [1]/No [0]
59 Have you ever been given a reward for long service?
[give examples]* 60 Have you ever taken part'in any kind of industrial action? 
a. If yes, what form did that take?
Strike [1], Demonstration [2], Work to rule [3], Other [specify___
61 Have you taken part in a company sport or social activity in the last year?
62 Do you have access to incoming telephone messages during the day?
Routinely [1] Emergencies only [2] Not at all [0]
Yes [1]/No [0] 
Yes rn/No roi
]
Yes [1]/No [0]
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63 How many accidents involving injury to workers have there been at your work place in the last year?
64 What is the best thing that ever happened to you in the company?
65 What do you like best about working in the company?
66 If you could change anything about your working conditions, what would you change?
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Appendix 3.5
ORGANISATIONS SURVEYED
Government
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC)
Ministry of Labour (MoL)
Ministry of Finance (Monitoring and Implementation Unit (MIU) - responsible for ESAP) 
Public Service Commission (PSC)
Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and National Cooperatives (MNA)
Quasi-Government Organisations
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)
Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Corporation (ZISCO)
Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC)
ZimTrade
Employers and Representative Organisations
Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry (CZI)
Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC)
Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC)
Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ)
Engineering Employers' Association of Zimbabwe (EEAZ)
Steel Association 
Institute of Foundrymen
Labour Organisations
National Employment Council for the Engineering and Iron and Steel Industry (NEC) 
National Engineering Workers Union (NEWU)
Zimbabwe Confederaion of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
Training Organisations
Ministry of Higher Education (MHE)
University of Zimbabwe, Mechanical Engineering Department 
National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Industrial Engineering Dept. 
Bulawayo Polytechnic/Westgate Vocational Training Centre (public sector organisations) 
Delta Engineering Training Centre (private sector training organisation)
ZIMDEF (National Manpower Development Fund)
Zimbabwe Institution of Engineers (ZIE)
National Manpower Advisory Council (NAMACO)
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Scientific and Technical Organisations
Science and Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC) 
Standards Association of Zimbabwe (SAZ)
Production Organisation Institutions
Price Waterhouse 
Independent consultants
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Appendix 3.6
ZIMBABWE INDUSTRY STUDY: ORGANISATIONAL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Name of Organisation _________________[code   ] Date
Name of Respondent ________________ [code______ ] Position in Organisation
History
When was your organisation founded? ____________
What was its original name? ____________
What was its original mandate? _____________________________________
When did it change its name to the present one? ____________
Why? _____________________________________________________
Is it an organisation with members? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
Data Collection and Production
What information do you collect on a regular basis?
What do you do with the information? [store, process, analyse, disseminate]
What publications do you distribute regularly?
How often? ______________________________________________________________
On average, what percentage of the data you collect is used in your publications? ______ %
How has this changed over the last five years? _________________________
Are they for members only? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
If not, do you get revenue from the sale of those not for members? Yes [1]/No [0]
Do you carry out or sponsor research? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
If yes, what? _______________________________________________________________
What do you do with the findings from the research?
Linkages
The following questions concern those you and your management team know who are useful to you in carrying out your
H o w  m a n y  a r e  
u se fu l t o  y o u ?
H o w  o f t e n  a r e  y o u  in 
c o n t a c t  w ith  t h e m  
o n  a v e r a g e ?
Users of your services - companies
Users of your services - individuals
Providing similar services as you in Zimbabwe
Providing different services in Zimbabwe
Providing similar services as you abroad
Providing different services as you abroad
Organisations training professionals and technicians
Civil servants
Politicians
Financial donors
Technical Cooperatinq Partners
NGOs
List the three organisations to which you are most responsive
(I)__________
(ii)____________
( H i ) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
List the three organisations which are most responsive to you
<i)____________
00__________
0 ")________________
Where are there communication and coordination deficiencies and why?
What have attempts have you made to overcome these problems in the past five years?
Constituent Groups
TICK WHERE APPLICABLE Often Sometimes Rarely
Executive decision
Selective consultation with members
Open voting
Ad hoc
Other [specify 1
List the three sub-groups among your constituents th£^ r^  most influentiai on your programmes
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Capacity
What problems, if any, do you have in carrying out your main functions?
What actions are you taking to address these?
Does recruitment take place on an open and competitive basis? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
is performance considered in deciding on the following rewards for staff...
Salary Yes[1]/No[0]
Bonuses Yes[1]/No[0]
Promotion Yes[1]/No[0]
To what extent are the following the key motivating rewards for staff?
Performance based Not [0], Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
Increased autonomy/empowerment Not [0], Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
Personal recognition Notfoj, Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
Professional identity/shared norms Not £0], Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
Do staff have annual reviews at which training is discussed? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
Do staff have annual reviews at which career plans are discussed? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
What have been the principal types of training used in the last year?
Apart from training, what else have you done in the past 5 years to improve the quality of work of your staff?
Are your salary scales flexible enough to attract your desired levels of qualifications and experience Yes [1]/No [0] 
To what extent are roles and responsibilities clearly defined within your organisation?
Not [OJ, Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
To what extent are people held accountable for the implementation of decisions taken within the organisation?
Not [0], Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
To what extent are staff encouraged to use their initiative, innovate and take risks?
Not[0], Slightly [1], Reasonably [2], Greatly [3], Principally[4]
Organisational Strategy
Do you have a plan that guides your operations? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
IF YES, PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
Is it any of the following? [tick all that apply]
Annual [1] Multi-year [2] Rolling [3]
Which of the following does it deal with, if any? [tick all that apply]
Investment [1] Recruitment [2] Training [3] Organisational changes [4] Marketing [7]
Financial Objectives [8] Other [specify.
Who of the following are consulted in its preparation? [tick all that apply]
Members [1], Professional Staff [2], Non-Professional Staff [3], Managers [4], Other [specify________________
Once prepared, how is it communicated?
It is not [0], membership or client circular [1 ], Other [specify______________________ ]
IF NO, PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:
How do you set your strategy?_______________________________________________________________________
How often is it reviewed?
6 monthly [1] Annually [2] Ad hoc [3]
Who of the following are consulted in its preparation? [tick all that apply]
Members [1], Professional Staff [2], Non-Professional Staff [3], Managers [4], Other [specify________________
Once prepared, how is it communicated?
It is not [01, membership or client circular [11, Other [specify_______________________]
IN EITHER CASE
List the main three changes in your STRATEGY in the past five years? [Include changes in goals, objectives, focus e.
0 ) _______________________________________________
0 0 _________________________________________________________________________
(iii) ________________________________________________________
When did you introduce the changes?
(i) ______________
0 0 ___________________
0»)___________________
What was the principal cause of each of the changes?
(') _______________________________________________
0 0 _________________________________________________________________________
0»)_________________________________________________________________________
What were the critical successs factors in ensuring achievement?
(i) __________________________________________________
0 0 _______________________________________
(iii)__________________________________________________
How often is progress checked against the plan?
0) _______________________________
0 0 ________________________________________________
(iii)_____________________________________________
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What have been the major outcomes of each of the changes [quantify benefits, where possible]?
(i) _______________________________________________________________
(ii ) ___________________________________________________ ____________
(iii )_______________________________________________________________
What problems, if any, have you experienced in implementing each strategy?
(i) _______________________________________________________________
(ii ) _______________________________________________________________
(iii )_______________________________________________________________
Organisational Attributes
Rate your organisation on the following criteria 
Flexible 1 2
Teamwork 1 2
Participatory management 2
Clear/shared vision/goals 2
Accountable to constituents 2
Timely decisions 1 2
Effectiveness
Have you had any performance audits or evaluations in the past five years? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
If yes, how often?________________
What was the scope of the most recent?_______________________________________________
Why?__________________________________________________________________
Did it assess cost-effectiveness of your operations? Yes [1 ]/No [0]
What were its three main findings?
(i )_______________________________________________________________
(ii )_______________________________________________________________
(iii) _______________________________________________________________
What changes were subsequently introduced as a result?
(i )_______________________________________________________________
(ii ) _______________________________________________________________
(iii) _______________________________________________________________
3 4 5 Rigid
3 4 5 Individual work
3 4 5 Autocratic
3 4 5 Lack of vision/goals
3 4 5 Autonomous
3 4 5 Slow decision makii
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Appendix 3.7
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
The following list is necessarily incomplete, but indicates most of the respondents from 
outside the surveyed firms.
Name Organisation Position
Mr. Jaya Bulawayo Technical College Vice Principal and ex-head of 
Mechanical Engineering Dept.
George Makings Conciliation and Arbitration Centre Lawyer
Much Masunda Conciliation and Arbitration Centre Director
David Parirenyatwa CSO Deputy Director
Ms. Mufakose CSO Industrial Sector
Mr. Taruvinga CSO Industrial Sector
John Deary CZI Ex-President
Farai Zizhou CZI Senior Economist
Joe Foroma CZI Chief Executive
Jim Wadhams Delta Engineering Training Centre/ 
EEAZ
Head/President
David Tarinike DETC Trainer
TG Mushambi EMCOZ Consultant
Lloyd Mutandi EMCOZ Executive Director
Patrick Lloyd Engineering Employers Association 
of Zimbabwe
Administrative Assistant
Joseph Muzulu Finhold Chief Economist
Mr. Newn Foundries Association Mashonaland Branch Chairman
Mrs. Behr GTZ Head of Office
Mr. Metzke GTZ Training Advisor
Mr. Monyawarara 1DC Deputy Director
Benson Zwizwai IDS-UZ Researcher
Brian Raftopoulos IDS-UZ Deputy Director
Jacob Kalyati IDS -UZ Researcher
Lloyd Sachikonye IDS-UZ Director
Torkel Alfthan ILO/SAMAT Training Specialist
Peter Peek ILO/SAMAT Director
Roland Offord Institution of Engineers Chief Executive
Mr. Bhunu Labour Relations Tribunal Deputy Chairman
Brian Holloran Labour Relations Tribunal Member
Mrs TC Mudzi Ministry of Higher Education Deputy Director - Research
CG Chivanda Ministry of Higher Education Deputy Director - Manpower 
Planning
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Appendix 4.1
EXAMINING ZIMBABWE DATA - ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
The main text discusses the problems of making assessments of dynamic change in industry 
on the basis of any conventional sectoral data, however accurate it might be. It is also 
important to recognise the limitations of the data, as produced by the CSO.
What is Manufacturing?
The definition of what is manufacturing and what is not is rather fuzzy at the boundaries. For 
example, in Zimbabwe:
"all supplementary [mining] operations, such as drilling, breaking, milling, 
cleaning and grading, and establishments operating on a mining site as 
refineries/smelters of non-ferrous or precious metals, are included in this 
division. ... Excluded however are mines and quarries operated by 
manufacturers as a source of their raw materials, such as limestone mines 
operated by cement manufacturers. These form part of the manufacturing 
industries. ".1
Changing the definitions can make a significant difference to the shares of mining and 
manufacturing. It has been estimated, for example, that including processed nickel, copper 
and tin in 'manufacturing' would have increased its gross output by 3 percent in 1982 
(UNIDO, 1985:22). In addition, some recorded agricultural products are actually processed, 
such as cotton lint and refined sugar (UNIDO, 1987:9).
Thus, there is limited utility in using these national income accounting ratios for comparison 
purposes and basing explanations of economic performance on them. Their arbitrariness may 
lead to spurious conclusions being drawn.
1 See Central Statistical Office, Census o f Industrial Production 1988/89 (p.i)
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Unfortunately, the way that data are aggregated in the Census of Industrial Production and 
the Quarterly Digest of Statistics are aggregated does not facilitate an unbundling of the 
various sub-sectors to reassess the figures on the basis of alternate definitions. It is clear, 
however, that a significant percentage of the manufacturing output is produced by sectors 
which are very close to domestic primary production. These include agricultural based 
products like slaughtered meat, milled grain, and some basic dairy products. Basic textile 
processing includes the production of cotton lint. Sawn wood is also included as a 
manufactured item. Even where such products are correctly allocated, the value added in 
vertically integrated operations may be applied to the wrong sector.2
Census o f Industrial Production
In liaising with the CSO to obtain case study firm data, it became apparent that there were 
a number of problems with the compilation of the Census of Industrial Production, which is 
the source of information for manufacturing's contribution to GDP. These include: records 
found to be missing for certain companies for a number of years and being imputed at 
average growth rates; firms producing across different industrial sectors having all their 
output entered into the sector in which over 50 percent of their output falls; companies which 
manufacture less than half their sales being excluded from the census; and, new firms being 
missed for several years after they come into operation. In 1981, it was estimated that over 
4 percent of total gross output was incorrectly classified, and in 'metals and metal products' 
(section 9 of the national breakdown) the 'correct' figure was 3.5 percent lower than that 
published (UNIDO, 1985:25-26).
Industry> and Trade Data
Production of nickel, copper and other metals, apart from ferro-alloys and iron and steel are 
not included in the CSOs definition of manufacturing. The CSO figures are not entirely 
reliable, as the basis for their calculations changed twice during the period. The CSO in 
Zimbabwe were unable to assist in reconciling historical trade to production data, as the 
commodity categorisations for production data uses the ISIC codes, while the trade data uses
2
See Fine and Rustomjee (1996) chapter 4, for similar arguments.
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the SITC codes.
It is not entirely clear what accounted for the rapid increase in gross output and value added 
recorded by the census of production between 1987 and 1989. Zisco's own figures for sales 
as submitted to the CSO (confidentially) account for less than a quarter of the total figures 
quoted for iron and steel gross output over the period. It seems in part a price effect. 
Between 1987 and 1988, the volume of ingots and billets exports declined by 8 percent, 
while the value increased by 50 percent, but this increase still only accounts for around 10 
percent of the total increase in the value of iron and steel gross output. Ferro-alloy exports 
account for much of the rest. The volume and value changes from 1987-88 were -9 percent 
and +38 percent respectively. Unfortunately the export figures for 1989 were not produced 
by the CSO.3 Apart from these problems, published figures can only provide a rough guide, 
as the payments for exports may not necessarily have been recorded at exactly the time the 
exports occurred.
The analysis in Chapter 4 is based on the assumption that the available data are a reasonably 
reliable guide. Yet the data problems should not be forgotten and the conclusions not 
interpreted as definitive.
2
Possibly this was due to the impossibility of reconciling them sensibly.
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Appendix 6.1
CASE STUDY FIRMS AND THEIR SECTOR: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
This Appendix provides data on case study firm performance.
Labour productivity
Productivity can be measured in a number of ways. In this case, both gross output per worker 
and measures for value added per worker are examined. Given the increasing uncertainty 
about the data as one subtracts costs away from sales figures, the more reliable data available 
are for gross output per worker.
Ideally, these figures should be calculated on the basis of productivity per hour worked, 
including overtime. This information was only available for 1996, however. It could be 
argued that the figures should be calculated for production workers rather than total workers. 
Yet, sales, marketing, administration and corporate management are also instrumental to the 
fortunes of the firms, so the figures shown are for total workers.
The figures quoted below give changes from one point in time to another. Yet, the figures 
for the firms for specific years are in a sense arbitrary, as the levels of gross output per 
worker fluctuate from year to year. By varying by a year either way the pattern may be very 
different. For example, the average change for a firm between 1981 and 1990 may be quite 
different from that between 1980 and 1989. Given data across the firms are not always 
available for the same year, comparisons of rates of change should not be taken as 
unambiguous indicators of firm performance. Data are not available for sufficient 
consecutive years to base the analysis on moving averages.
Furthermore, increases in productivity are not unambiguous. They could be a result of: 
increased automation through new investment; increased worker effort, associated with 
increased capacity utilisation; a more streamlined organisation; or, they could be reflecting 
retrenchments. Some reasons for these differing patterns are examined in Chapter 6 .
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Table A6.1 ■ Changes in Gross Output per Worker 1980s and 1990s
Firm/
Z$'000 per
annum
ri990pricesl
STATIC
CO
SAND
CO
RENE
wco
QUAL
CO
DELA
YCO
PLAS
TICO
‘MON
OPCO
Engineering
Total
Fabricated
Metal
Products
Gross Output/ 
Worker 1980/81
73.8 34.0 152.4 66.41 52.2' 161.4 48.3 37.9
Gross Output/ 
Worker 1989/90
15.82 57.8 21.8 206.5 54.43 33.0 300.14 58.04 45.14
Gross Output/ 
Worker 1994/95
18.7 62.5 14.3 175.3 42.7 46.7 232.9 57.3s 46.1s
1980s change 
per annum [%1
-1.8 -4.8 3.4 -2.2 -5.6 6.4 2.1 2.0
1990's change 
per annum F%1
5.8 1.6 -8.1 -3.2 -5.8 7.2 -6.1 -5.06
Notes: 1 - Figures are for 1981/82; 2 - 1991/92; 3 - 1990/91; 4 - 1990; 5 - 1993; 6 - Average from ES Census results
Source: survey data and CSO, Census o f Industrial Production (various)
Comparing these firms’ figures with those for the engineering sector as a whole, while gross 
output per worker fluctuated widely during the 1980s, by 1990 it had effectively increased 
by an average of 2.1 percent per annum over the decade, about the same growth rate as that 
for the fabricated metals sub-sector. From the ES Census, the 1990s were worse, with an 
average decline of 5 percent per annum. During the period as a whole, the average value of 
gross output per worker and the average changes for the case study firms were in the middle 
of wide variations seen among the sample firms.
In general, the changes to value added per worker are worse.1 While the record of decline 
during the 1980s is similar to the gross output picture, only MONOPCO showed an increase 
in this indicator. At absolute levels, QUALCO and MONOPCO are again the leading 
performers, but in this case, MONOPCO starts to lose some of its advantage in the 1990s.
1 For the purposes of the comparison with sectoral data, net output is used as a proxy for value added. It 
is also a more reliable guide, as the data available for payments for services varies across the sample. The 
broad patterns of change are similar, however.
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It is interesting to note that only QUALCO and to a lesser extent SANDCO follow the 
sectoral trend of a decline during the 1980s and an increase in the 1990s. The firms with the 
highest productivity levels, QUALCO and MONOPCO, are also unsurprisingly, the firms 
with the lowest ratios here. With less workers producing more each, the firms require a 
lower share of their output to meet their wage bill. On the other hand, a firm like 
RENEWCO, which has seen falling productivity thoughout, has correspondingly seen an 
increase in the share of gross output accounted for by non-material input costs. Some of the 
large swings in this ratio may be more due to data problems than reflective of real changes.
Profit data is treated with great scepticism and not used to any great extent in the research. 
Profitability, is difficult to estimate accurately from the firm information provided. Some 
firms, for example SANDCO, appear to be making losses. Yet, they are paying corporate 
tax. On the other hand, firms like STATICCO and DELAYCO appear to be paying little or 
no tax and, on first assessment, to be making substantial profits.
Table A6.4 - Changes in Gross Profit/Total Revenue 1980s and 1990s
Firm/
percentage
STATIC
CO
SAND
CO
RENEW
CO
QUALC
O
DELAY
CO
PLASTICO MONOP
CO
1980/81 33.0 ii:4 20.0 9.51 59.31 31.1
1989/90 27.12 -4.23 9.2 7.7 8.93 32.7 26.64
1994/95 10.7 -7.9 -6.5 23.4 10.9 13.1 12.2
Notes: 1 - Figures are for 1981/82; 2 - 1991/92; 3 - 1990/91; 4 - 1990; 
Source: survey data
Table A6.4 suggests that, with the exception of SANDCO, those firms with faster growing 
productivity in the 1990s, namely STATICCO, QUALCO and PLASTICO are also those 
where profitability remains higher in 1994/95.3
Overall, it is clear that the days of easy profits made at the end of the UDI era are over. Some 
companies were still able to achieve gross profit margins of over 25 percent just prior to the 
introduction of the changes in economic policies in 1990/91. By 1994/95, with the exception 
of QUALCO, firms were struggling to get margins of little over half that value.
3 It looks as though the 1989/90 figure for firm QUALCO was something of an anomaly. By 1991/92 the
profit ratio had already recovered to 17.8 per cent.
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Other firm performance indicators
An area where there is considerable commonality of experience is in stockholding. Contrary 
to the efforts of management in many firms to reduce stock levels to lower working capital 
costs, in the high interest rate environment, this has not been seen in many firms during the 
early 1990s. Most of the managers interviewed were of the impression that their stocks had 
reduced.
Table A6.5 - Changes in Stocks/Gross Out [jut 1980s and 1990s
Firm/
percentage
STATIC
CO
SAND
CO
RENEW
CO
QUA
LCO
DELA
YCO
PLAS
TICO
MON
OPCO
Engineering
Total
Fabricated
Metal
Products®
1980/81 29.0 11.9 15.1 20.11 2.51 17.5 33.1 20.8
1989/90 8.82 18.13 19.1 15.8 20.63 13.2 10.54 29.44 18.14
1994/95 9.9 24.0 21.1 24.8 8.4 2.2 36.5
Notes; a - including non-electrical machinery; 1 - Figures are for 1981/82; 2 - 1991/92; 3 - 1990/91; 4 - 1990; 
Source: Survey data and CSO, Census o f Industrial Production (various)
Capacity utilisation is another well-established indicator of performance. Estimates of 
capacity utilisation ranged across the firms from 50 percent to 100 percent at the time of the 
survey in 1996. There was some correspondence between capacity utilisation and 
profitability, with the two firms with the lowest capacity utilisation making losses. 
Management in most firms considered that capacity utilisation had either remained the same 
or fallen over the past four years. Only in the case of firm RENEWCO, with its new 
management team shaking up the organisation, and firm YOUNGCO, which is expanding 
rapidly, was there an intimation that it may have increased.
385
Appendix 7.1
A CASE OF INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA: THE FOUNDRY TRAINING CENTRE
The case study illustrates a number of institutional characteristics which inhibited the process 
of redefining the relationships between government and the private sector, following the 
recent macro-policy changes in Zimbabwe. These included divisions within government, 
associated with a lack of clear and decisive leadership and well designated responsibilities. 
Industry was constrained financially and organisationally, in the face of collective action 
problems and the public good character of the investment. Government was not clear about 
its need to take seriously an industry representative body which seemed to lack legitimacy, 
and did not have the full commitment of some firms in the sector.
As part of the then Ministry of Industry and Technology's efforts to gear up the development 
of the capital goods sector in Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s, the permanent secretary 
acknowledged the need to support local skills development in several key industrial areas1. 
These included the foundries industry, which had suffered from both a lack of local training 
facilities and from the emigration and natural wastage of many white skilled workers. 
Improvements were required to the quality and range of products, including spares and 
machinery components. An approach was made to UNIDO in 1987 to provide advice on 
establishing a training centre for the industry.
A 1987 mission from UNIDO visited many foundries in Zimbabwe and the only facility 
which was providing any training specifically for the industry, the Bulawayo Technical 
College. The investigation found BTC offered neither adequate training, nor the possibilities 
for using its facilities to support the introduction of modem foundry technologies. It 
concluded that "it is essential ... to establish as soon as possible a Foundry Training and 
Demonstration Centre (FTDC)" (UNIDO, 1987a:7). With the majority of Zimbabwean 
foundries in Bulawayo, it was recommended that the FTDC be established at BTC. A 
Bulawayo foundry firm, F. Issels, owned by the government through the IDC, was 
recommended as a venue for on-the-job training.
1 The following account has been drawn from interviews and confidential documentation from a number 
of sources in Zimbabwe,
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The foundries industry had a representative organisation, the Zimbabwe Institute of 
Foundrymen (ZIF). Up to 1994, the ZIF operated technically as two branches (in Harare and 
Bulawayo) of the South African Institute, although functionally it was already quite 
autonomous. In that year it became fully autonomous, in response to Zimbabwean members' 
need to have a more powerful voice at the national level. The organisation was a hybrid. It 
represented sectoral business interests; assisted in maintaining professional standards in the 
industry, in improving skills and transferring technology; and, acted as a mouthpiece for the 
industry.
In 1989, the ZIF's precursor became involved in consultations between the Ministry of 
Industry and the recently formed MHE on the UNIDO recommendations, which were 
languishing. NAMACO's mechanical engineering committee considered and reconsidered 
the proposal before recommending it in 1991. Government claimed it had been inadequately 
involved in the study.2 In February 1991, the Ministry of Finance requested UNIDO to 
produce a follow-up study, with greater emphasis on a training needs analysis, and to work 
more closely with government.
As a result, UNIDO conducted a more comprehensive analysis, which became known as the 
Marshall Report (UNIDO, 1992). It found that the "major shortage of experienced and 
trained manpower at all levels in the industry [were a] major problem" (ibid.: 19). Its 
recommendations were similar to those of the earlier mission. They included: improved 
training; the introduction of new technologies, processes and equipment; and the introduction 
of quality management systems.
During the study, the BTC submitted its recommendations for the upgrading of its foundry 
training facilities to the MHE. This called for a very large direct investment, of nearly Z$ 16 
million, as against the reported cost arising from the 1987 Report's recommendations of Z$4 
million, or Z$10 million in 1991 prices. In the contemporary plans for the Scientific and 
Industrial Research and Development Centre (SIRDC), proposals were included to establish 
a foundry research and development facility. The Marshall report suggested that the 
Zimbabwean industry was too small to support two separate facilities, and proposed one
2 Though it is not clear which part of government this was.
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multi-purpose centre. The main departure from the earlier report was the recommendation 
that it "would be more effective if operated in the private sector, by foundry personnel who 
have considerable knowledge and experience in the sector." (ibid.:21).
The report stated the expectation, that with donors funding the capital costs, there would be 
sufficient possibilities for revenue generation, including government grants, to make the 
FTDC financially self-sufficient within a short period.
After the report had been submitted, the ZIF decided a feasibility study should be conducted 
to assess the costs and benefits of the proposed centre. The ZIF liaised with the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce to obtain funding. The MIC transferred the project back to the 
MHE. On consultation, the ZIF indicated its dissatisfaction with the BTC option. 
Disregarding industry's concerns, the MHE submitted the BTC expansion proposal to 
UNIDO in January 1993. UNIDO rejected the request for support.
An increasingly acrimonious competition for support of the two options ensued. By 1996, 
this had remained unresolved. Infrequent meetings were held between the two sides. 
NAMACO were unable to resolve the problem, despite recommending the ZIF option to the 
MHE. In late 1995, in spite of the apparent commitment of the head of the MHE to support 
the ZIF's proposal, MHE resubmitted the BTC expansion proposal to UNIDO. This was 
rejected again in mid-1996. UNIDO reiterated the view of the Marshall Report, that a 
foundry training centre should be autonomous from government, driven by industry's needs 
and run on a profit-making basis.
The support of the two sides for their preferred options centred around differences in 
priorities. The ZIF was highly suspicious of government's ability to adequately fund, run and 
manage the training centre. It was not ruling out government playing a role in the centre, but 
argued for a feasibility study to assess various options. In the MHE's view, the private sector 
alone would not have been able to afford the capital to establish the centre. For government 
to have assisted in mobilising funding, it should also have responsibility for running the 
centre. MHE staff suggested industry should partner government in determining the direction 
of the centre.
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Several lessons emerge from an examination of the issues. These centre on the 
organisational capabilities of the two sides, as well as their positions in the changing class 
structure underpinning Zimbabwean industry. The ZEF represented a sector with under fifty 
foundries in Zimbabwe (excluding micro and small scale operations). Many of these 
belonged to firms with other divisions. The ZEF lacked the commitment and unity necessary 
to establish a permanent secretariat. It was reported, from within the industry, that the 
Bulawayo foundries were less keen on opposing the MHE's proposals. Consequently, the ZIF 
was unable to support a lobbying campaign. It also lacked political contacts and the 
experience essential to ensure that its lobbying would be heard.
The MHE was staffed with a middle level of managers, who were the same people in place 
during the 1980s and were responsible for, or involved in, the implementation of the 
recommendations of the National Manpower Survey (see Chapter 4). As with Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce officials, they were imbued with the idea that government had to act 
in a controlling manner to transform society. The shift to ESAP introduced an implicit 
exchange of that approach for one that, at its best, proposed a genuine partnership between 
government agencies and others in society. Such a move required a major shift in approach. 
There was little evidence of such a change among middle-management at the MHE.
MHE staff actively resented being told what to do by outsiders. Industrialists' attitudes were 
perceived by ministry officials as dismissive of their experience. They, not the industrialists, 
were the training experts, and should be listened to. MHE's criticism was also aimed at the 
role of UNIDO. Even the Marshall Report excluded government's views. It was claimed the 
report "lacked an awareness of the sensitivity and clash of interests that its recommendations 
were likely to provoke".3
In conclusion, this example encapsulates some of the problems of organisational inflexibility 
noted elsewhere. It illustrates some of the difficulties of trying to introduce change in the 
face of many forces engaged in effectively promoting the preservation of existing patterns 
of interaction and decision-making.
3 Interview with MHE official, 2 July, 1996.
